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G. S. Sardesai

# **SARDESAI COMMEMORATION VOLUME**

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*This Volume was presented*

*to*

*Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, B. A.*

*on*

*1st October, 1938*

*in Bombay*

*at the hands of*

*the Hon. Mr. Justice M. R. Jayakar, M.A.,  
LL.B., Bar-at-law, LL. D.*



*As originally arranged, this Volume was to be presented to Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai on the 17th May, 1938, his 73rd birthday. For some reasons the idea had to be postponed to this date. Many hands have made our work easy and we hereby thank them all. Our thanks are due to those learned professors and scholars in particular who kindly responded to our request and contributed papers for publication and also to the Publisher who kindly shouldered the responsibility.*

*Prarthana Samaj, }  
BOMBAY 4  
1st Oct., '38.*

**B. V. Jadhav**  
*Chairman,*  
Sardesai Memorial Committee



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**SARDESAI**  
**COMMEMORATION VOLUME**



# AHMAD SHAH ABDALI'S NINTH INVASION

1766-67

BY

DR. HARI RAM GUPTA, M.A., Ph.D., Lahore

## AHMAD SHAH CROSSES THE INDUS, DECEMBER 1766

The undaunted Ahmad Shah Durrani came to India once more in November, 1766. He crossed the Indus at Attock early in December. At Behgy (Tarki, 15 miles from Rohtas ?) about ten *kos* from Rohtas on the other bank of the Jhelum, he had a fight with the Sikhs. "Ballam Singh and other Sardars who had thrown up several strong-holds and stationed strong garrisons in that country, were posted there with 7,000 or 8,000 horse. The Mussalman army charged them vigorously and caused a great slaughter, the Sikh chief being slain among the rest. A great number were taken prisoners and several drowned in the river Jhelum."<sup>1</sup>

Ahmad Shah's plan of action was this. He aimed at reaching Delhi as soon as possible without fighting the Sikhs and wanted to punish them on his return journey.<sup>2</sup> But unfortunately he was never again destined to enjoy the sight of the imperial capital which he so ardently desired to reach.

In his onward march from Rohtas, the Muslim potentates of the neighbourhood began to join the Afghan invader, and Shah Daulah of Gujrat arrived in his camp on the night of the 14th December.<sup>3</sup>

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1. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, ii-16 A. We are fortunate in possessing minute details of this invasion of Ahmad Shah in the form of numerous letters and notes written by high officials and messengers who supplied the information of the progress of the Durrani to the British Government at Calcutta. The vakil of Mir Qasim, ex-Nawab of Behar and Bengal, waited upon the Durrani at Rohtas and probably sought assistance for his master against the English, though Shah Wali Khan, the prime minister of the Abdali, assured Lord Clive in a letter dated the 8th April 1767 that they had led the expedition "for the extirpation of the ill-fated Sikhs". *Ibid.* 12 A and 284.

2. *Ibid.* 16A.

3. *C. P. C.* ii 16 A.

The advanced party of the Abdali crossed the Jhelum and the Sikh Sardars again collecting the remains of the defeated party on the other side of the Jhelum, made another attempt but with equal ill success.<sup>4</sup> The Durrani arrived at Sialkot and set out from there on the 10th December. He encamped at Ghuinki (8 miles south-west of Sialkot, on the road to Daska) and halted there for four days, and granted interviews to the Zamindars of Aurangabad, Bureseron, Gujrat and Sialkot. He levied a contribution of 1½ lakhs from them owing to several Sikhs being concealed in the neighbouring villages.<sup>5</sup>

Ahmad Shah left Ghuinki on the 15th December and stopped at Daska. There Pir Muhammad Nurak's son, waited on the Shah but the other Zamindars fled through fear. The Abdali troops pursued and brought them back prisoners.<sup>6</sup>

The Abdali stayed at Daska for two days and marched to Eminabad. On the 21st, the Shah continued his march and got as far as Fazilabad which is about 12 *kos* from Eminabad and 6 *kos* on the other side of Lahore. Subah (Sobha) Singh, Manha (Lehna) Singh, Gujar Singh, Hira Singh and Ajib Singh, who were in the city of Lahore with a body of 8,000 horse, on the approach of the Shah, abandoned the fort and town with precipitation. Gujar Singh and Lahna Singh retired to Kasur, and Hira Singh, Ajib Singh and Sobha Singh fled over to Baba Farid. Jahan Khan, Barkhurdar Khan Arzbeigi and Darwesh Ali Khan Hazarah passing over the river Ravi at Razi Ghat took possession of the city of Lahore.

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4. *Ibid.*

5. Sa'adat Khan who had a very intimate knowledge of all the country, was employed in all matters of business about the Shah's person. It was he who suggested to the Shah the levying of a contribution from the Zamindars. The latter were therefore ordered to give *muchalkas* agreeing to apprehend and despoil with every degree of severity all persons carrying the marks of a Sikh. They had accordingly engaged not to give protection to the Sikhs, and should a Sikh fall into their hands, to send him to the Shah to undergo condign punishment.

6. Shah Wali Khan, the wazir, asked them the cause of their flight; they replied that it was not their intention to run away, that the troops under Nasir Khan had marched through their country, that as it was defenceless, they had left it, but that since the arrival of the Shah, their courage was revived. Sa'adat Khan represented to the Shah that if he put any of the Zamindars to death, none would at any time afterwards come to him, and that it would be prudent therefore to quiet their apprehensions and dismiss them. In consequence of this advice Pir Muhammad and other Zamindars had mercy shown them and only three lakhs of rupees were levied from them.

AHMAD SHAH AT LAHORE

Ahmad Shah reached Lahore on the 22nd December. Here a deputation of the city fathers waited upon him and told him that Lahna Singh was a good and a sympathetic ruler. In spite of his power he made no distinction between Hindus and Mussalmans. On the festival day of *Id-u-Zuha* he bestowed turbans on the Qazis, the Muftis and the Imams of mosques and treated all the citizens with great regard. Ahmad Shah expressed his regret<sup>7</sup> and clearly realizing that less the Sikhs were thwarted the less troublesome would they be, he addressed Lahna Singh a letter offering him the governorship of Lahore together with a present of dry fruits of Kabul. The latter sent Rahmat Ullah Beg of village Modah declining the invitation on the ground that in obeying him he would fall in the eyes of his co-religionists.

Lahna Singh returned his fruits also and sent him instead a quantity of inferior kind of grain stating that the fruits were the food of the kings, while he was a poor Zamindar and lived on the grain sent to him as a sample.<sup>8</sup> Ahmad Shah stayed in Lahore for about a week and having appointed Dadan Khan, brother of Maulvi Abdullah, with Rahmat Khan Rohilla as assistant at the head of 1500 horse and foot marched towards Sirhind.<sup>9</sup>

Jasant (Charat) Singh, Jesah Singh the elder (Jassa Singh Kalal) and Hylah (Hira ?) Singh, with a body of 20,000 cavalry, were encamped at the village of Kalsah, about 35 *kos* from Lahore, and at the same distance from Beas. Tara Singh and Khushhal Singh with 6,000 horse were stationed at Taragarh, about 4 *kos* from Nichlah and 14 *kos* from Shah's camp. Ahmad Shah gave orders for a body of horse with provisions for eight days to be ready to destroy the Sikhs. Leaving behind such men as were unfit for service, and all his heavy baggage, he advanced with a chosen body of 50,000 horse, the field pieces and 7,000 *jizaris* to—(a place),<sup>10</sup> 12 *kos* on this side of Lahore. On the 27th December at a distance of about 4 *kos* beyond his camp, he detached Jahan Khan, Faiz Talab Khan, Barkhurdar Khan and Darwesh Ali Khan Hazarah, who took up their quarters at Chak (Amritsar). All the Sikhs who were there

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7. *Ali-ud-Din*, 130a.

8. Khushwaqt Rai, 129.

9. *Ali-ud-Din*, 130a.

10. " Here there is a blank in the Ms. "



retired to a distance of 10 or 12 *kos*. On the 28th, the Shah fixed his quarters at Fatahabad.<sup>11</sup> He plundered it for about half an hour and killed a few Sikhs who were in the fort. The Sikhs did not attack him but always kept at a distance of 10 or 15 *kos* from him.<sup>12</sup>

Charat Singh, Lahna Singh and other Sikhs who were in the neighbourhood of Chak, determined to attack the Shah's baggage which was near Lahore. Accordingly, they marched, and falling upon it plundered the merchants, sarrafs, etc. The Shah's brother-in-law with the Shah's family and several officers with about 4,000 horse was in the city of Lahore. Finding that the Sikhs were very strong, the Shah's brother-in-law did not venture out, but wrote to the Shah saying that the Sikhs had plundered the baggage, that they were coming against Lahore and would beseige him and his family, and requested His Majesty to return to his assistance. As soon as the Shah received this '*arzi*' he marched back and encamped on the 1st January at Mahmud Tooly close to Lahore. Upon this the Sikhs retired about 15 *kos*. They kept about 15 or 20 *kos* from him and plundered all the baggage they could lay their hands on. The Sikhs constantly harrassed Ahmad Shah and scornfully rejected all proposals of peace.<sup>13</sup>

#### JAHAN KHAN DEFEATED AT AMRITSAR

On the 17th January, Jahan Khan with a vanguard of about 15,000 horse marched, plundering the country as he went, to the neighbourhood

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11. Twenty miles S. E. of Amritsar and 4 miles W. of Beas.

12. C. P. C. ii, 36, 108 A.

13. C. P. C. ii. 108 A, ("The Raja of Chamba sent a wakil to the Sardars of the Sikhs, and Sa'adat Yar Khan of the family of Adina Beg sent them word that they should make peace with the Shah, since His Majesty had no intention of dispossessing them of their country, but was proceeding to Hindustan; that he would introduce them to His Majesty and settle what country they should cede and what sums they should pay, and that he would put them in possession of Lahore. The Sikhs abused the wakil of the Raja of Chamba and drove him out of their army. They also wrote to Sa'adat Yar Khan refusing to make peace with the Shah." *Ibid.*

On the 15th January, Ahmad Shah Durrani was in the neighbourhood of Nur-Ud-Din Kot and wrote to Khumda (Jhanda) Singh, Jesa (Jassa) Singh Gulal (Kalal) and Khushhal Singh, the chiefs of the Sikhs, to the effect that if they were desirous of entering his service, they should come and join him, but that if they had any hostile intention, they should meet him in the field. Charat Singh, Hira Singh and the other Sikh chiefs were at Chak with their forces. Two other Sikh chiefs were moving about Lahore, while small bodies of them were hovering all round the Shah's army at the distance of about 10 *kos*. *Ibid.* ii. 50.

of Chak, where Jasant (Charat) Singh, Hira Singh, Lattha (Lahna) Singh and Gujar Singh were assembled. When they heard of his approach, they met him and a warm engagement ensued for about three hours. Five or six thousand Durrani were killed and wounded, and Jahan Khan was at last obliged to retreat. As soon as the Shah heard of this, he himself marched to Jahan Khan's assistance and fell upon the Sikhs who were in the end obliged to fly towards Lahore. Ahmad Shah, leaving his baggage near Jalalabad (on the Beas) pursued them. The Sikhs attacked the baggage, but Nasir Khan Baluch, who had the care of it, routed them and pursued them in their flight towards the jungles. Jasant (Charat) Singh, Gujar Singh, and four or five other Sardars were at Chak and in the neighbouring forts with bodies of foot and artillery<sup>14</sup>.

#### THE DURRANI IN THE JULLUNDUR DOAB

Ahmad Shah crossed the river Beas the same day (17th January), probably in the evening and on the 18th marched to Shiner Theley (Suhareewal, nearly 22 miles from the Beas?) and encamped there. Rao Megh Raj, vakil to Najib-ud-Daulah; Sujan Rao, vakil to Mir Qasim; Lahori Mal, vakil to Jawahir Singh Jat and Bhim Singh, vakil to Raja Madho Singh came and paid their respects to the Shah. The vakil of Amar Singh and Himmat Singh, grandsons to Raja Alha Singh, came and made his obeisance to Ahmad Shah and presented him

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14. C. P. C. ii. 65. The news of the defeat of Ahmad Shah's troops by the Sikhs was received with a great delight by Lord Clive, the British Governor of Calcutta. A despatch written from Calcutta to the Nawab Wazir of Oudh dated the 19th February in the originals says :—"Has received his letter to Lord Clive with the papers of news enclosed. Is extremely glad to know that the Shah's progress has been impeded by the Sikhs. If they continue to cut off his supplies, and plunder his baggage, he will be ruined without fighting; and then he will either return to his country or meet with shame and disgrace. As long as he does not defeat the Sikhs or come to terms with them, he cannot penetrate into India. And neither of these events seems probable since the Sikhs have adopted such effective tactics, and since they hate the Shah on account of his destruction of Chak." C. P. C. ii, 52.

Lord Clive, in another despatch, writing to Shah Wali Khan in response to his letter flatters him and the Shah saying, "Praise be to God that through His Majesty's good fortune and the addressee's wise measures the perfidious Sikhs have met with the punishment due to their evil deeds; the fame of His Majesty's greatness has spread to the four corners of the world, and the people of God have been freed from the tyranny of the infidels". C. P. C. ii. 327.

### *Ahmad Shah Abdali's Ninth Invasion*

on behalf of his masters, with Rs. 5,000 and 2 horses as a *nazr*. To Shah Vali Khan and Jahan Khan he presented Rs. 2,000 each. The vakil of the son of Rao Kalha also came to the Shah. The Shah gave orders to all the vakils to write to their respective masters to come into the presence<sup>15</sup>.

Ahmad Shah then encamped at Nur Mahal (17 miles south of Jullundur) where he was joined by the Zamindar of Patiala (Amar Singh<sup>16</sup>) and other neighbouring Zamindars who were coming to him and settling their payments through the mediation of Shah Vali Khan<sup>17</sup>. Abdali crossed the Sutlej and halted at Machhiwara where he was again harassed by the Sikhs<sup>18</sup>.

The Sikhs gave Ahmad Shah no rest. He pursued them in all directions but to no purpose, as they always avoided an open engagement with him. They inflicted a great defeat upon Nasir Khan Baluch and the Shah was so much displeased with him that he did not grant him an interview. Ahmad Shah, marching by way of Makri, Giddah, Patiala, Banur, reached Ismailabad, 20 miles south of Ambala, where he was joined by Najib-ud-Daulah on the 9th March<sup>19</sup>.

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15. The Shah sent a letter to Najib-ud-Daulah, asking him to come with 7 years' tribute due to him and amounting to two *karores* and eighty lakhs of rupees. *Selections from Peshwas' Daftar*, xxix 119, and 165.

16. Maya Singh of S. P. D. xxix. 165, dated 2-2-1767.

17. C. P. C. ii. 79 & 139. About the poor position of Ahmad Shah one despatch says:—"The Shah's influence is confined merely to those tracts which are covered by his army. The zamindars appear in general so well effected to the Sikhs that it is usual with the latter to repair by night to the villages, where they find every refreshment. By day they retire from there and again fall to harassing the Shah's troops. If the Shah remains between the two rivers Beas and Sutlej, the Sikhs will continue to remain in the neighbourhood, but if he passes over towards Sirhind, the Sikhs will then become masters of the parts he leaves behind him." *Ibid*, 161 A.

The British Governor again expressed his opinion that if the Sikhs were afforded a little assistance by the Jats and Rohillas, it was probable that Ahmad Shah would suffer defeat and disgrace. *Ibid*. ii. 145.

18. S. P. D. xxix. 165 dated 2-2-1767.

19. C. P. C. ii. 107 C & D, 130 A, 213, 214, 234, 254, 266, 415; Delhi Chronicle, 211; Nur-ud-Din, 109 b, 110a.

#### AHMAD SHAH RETURNS HOMEWARD

In view of the opposition of Najib to the Shah's intention of approaching towards Delhi<sup>30</sup> and the Sikh ravages in the rear, Ahmad Shah decided to return and to devote his energies to the punishing of the Sikhs. Consequently, the Shah set off backward on the 17th March from Ismailabad. He encamped at Ambala on the 18th where he called upon Amar Singh to pay 9 lakhs which sum became due during the management of the Sirhind country.<sup>31</sup>

#### AMAR SINGH RECEIVES THE TITLE OF RAJA-I-RAJAGAN

Ahmad Shah then reached Sirhind and showed Najib several favours on the way.<sup>32</sup> Najib, finding the Shah so much inclined towards him, made a proposal to him for the grant of Sirhind territory to his son Zabita Khan but received no answer.<sup>33</sup> After some consideration Ahmad Shah agreed to it and Zabita Khan took possession of the fort of Sirhind. Amar Singh who owned this place was kept under surveillance by Najib-ud-Daulah. The Nawab said to Amar Singh one day, "Raja! your Patiala fort is of no consequence. I shall give you my Pathargarh fort of Najibabad which I have made so secure and strong." Amir Singh at once understood that he would be taken to Najibabad as a prisoner. He lost all heart and was despaired of his life. His grandmother Rani

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20. "It is said that the Shah, on several of the vakils representing to him the good consequences of maintaining his situation, flew into a violent rage, declared that he would move forward immediately to Delhi, and expressed the greatest astonishment that not a single zamindar had made offers of a *peshkash* since his first setting on foot this expedition against the Sikhs. Najib-ud-Daulah, on hearing this, had a private conference with Yaqub Ali Khan and Rao Meghraj, which lasted six hours. After it was over, he repaired to the presence and said, 'If Your Majesty is resolved to march to Delhi, it is well, but beyond all doubt there will be a general flight of all the inhabitants wherever you pass, and the whole country will become a desert, as already is the case in many parts of it. I have now arrived in your Majesty's presence and have attained the summit of my wishes, an interview. If your Majesty actually proceeds (to Delhi), I have one request to make; that you would first sacrifice me and then pursue your intentions'. " C. P. C. ii. 294.

21. C. P. C. ii. 310. (Najib-ud-Daulah paid two lakhs of rupees on account of the stipulated money. The Shah presented him with a Turkish horse, appointing him at the same time to the supremacy of Hindustan, and Zabita Khan to be the colleague of the Wazir Shah Wali Khan.) cf. also Delhi Chronicle, 211.

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.* 323.

Fatto, widow of Alha Singh, a very wise and diplomatic woman, visited Wazir Shah Vali Khan in private, placed her *chadar* (head covering) at his feet and appealed for the release of Amar Singh from Najib.<sup>24</sup> She also offered him a costly *nazr* (gift) together with the tribute demanded by Ahmad Shah. The Wazir persuaded the Shah to instal Amar Singh in the *faujdari* of Sirhind pointing out that he alone would be able to keep the Trans-Sutlej Sikhs out. Next morning the Shah summoned Amar Singh from the house of Najib-ud-Daulah and granted him a robe of honour (*Khila'at*), standard and kettledrum (*mahi-maratab*) and the subahdari of Sirhind accompanied by the superlative title of *Raja-i-Rajagan*.<sup>25</sup> Amar Singh is credited by Khushwaqt Rai for having secured the release of a number of captives taken by the Afghans from India.<sup>26</sup>

#### THE SHAH ENCAMPS ON THE SUTLEJ

From Sirhind Ahmad Shah marched to Machiwara Ghat on the bank of the Sutlej,<sup>27</sup> where he organized several expeditions in pursuit of the Sikhs and stayed here for about a month and a half. He despatched his troops to punish the Sikhs who had taken refuge in places difficult of access.<sup>28</sup> Just then he got the news that a large body of the Sikhs had

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24. *Hussain Shahi*, 85.

25. *Hussain Shahi*, 84-85; Khushwaqt Rai, 168; Gian Singh, 1041. The author of the *Hussain Shahi* on folio 86 further says:—"Since then to the present day which is 1798 A.D. the coin of the Shah is prevalent in the family of Amar Singh at Patiala. Whoever succeeds to the throne issues the same coin in his country and considers himself as subject of the Durrani Emperor. Amar Singh had engraved 'Amar Singh Bamizai' in his seal because Shah Vali Khan was a Bamizai Afghan," cf. *Tarikh-Ahamd*, 17.

Cunningham, 113 and Gian Singh, 1041, wrongly state that on this occasion the title of Maharaja was conferred on Amar Singh.

Gian Singh in "*Raj Khalsa*" p. 388 says that in this memory a Persian verse is still written on the coins of Patiala—

The superlative title seems to have been obtained by Amar Singh with a view to assume superiority over his brethren rulers of Nabha, Jind and other places who were trying to make themselves known as Raja by this time.

26. Khushwaqt Rai, 168.

27. A report dated the 23rd March says that the Shah lies encamped on the banks of the Sutlej. It shows that Ahmad Shah had arrived there either on the 23rd or a day or two earlier. *C. P. C.* ii. 323.

28. The Sikhs were assembling to celebrate their famous festival of Baisakhi at Chak (Amritsar). A despatch says, "The Sikhs to the number of 12,000 men, both horse and foot, all faithful to one another and equipped for war, are assembled at Chak." *C. P. C.* ii. 345.

concealed themselves in the hills of Mani-Majra, 40 miles east. The Durrani troops accompanied by Afzal Khan, the brother of Najib, fell on them and brought away many captives, men and women; but their leader was not captured. Large booty as well as captives were sold in the camp cheaply.<sup>29</sup>

#### THE SIKHS RAVAGE NAJIB'S COUNTRY

On the 11th May Ahmad Shah gave leave to Najib in view of the ill state of his health from the banks of the Sutlej. Just then the news arrived that the Sikhs, who a week ago had managed to give a slip to the Durrani troops in passing by their camp and had plundered the Sirhind country, had, leaving their families and effects in the jungle of Rohi, crossed the Jumna at Buriya Ghat and were ravaging Najib's territory, which lay utterly defenceless at that time. They had sacked Umbetah and then turned to Nanouth on the 14th May. Subsequently, they directed their attention to the Barha Sadat settlements in Muzaffarnagar. They then stormed Meerut. Najib at once approached Ahmad Shah and sought his assistance against the Sikhs. The Durrani immediately ordered Jahan Khan to punish the Sikhs. The Afghan general, taking Zabithah Khan with him, travelled by forced marches and reached Meerut (nearly 200 miles) in three days!

The Sikhs got news of it four *gharis* beforehand, and went away towards the Jumna. Those who remained behind were all killed and much plunder was taken. The Sikhs were then overtaken and engaged in a fight between Shamli and Kairanah, two important towns on the western side of the Muzaffarnagar district. The leader of the Sikhs was slain, Baghel Singh was wounded and a large number of the Sikhs were killed.<sup>31</sup> The rest fled away. Then in the same manner, the detachment returned to the halting place in the course of seven days.<sup>32</sup>

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29. Najib-ud-Daulah himself writing to Shah Alam, the Mughal Emperor, from the Shah's camp says, "The Shah marched his army to Makhawal, which is the sanctuary and fortress of these infidels; and the chastisement of this unclean tribe was begun and still continues."

—C. P. C. ii. 415. Cf. also Nur-ud-Din, 110b & C. P. C. ii. 310.

30. G. R. C. Williams in *Calcutta Review*, January 1875, p. 27 quotes from the diary of a contemporary relating to this invasion of the Sikhs—"Indeed this slave of God himself lost some property on the occasion; it was the very month of Sham-ud-Din's marriage and Sheikh Allah Yar Khan, son of Muhammad Khan attained the crown of martyrdom by the bands of the infidels."

31. 9,000 according to Miskin who was present in the campaign—Miskin, 268.

32. C. P. C. ii. 412; Nur-ud-Din, 111b-112b; Miskin, 267-68.

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### AHMAD SHAH LEAVES INDIA

Najib left the Shah from the Sutlej;<sup>33</sup> and Ahmad Shah, being oppressed by the burning heat of the Punjab plains which was daily growing and the harassing tactics of the Sikhs,<sup>34</sup> and in view of the swelling rivers of the Punjab, speedily marched from the banks of the Sutlej and by fast marches returned to his own country *via* Lahore,<sup>35</sup> thus leaving the whole country into the hands of the Sikhs.

This was the inglorious end of the last invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali. In spite of his best and constant efforts he ultimately failed in suppressing a militant people who were closely knit together by ties of race and religion, and who possessed an invincible courage and an irresistible will.

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33. ["Thereafter Ahmed Shah gave Najib leave to go, Najib came to the Sirhind district and long stayed at Mustafabad (25 miles east of Ambala), attached many parganahs of the Sikhs, and encamped on the stream of Saraswati, which is sacred to the Hindus and is dry at some places and flowing in others". Nur-ud-Din, 112b.] Najib-ud-Daulah arrived at Delhi on the 30th July where he stayed in the mansion of Shuja-ud-Daulah, *Delhi Chronicle*, 213.

34. "The Sikhs are so strong in numbers that it is impossible for the Shah to reduce them till after a long time." C. P. C. ii, 393.

35. C. P. C. ii. 377, 513, 1365.

# THE EXTINCTION OF THE NIZAMSHAHI

(A Survey of the History of the Deccan from Portuguese Sources)

BY

PANDURANGA PISSURLENCAR, K.T., M. Acad. sc. (Lisbon)

From the days of Humayun, the Portuguese statesmen viewed with growing suspicion the expansion of the Mughal power in the Deccan in view of the harm that might result to the Portuguese dominions in the East from the vicinage of the mighty Mughal power.<sup>1</sup>

According to the evidence of Fr. Fernão Guerreiro, confirmed by many other Portuguese sources,<sup>2</sup> it was the intention of the great Mughal Emperor, Akbar, to conquer the kingdoms of the Deccan and, thereafter, "Goa, Malabar and the entire kingdom of Vijayanagar."<sup>3</sup>

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1. *Vide* P. Pissurlencar, *Portugueses e Maratas*, II, pp. 68-69; Stefan Stasiak, *Les Indes Portugaises à la fin du XV siècle*; MacLagan, *The Jesuits and the Great Mogul*, p. 58. Also Diogo do Couto, in his *Década X, Part II, chap. XV*, p. 114 (Ed. of 1788) writes; ".....D. Paulo de Lima, captain of Chaul, .....was soon apprised of all these things, and comprehending fully well how much evil it would be if the Mughals set their foot in the Kingdom of Verara (Berar?); because it would be very easy for them to conquer the whole of the Deccan, sent an express messenger to Khalabat Khan with a letter.....to arrange the defence of the Kingdom of Ahmednagar,.....and that he should assemble other kings of the Deccan, and that all should join to oppose the Mughals, for, if they were to pay no heed he, as an older and more experienced captain would tell them that the Mughal would render himself master of all these Kings,.....and that he would not let any opportunity go by; and that, if for the defence of that Kingdom (of Nizam Shah of Ahmednagar) his favour.....and help were needed, he would immediately start with five hundred Portuguese."

2. *Idem.* Diogo de Couto wrote: "Akbar, the powerful King of the Mughals in the city of Agra was there and thought of conquering all the kingdoms of the Deccan, in order to make himself a greater king than Tamarlane, from whom he descended....." (*Década IX, chap. XIII*, p. 64, of 1788 edition).

3. F. Guerreiro, *Relação Anual* (of 1930 edition) p. 6.



## *The Extinction of the Nizamshahi*

With a view to offer resistance to the Mughal, the Portuguese policy was directed to form against him a defensive alliance of the Deccan Kingdoms.<sup>4</sup>

Notwithstanding the attempts made by the Portuguese statesmen to form this alliance, the Mughal Emperor, availing himself of the discord among the Deccan rulers, succeeded in annexing to his empire a part of the kingdom of Nizam Shah, including Ahmednagar, after the murder of the heroic Queen Chand Bibi who had resisted him "with the help of the Portuguese arms".<sup>5</sup>

Following the conquest of Ahmednagar, Akbar captured Burhanpur and the fortress of Asirgarh.<sup>6</sup> The fort held out stubbornly for nine months: (from April 1600 to January 1601)<sup>7</sup>. Among its defenders were seven distinguished officers who, though Muhammadan by religion, were grandsons and descendants of the Portuguese.<sup>8</sup>

With the fall of Ahmednagar the Nizamshahi sultanate did not become extinct; the able Abyssinian, Malik Ambar, and other officers of the state proclaimed the young Murtaza Nizam Shah (II) as Sultan, and transferred the capital at first to Ausa and then to the fortress of Parenda.<sup>9</sup>

It was natural that in this unequal contest the Portuguese should assist the weaker party, the defenders of the Nizamshahi kingdom against the devastating power of the Mughal. In the *Documentos Remetidos da India*, one finds, a royal letter, dated the 6th March 1605, ordering the Viceroy D. Martin Afonso de Castro "by secret means and without causing suspicion"....."to encourage Malik to defend himself and suggest Idal Khan to help him, so that they might preserve their states, and let not the generals of Akbar seize them"<sup>10</sup>."

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4. Vide Stefan Stasiak, *op. cit.*; Rev. H. Heras, *The Portuguese Alliance with the Muhammadan Kingdoms of the Deccan*, in *J. B. B. R. A. S., New Series*, Vol. 1, pp. 122-125.

5. F. Guerreiro, *cit. Relação*, p. 6.

6. V. Smith, *Akbar the Great Moghul* p. 276 and following.

7. Payne, *Akbar and the Jesuits*, p. 249.

8. F. Guerreiro, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Rev. H. Heras, in *Indian Antiquary* LIII, 1924, pp. 33-41.

9. Dr. Balkrishna, *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 60.

10. Bulhão Pato, *Documentos Remetidos da India*, Vol. 1, p. 34, doc. 8.

Akbar died in 1606. In that year a captain of the Sultan of Ahmednagar made an incursion in some villages of Bassein.<sup>11</sup> In the following year Malik Ambar conquered Junnar and made it the capital of the kingdom of Nizam Shah<sup>12</sup>.

In 1610, the capital of Nizamshahi was once again transferred to the newly built city of Khirki, near Daulatabad. The successor of Akbar, Jahangir continued the struggle with the Deccan States;<sup>13</sup> it was in the interest of the Portuguese to support the Deccan sultanates against the onrushing tide of the Mughal invasion. In a letter addressed to the Viceroy, Rui Lourenço de Tavora, the king of Portugal wrote on the 29th October, 1609.

"The Archbishop, Governor of this state, wrote to me about the conquest of the Deccan, which was something to be feared about ; for, although the Mughal Emperor showed himself a friend and was sending a new ambassador,<sup>14</sup> who was waiting, he believed that his affairs did not mean anything good, and from the place where he was up to the walls of my fortresses of the north, there was nothing to oppose him, and he only found some resistance from Adil Khan, who had sent ambassadors to Malik and Cotta Moluk, king of Masulipatam, and Venkata Naik,<sup>15</sup> that all of them may unite : however, they and all the Deccan were in great terror, and he, the Governor, had requested them all to defend themselves. And because this matter is of great importance as you know, for the Mughal is so powerful a king that, should he be in the vicinity of the said fortress, he would give them much to do and everything would run great danger. I recommend you to do all that is possible in order to unite these princes against him, helping them in all that be needful, not only to reward them for the good done on the occasion of the rebellions but also for the great advantage to this State. However, it should be done with such secrecy that the Mughal may not be apprised of it. You should rather humour him with all the possible demonstrations to preserve his friendship, understanding, so that in case you be forced

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11. Livro das Monções No. 11, p. 49 (Goa Records).

12. Brigg's Ferishta, *The History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India*, Vol. III, p. 315-320.

13. Dr. Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, 1930, p. 255.

14. The ambassador referred to by the Portuguese monarch was Mukarab Khan who was converted to Christianity receiving baptism at the convent of St. Augustin, in Goa. (Bocarro, *Decada XIII*, Vol. I, p. 354).

15. Venkata Naik of Ikiri.

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to declare yourselves for any of the parties, *it must be that of the neighbouring kings*<sup>16</sup> ”.

In another royal letter, written to the same Viceroy Rui Lourenço de Tavora, on the 11th, March, 1611, we find : “ I have also taken note of what you wrote to me about Malik, and I recommend you to maintain with him friendly intercourse, making him favours, that he may be encouraged against the Mughal ”<sup>17</sup>. The same can be concluded from another royal letter dated the 1st March, 1613, and addressed to the Viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo<sup>18</sup>.

The year 1613 witnessed a cooling of the amicable relations that had so far subsisted between the Portuguese and the Ahmednagar ruler. Hostilities broke out over some orchards at Chaul<sup>19</sup> and the Portuguese were driven to the shelter of the walls of their castles, while their country outside was devastated by the enemy<sup>20</sup>.

The Viceroy Dom Jeronimo de Azevedo, in his letter of 22nd December, 1613, writes —

“ The Mughal has achieved little or nothing in the war he wages against Malik, although he has his generals and men on the outskirts of that Kingdom. I have sent them a Hindoo of trust, Azu Naik by name, with letters and a present, offering help and favour in that war, not because I think it should be given, nor have to give, but that, being informed of it, Malik Ambar's fears may be roused and he may open negotiations for peace, to obtain which I see no other honourable way. When this Hindoo was returning with the reply the vessel he was sailing in was captured,<sup>21</sup> and he himself being a well-known person and

16. Cit. *Documentos Remetidos*, t. 1, pp. 253-254.

17. *Idem*, t. II, p. 189, Doc. 198.

18. *Ibid.*, t. II, p. 349, Doc. 331.

19. A. Bocarro, *Decada XIII*, Vol. I. p. 48 and following.

20. Royal letter of 18-12-1613 in *Documentos Remetidos da India*, II p. 463 (Doc. 396).

21. The vessel, referred to by the Viceroy, is that of Mecca, captured in August, 1613, by the Captain of the Fleet of Diu, Luis de Brito de Melo, originated the war between the Mughal Emperor Jahangir and the Portuguese, the former having in consequence given orders “ to lay hands upon the possessions of the Portuguese and vassals of His Majesty and of the persons of all who were in his hands, and numbered more than twenty..... ” (A. Bocarro, *Decada XIII*, Chap. 46, p. 200). The treaty of 7th June 1615, celebrated between the said Emperor and the Viceroy D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, brought this war to an end. (See P. Pissurlencar, *Agentes Hindus de Diplomacia Portuguesa na India*, pp. 6-7).

inhabitant of this city was arrested. Thus the business stands up to now, and I do not know what was settled by him.

"Adil Shah has often asked me to establish peace; at first I did not grant his request, because in the manner of his language, it was easy to see that he did not care for the good of this State, but rather wanted to know the state in which we were. He also wrote to me with great insistence, which was what I expected to see in this matter and through an ambassador that I had there, *sent me word about many things which being against the Mughal, it seems to me he did not dare to commit to writing*. I have replied to him that, since he insists so much, I cannot decline his offers, and thus I put the business in his hands, telling him that it is good to come to an immediate truce and suspension of arms so that the peace may be better effected.....

Adil Shah has a weak government. He keeps vicious company, but has no evil intentions against the welfare of this State, nor will he do by himself anything that may harm us, but he is under the influence of some ambitious Persians who tyrannise over all to enrich themselves."<sup>22</sup>

Writing about the settlement of peace with Nizam Shah, the Viceroy D. Jeronimo de Azevedo, informed His Majesty on the 31st December 1614 —

".....Adil Shah has continued to send word to me through his ambassador in Goa, about peace with Malik, and insisted that I should depute some one to him to negotiate and conclude peace. I kept on replying to him that for his sake I would accept his advice, and put the business in his hands, but that it was necessary that a person should come to Goa on Malik's behalf and sue for peace, for it was he who had begun the war. Seeing the duration of the war and the trouble it is giving to the inhabitants of the North, so that if it was not brought to a speedy end, they will be completely ruined and exhausted, I thought how it could be remedied and peace be brought about, without letting it be known that this State sought it. Having learnt that Adil Shah has agreed to the marriage of his daughter with the king of Masulipatam, I made haste to send congratulations to him, and in order to let him know that I was now proceeding towards the North with the fleet, I sent him an ambassador and appointed for that purpose Antonio Monteiro Corte Real, not only because he was an able man and could fulfil this task with authority and honour, but also, more particularly, because he knew how to deal with these Mahomedans and negotiate with them. I ordered him that he should

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<sup>22</sup>. 'Livro das Monções No. 12, pp. 47 v-49 v.

not in any way refer to the matter of peace with Malik, and in case he should be spoken about the same, though he had my authority to deal with that matter, when much pressed he should reply that they could write to me and that he knew that I had much good-will towards Adil Shah, and would do anything concerning him. He left in early September, was well received, and before long they spoke to him about the peace. But he told them that he had no authority, but that they could write to me; they did so, and with great insistence they requested me to order an immediate cessation of arms<sup>23</sup>. I answered to him that as long as Malik's agent should keep within his own boundaries and commit no act of hostility, I would order that on our side too the same be done, and that this suspension of arms should be for a limited time of two to three months, and as for peace, as I should be going now to the North, he should be sent to negotiate with me. However, I do not trust at all the friendship of these Mahomedans, but I pretend, for our condition is not such as to allow us to break off with all of them together....."<sup>24</sup>

Idal Khan, who is referred to in these letters, is Ibrahim Adil Shah who was, at that time, much friendly towards Malik Ambar. By the mediation of this Sultan, peace was at last made in 1615 between the Portuguese Government and the Nizam Shah<sup>25</sup>.

Malik Ambar died in May 1626. Ibrahim Adil Shah did not long survive him, he died in September 1627. We read in the Persian Chronicle, *Basatin-us-Salatin*, by Muhammad Ibrahim Zubairi, that this Sultan of Bijapur was treated, in his last illness, by a Portuguese doctor *Farmalobe* by name<sup>26</sup>, who is no other than the unfortunate

23. Confirmed by A. Bocarro who writes: "As Antonio Monteiro spoke to Adil Shah about the people who gave help to Malik, in the manner the Viceroy desired him in his order, he wished to act as an intermediary to end the war and the differences between the State and Malik; and thus, with the Viceroy's permission, sent an ambassador of his, named Kuta Khan, in company of Antonio Monteiro to Daulatabad, Malik's Court, to sue for peace, which indeed was effected, having put off defining its terms; in the meanwhile there should be a truce..." (*Decada XIII*, Vol. I, p. 305.)

24. *Livro das Monções* No. 12, pp. 164-164v.

25. See *Assento e contrato de paz e amizade com El-Rey Nizamoxá, por intervenção de El-Rey Idalxa, sendo Viso-Rey D. Jeronimo de Azevedo*. in J. Biker, *Collecção de Tratados da Índia*, t. 1, p. 192 and following; and the article in Maráthi by D. V. Apté in *शिवचरित्र-साहित्य*, Vol. IV. p. 25. The Maráthi text of this treaty, with copious notes is published in the magazine, *भारतमित्र* of Goa, Vol. VII. No. 7, pp. 130-134.

26. Varma, *History in Muhammad Nama*, in *शिवाजी-निबंधावलि*, Part 11, p. 79;

physician Fernão Lopes who, by order of the Governor Fernão Albuquerque had gone to cure him "of many old complaints".<sup>27</sup>

The political situation of the Deccan now took a different turn.

Muhammad Adil Shah succeeded his father Ibrahim Adil Shah to his vacant throne. Concerning this monarch, one reads in a *Relação dos Reis Vizinhos*, made towards the end of the year 1629 and sent to Lisbon in February of the following year<sup>28</sup>.

" It is three years that Ibrahim Adil Shah is dead, and as he was not on friendly terms with the chief Queen named Muluk Jahan, daughter of King Kutub Shah of Telangana, at the time of his death, he ordered to be put out the eyes of the heir-apparent and eldest son, named Darma Patah Shah, although he was his legitimate son by his Queen Muluk Jahan, and left the kingdom to an illegitimate son, Sultan Muhammad by name, born of the Queen Taje Sultan who was a lady of the court. This Sultan Muhammad resides in the court of Bijapur, and is about 15 to 16 years old. The kingdom is governed by a Persian, Muhammad Deamy by name, to whom has been given now the title of Mustafa Khan, and acts as Caramaluco, which is the office of Secretary of State of the King. During the time of Governor Fernão de Albuquerque, Mustafa Khan was captain of Ponda and Konkan. Inside the palace lives a certain Daulat Khan who is always about the king's person, and belongs to the caste of dealers in oil, and, although he was a musician in the time of this King's father, shows now to be a great favourite of the King as he is majordomo. The Kingdom of this Adil Shah is full of Persians, enemies of this State. And Mustafa Khan serves as Secretary and Lord of the Treasury of the State, and because Calcão does not desire to serve, as he was before, because he is an Abyssinian, and as he sees the Persians govern, he does not want to mix up with them, for they are treacherous. Only Mustafa Khan and the Daulat Khan govern between themselves the whole kingdom of Adil Shah, and, at present, there has come Shaik Medina, ambassador of Sultan Khurram, king of the Mughals, to demand the yearly tributes amounting to 900,000 pagodas, at the rate of 15 annas a pagoda, and good elephants, horses, precious stones and other things. When Adil Shah sees these

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27. See the Act of Goa Council of State of 23rd January 1631, (Hist. Arch. of India) ; P. Pissurlencar, *Contribution à l'Étude de l'Histoire de la Médecine Portugaise dans l'Inde* ; Livro dos Reis Vizinhos no 1....

28. See Livro das Monções No. 13 A. p. 239. This part was published by me with notes, in the *Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama*, No. 7.

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ambassadors of the Mughal King, he goes to receive them personally at a distance of three leagues from his court, and gives them a lodging and 4,000 pagodas a month for their expenses, because this ambassador brings in his company three hundred horsemen, and forty and odd elephants, beside foot-soldiers. And this ambassador harasses him much, and every time asks him what he likes, and he has become weary of him, being a tributary....."<sup>29</sup>

Malik Ambar was succeeded by his son Fateh Khan who continued to wage war against the Mughals, although without success. The Mughul General Khan Jahan Lodi however granted him, a respite on favourable terms.

The Sultan Murtaza Nizam Shah II, imprisoned Fateh Khan in 1629 and appointed Hamid Khan to the office of *Vizir*.

The aforementioned *Relação dos Reis Vizinhos* (1629) informs :  
".....as presently the Sultan *Khurram*, the King of the Mughals favours greatly the Nizam Shah on account of having harboured the Sultan in his kingdom when Khurram was a fugitive on account of his brother's death; he remembers of the good done by Malik Ambar, the Captain-General of

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29. See P. Pissurlencar, *A Índia em 1629*. (Relação dos Reis Vizinhos) in the *Bol. Instit. V. Gama*, No. 7.

Cf. ".....the two favourites that totally rule the kingdom and oppress it and in their power the king, a youth of some 13 or 14 years in age. Daulat Khan, one of them, is inside the palace with the King whom he holds under his thumb, and Mustafa Khan, who, from outside, as a private secretary, favourite and governor, does everything regarding the government. In their hands lies the treasury of that kingdom at war. They wage it because, (although a native of that kingdom) he is a great enemy of ours and greater still of the Christian faith, and the second is of Persian nationality, who, on this account will render himself absolute master of that kingdom and has leagued with the Mughal, making the poor King his vassal and tributary, and so subject is this King to the Mughal, that he obeys like a servant.

The Mughal ambassador (who lives in the court of Adil Shah) orders every one and even influences Adil Shah.

Therefore I think that Adil Shah and State are in a miserable condition for which I feel most and it can give us trouble, because if it be lost soon, the Mughal will make himself master of it and the Kingdom of Adil Shah. And by what Mustafa Khan does and from how he behaves one can presume that he wants to deliver this kingdom of Adil Shah in the hands of the Mughal to remain as its Governor ....."<sup>30</sup> (Letter of the Viceroy Conde de Linhares, written to His Majesty on Jan. 6, 1631, in *Livro das Monções* No. 14, pp. 197v. and 199v.)

this Kingdom ; he wages no war against Malik, and thanks him for the kindness with which he had been treated. However he orders Nizam Shah to set free Fateh Khan, son of Malik Ambar who is in prison and Zulficar Khan. Between Adil Shah and Nizam Shah there is an estrangement caused by raising to the throne the illegitimate son, waiving the right of the heir who is the brother-in-law of the Nizam Shah, brother of his wife, the Queen. The Queen requests her husband on behalf of her brother Darves, the lawful son, who had a right to the kingdom, saying that his father Ibrahim Adil Shah had done much injustice and acted unrighteously in taking out the eyes of her brother, Darves Pat Shah, who was the lawful king, and that all this Ibrahim Adil Shah did by the advice of Muhammad Mustafa Khan and of Daulat Khan, and that he should try to drive them out of that kingdom, to appoint Ekhalat Khan in their place, and to raise to the throne the son of Darves Pat Shah. But this was never done, and after this ambassadors came on either side, and made peace, and settled that both these kings should be friends, and that Adil Shah should give help to Nizam Shah against the Mughals, as they ever gave before, of 15,000 horse, all the time that the war of the Mughals lasted and in order to establish this and swear peace there came another ambassador of Nizam Shah, Mirza Abdul Fateh Khan of Persian nationality, saying that his king would be satisfied with the treaty, and that he should banish from his kingdom Muhammad Amy and Daulat Khan, Ekhalat Khan being given his office of the Lord of the Treasury of the State as before, and that the Nawab Agaraia be set free and reinstated as Secretary of State. This contract done, both the kings would be friends as before, and all this was better, and all the captains and officers were satisfied. But, as this league was against Muhammad Amy and Daulat Khan, they did not let it go ahead ; and as the King is young and weak, everything is in disorder, and moreover there are encamped twelve thousand horse of Nizam Shah on the boundaries, along the river....., 30 leagues from Bijapur, there is no news of a firm peace and the war continues."

Jahangir was succeeded by Shahjahan who, was according to Fr. Manrique "the implacable enemy of the Portuguese."<sup>30</sup>

30. See MacLagan, *op. cit.*, p. 100. To Shah Jahan is due the destruction of the Portuguese factory of Hoogli, in Bengal: "in hatred of the Christian name and in revenge of the affronts he had received from the Portuguese, who lived in the port of Hoogli, his land (soon he began to reign)" (*Livro de Assento do Conselho do Estado de 25 de Janeiro de 1933*). It is also known from a contemporary Portuguese document that "this Mughal King, for the last six or seven years, was

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## *The Extinction of the Nizamshahi*

The Viceroy Conde de Linhares sent to Lisbon, in a letter dated 10th February 1630<sup>31</sup>, the following information about the Emperor Shah Jahan and of the political state of Deccan <sup>32</sup> :

"Shah Jahan, the Mughal King who has now rebelled against his father, Jahangir, killing his eldest brother and heir to the kingdom, when he was Viceroy at Burhanpur, is in the vicinity of Nizam Shah with whom he was at war. Jahangir, having learnt that he had murdered his brother, tried by gentle means to call him to his side, but, as one guilty, he always kept himself away and chose an evil means, namely to march against his father with army of 70,000 horse, and having news of his departure he came from Lahore to Agra where he kept his treasure, but he marched with such great haste that he met his father at Delhi, with scanty forces, and there he ordered a Hindu general, named Barka Mamji, with 40,000 men to give battle to his father's army which was encamped. The general was defeated, having received a bullet which killed him.

"The news became known and all ran back where Shah Jahan was, who, without delay, on learning the death of his general, withdrew with all haste, and as every day more people came to join the King's army, he immediately sent Muhabat Khan, his Commander-in-Chief, after him who routed and forced him to fly, and fought many other battles. On account of the defeats, and compelled by evil fortune, and as every one had deserted him, Shah Jahan sought refuge in the land of a neighbouring king, a vassal of King Malik, where knowing his father's death, he sent word to Khan Jahan Lodi, a Pathan who was a general in the army of his father at Burhanpore, requesting for help in obtaining the possession of the kingdom. Lodi refused to help, saying that the generals were many and they did not want Shah Jahan to occupy the throne at Agra. Lodi however assured Shah Jahan that he would not be against the Prince and would obey him.

"Shah Jahan was married to a daughter of Asaf Khan, brother of the Queen Nur Mahal who really governed and through whose influence the brother became so great that the King submitted himself to him and the Queen and nothing was done in all the kingdom, but what both of

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planning that revenge on account of the affronts he had received from our Portuguese". (*Idem*) Vide the article by S. N. Bhattacharya in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X., 683 & 707; cfr. Dr. J. Campos, *the Portuguese in Bengal*, p. 128. Pe. Cabral, in *Catholic Herald of India* 1918, pp. 111-113 etc.

31. Livro das Monções No. 13A, p. 239.

32. Livro das Monções No. 13B, p. 452.

them wanted. Thus Asaf Khan went on supporting Shah Jahan, though in secrecy. On Jahangir's death, another son of the King, named Sultan Shahryar, proclaimed himself King, and within a few days collected an army of more than 50,000. As soon as Asaf Khan learnt this he resorted to a cruel trick. He tried and succeeded in arresting the Royal sister immediately, after the king's death on his way back from Kashmir, fearing she might be of the party of him who had made himself King at Lahore. Again he took Sultan Bulaki, grandson of King Jahangir, and son of the brother whom Shah Jahan had put to death, proclaimed him King, delivering to him all the insignia of Royal power which was his grand-father's. This done, he collected the whole army and marched upon Lahore. Shahryar, when informed of this, ordered his army to go out to give battle and he went to lead his troops in person. But as Asaf Khan sent men to his camp to bribe his generals with gifts and promises in the name of King Bulaki, they deserted the poor King. Shahryar had no other course left but to return to the city where Bulaki soon entered. Having imprisoned Shahryar and having plucked his eyes, Bulaki sat on the throne and was recognised as King. But as Asaf Khan intended to make his son-in-law Shah Jahan King, he kept Bulaki under careful watch, and allowed him to speak with those who belonged to Asaf Khan's party. In the meanwhile Shah Jahan was informed of what was happening. Asaf Khan also wrote to a brother-in-law, his sister's husband, who was the Governor of Agra, a very strong fortress where the Kings used to keep their treasure and hold their court, that as soon as Shah Jahan approached Agra he should go out to receive him, and hand over the Capital to him. This was done, and Shah Jahan, while in Agra, sent a captain (polapota ?), called Rajabadar, with letters to Asaf Khan to the effect that the captain be ordered to kill Bulaki, as well as another royal brother and three other princes. His orders were complied with and the heads of those slain were brought to him. Asaf Khan soon came over to him with all he had, and thus Shah Jahan became King without any one to oppose him nor take arms against him.

"As he was displeased with Khan Jahan Pathan, for not having accompanied him with his army, Shah Jahan began always to feel a great grudge against him, but showing the contrary, wrote to him affectionate letters and sent him presents. Later on he sent for him because he wished to see him and guide himself by his advice, as the most experienced general that he was, in matters concerning the Crown. He came and at first was well received by the King, but the reconciliation was formal; the King soon fomented a plot against the life of Khan Jahan which however proved unsuccessful. Khan Jahan then took as his

mediator, Asaf Khan, who led him to the royal presence, assuring him for his safety and induced the King to make a handsome present to the Khan, both in cash and valuables of 17 lakhs of rupees, (each lakh of fifty thousand patacas) and, drawing his sword from his girdle and giving it likewise to the King, the Khan said that king's father Jahangir, had offered it to him. The King accepted everything and the Khan returned to his house, and as Asaf Khan was much inclined towards the King, began to think that it was not advisable to trust him, and therefore, he took two Hindu princes, vassals of the Mughal Emperor as his mediators. But he gained nothing thereby; on the contrary, the King ordered his house to be besieged, and proclaimed that all the servants and soldiers of Khan Jahan should leave his service and come over to him, but the Khan's servants were Pathans, resolute men; they retired some five hundred of them in the house of the said Khan Jahan, and the others pretended not to be his servants and scattered themselves over the city and neighbouring villages. The King seeing what was happening, sent iron chains to be set on his feet, to which he replied that he was not guilty against the King and had done nothing for which he should deserve such a recompense. Six or seven days went by, during which the King did not dare to approach the house of Khan Jahan, a ridiculous thing that in such a great city as Agra is, and under his own fortress a King should not dare, with so many thousands of men, to enter the house of a general of his who only with five hundred men was defending himself, nor besiege him thoroughly. It is true that he feared the rising of the Pathans who were believed to be in the city, if not in the suburbs. It was from them that the Mughal snatched the sceptre and crown. Khan Jahan, according to his plan, resolved to come out one day at about 11 to 12 in the night with the Pathans he had with him, and with bold determination he passed through the very midst of the King's people, and soon sounded his trumpets. No sooner this signal was heard, the Pathans, who were already warned, began to assemble from all directions, and Khan Jahan marched with them taking the road to Burhanpur. As soon as the news reached the King, he sent to the place the captains who were that night at the court on duty. They were Rajah Bahadur, Khavai Khan Albardin, and the father of the King Ani Rao. These with their officers and soldiers and other men immediately went in pursuit. Khan Jahan, reached Dholpur on the Chambal, crossed the river at day-break and ordered his son and two thousand Pathans on horse, to remain in ambush in the jungle, and hold the pass, until he had reached further. When in the morning, at broad daylight, the King's people reached the other

bank the Pathans came out of their hiding and fought with great resolution. Victory was on the Pathans' side; Rajah Bahadur soon fell dead. It was he who, at Lahore, had cut off the heads of the five princes. The King felt this death deeply, so much that seeing his corpse he began to weep and spoke words of sorrow. Khavai Khan and the father of Ani Rao were mortally wounded; two great captains on the side of Khan Jahan and one of his sons were killed. The King ordered his head to be hung on the gates of the city, and kept guard lest anyone might take it away. But at midnight, many men came on horse and placing a ladder carried it away, killing some of the watch and putting others to flight.

"As Alabardin had taken no part in the fighting the King thought it to be a sort of disaffection, and ordered him to go after Khan Jahan. When he reached the Khan's vanguard, the Pathans attacked him and killed thirteen men of his and forced him to turn back. The King reorganised his army and ordered him to advance. The Pathan was beyond Dholpur; he had now with him fifteen thousand horse with whom he went to a King, who ruled in the vicinity of Burhanpur; there, it is said, he had assembled a large number of Pathans, so that the King is now in great fear and anxiety, for he is not loved by his people nor by his generals; moreover on the side of Bengal a petty King, his vassal, has rebelled, and has a large army. It is said that all the Pathans may rise and seek to make Khan Jahan king.

"The Mughal King sent two ambassadors, one to Nizam Shah and Adil Shah and the other to Kutub Shah, of Golconda. After having settled peace with Nizam Shah the ambassador went to the court of Adil Shah to demand the tribute which he owed for the three years past and amounted yearly to 300,000 pagodas. On the death of Adil Shah, a son, twelve years old succeeded him. He is governed by three great tyrants who have made themselves absolute masters of the kingdom, imprisoning the old generals who governed in the time of the late King. King Malik, as neighbour, sent an ambassador to tell the young Adil Shah that he should release the old generals and guide himself by their advice and arrest the tyrants. As the Shah was a mere boy, the tyrants who represented him, did not accede to the proposal, and Malik therefore collected an army of 8000 and sent it against Bijapur. Having news of this, the tyrants did likewise and ordered their men to station themselves outside the city to face the other. But should Malik's people reach, the victory will undoubtedly be theirs, for they are very good soldiers and trained in arms, while those of Adil Shah are weak and unaccustomed to them.

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"Kutub Shah, of Golconda, was negotiating to send through the Mughal ambassador great presents to the Mughal Emperor and thus they are giving him money which contributes to weaken their own armies, for it is the chief sinews of war. It is certain the Mughal will come and vanquish them all and make himself master of their Kingdom.

"The European enemies who had a factory in the port of Masulipatam entered the fortress by treachery, killed its captain and made themselves masters of same. The Mughal King being informed of this, wrote to the captain of Surat to guard his fortress well, lest the same should happen to him."

The same Viceroy, count of Linhares, wrote to His Majesty, in a letter dated the December 12th 1630—<sup>33</sup>

".....Sultan Khurram began his reign by undoing all his father's work, and being of restless spirit he assembled his soldiers, who are always in his pay, and are in such large numbers that it seems incredible that all belong to cavalry. The first object of his ambitions, some two years back, was to conquer the kingdom of King Malik who had sheltered him in his difficulties and protected him from his farther's anger, and with a very powerful army Khurram left Agra, in January or February 1629, and hastened his march, on hearing of the rebellion of his captain-general Khan Jahan, a Pathan by race. Khan Jahan withdrew to the Ghats which are close to those of Malik. In little less than two months during which Sultan Khurram marched, he settled his court and encamped his army at Burhanpur, the capital of a kingdom of that name, which lies a few leagues distant from the lands of Malik. There were many encounters with Khan Jahan's as well as Malik's men, and in those contests the people of Khurram always lost their reputation. He began to feel the want of victuals as well as of water, and therefore was forced to wage a slow war. As there was a treaty with Adil Shah to divert his attention from behind, he pressed Malik hard. In the rainy months it was expected he would retire and disband his armies, but he continued his skirmishes, in those regions, for there was no rain that year, causing a great need of foodstuffs. Many people and beasts died of thirst but great was the danger which Malik felt. Harassed by Adil Shah, as many of his<sup>34</sup> officers were compelled by necessity to go over to the enemy, he however, aided by Khan Jahan, continues to offer with great

33. Vide Livro das *Monções* No. 14, pp. 201v-202v.

34. Reference to Shivaji, and other officers. (See Dr. Balkrishna, *op. cit* p. 81; G. S. Sardesai, *Shahji*; J. Sarkar, *Shivaji and his times*).

valour resistance and not without the hope of success. Malik seeks to help himself with every thing but finds little aid from kings on whom he founded his hopes, as they are losing their kingdoms. In former times to oppose all such undertakings of the Mughal, the Sultan of Golconda and Adil Shah always allied themselves with Nizam Shah and not only offered great resistance to the great power of the Mughal, but ever compelled him to retire with considerable loss. But Adil Shah has failed the league. He has made himself an avowed enemy, owing to a favourite of his<sup>35</sup> who is believed to be in league with the Mughal to make himself master of the kingdom of Adil Shah. It appears that if the undertaking of Malik, who wished to seek my aid, does not succeed.....Malik's proposal being submitted to the Council which assists me, it resolved, as Your Majesty will note, what is stated in the included resolution.

"It was reported by Malik that Sultan Bulaki was alive and that he was coming near his territory. On the 20th November, last year, by sea there entered a man in disguise, saying that he was Bulaki, and convinced all the Muhamadans and even Christians who live there that he was the true King of the Mughals (whom from the hillock of Chaul to the top of which he went, on disembarking, amidst adorations), they venerated him and secured him in a fortress that stands on that mountain, which is called *drug*. I was informed with all haste that I should harbour him in the fortress of Chaul. But as it is imprudent in believing such matters easily, I deemed it wise to send first a priest of the Society of Jesus, Francisco de Leão, by name, who has spent many years in teaching our doctrines to this prince. Francisco de Leão did his office very well, although at the risk of his life, and entered the fortress of *Drug*. And, in a letter dated the 24th December writes to me that he is not the true Bulaki, as he was ordered by me, lest it should be a plot of Malik, who publicly said that he was the true King of the Mughals with which people were encouraged, and thus the fame and the credit of that man grew; this, Sire, is, in short, the state in which the affairs of these parts are; on account of the ill-will which Sultan Khurram has for the Christian name and owing to the favour with which he treats the enemies from Europe, I feel that he may attempt to make war against the fortress which Your Majesty possesses in the northern coast; and it appears to me, that Adil Shah may be encouraged to start hostilities against this city. About the preparations I am making in case this may happen, I am giving account to Your Majesty by the same vessel."

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35. Reference to Mustafa Khan.

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In 1630, Shah Jahan, with his numerous army, marched into the Deccan, in order to accomplish its conquest.

At the beginning, the Mughal army suffered great hardships caused chiefly by shortage of victuals.

The Portuguese Government resolved, in the grave crisis which threatened Nizam Shah to help the Ahmednagar State "as far as they could."<sup>36</sup>

Shah Jahan was not, however, successful in this war. The Portuguese ambassador at the court of Bijapur, Baltazar de Azaredo, communicated to the Portuguese Government in April 1630, that Malik Ambar surprised the Mughal army and captured and killed many horses, elephants and men: that the army also suffered from a severe famine and that a measureful of any foodstuff was worth half a gold crown and similarly a small potful of water. And therefore for the time the Mughal attack had fizzled out<sup>37</sup>.

The Viceroy writing to His Majesty on August 10th 1631, after giving the news of the great famine prevailing in the Mughal army, said, ".....it seems that it was a special favour which God granted us, because the pride with which the Mughal King set out from Agra with an army of 400,000 to conquer all the Kings of India, beginning with Malik, would have certainly subdued all others; but God helps us in the greatest needs. Even now, left though he has with him, of the 400,000 not more than 20,000 still in the opinion of some, he is obstinately staying at Burhanpur, though in the latest news which I received, they

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36. Copy of the Council resolution, concerning the Mughal, of 27th March 1630 (*Livro das Monções No. 14*, p. 324). The Viceroy Count of Linhares wrote to His Majesty on Dec. 6th 1630—"On the occasion of the letters from Diogo Saraiva I wrote to King Malik intimating to him to fight against the Mughal King, who in person and with a large army has come upon this king and his kingdom, offering him all the help and favour that this State could render him in conformity with Chap. 15, of the regulation which your Majesty ordered me to give.....And, in agreement with the opinions (of the Council of State), it was decided that a second request be made to Adil Shah and his favourites that they should agree to make peace with Malik; thus, an intelligent person was immediately despatched, and I hope in God, our attempts will be fruitful; it was also decided that Malik should hand over to Your Majesty's minister, as a token of goodwill, the custom he has at Chaul and that he should be given fifty to sixty thousand xerafins in cash, as help....." (*Livro das Monções No. 14*, p. 178).

37. Minutes of the Council of State, of May 6th, 1630 (*Livro das Monções No. 14*, p. 325).

inform me that owing to a rising that has taken place in the lands of Agra, he is trying to go to that part." <sup>38</sup> Another letter of the same Viceroy to His Majesty of Nov. 6th 1632 <sup>39</sup> reports—

".....The Mughal came down from Agra to Burhanpur which lies in the vicinity of the kingdom of Malik, from where he had begun to conquer him, and after various happenings, and great famine and deaths which followed thereby, Malik saw himself pressed on the one side by the Mughal and on the other by Adil Shah. He was forced to make peace with the said Mughal; vassals rebelled against the said Malik, they seized him, but he died a few days after his imprisonment<sup>40</sup>. The kingdom was now governed by one of his generals, named Fateh Khan, who was in prison. Having proclaimed King the said Malik's son, seven years old<sup>41</sup>, the Nizamshahi captains combined themselves against Adil Shah who had brought down the Mughal with an agreement that they would divide between them the said kingdom of Malik. That such agreements should not take place, or at least that they should be put off, I made great and diligent efforts at a great cost of my own treasury and belongings. Had hunger and disease not destroyed so many men of the Mughal, I am certain he could have added to his crown the kingdoms of Malik and Adil Shah; however, it is true that out of 500,000 people of all kinds.....of the Mughal army, more than 400,000, and.....thousand and seven hundred well known gentlemen perished. In spite of this the Mughal army laid siege to Bijapur, the capital of Adil Shah, and as it could not enter the city, began ravaging the country with fire and sword up to twelve leagues from the city. However, the Mughal King remained at Burhanpur. All this time, both from his side as well as of Malik with whom I am on very good terms, I was asked to help him to win the kingdom of Adil Shah, promising that they would give me as our share, almost all the lowlands which are in the suburbs, that I might build in them a fortress. I continually replied to them that I would help them with great pleasure, were it not against a king with whom we had sworn friendship, and preserved it for many years. They repeated their proposals referring to the several matters in which Adil Shah had broken faith, and his evil conduct towards Your Majesty's state.

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38. *Livro das Ordens Regias* No. 1 (1630-1638) pp. 11 and 11v.

39. *Livro das Monções* No. 15 p. 5.

40. According to Sir J. Sarkar, Burhan was killed in February 1632 (?) See *Modern Review*, previously mentioned.

41. This is Hussain Shah, son of Murtaza Nizam Shah,



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I declined the offer saying that the king was young, and had made amends and felt sorry for past conduct. And because I knew the spirit of these offers, I gave in secret to Adil Shah help with guns, powder and ammunition.

"During the time in which the army of the Mughal was destroying the kingdom of Adil Shah, in the kingdom of Kabul, there arose a cousin of the King, who had been baptised by the Fathers of the Society and named Dom Carlos. He began afterwards to lapse back to his former faith, and seized that kingdom winning the favour of a people, known as Uzbeks, who are most feared and valiant of all those who live in those countries. On this account the Mughal was compelled to hasten to Kabul, because that country supplies him horses for his armies; he besides feared that Dom Carlos might make himself master of the kingdom of Lahore which is in the vicinity of Kabul.....

When the Mughal King withdrew, he left his father-in-law, Asaf Khan in command, and it was he who entered the kingdom of Adil Shah. He also left 20,000 horse at Burhanpur with which he wages war against Adil Shah, and gives him no respite to make himself master of the kingdom of Malik which has been destroyed by the causes already referred, and on that very account there are many in revolts in the said kingdom of Malik....."

In these circumstances, Shahji, who had been one of the foremost officers of the kingdom of Nizam Shah and had deserted to the Mughal fearing treachery on the part of Fateh Khan, conceived the daring project of reviving the kingdom (September 1633).

With this end in view Shahji raised the standard of revolt against the Mughal, and strongly entrenching himself at Payamgad or Pemgiri, established a new dynasty of Nizam Shah, in the person of a relative of Hussain Nizam Shah (September 1633).

The gravity of the situation, created by Shahji's revolt compelled Shah Jahan to descend anew to the Deccan with an army of 50,000.

The Mughal Emperor renewed the war simultaneously against both Shahji and Adil Shah who was in league with that generalissimo of Nizam Shah in the struggle against the Mughal.

Within a short time the Emperor compelled Adil Shah to pay him a tribute of twenty lacks of rupees and acknowledge his suzerainty. By

the treaty that was concluded between the governments of Bijapur and of Delhi it was stipulated that the territory of the Nizam Shah should be portioned between the two powers. This important treaty was made in 1636<sup>42</sup>.

In virtue of one of the conditions of that treaty the government of Bijapur declared war against Shahji, sending against him one of its best generals, Randullah Khan. The Mughal army, under the command of Khan-i-Zaman, besieged the forts which were held by Shahji who became powerless against two such powerful enemies. It is said that he first retired with his army to Danda Rajapuri, which was in the hands of an officer of Nizam Shah, and after remaining there for some days turned to Muranjan, and, later, to Mahuli, being hotly pursued by the allied armies of Bijapur and the Mughals.

Shahji, considering the circumstances in which he found himself sought the aid of the Portuguese, as can be surmised from the minutes of a resolution dated 2nd October 1636. Here is the text—

“ Having passed this resolution, a letter was read from Antonio Carneiro de Aragão, captain of Chaul, in which he said that after sending away the light vessel which sailed away from that place on September 26th (of 1636), there arrived a Muhammedan, sent by Shahji with a letter to the said captain, saying how his affairs stood and what were his difficulties, so that the Viceroy might help him in the great need and danger that he was, as a friend that he always had been of that fortress and of all the Portuguese. The Nizamshahi King was but a minor whom he had placed in the fortress of Trimalavary, in the Upper Ghats, strong as that place was. *It was three years that he was governing that kingdom without depending on any one*, and by the list he sent, the Viceroy would know about the men that Shahji had with him. But as he had against himself two powerful kings he asked permission to keep in the fortress of Chaul his children and wife. He also believed that Shahji was on the point of surrendering and would have long before given up opposition if Khan Jahan, favourite of the Mughal, had not forwarded him, being very friendly towards him. They also say that he sent word to Randulla Khan, captain of Adil Shah, who was marching upon him, to tarry in the Ghats, in order to give him time and place to accomodate his people and set his things in order, which he was doing placing his wife and children in safety. He was also

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42. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzib*, Vol. I & II, pp. 32-36.

## *The Extinction of the Nizamshahi*

asking the Viceroy for some relief, and when he could not live among his own people, he would come to live in the fortress of Chaul. He also promised to give His Majesty any lands which might be wanted from the kingdom of Malik, because everything was in his hands. He informed the Viceroy that Shahji was a Hindu, and not a Muhammedan, and this meant much. And as it has been done up to now, His Excellency was informed of everything that he might order as to what should be done.

"The Council unanimously agreed that concerning Shahji who was pursued by two such powerful enemies as the Mughal and Adil Shah, with whom we were at peace and on friendly terms, it was not convenient to favour and help openly, nor give him shelter in the fortress of Chaul, but *in case he were to go to that of Danda, that way he could be helped with all precaution*, and that he should receive even the ladies if so far they had not been received. Should they have been received, they ought to be given passage on vessels by the same way of Danda or where he should think best, for we should declare ourselves against two such powerful Kings, with whom we were at peace and friendship, although it might be at the price of our getting the same fortress of Danda. And His Excellency the Viceroy agreed with the vote of this Council, and the resolution was recorded hereon....."<sup>43</sup>.

By this resolution we learn the motive why Shahji was at Danda Rajapuri, before proceeding to Muranjan.

Attacked on all sides by the Allied armies of Bijapur and the Mughal, Shahji found no other remedy but to hand over to the enemy the last Nizamshahi Prince which was done in December 1636.

Thus, after forty years of struggle, with periods of ephemeral peace, the Nizamshahi Sultanate became extinct <sup>44</sup>

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43. *Livro das actas do Conselho do Estado.*

44. Vide Dr. Balkrishna, *op. cit* ; D. V. Apte, शहाजी व शहाजहान in शिवाजीविमर्शिका pp. 228-250 ; G. S. Sardesai, शहाजी, pp. 23-58 ; Sir J. Sarkar, *the Rise of Shahji Bhonsle, in Modern Review*, Calcutta, September 1917 ; Sir J. Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*.

# THE BATTLE OF KIRKEE

BY

H. G. RAWLINSON, C.I.E. M.A. F.R. Hist. S.

The battle of Kirkee forms an interesting study in military tactics, and unlike most battlefields, it is accessible to any one who will take the trouble to take his morning walk on the rolling plain at the back of the Poona Agricultural College. Better still, if one climbs the conical hill outside Government House with a good pair of field-glasses and a map, it is to try and picture in one's mind the scene on the morning of November 5th, 1817.

Ever since Mountstuart Elphinstone had come to Poona as Resident in 1810, the situation had been deteriorating. The Peshwa chafed more and more at the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Bassein, and the murder of the Gaikwar's Minister, Gangadhar Shastri, by the agents of Trimbakji Danglia, had been an act of open defiance. Troops were known to be pouring into Poona, and it was unsafe for Europeans to be found outside the lines. Elphinstone's position was a delicate one; in the absence of communications, he was absolutely cut off and his forces were very inadequate. At the Sangam Residency, he had his personal bodyguard, consisting of two Companies of the Bengal Native Infantry; in the Garpur cantonment, now the Imperial Bank and the Post Office, were the 2nd Battalion of the First Bombay Native Infantry and the 2nd Battalion of the Seventh Bombay Native Infantry under Col. Burr; and at Dapuri, afterwards Government House and now a P. W. D. Store, about six miles away, was the Subsidiary Brigade, maintained by the Peshwa under the terms of the Treaty, and commanded by Capt. John Ford, formerly of the Madras Army and for some years on the Resident's staff. Ford's Brigade Major was Capt. Peter Lodwick, the discoverer of the hill-station of Mahabaleshwar. Ford and his officers were on excellent terms with the Peshwa's officers and in particular with Moro Dixit and Bapu Gokhale, the Commander in Chief. The nearest reinforcements were at Sirur, 36 miles away on the Ahmadnagar Road. By the end of October, 1817, Elphinstone's position was rendered untenable by the constant attempts of the Peshwa's agents to corrupt the sepoys,


## *The Battle of Kirkee*

and he came to the conclusion that the only possible course to withdraw Burr's force to the hill of Kirkee, where the ammunition factory now stands, while he himself remained at the Residency. Fortunately Burr received a welcome reinforcement in the shape of the veteran Bombay European Regiment, familiarly known as the "Bombay Toughs", who had been hurried up from Bombay and on hearing of the danger, arrived at Kirkee after a forced march of thirty miles from the foot of the Ghats on October 30th.

On November 3rd, Elphinstone found the situation so threatening that he despatched a messenger to Sirur, asking for help, and the Peshwa, hearing of this, sent an ultimatum on the 5th, by the hands of an officer named Vithuji Gaikwar, demanding that the European Regiment should be sent away and the order for troops to come from Sirur should be countermanded. Elphinstone refused to comply, and hardly had the envoy withdrawn when a great body of Maratha horses was seen to be approaching. Elphinstone and his staff just managed to ford the river in time, and crossing Holkar's Bridge, reached Burr's camp safely; the Residency, with his precious library and manuscript materials for a History of India, was burnt to the ground. Grant Duff, the historian of the Marathas, who was on Elphinstone's staff, gives an unforgettable picture of the advance of the great Maratha force which poured out of Poona city to wipe out the "contemptible little army" encamped on the Kirkee hill —

Those only who have witnessed the Bore in the Gulf of Cambay and have seen in perfection the approach of that roaring tide, can form the exact idea presented to the author at the sight of the Peshwa's army. It was towards the afternoon of a very sultry day; there was a dead calm and no sound was heard except the rushing, the trampling and neighing of the horses and the rumbling of the gun-wheels. The effect was heightened by seeing the peaceful peasantry flying from their work in the fields, the bullocks breaking from their yokes, the wild antelopes startled from sleep bounding off and then turning for a moment to gaze on this tremendous inundation, which swept all before it, levelled the hedges and standing corn and completely overwhelmed every barrier as it moved.

Elphinstone, in a letter written on the battlefield and quoted in Colebrooke's *Life*, vividly describes what followed. He knew that a



## *The Battle of Kirkee*

passive attitude would encourage the enemy and without hesitation he ordered Col. Burr to move out and attack them. At the same time he sent orders to Ford to march out at once to join him. Elphinstone's line of battle consisted of the Bombay European Regiment, the Resident's Bodyguard, and the 2/6th Bombay N. I. in the centre, and the 2/1st and 1/7th Bombay N. I. on the right and left flanks, each with two guns. A detachment of the 2/6th, with two more guns, was left to guard the camp. The Marathas had a regular battalion under a Goanese officer named Major Pinto with 14 guns and rocket batteries in the centre, the Vinchurkar horse on their left and other large masses of cavalry on their right and rear.

It was now about four o'clock on a sultry afternoon, and the two lines were facing one another. The British were unlimbering their guns and anxiously awaiting Ford's Brigade, which had succeeded in crossing the Mula river without opposition and were advancing with all speed. Gokhale and his staff were galloping up and down the Maratha lines exhorting the troops. The Peshwa, who was observing proceedings at a safe distance from Parvati hill, sent word to Gokhale, "not to fire the first shot"; Gokhale replied by opening fire with all his guns and pushing forward a cloud of cavalry as skirmishers to cover his advance. The ground was then much rougher than it is now, when the building of the railway and draining of the nullahs has effaced many of the original landmarks, and the 1/7th suddenly saw Pinto's battalion advancing towards them, their red coats showing conspicuously in the scrub. The Bombay sepoy, gallantly but injudiciously, fired a volley and charged with the bayonet. This separated them completely from the rest of the line, which was powerless to help as it was itself under heavy fire and threatened with attack. Gokhale now saw his chance to annihilate them, and personally headed a charge of 6,000 horse. The Maratha guns ceased as this great body came thundering across their front, receiving the fire of the British line as they swept fast. "The whole mass of cavalry came on at speed in the most splendid style", says Elphinstone, "the rush of horse, the sound of the earth, the waving of flags, the brandishing of spears, were grand beyond description". Elphinstone thought the battle was lost, but Col. Burr rode out and taking post with the colours rallied his men, ordering them to reserve their fire. Fortunately there was a deep nullah immediately in front of the British left, and this proved disastrous to the Maratha cavalry, completely breaking the force of their charge. The foremost horses came down, and the rest rode into them. The sepoy opened fire upon this confused mass with great effect, and very few of the

enemy came up to the bayonets. Many rode on and attacked the camp, but were driven off by gunfire.

Meanwhile, a separate battle was taking place on the English right, where Moro Dixit was compelled to attack his friend Ford. Gokhale's object was to overwhelm Ford's Brigade before it could join hands with Elphinstone, but Ford formed his men into squares, against which the Marathas beat as vainly as the sea on a rocky shore. It is said that Ford and Dixit had made a mutual arrangement, that if either fell, the other should support his family, and by a singular stroke of ill-luck, Moro Dixit was killed by a cannon-ball while leading the charge. Lady Bartle Frere writing long after tells us that "old soldiers of the Bombay European Regiment would relate how the fidelity of the sepoys resisted all the bribes and threats of Bajirao Peshwa, and thus enabled Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone to defer open hostilities—a matter of vital importance to the operations of Lord Hastings on the other side of India in preparing for his great campaign against the Pindaris. The veterans would recount all the romantic incidents of the struggle which followed.....As they formed up in line of battle, they anxiously watched the native regiments coming up on their flank from Dapuri, for that was the moment for successful treachery if the sepoys were untrue. Not a man, however in the British ranks wavered, though before the junction was complete, a cloud of Maratha cavalry dashed through the opening left between the two lines, enveloped either flank of the little army and attacked the European Regiment in the rear."

The retirement of the Marathas to Poona city left the British in possession of the field, but the struggle was by no means over. Elphinstone was far too weak to take Poona, and he fell back to Kirkee to await reinforcements from Sirur. Our losses had been trifling, 86 killed and wounded, mostly in the action on the left flank. The Marathas lost about 500 killed and wounded, among them being Moro Dixit. The Maratha army was estimated at about 18,000 horses: 8,000 foot and 14 guns. The British had 2,800 foot, of whom 800 were Europeans, no cavalry and six guns. General Smith arrived from Sirur on the 13th, and on the 15th it was decided to cross the river at Yeravda. There was then a ford where the present Bund is situated. Though the Peshwa had now been heavily reinforced, the Marathas put up a poor fight, and river was crossed and Ghorpuri taken, with a loss of 84 men. The next day Poona surrendered, the Peshwa having fled. The remaining part of the campaign is soon told.



### *The Battle of Kirkee*

On New year's day 1818, a flying column from Sirur, consisting of 500 men of the 2/1st Bombay N. I. 300 irregular horse and two guns, beat off the whole of the Peshwa's army at Koregaon. On February 20th the Marathas were defeated in a cavalry action at Ashti in the Sholapur district, where the gallant Gokhale found a soldier's death. The Maratha hill-forts could do nothing against the high-angle fire of the British howitzers, and on June 3rd the Peshwa gave himself up. This was the end of a short but memorable campaign, which resulted in the overthrow of the Maratha Empire.

# THE EVE OF THE ANGLO-MARATHA WAR OF 1803

BY

EDWARD THOMPSON

THE BATTLE OF KHARDA

There was only one quiet interlude, when Nana Farnavis took advantage of the retraction and retrenchment enforced on the Company by the cost of Lord Cornwallis's campaign against Tipu, and accomplished the singular feat of knitting all the Maratha chieftains together—the last occasion when all appeared under the Peshwa's authority against the Company's protégé, the Nizam of Hyderabad.

Hyderabad, unlike the Marathas, had neither racial nor religious cohesion. It was the creation of one able man, Asaf Jah, the Emperor's Wazir, who withdrew to it as Subadar (overseer) of the Deccan and freed himself from all but nominal dependence on his master, in the same period as that in which the leading Maratha chieftains established themselves. He and his successors are generally styled Nizams, from his title Nizam-ul-mulk, 'Regulator of the State'. He died, 1748, and in the stormy days that followed, Hyderabad was saved only by the coming of the British. As the century neared its end, the Nizam was very conscious that he was much the weakest of the four great powers of India—the others being Tipu, the Marathas, and the Company—and by long subservience had come to lean heavily on the British. Lord Cornwallis's successor, Sir John Shore, had neither the money nor the inclination for wars, though aware that the Nizam would have liked assistance in settling his differences with the Marathas. 'If I were disposed to depart from justice and good faith, I could form alliances which would shake the Mahratta Empire to its very foundations'. He refused assistance, and the Nizam, disgruntled by this temporary desertion, followed Maratha example and turned to the French and obtained his own foreign legion.

Before his measures were matured, however, Nana Farnavis in 1795 brought a long-standing dispute to the arbitrament of battle, which the Nizam boastfully accepted. Dancing girls sang his expected triumph,

## *The Eve of the Anglo-Maratha War of 1803*

court buffoons were witty about it, his chief minister predicted that the Peshwa would be sent, with a cloth round his loins and a brass pot in his hand, to mutter incantations on the bank of the Ganges at Benares. There was one battle, at Kharda, where his troops fled in dastardly fashion, the fight, apart from the pursuit, being won and lost as cheaply as Plassey. The victorious Peshwa went forward from it with downcast demeanour, which he explained as due to shame on both his enemy's account and his own people's, that the one should have yielded so contemptible a conquest and the other should consider it worth exulting over. The Nizam was mulcted of an indemnity, but was not treated harshly.

Nana Farnavis's long unchallenged reputation as a statesman is being at last questioned by his own nation's historians of to-day. But it can hardly be challenged that he was right in his unswerving effort to give the Marathas a centre and a head, and to make them a confederacy under the Peshwa and based on Poona. And no one but the Nana could have secured the Gaekwar's assistance in the Kharda campaign. Since the Treaty of Salbai, in 1781, which closed a war in which the Company had supported him against Sindhia, the Gaekwar's had been practically a British protected state.<sup>1</sup> His subsequent relations with the Company and his own people can be briefly summarised. After Kharda, he practically withdrew from the Maratha confederacy. When the British annexed Surat (1799), they requested him to make the acquisition more worth while, by handing over an adjacent district. He consented, but remarked that the Peshwa's sanction should be obtained. Both parties were aware that the Peshwa was in no case to refuse (which he would have done if free to do so). All he could do was to rebuke his straying and now all but emancipated vassal for concluding a separate treaty with the Company. The rebuke went unheeded; the Gaekwar was conducting a private war with the Peshwa's Governor at Ahmedabad, and hoped to get British help. He did not get it, but managed to succeed without it. In September 1800, he died, and Baroda was involved in civil war, which the British were asked to settle, both parties making the Bombay Government tempting offers.<sup>2</sup> The Bombay Government settled it accordingly, by another of the toy campaigns with battles costing two or three score casualties, which are so many in British-Indian history that they have deservedly dropped from sight. The Gaekwar, when the fighting was

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1. See the valuable contemporary 'Account of Affairs in Gujarat from 1782 to 24th June, 1802': India Office Records, Home Misc. Series, 241 (7), pp. 215-223,

2. *Ibid.* esp. pp. 225 ff. and 253 ff.

over, accepted a subsidiary force (June 25, 1802); and one of the four great Maratha chieftains had been permanently detached from the confederacy. The British Resident, Major Walker, became the practical ruler of Baroda, whose finances and administration were in ruins,<sup>3</sup> and the Gaekwar's dominions subsided into something strangely like peace. Henceforward, the troubles which for twenty years came thick and fast upon his brethren were probably interesting news-items to him, but they were nothing more. The other Marathas continued to be like the sea, that is never at rest. But he himself had said goodbye to all that, and was *emeritus* from it.

Count de Boigne, the maker of Sindhia's army, retired in 1796, the year after Kharda. A French gentleman of pre-Revolution type, he hated new-fangled ideas of liberty, fraternity, equality, and was well disposed to the Company, whose commission he had once held. As his last word he left his reiterated warning, that Sindhia would do well not to excite British jealousy, and that it would be better to disband his battalions than to fight. The Company showed him every courtesy in his journey from India, and arranged the transference of his vast fortune to his native town, Chambéry, in Savoy. Here he lived with great distinction until his eightieth year, in 1830—a 'nabob' who dispensed lavish charity to his fellow-Savoyards. He was always ready to talk over Indian affairs with British visitors, and to express his poor opinion of his successors in Sindhia's higher command.

He was followed by General Perron, and the Ganges-Jumna doab assigned for the upkeep of the French officers and their sepoys, was presently styled by Lord Wellesley Perron's 'independent state' and his 39,000 troops 'the national army' of that state.<sup>4</sup>

#### LORD WELLESLEY AND THE PESHWA

When he reached India, Lord Wellesley found the Peshwa's authority 'reduced to a state of extreme weakness by the imbecility of his counsels, by the instability and treachery of his disposition, and by the prevalence of internal discord.'<sup>5</sup> He set himself to obtain control of

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3. *Ibid.* 242, pp. 443 ff.

4. To Secret Committee, July 13, 1804; Martin, IV, 137.

5. N. B. Edmonstone, Secretary to Government, to Lieut.—Col. Barry Close, Resident at Poona, June 23, 1802.

Maratha affairs through him. For a while he was foiled, by the Peshwa's unexpected blindness to his own best interests! The latter

'deliberately prepared a situation of degradation and danger with nominal independence, to a more intimate connection with the British power, which could not be calculated to secure to the Peshwa the constant protection of our armies, without at the same time establishing our ascendancy in the Mahratta Empire.'<sup>6</sup>

Lord Wellesley, whose language is a laval flow which never cools, fed by incessant renewal from the internal furnace, in a torrent of exasperation ascribed to the Maratha 'intricacy,' 'perverse policy,' 'treachery,' 'low cunning,' 'captious jealousy,' 'the spirit of intrigue and duplicity, inseparable from the Mahratta character', with which he contrasted his own 'just and reasonable', 'temperate' and 'moderate' proposals. He found the contrast maddening.

The Marathas had been distinguished among the ramshackle polities of India, by a genuine patriotism which operated despite their dissensions. But dissensions had now become too deep-seated for healing. In the warfare which followed with the British they were hopelessly out-classed in every phase, the diplomatic no less than the military. Their statecraft was casual and occasional, meeting the immediate demand with what seemed the best immediate answer, which was often an evasive one. These answers were taken up, explored, replied to, and filed, by a Secretariat which had been stiffened into the sternest efficiency—a machine that lost account of nothing, but tabulated and kept and compared all that came into it, and drove remorselessly to its predestined end. The Secretariat was served, moreover, in the courts of Native India by a succession and galaxy of men such as even the British Empire has hardly ever possessed together at any other time. 'Their spy system was perfect'.<sup>7</sup> As a consequence, when war broke out in 1803, the Marathas, sprawling in their desultory fashion over half of India, had been tracked down over a score of years past, and their habits, their strength and weakness, scientifically docketed. Lord Wellesley's files contained information gathered as far back as 1779, in C. W. Malet's elaborate report<sup>8</sup> on the Sindhia and Holkar families and their history, when he was stationed at Surat. The

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6. Lord Wellesley.

7. Jadunath Sarkar, *Mahadji Scindia & North Indian Affairs, 1785-1794*, iv.

8. I. O. R., H. M. S., 242.

same cool indefatigable observer, when attached to the Maratha camp before Kharda, had added, in March 1795, a fascinating analysis of his hosts' military methods, or want of method. Colonel William Palmer, who succeeded him as the Company's representative with the Peshwa, was urged unceasingly to watch for the first possible chance to establish British ascendancy over the court at Poona, and thereby over all the Marathas.

Like Major Kirkpatrick, his colleague at the Nizam's court, Palmer was Indianised in habits and sympathies, and his instructions, even though couched in terms of excitement and exacerbation, were carried out tactfully, to avoid ruffling Maratha feelings more than was inevitable. Nevertheless, the Peshwa, though he could hardly guess what close continuous studies of his conduct and intentions<sup>9</sup> were passing to the Governor-General, felt like a wild beast of the jungle, with hunters behind all bushes. Not the Peshwa alone, but Sindhia, the Bhonsla Raja, and Holkar, all ultimately acted like hunted animals, in a fashion that put them at a hopeless disadvantage, and gave their adversary reason ample to his own mind, to hold them up to indignation, as morally responsible for the outbreak of hostilities. To achieve this is, after all, a large part of what has always been considered statesmanship, in all ages and countries. It has rarely been more triumphantly achieved than in India, in the twenty years when independence was lost.

In fairness, it has to be admitted that their British conquerors were not the only people who found the Marathas vacillating and untrustworthy. Bussy complained (September 9, 1783), that Montigny, while showing zeal and disinterestedness, had placed '*trop de créance aux protestations et au discours d'un peuple inconstante et perfide*'.<sup>10</sup> Their replies were no replies, or were put forward to gain time or postpone a problem; it was a warring of different ethics and habits, and not of armies only.

Nana Farnavis, whose espionage system was as good as the Company's, foresaw his countrymen's subjection. But during his lifetime he warded it off, without exasperating Lord Wellesley or losing that respect which the Governor-General accorded to him alone of all the

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9. See especially Palmer's letters from December 7, 1798 onward (I. O. R., H. M. S., 482).

10. Pondicherry Records.

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Marathas. His chief defensive weapon was a disconcerting frankness. 'A man of strict veracity',<sup>11</sup> he answered questions freely and gave explanations which (Palmer repeatedly points out) tallied exactly with information received and checked up from other sources.

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11. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, iii. 188.

# THE MARATHAS IN MALWA

( 1707-1719 )

BY

DR. RAGHUBIR SINH, M.A., LL.B., D.Litt., Sitamau

Only very recently due to the kind permission and the most encouraging co-operation and help of the Jaipur Government it has been made possible for me to get copies made of the '*Akhabarat-i-Durbar-i-Mualla*' and other important papers covering a period of full 12 years immediately following the death of Aurangzib (1707-1719 A.D.). These papers have been stored up in the archives of the Jaipur State during all these centuries unseen and unexamined by any historian. The *Akhabarats* and other papers now for the first time see the light of examination by one interested in the study of Indian history and even a cursory glance over them is sufficient to convince us that these documents easily take the first place among the original and primary authorities for the period. It is obvious that in future no student working over this period of Indian history can ignore this new yet more important source of historical information. The new source is not only going to overthrow many of our age-old theories and beliefs about the period but is also going to make our knowledge of it all the more complete. These daily court-bulletins, letters, *hasb-ul-hukums* and *farmans* throw a new light on the events of these years; they supply many of the hitherto unknown, minor yet very vital points in the narrative of the falling Empire; they complete the official details and correct many inaccuracies of the various secondary historical sources which have all along been our chief and the only authority for the events of these years.

The copies of the records that have hitherto been supplied to me cover more than 3,000 sheets of demi-foolscap size written on both sides. They are now kept carefully stored up in my collection and it shall ever be a matter of genuine pleasure for me to let ardent students of history, working over this period, examine and make use of them. These records are not only important to those working on the history of the declining Mughal Empire, but are of equally great importance to students working over provincial histories. References to events in the provinces are many



and almost cover all the provinces, even including Bengal and Kashmir. The affairs in the Deccan and the struggle between the Mughal and the Maratha forces during these years are reported at length ; it would amply repay the labours of any student to study them along with the recently published records in Marathi.

When working for Chapter III of my work '*Malwa in Transition*', I ransacked all the then available Marathi and Persian sources to gather all the details about the relations of the Marathas with Malwa during these momentous years ; but not much could be found. There were just a couple of references in Marathi and only a few scanty references in the Persian. The Jaipur Records now come to our help, fill up the gap and give us full details about the various Maratha inroads into Malwa during these 12 years. This is an attempt to give a connected account of the various events as reported in these records.

At the time of Aurangzib's death the writer of these *Akhabarats* was at the Imperial court in Ahmednagar and when Azam Shah, the second surviving son of Aurangzib, proclaimed himself the Emperor, the Imperial recorder began to note down the happenings at his court. Azam Shah was killed on the battle-field of Jajau and the Azam Shahi *Akhabarats* end with his death. The *Akhabarats* of this short reign of Azam Shah mainly report the march of Azam to the north, his preparations to meet his elder brother then marching from Lahore, and finally various promotions, rewards and appointments made during those few months.

One important point *viz.*, the escape of Shahu from the army of Azam is, however, cleared by these *Akhabarats*. They confirm the facts as reported by Bhimsen (II. fol 163a). On March 23, 1707 when Azam was at Aurangabad, Shahu, who was in charge of Zulfiqar Khan, came to Azam Shah through the mediation of Zulfiqar Khan himself. Next day Shahu appeared before Azam and along with Raibhan and Rao Kanhu received robes of honour (*khilat*) and was appointed with the army of Zulfiqar Khan. Azam reached Dauraha on May 8, 1707 but the *Akhabar* of the day does not report about the flight of Shahu from the army of Zulfiqar Khan. An entry on Aug. 3, 1707, however, clears the point where in it is recorded that Raja Shahu, son of Sambhaji, who had run away from the company of Muhammad Azam to the Deccan, was ordered (by Bahadur Shah) to remain in his former rank. It can well be pointed out that official chronicler stated facts as then known, reported and recorded in the official documents.

The *Akhabarats* and other papers relating to the reign of Bahadur Shah cover about 1200 sheets and give us a variety of information about the events in the Empire. Here we, for the first time, know about the various deputy-governors appointed by Prince Jahan Shah, the absentee Governor of Malwa. The affairs of Rampura and the increasing power of Ratan Singh (Islam Khan) are mentioned in detail. These *Akhabarats* clearly prove that during this reign Chhatra Sal Bundela continued to be a loyal and helpful noble of the Empire, and the Emperor even ordered Chhatra Sal to go against the Maratha invaders. Again, it is for the first time made known to us that Chhatra Sal Rathore, the founder of the present state of Ratlam, continued to lead an active life even as late as February 1709; the present belief that Chhatra Sal became a recluse and left the worldly life appears to be mistaken, as we find Chhatra Sal serving the Mughal Emperor and receiving rewards and increments from him. These *Akhabarats* report many a local disturbance in Malwa but there is not to be found any mention of Maratha inroads save one during the first half of the year 1711. The Marathas appear to be mainly busy in the distant Deccan; they had not yet gathered enough strength to reach the borders of Malwa once again. One curious fact about the Bahadur Shahi *Akhabarats* is that though the 18th *Zil Hijja* was settled as the official date of Bahadur Shah's accession as also of the beginning of a new *Julusi* Year (Irvine I. 135), a new *Julusi* year begins from the 1st *Zil Hijja* in one of them.

The only Maratha raid during the regime resulted from a curious series of incidents and it had far-reaching effects. Firuz Jang, the father of Nizam Asaf Jah, was the Governor of Gujrat till his death in October 1710. On his death the few Maratha sardars, who were in his service, lost their appointment with the result that they thought of taking to plundering for their livelihood. They gathered together a large Maratha force and marched from Ahmedabad, to Malwa by way of Jhabua. They crossed over to the southern bank of the Narmada at the Akbarpur ferry, and reached Khargon (Jan. 14, 1711). Just then one of them, Ganga or Gangaram by name, took with himself a force of 10,000 Marathas and crossed the Narmada with an intention to invade and plunder in Malwa; but Sher Afghan, the deputy-Governor of Malwa, marched with his army to meet the invaders and thus forced Ganga to recross the Narmada to go back to his associates at Khargon (Feb. 26, 1711). The Emperor was pleased with the prompt action of Sher Afghan and praised him for his alertness (March 25, 1711).

The main body of the invaders was still at Khargon beseiging the place for twenty days. Khandu (Dabhade!) who too was with the

Maratha invaders, took along with him a force of 10,000 horse and plundered Sultanpur in Nandurbar district (March 11, 1711). Just then Daud Khan Panni reached Burhanpur; on hearing of the siege he made forced night marches and reached Khargon. The Marathas raised the siege; the whole horde divided itself into two bands and they moved away in different directions, one going towards Khandesh and the other towards Ahmedabad. Ganga and other Maratha sardars who had been in the service of Firuz Jang, went to Daud Khan, who consoled them and took them in his service (March 17, 1711). But Ganga did not stay long with Daud. Soon after he once again collected a big force estimated at 30,000 horse and 40,000 foot and was joined by other Maratha leaders including Kanhoji Bhonsle and Chimnaji (also written as Jamna in other places). They crossed the Narmada and marched to Amjlhera, besieged the town for full two weeks, and exacted a sum of Rs. 25,000. Thence they proceeded to Nolai (Badnagar). Sher Afghan, the deputy-Governor of Malwa, had entrenched himself, to guard the city of Ujjain with firmness and was ready to give the invaders a battle. On hearing their camp at Nolai, he considered it most advisable to stay where he was, but despatched with Mian Khan 4,000 horse to meet the Marathas. When faced by a big horde of 25,000 Marathas Mian Khan was easily outnumbered, and in the battle, fought on Friday, March 30, 1711, many of Khan's men were killed. In the battle the Khan descended from his elephant and began to fight with all the vigour when he was surrounded by the Marathas. The Khan's followers deserted him. The Marathas then moved towards Ujjain and attacked the city, but Sher Afghan fought bravely with the invaders. Their forces were numerous and the Emperor grew anxious for the safety of Ujjain and sent urgent orders to Chhatra Sal Bundela and Daud Khan to run to Malwa to chastise the invaders. Daud Khan was, however, already on his way to Malwa with his forces and the news of his march made the Marathas retreat and soon the big horde melted away (*Akh.* April 8—23, 1711). A few months later another of these sardars Kanhoji (Bhonsle?) made an attempt to invade Malwa by way of Seoni and Hoshangabad and thought of establishing himself there. But this did not escape the ever-watchful eye of Sher Afghan who with a force of 5,000 horse persued the Maratha sardar out of Malwa (Aug. 1, 1711). For the next two complete years Marathas did not disturb the peace of Malwa.

This Maratha raid on Malwa of Ganga and other sardars greatly influenced the future of the province. Big hordes of Marathas were brought to it, many of whom stayed back and thus added one more to already-existing disturbers in the province. The Maratha outlaws easily

gathered round any one who would raise a standard of revolt against the established authority. Thus when Sultan Singh, the Sisodia zamindar of Badnawar rebelled, he received much help from 'these villains' (Nov. 17, 1711). Again, many Marathas set up their camps and established themselves on the banks of the Narmada where local chieftains helped them believing that in time of need Marathas might be of use to them (Oct. 22, 1712). Moreover the attention of the Marathas was directed once again towards the rich province of Malwa and the road during the early months of 1711, was not to be closed. Even the heavy losses that the Marathas had suffered in the beginning could not discourage them from invading and trying their luck again.

The early months of Farukhsiyar's reign immediately following his accession in Delhi saw rapid changes in the Governorship of Malwa. On February 27, 1713, Nijabat Khan was appointed to the post; he had acted in that capacity for some months (April-June) in 1707, and was at the time acting as the Governor of Baglan. It took some time for him to reach Malwa and the delay displeased the Emperor. He was dismissed from the Governorship and on May 22, Shahmat Khan Amanat Khan was appointed to the charge, who was at that time in Ahmedabad awaiting the arrival of his successor, Daud Khan Panni; he was ordered to continue to stay in Ahmedabad and was instructed to send his own deputy to Malwa.

But finding Malwa unprotected and without a governor, Ganga and Kanhoji once again gathered a horde of 30,000 horse and along with other Marathas crossed the Narmada, entered in the pargana of Ashta and marched towards Ujjain devastating and plundering the villages on the way. In the meanwhile Nijabat Khan had hurried from Baglan, reached Ujjain on May 6, employed an additional force of 3,000 horse and 5,000 foot, and prepared to meet the invaders. Rai Sahib Singh had arrived in Ujjain to help the Royalists in defending the city. The Nizam was at this time going to assume the charge of the Governorship of the Deccan; he had reached Narwar on May 10, and as the rainy season was drawing near he was moving by forced marches. The Maratha hordes once again melted away in the face of such a strong opposition; they recrossed the Narmada and returned to Khandesh. The arrival of Nijabat Khan in Malwa at such critical moment, and the fact, that Malwa was saved due to his promptness, made the Emperor reconsider his order dismissing Nijabat Khan from the Governorship, and on May 29, 1713, Khan was reappointed to the post. (*Akhabarats* dated May 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, and September 2, 14, 1713).

Once again the intentions of the Maratha invaders were foiled, but as was correctly guessed by the reporter in Malwa (*Akhabar* Sept. 14, 1713), soon after the rains the Marathas thought of invading Malwa. On November 27, 1713 it was reported to the Emperor that Ganga and other Marathas had reached the Narmada with 25,000 horse. On October 15, 1713 Jai Singh of Jaipur was for the first time appointed Governor of Malwa, but as he could not reach Malwa till after the end of 1713, Nijabat Khan continued to govern. The possibility of a Maratha invasion had once more raised great hopes in the hearts of all the turbulent rulers of Malwa, specially Shiv Singh, zamindar of Narayana, Prithi Singh, Rawat of Devalia-Partabgarh, and the descendants of Gopal Singh in Rampura; Nijabat Khan had to move towards Rampura to put them down (*Akh.*, Nov. 20, Dec. 4, 1713). The Imperial court sent mace-bearers to Chhatra Sal to hurry him to Malwa (Dec. 11, 1713) and wrote letters to Jai Singh, the newly appointed Governor of Malwa, now on his way to the province, not to waste any time on the way (Letters, Dec. 12 and 31, 1713). Once again the Maratha invaders could not achieve their object. The active vigilance of Chhatra Sal Bundela and Jai Singh saved Malwa from any further inroads during the whole of the year 1714, and Jai Singh could get time to put down all the rebels and other local disturbers of peace. One does feel interested to see Chhatra Sal Bundela write to Jai Singh sometime early in May, 1714 — "The Marathas wanted to encamp on this side of the Narmada but now have encamped on other side on account of our presence. They have had intentions after the rains. When we three with our armies block their way they dare not cross the river. They will be beaten by the good luck of the Emperor. I am watchful and request you also to be equally alert as the Marathas are cunning and fraudulent."

With the beginning of 1715 Dilair Afghan was busy causing troubles in south-western Malwa. He arranged to get the help from the Marathas who gathered together near Hoshangabad, crossed the Narmada at the Hindia ford and began to plunder the province. (*Akh.* Feb. 5, March 8, 1715; Letters Feb. 8, March 31). Jai Singh determined to put down Dilair Khan started from Ujjain sometime in the last week of February, and marched to Sarangpur. On March 30 he reached Sironj. Aiwaz Quli Khan accompanied him and the strength of the Imperial army increased all the more when Budh Singh Hada and Chhatra Sal Bundela with their forces joined Jai Singh. On April 10, 1715 a severe battle took place between the Imperialists and the Afghans. The losses of the Afghans were heavy and out of a force of 12,000 horse they lost

about 2,000; Jai Singh lost only 500. It was a great victory for the Imperialists and the Emperor was very much pleased to hear about it. Desirous to follow up the victory Jai Singh despatched Azam Quli Khan to pursue the fleeing Afghans, and he himself went to Alamgirpur (Bhilsa). But just then Jai Singh was forced to return hastily to Ujjain to meet the Maratha invaders, and this diversion saved Dilair Khan from being completely crushed. No sooner had Jai Singh turned his back, than Dilair Khan again raised his head, and in June, 1715 he was reported to be causing trouble near Kalabagh (*Akh.* April 10, 11, 28, June 18; Letters April 27, May 3, 1715).

Jai Singh now turned towards Ujjain to face the Maratha invaders. Even as early as last week of February, 1715 a Maratha horde led by Kanha, son of *Narsu* (?), (*Parasu*?) and Ganga was wandering near Khargon. They entered the Zamindari of Mohan Singh of Awasgarh (Barwani), collected chauth, reached as far as Dharampuri and even went to the ford but did not cross it. They returned possibly because Marhamat Khan, the *faujdar* of Mandu, was encamped on the river and they dared not risk an engagement with him. For one full month they kept on wandering on the southern bank of the Narmada. During this period they fought a severe battle with the Nizam somewhere near Burhanpur. In it the Marathas were badly defeated and Kanhu, son of Narsu, was killed. At long last on March 29, the Marathas decided to invade Malwa. Kanha (Kanhoji Bhonsle ?) and (Khande Rao) Dabhade led this horde of 30,000 horsemen, which crossed the Narmada at the Akbarpur ferry on April 1-2. The main body of the invaders kept on wandering near about Mandu, Dharampuri and Maheshwar. They even collected Rs. 500 from village Khojalun in Mandu pargana as chauth. But a small band of 3 or 4 thousand horsemen moved on northwards by way of Sadalpur (12 m. N. E. of Dhar) and Sagrod (7 m. south of Depalpur) they reached Depalpur, burnt the town and went within 4 miles of Ujjain. Once or twice these invaders had collected chauth but generally they went on plundering and devastating the villages in their way. The panic was great and all people began to flock to Ujjain for protection. Marhamat Khan took shelter behind the walls of Dhar as he was afraid of the Marathas. Urgent requests were made to Jai Singh to drive out the invaders. The news of victory of Jai Singh over Dilair Khan had by now spread far and wide, and it gave some hope to the suffering inhabitants of south-west Malwa, who wished and prayed for a second victory to Jai Singh now against the Marathas (*Akh.* April 5, May 8, June 1, 1715; Letters—March 12, April 15, 18, 21, 26, 29, May 8, 6, 1715).

Just then another Maratha horde invaded Malwa and crossed the Narmada at the Barwah ford on April 5, 1715. The vast army of 12,000 horsemen frightened Surajmal, the zamindar of Barwah, who left the ferry unguarded, and took refuge in (the fort of) Nilgarh, about 5 miles west on the Narmada. At that time an Imperial escort was on its way to Burhanpur carrying the treasures then lying with Nijabat Khan. But this escort was not prepared to face the invaders and finding no grain was left by the Marathas in the area round about Barwah it returned back to Indore. The Marathas devastated Barwah and then they marched on to Tilwara, 3 kos north of it. They demanded chauth of Kampel for the past three years. The *Amil* of Kampel went away to Ujjain, while Nandlal Chaudhuri (better known as Nandlal Mandloi) and other inhabitants of Kampel sent away their families and made ready to escape in case the Marathas came that way. Nandlal and others agreed to pay the chauth; by way of good gesture they sent two horses and some cash immediately, and requested that the villages be not plundered and burnt. (Letters—Feb. 8, April 5, 15, 26, 29, May 8, 1715). The Jaipur records do not at all tell us whether the full chauth was paid but the few unpublished Persian letters in the Mandloi *daftar* show clearly that Mandloi had paid about Rs. 25000 by way of chauth which was later taken into consideration by the Imperial authorities when realizing the State dues from him.

Jai Singh was hurrying from Bhilsa towards Ujjain, with a force of 10,000 horse, guns, *rahkals*, *shuturnāls* and other materials of war. He sent his deputy Rupram Dhabai ahead with an army, and himself reaching Ujjain on May 2, encamped at a place 2 miles south of the city whence the Maratha were constantly coming. At first the Marathas thought of resisting but later on knowing about the army of Jai Singh they began to withdraw southwards. Jai Singh too moved to the south and on May 8 he was encamped near Kampel. Just there he received a letter from Anup Singh, zamindar of Pilsud,\* in Mandu pargana saying that Kanha and Ganga have been so much overawed and terrified by the advance of Jai Singh that they were in regular flight and would ford the Narmada at the Pilsud ferry. The Marathas were in a great hurry that they were leaving behind them much of the goods and cattle which they had

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\* Pilsud,—19 miles east of Maheshwar and 2 miles north of the Narmada. The name has been differently written in different letters as Pilauda, Bahloda, Pilwa, Sodha, which all obviously refer to one place only. On a careful examination of the various details of the march and movements of Jai Singh, which have been described at length, it appears that Pilsud is the place meant there. The ferry on the Narmada is about 4 miles south-west of Pilsud.

plundered while in Malwa. Thus encouraged Jai Singh decided to make a forced march and pursue the Marathas. Budh Singh Hada, Chhatra Sal Bundela and Dhiraj Singh Khichi of Bajaranggarh were also with him. On May 10, Tuesday, Jai Singh, accompanied by these Rajas and the army, rode 38 miles and approached Pilsud just an hour before sunset. The Marathas were surprised but being rather confident of victory because of their vast numbers they faced the Imperialist army and a battle began forthwith which continued for full four hours. The neighbouring zamindars too now came out and joined the Imperialists. At last the Marathas lost heart, a panic spread among them and they began to retreat to the Pilsud Hill, about 6 miles away from the battlefield and finding that it afforded natural fortifications they camped there for the night. Jai Singh posted his army in the battlefield and passed the night there in the open. Men and horses had been without food and fodder. The army just got a few hours' rest at night, for before long when it was still dark, a few hours, before the dawn, Jai Singh started in pursuit of the Marathas whom he met a few hours after the dawn. The Marathas had suffered a serious defeat on the previous day and they were afraid to face him again. They left behind their wounded men, all the cattle and booty which they had gathered in Malwa during last few months and fled away in hot haste. Jai Singh allowed his soldiers to plunder what had been left. The losses on the Imperialist side were very few (*Akh.* May 25, June 6, 1715; *Waqia* papers, May 17, 18, 1715; Letters-May 14, 1715).

It was a great victory for the Imperialists and much beyond the expectations of Jai Singh himself. The neighbouring zamindars too admitted that such a decisive victory had never before been achieved. Rao Budh Singh of Bundi had fought bravely and had contributed much to win. The rejoicings were great, and on the day following (May 12), Budh Singh Hada and Chhatra Sal Bundela visited Jai Singh to spend time together to enjoy. The Emperor too was very much pleased with the news, expressed his sincere thanks to the Almighty and ordered that the victory be recorded in most suitable words in the *waqia* for May 17 (*Waqia* May 18, 1715; Letters-May 10, June 6, 1715).

The Marathas had been expelled from Malwa. Jai Singh had gained a great reputation by his two outstanding victories against Dilair Khan and the Marathas. The treasures which were to be brought from Burhanpur had been escorted to Malwa by the Nizam now on his way to Delhi (Letters-May 5, 1715), and hence not much remained to be done. The rains had set in and soon after Hussain



Ali had left Malwa, Jai Singh started for the capital. On September 25, 1715 Jai was summoned by the Emperor, but before Jai Singh could reach Delhi he received a letter from Hussain Ali Saiyyad, then in the Deccan, ordering him in the name of the Emperor to go to Malwa as the Marathas were still roaming there. This was evidently meant to prevent Jai Singh from going to Delhi. Jai Singh informed Hussain Ali that he had started for Malwa, but it appears that he never went to Malwa during the season, and when once again in March, 1716 the Emperor called Jai Singh to Delhi, in all haste, it was said that he might possibly be sent to Malwa where the Marathas were causing great disturbances. (Letters—Sept. 25, Oct. 27, Nov. 21, 1715 ; March 1, 1716).

The absence of Jai Singh from Malwa encouraged the Marathas to invade the province, and from the few references in the letters written during last months of 1715, we learn that they came to Malwa to create some disturbance, but other details about their movements and the exact location where they caused the disturbance are not available. Again, it is significant that there are no entries in the *Akhabarats* of these months about the disturbances in Malwa by the Marathas.

Early next year once again the Marathas invaded Malwa. One horde of 15,000 Maratha horse led by Santa (Bhonsle ?) crossed the Narmada to enter Malwa. The zamindar of Chaukigarh (25 m. S. W. of Raisin) went ahead to face the invaders and a battle was fought in which some Marathas were killed, but it was impossible to stop them. These events were reported to the Emperor in Delhi on March 25, 1716, and as by then the urgent call summoning Jai Singh to Delhi had already been sent the Emperor ordered that the deputy of Jai Singh be instructed to do the needful. During the remaining period of his Governorship of Malwa (March 1716–November 1717) Jai Singh was busy with the campaign against the Jats and the Government of Malwa was carried on by his deputy there. The Maratha invaders continued to disturb the south-eastern parts of the province, and it greatly affected collection of the revenue ; on hearing of the invasion of the Marathas the Imperial agents there collecting the state dues in Chanderi pargana delayed the collection and the subjects too hesitated to pay it off (Let. April 25, 1716). The local authorities were already busy arranging the defence of Alamgirpur (Bhilsa) and Duraha, and as soon as fresh orders were received from the Emperor, the *faujdar* of Sironj raised an additional force of 1,500 horse and 2,000 foot, and started from Sironj to punish the invaders, who had come to Sihore and Duraha (*Akh.* May 23, 1716). This activity on the part of the Imperialist officers forced the invaders to retire to the Chanda pargana.

At the same time another Maratha force crossed the Narmada at the Donkalia ford, moved northwards and reached the village of Karnawad in Diju(?) paragana, about 44 miles from Ujjain. Thence it moved towards Depalpur, burnt some villages, and after plundering them returned to the Northern bank of the Narmada and wandered about Maheshwar and Dharampuri. One small band of 500 Maratha horse raided as far as Dewas, but on account of the vigilance and care of the *amil* there they had to retire. But on their way back they plundered Sahna and a couple of villages in Dewas paragana. The panic was great and all men flocked into Ujjain for shelter. The *amil* of Dewas wrote to the Deputy-Governor of Malwa at Ujjain but the letter did not reach him. Before long the raiders were within 10 to 12 miles of Ujjain, where Rupram Dhabai, the Deputy of Jai Singh, was ready with a force of 1,500 horse and 4,000 *barqandāzes* to meet the invaders and to defend the city. The raiders, however, soon retreated southwards (March-April, 1716).

These events were reported in quick succession to the Emperor, who was greatly perturbed and became anxious for the safety of Malwa. Special messages were sent to Jai Singh, then on his way to Delhi, to send down suitable force to Malwa to defend the province and to drive the invaders out of it. And when the situation in Malwa appeared to be most critical special mace-bearers were sent by the Vazir to Jai Singh to arrange to get a force of 3,000 veteran soldiers sent to Malwa along with those mace-bearers. The Maratha raiders had already retreated to the banks of the Narmada and the Deputy-Governor did not take any active steps to sweep them out of the province, with the result that the Marathas established their thanas and outposts on the bank of the Narmada. Even Dost Muhammad Khan wrote to Jai Singh that the disturbance of the Marathas made it impossible for him to remain peacefully in his own territory (in the south-western Malwa). (*Akh.* March 25, May 23, 1716; Letters March, 1716; April 19, 27, May 13, 1716).

Maratha raids in Malwa were now becoming a rule rather than an exception and soon after the monsoons were over Maratha invasion became imminent, specially when it was reported to the Emperor early in October 1716 that a big horde of about 40,000 Maratha horse was gathering together between Berar and Khandesh to attack Ujjain soon after Dassera (Oct. 4, 1716). Jai Singh was ordered to instruct his deputy to collect a suitable force and guard very carefully the fords and passages on the Narmada. At the same time orders were sent to

Maharana Sangram Singh of Udaipur and Chhatra Sal Bundela to help the Deputy-Governor of Malwa (Let. Oct. 6, 1716).

Early months of the year 1717 were rather peaceful but with March the Maratha invasion loomed large on the horizon. On April 2, 1717 it was reported to the Emperor that Khandu (Dabhade) and other Maratha leaders were wandering in the parganas of Ashta, Devgarh and Sihore to collect chauth. Another band of 25,000 horse, led by Santa, Sawant and other Maratha leaders made a vain attempt to cross the Narmada. Jai Singh was ordered to instruct his duty in Malwa not to let the Marathas cross the river (Let. April 2, 1717). But all efforts to stop Santa failed, and he soon joined the Maratha forces in Malwa. Rupram Dhabai and Bhatt Himmat Rai, two of the prominent officials of Jai Singh in Malwa, led the Imperial forces against the Marathas. In the battle that followed the Royalists were severely defeated and both the officials fell into the hands of the invaders. Marathas marched towards Ujjain, but the defence of city was carefully organised by Laliram, son of Rupram Dhabai, and Gulab Rai, brother of Himmat Rai. They had 1,000 horse and as many musketeers all entrenched in the vicinity of the city; while another force of 500 horse led by Kaluram, the *naib-faujdar* of Ujjain, patrolled round. The Marathas, however, turned northwards, leaving Ujjain to their left.

Pancholi Biharidas, somehow secured the release of Rupram Dhabai and Bhatt Himmat Rai, and when these two returned back to Ujjain they employed an additional force of 1,000 horse-men, encouraged the citizens of Ujjain and decided to fight once again the Marathas to avenge their former defeat. But it was reported that the Marathas were wandering near Sitamau, about 64 miles north of Ujjain, and hence the Imperial army decided not to move out of Ujjain.

Jai Singh sent consolatory letters to Dhabai and Himmat Rai and ordered them to work with all the vigour. All sorts of rumours about their release from the Marathas were current. The most popular of them was that the two officials on agreeing to pay Rs. 2 lakhs, were released on leaving some of their men as hostages with the Marathas. They were allowed to return to Ujjain to remit the promised sum. Jai Singh made enquiries about the authenticity of this rumour from more than one person. In their replies sent by the officials and other men then in Ujjain, all say that talks of the Dhabai and Himmat Rai having agreed to pay 2 lakhs of rupees were false; no hostages were left by them nor did they collect any amount to be paid to the Marathas. The few letters that give all

these details do not contain any date which could help us to determine exactly when these events occurred nor do they supply the name of the place where this battle was fought. It can just be guessed that the events occurred sometime in April-May, 1717.

The Imperialists had suffered a severe defeat, and the prestige of the deputies of Jai Singh in Malwa was greatly shattered. Jai Singh was still conducting the campaign against the Jats and could not possibly be spared to go to Malwa. Other political developments, specially the strained relations between the Emperor and the Saiyyad brothers, necessitated a full-fledged, strong, governor in Malwa. Muhammad Amin Khan wrote to Jai Singh on August 9, 1717 that he was appointed to punish the villains; he did not know till some time later that he was appointed the governor of the province also.

The defeat of the Imperialist forces led by Rupram and Himmat Rai greatly encouraged the Marathas, and on their return journey they picked up a quarrel with Dost Muhammad Khan Ruhela, in which the Ruhela killed the nephew of Santa. But the rains were approaching and Santa decided to wait till the season was over for his vengeance. The Marathas returned to Bhilsa pargana and exacted as much as they possibly could from the villages in the way. Moreover, Santa killed the Chaudharis of Handia pargana and set up his own thana there. Emboldened by these successes Santa in June-July, 1717 sent letters to Dost Muhammad Khan Ruhela and Shyam Singh, Chaudhuri of Duraha, asking them to pay rupees 2 lakhs as dues to the Marathas threatening them in case of non-compliance to invade their territories immediately after the monsoons were over. Dost Muhammad, however, sternly refused to pay. The power of the Marathas was, however, increasing and even during the rains they raided Kampel and Dewas, and took away 7,000 blankets. (Let. Sept. 10, 1717).

During the rains Santa and his followers encamped near Seoni and Kalibhit. They seized two parganas from Fateh Singh, the zamindar of Kalibhit, and appointed 700 horsemen in the fortress of Saiwas by way of a thana, imposed *rāhdāri* tax on the travellers and blocked all passages on that side (Let. Sept. 10, 1717). The fact that Santa encamped near Handia made the Imperialists feel the need of strengthening the outposts of Handia and those in its neighbourhood to guard against all future raids from the Marathas.

In the meanwhile the Emperor had appointed Muhammad Amin Khan, Governor of Malwa, who was on his way to his new charge.

Moreover, soon after Hussain had made peace with the Marathas, restricting thereby the possibility of their attacks to a few private individuals only. The Royalists once again became active and when in March 1718 Santa invaded Malwa the Royalist soldiers persued him. Within six days of their leaving Ujjain they defeated Santa and on March 15, 1718 forced him to submit. The victors were in such high spirits that they even thought of putting an end to the life of Santa. But then Balaji Vishwanath, the Peshwa, intervened and secured his pardon. The Royalists did not want to displease the Peshwa and hence his request could not be ignored.

The country was rid of all invaders; all disturbances had been ended, and peace and tranquility were once again in sight. But all this continued only at the sweet will of the Maratha authorities, and no sooner had Baji Rao succeeded his father as Peshwa and had thought of an aggressive policy than all peace and tranquility in Malwa disappeared. Granting that the changed political situation and internal dissensions between the various high officials of the Empire greatly assisted the Marathas, it must be asserted that the weak points in the provincial administration of Malwa had begun to appear even during the reign of Farukhsiyar and it was just a matter of time for them to grow. And when the violent storms of the Maratha invasions swept over the province the tottering edifice collapsed; there was utter confusion and complete anarchy in the whole of Malwa.

# A GREAT MARATHA SERVICE TO SOUTH INDIA IN THE PRE-SHIVAJI EPOCH

By

Rao Saheb C. S. SRINIVASACHARI, M.A.

## *I The decline of the Hindu Empire*

After the Empire of Vijayanagar was shattered at the battle of Rakhas Tangadi (ordinarily known as Talikota) it was felt, as assumed by scholars even at the present time, that the era of Hindu greatness and independence in South India had ended and Mussalman expansion into the land was bound to proceed apace. But Tirumalaraya, the survivor of the Aravidu brothers, regained power so far as to exercise an effective capacity for intervention in the affairs of the Bahmani kingdoms. Sriranga who succeeded Tirumalaraya about A.D. 1578, had to work hard against Golconda aggression in order to keep its power off his Empire. The danger from the Muhammadans to the South became all the greater towards the end of the 16th century, since both Bijapur and Golconda had come to a mutual understanding that their policy should be not to play into the hands of the Hindu power and each should fix for its career of expansion a distinct groove, respecting the other's sphere of activity. Bijapur was to extend in the plateau region in the east of Mysore and thence across the Ghats descending to Vellore and Gingee; while Golconda agreed to have for its sphere the whole of the lower Karnatak below the Ghats, extending from the lower valley of the Krishna to the Chingleput district. Sriranga had numerous difficulties to overcome and was, on one occasion, even taken prisoner by the Muhammadans. He had created two viceroyalties, one at Seringapatam to control all the territory of the Mysore plateau extending northward to the Tungabhadra, and the other at Chandragiri which was to govern all the region along the plains, down to the extreme south. At the time of his death (1586) the Hindu Empire was more or less intact, and Golconda's expansion had not proceeded far to the south of the Krishna.

Venkatapati, the next Raya, had already been the viceroy at Chandragiri and ruled down to 1614. He also contrived to keep the Empire

intact and to beat off the attacking Muhammadan army from Penukonda with the help of Jaggadeva Raya, the governor of Chennapattana, and of the brave Raghunatha Nayak, the heir to the throne of Tanjore. His reign also witnessed the extinction of the viceroyalty of Seringapatam and the setting up in real independence of the Udayars of Mysore. In the civil war that followed the death of Venkata, Yachama Nayak who tried to champion the cause of the legitimate heir, Ranga, and was supported only by Achyuta Nayak of Tanjore and his son Raghunatha, against Jagga Raya and almost all the feudatories of the Empire, the former or legitimist party was defeated in a great battle at Topur, near the Grand Anicut on the Coleroon. In this battle the Nayaks of Gingee and Madura fell on the field, and even a Portuguese contingent is said to have taken the side of Jagga Raya according to the *Raghunāthābhyaṇam*. It is this battle of Topur that, more than other factors, constituted the most serious cause for the decline and dismemberment of Vijayanagar. The newly started state of Mysore held aloof from the civil war and the powerful Nayak of Madura was the head of the disloyal combination. Perhaps, the Mysore ruler feared the possibility of imminent Muhammadan attacks on his own northern frontier. From now the Nayak rulers of Madura aimed at achieving a total independence of their royal masters; while Mysore had to maintain an ever vigilant watch against the unceasing Bijapur aggression. The central power in the state now became "the unenviable spectator in all the quarrels, shiftings and changes of frontiers between its greater feudatories, particularly Mysore and Madura." In the half a century of confusion that intervened the battle of Topur and the death of Shahji in 1664, Mysore did some service to the Hindu Empire by resisting the aggressions of Bijapur, though ultimately the latter power was able to occupy the districts of Chitaldrug, Tumkur and Kolar and also one half of Bangalore. Through all the vicissitudes of the Empire in this epoch, Madura discharged no such duty either to herself or to the Empire. In one sense indeed Mysore could claim to have acted as the champion of the Empire, while Madura had not that credit or claim. When Sriranga III ascended the throne of Chandragiri some time about 1642, the Empire was in a very bad condition and could barely maintain an unequal struggle for existence, chiefly through the want of loyalty of the feudatories of the south, particularly of the powerful Tirumala Nayak of Madura. The Raya made even at this moment an organised effort to bring these Nayaks under effective allegiance to him. In this move of his, he could let Mysore go on her own path, as she had so far committed herself to no open act of disloyalty, but on the other hand, by actually occupying the region of the previous Chennapattana viceroyalty, had put herself in the way of

the aggressions of Bijapur, thus rendering a service to the Empire, though only indirectly.

With regard to the aggressions of Golconda, the Empire had to bear their brunt alone and unaided. Madura which was the only strong feudatory power, did not perceive this root danger to the Hindu cause; and its non-co-operation and frequent treachery might be regarded as the primary factor responsible for the extinction of the Hindu Empire. This evil was accomplished under the able rule of Tirumala Nayak who is usually regarded by historians as the greatest of the line of the Madura rulers. Mysore openly threw off its nominal allegiance to Vijayanagar only in 1646.

## *II Shahji and the Bijapur Aggression*

It was also about this period that the chiefship of Ikkeri (Bednore) was coming into prominence. The Bijapur invasions across the Tungabhadra into the Mysore plateau first injured and broke up the viceroyalty of Chennapattana and attacked, besides, the territories under the chief of Bednore. They absorbed the region that afterwards constituted the Nawabship of Sira as described by Col. Wilks and then encroached southwards into the district dependent upon Chennapattana and Bangalore and contrived to occupy them in a series of invasions undertaken by Randullah Khan and Mustafa Khan in 1636 and the following years.

It was now that Shahji showed himself in his most important aspect as the ultimate saviour of the Hindu cause. Along with Randullah Khan he attacked the Nayak of Ikkeri and occupied his capital as well as a half of his kingdom (1637-38). Two years later, he once again helped in the defeat of the Nayak but also contributed to his subsequent restoration to his principality. It was about this time also that the Nayak of Sira was defeated and killed treacherously by Afzal Khan, one of the Bijapur generals, in the course of an attempted negotiation. Sira was handed over to Kenga Hanuma of Basavaptam the sworn enemy of the Nayak of Ikkeri; while Kempe Gowda the chief of Bangalore was also threatened into submission and forced to retire to Savandurga. Shahji had been promised a jagir in these new conquests of Bijapur and was given actual charge of Bangalore in 1638. He subdued the Udayar ruler of Seringapatam, Kanthirava Narasaraja, but arranged to leave him undisturbed in possession of his territory and fort. He is also credited, according to the *Shiva Bharata*, with winning over the Nayaks of Madura and Kaveri-



patam to his side. He distinguished himself again in the attack on Kenga Hanuma of Basavapatam. A most distinguished achievement of Shahji at this point of his career was his creation of a confederacy of the local Nayaks and of several Maratha and Muslim chiefs in support of the Bijapur invaders against the powerful Sivappa Nayak of Ikkeri, who had restored and vastly increased the strength of his state and who showed himself a warm supporter of the cause of the Hindu Emperor. Thus in 1644 and in subsequent years Shahji contrived to earn further honours for himself and to organize a combination of the Nayaks of Gingee, Madura and Tanjore against the opposition of Raya and against Jaggadeva of Kaveripatam. When Vellore was invested by the Bijapur forces, Shahji commanded the right wing of the army and was given the charge of that place along with a Muhammadan colleague as well as the high titles of *Maharaj* and *Farzand*. His achievements are not fully outlined in the *Muhammad Nāmā* of Zahur, a Bijapur historian who was a *protege* of one of his enemies. Shahji contrived to become, by 1648, the governor of all the Bijapur conquests below the Ghats (hence called Karnatak Bijapur Balaghat). He ruled over all these territories from Bangalore, but sometimes also from Kolar and Dodballapur. The chiefs who were restored to their territories by him were transferred to the less productive parts in their respective lands; and this resulted in bringing under cultivation and attracting settlers and cultivators to the more neglected parts of the country. Thus the chief of Basavapatam was given Tarikere, that of Bangalore was sent to Magadi; the ruler of Hoskote was sent to Anekel, the chief of Kolar was given Punganur; and the Nayak of Sira was transferred to Ratnagiri.

When the great campaign of 1648 was being waged by Bijapur against Gingee, consequent on its investment by Mir Jumla, the famous general of Golconda, Shahji found that the Bijapur troops, instead of helping Tirumala Nayak of Madura who had repented of his short-sighted policy and sought an alliance with them for the defence of the Gingee Nayak was actually in league with the foe. He saw that his Muslim colleague had come to a secret understanding with the enemy and therefore contrived to prolong the operations. After the Bijapurians had acquired Gingee towards the end of 1648, Shahji became even more powerful than before. Even during the course of the operations against the place, Nawab Mustafa Khan, the Bijapur generalissimo, had begun to fear that Shahji might help and was even then secretly planning a powerful combination of the Hindu rulers of the country consisting of the Nayaks of Madura, Tanjore and Gingee and of the chiefs of Mysore, Kaveripatam and Ikkeri,

the coalition to be headed by the Emperor Sriranga and Shahji himself. Then followed Shahji's imprisonment at Bijapur at the instance of his redoubtable enemy, Mustafa Khan. His release from prison must have been due in some measure to the opportune death of his enemy Mustafa Khan and partly to the threatening attitude of the Mughals who now began a series of attacks on the northern frontier of Bijapur.

Shahji returned to his gubernatorial charge in the south in 1651; soon afterwards he contrived to capture the great fortress of Penukonda and to recapture Vellore and finally confined the last Rayalu to the possession of Chandragiri and its immediate neighbourhood. In the years 1654-58, he was engaged most actively in subduing the refractory poligars in his dominions. It was now that his son, Ekoji, who later on became the founder of the Maratha dynasty of Tanjore, conquered the country round Srisailem. It was now also that Shahji bought over the Nayak of Tanjore to his side and proceeded to invest Trichinopoly (the then capital of the Madura Nayak), though fruitlessly for the time being. Shahji next turned against his own ally, the Tanjore Nayak, assaulted his capital and captured Mannārkoil (Mannārgudi) and Vallam Kottai (a fort near the capital). He subsequently contrived to break up a powerful combination made by Chokkanatha Nayak of Madura (*acc.* 1660) for the restoration of the Raya and for the recapture of Gingee from Bijapur. He easily contrived to break up the combination and even made an attempt at the dethronement of the Nayak himself, cleverly seducing the Tanjore ruler from this alliance. One achievement of Shahji stands out prominently at this stage. He took advantage of the departure of Mir Jumla from Golconda to Hindustan in the train of Aurangzeb and of the consequent absence of any serious Muhammadan opposition to him on the Carnatic coast. He captured the fort of Tegnapatam (Cuddalore) and also the important port of Porto Novo. He made Porto Novo the base of his operations against the Tanjore kingdom which had now become his objective and aimed to bring all ports in this part of the coast into his possession. He was now definitely convinced that the Bijapur Sultanate would soon die out; and also, perhaps, he now planned a combination of his forces with those of his son Shivaji, for the destruction of Bijapur in entirety. He died in 1664 shortly after effecting an understanding with the Bijapur general sent to oust him from his position. At the time of his death his power extended from Bangalore, Kolar and Nandidrug to Gingee, Tegnapatam and Porto Novo.

### *III Shahji's Services to South India*

Shahji appears, almost from the very commencement of his career in the Carnatic, to have occupied a position of considerable importance. His

first co-adjustor, Randullah Khan, was very friendly towards him and appointed him to the charge of Bangalore even when it was first conquered. The fact that Chikkadevaraya Udayar of Mysore ultimately effected the purchase of Bangalore from Ekoji, the son of Shahji, in 1684, would seem to show that the family retained almost continuously the possession of Bangalore. The *Shiva Bhārata* distinctly says in several places that Shahji was very important throughout his career in the Carnatic. We may conclude effectively, judging by the combined results of all the sources of information, that Shahji played from the first an important part in the conquests of the various petty states of the Karnatak for Bijapur and step by step, he was able to build from out of these conquests a pretty big government for himself certainly under the authority of his masters at Bijapur to begin with, but gradually to become more or less entirely his own in the inefficiency and division of interests that were the bane of later Bijapur history, with the Damocles' sword of Mughal conquest hanging over its head. It is just possible, although it could not be satisfactorily maintained, and proved that Shahji showed himself friendly to the interests of Sri Ranga Raya on one occasion and that he tried to enter the service of the Qutub Shah another time.

When Bijapur finally fell in 1686, Shahji's work was visible in the existence of the Maratha State in the south, generally called the Tanjore Raj, but extending far into the plateau and constituting a comparatively large bit of the Karnatak. The southern portion of Shahji's territory seemed more justifiably independent and more possible of reconstruction as the successors of the vanished Empire of Vijayanagar. Shahji seems to have possessed some real elements of culture and learning relating to the Dravida country. From the references in the *Rādha-Māhava-Vilāsa-Champu*, a prose-poem by one Jayaram Pindiya, we find that his court at Bangalore was cultured and refined and that he patronized men of learning on a liberal scale. Shahji himself composed a *samasya* in Sanskrit and was followed by Malhari Bhatta, Naropant Hanmante and fifteen others in Sanskrit and thirty-five additional persons came forward in the court to set *śamasyas* in the different vernaculars of the country. Naropant and his sons Janardan Pant and Raghunath Pant were well known ministers at the court of Shahji and his son Ekoji.

The Maratha element was introduced, as a result of Shahji's conquests, into the north of Mysore as well as into the other districts below the Ghats that he conquered and ruled. Marathi became the revenue and official language of Bijapur by the time of Ibrahim Adil Shah, the fourth king of

the line. Naturally enough and effectively also Marathi came to be the dominant language of several parts of upper and lower Carnatic from this period. During the days of the rule of Carnatic Nawabs and also for a considerable number of years even after the establishment of British power, a dialect of Marathi, though much corrupted by its contact with Urdu and with Dravidian languages, was in use the official language of accounts in all the districts of the Madras Presidency till 1855 when it ceased to be so. This official language differed as much from the Tanjore Marathi dialect as the latter differed from the pure Marathi of Maharashtra. Its abolition as the language of accounts in Tanjore was coeval with the extinction of the titular dignity of the Maratha Rajahs of Tanjore. Shahji should be remembered as the preserver, to an appreciable extent, of the Hindu heritage of Vijayanagar and its feudatory kingdoms and as having injected into it a Maratha strain which was perhaps the only available and effective remedy for its preservation.



# THE QUEST OF THE GOLDEN FLEECE

BY

CHARLES A. KINCAID, C. V. O., I. C. S. (Retd.)

Some forty years ago there used to be a great deal of talk about the "Gold drain" from various countries especially from India to England. That talk has died down nowadays; nevertheless readers of Rao Bahadur Sardesai Memorial Volume may be interested to read of the first genuine "Gold drain" in history, the robbery of the golden fleece by a band of Greek sailors from Colchis on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea.

Modern scholars explain that the fleeces were used by the Colochians to catch the alluvial gold, as it was washed down by the neighbouring rivers. The Greeks raiding Colchis carried off a number of gold saturated sheepskins and thus gave rise to the legend. This is not impossible; but let us now turn to the legend itself. In his "*Heroes*" Charles Kingsley wrote the story of the Quest; but whence did he obtain his materials? He took them from the "*Argonautica*" an epic poem written by Apollonius Rhodius, a poet born in Alexandria about B.C. 255. He became the pupil of the famous Greek writer Callimachus, but afterwards quarrelled with him. Apollonius' publication of the "*Argonautica*", in which he described the expedition in four long books of verse, gave Callimachus his chance; and he and his friends slated the poem, much in the style in which Macaulay slated Robert Montgomery. Disgusted at the reception of his work, Apollonius left Alexandria for Rhodes and settled there, taking the title of Rhodius or the Rhodian. There the critics were unbiassed and were also jealous of Alexandria, so they lauded their new poet to the skies. Eventually the Rhodians' praises influenced the views of Alexandria and as Callimachus' vogue declined, the *Argonautica* rose in favour. At last about B.C. 194 Apollonius was appointed Librarian in the Royal Museum of the Ptolemies and this post he held until his death in B.C. 181. The *Argonautica* has never been very popular with English scholars for the arbitrary reason that it was written after the golden age of Athenian literature; but it was very popular in ancient Rome. The poet Varro translated it into

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Latin verse and Virgil borrowed from it several incidents in the 1st and 3rd books of the *Aeneid*.


Now let us come to the legend itself. The *Argonautica* like the *Iliad* does not begin at the beginning of things. The reader is made suddenly aware that Pelias, king of Iolcus in Thessaly, has ordered his nephew Jason to sail to Colchis and bring back the golden fleece. But a great many things had happened previously and they must be related before the reader can understand the story.

A beautiful Greek princess Tyro had loved Poseidon or *Varuna*, the sea god and borne him a son called Pelias. Afterwards she married a mortal prince called Cretheus, the king of Iolcus and she bore him a son called Aeson. This Aeson was the father of Jason. When Cretheus died, his lawful heir was Aeson, but his half brother Pelias, the son of Poseidon, usurped the throne of Iolcus. Aeson fled with his son Jason. When Jason grew up, he went to his uncle's city, resolved to demand at any rate a share in the kingdom. In the meantime Pelias had learnt from an oracle that he should beware of a man, who came to him wearing only one sandal. Now it so happened that Jason had lost one sandal, when fording the river Anaurus. He had stopped to carry across the stream an old woman and his sandal had stuck in the mud. The old woman turned out to be Hera or *Lakshmi* and she was furious with Pelias, because he had not invited her to a feast given by him in honour of his father Poseidon. She blessed Jason and promised him her help whenever he needed it. Fortified by her blessing, Jason went to Pelias' house. The king noticed that he had only one sandal and learning that he was his nephew and the real heir to the throne, judged that he was bent on murder to regain his rights. Pelias promptly commanded the boy to prove his manhood by going to Colchis and bringing back the golden fleece.

The next question is "What was the golden fleece?"

No account of it is given in the poem, but its origin was as follows:—One Athamas was king of Orchomenus in Bœotia. At the bidding of Hera or *Lakshmi*, he married Nephele and by her became the father of a son and a daughter, Phrixus and Helle. Afterwards Athamas fell in love with Ino, the daughter of Cadmus, king of Thebes and by her had two sons. Ino persuaded Athamas to sacrifice Phrixus to Zeus or *Vishnu*, so that her own sons might succeed to the throne. Nephele hid her children and bade them flee from the country on a ram with a golden fleece, that the gods

had given Athamas as a reward for his previous piety. Phrixus, taking with him his sister Helle and a part of the royal treasure, mounted the ram. It rose in the air and made for the Black Sea. Passing over the Hellespont or Dardanelles, Helle fell off and was drowned. The ram carried Phrixus to Colchis, where he sacrificed it to Ares or *Mangal* the War god. The king of Colchis was Aeetes, the son of Helios or *Surya* the Sun. He at first received Phrixus kindly and gave to him in marriage his daughter Chalciope. Later to obtain the golden fleece, he murdered Phrixus. The latter's spirit remained unappeased and the Greek kings and nobles were anxious to avenge his death and recover the fleece. This was especially the case in Iolcus because the royal family were related to that of Phrixus as the following table will show.



It was, therefore, not unnatural that Jason should join in an expedition against Colchis. On receiving his uncle Pallas' order, he collected all the royal and noble youths he could and had constructed with the help of Athene, a Greek goddess for whom there is no Indian equivalent, the ship Argo. This is the point at which the poem begins.

All the heroes' names and families have been given by Apollonius and this is the duller part of the poem. Jason said goodbye tenderly to his mother Alcimede and joining his comrades begged them to choose a leader. At first they wanted to choose the strongest youth present, namely Heracles, the *Bhima* of the party; but he refused and insisted on Jason's election. Jason agreed to be captain and decided to leave at once.

They first touched at the island of Lemnos. It so happened that the Lemnian women had shortly before, murdered their husbands, because of their infidelities with captive women. There was not in fact a male left on the island. As the women did not wish to grow old without sons to defend them, they entertained the Argonauts so agreeably, that with their help they reseeded Lemnos. At last Heracles, who had not taken a Lemnian mistress, insisted on the Argonauts continuing their journey. They reembarked reluctantly and met with their next



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adventure in the Propontis or Sea of Marmora. There they anchored on the Asiatic shore and were welcomed by the local king Cyzicus and helped him to destroy some very unpleasant neighbours, each of whom had six arms and hands. They set sail again, but were driven back by headwinds to Cyzicus' domain without knowing it. This time their former friend, not recognizing them, attacked them. A battle ensued in which Cyzicus was killed. The Argonauts were stricken with horror at his death and mourned for him for twelve days and nights. Then they sailed up the Propontis to the mouth of the river Cos. Here they landed, so that Heracles, who had broken his oar, might fashion himself another one. Just as he had chosen a suitable tree, his page Hylas came to an untimely end. The boy had gone to draw water, but as he bent to fill his pitcher, a river nymph fell in love with him and dragged him in. Heracles and his friend Polyphemus looked for Hylas everywhere and while they were searching for him, the Argonauts not noticing their absence sailed away without them.

Their next stage brought them to the kingdom of the Bebryces, whose king Amycus was a son of Poseidon or *Varuna*. His habit was to challenge all strangers, who landed on his shores to a boxing match. As he was immensely strong, he had hitherto struck dead all his opponents. Had Heracles been present, he would with a single blow have knocked Amycus senseless. In his absence the Argonauts put forward Polydeuces, the brother of Helen, the princess who caused the Trojan war. Polydeuces after several rounds felled Amycus and in the ensuing fight the Argonauts plundered the possessions of the Bebryces. With their plunder they sailed away until they reached Salmydessa, where they found Phineas, a relative of two of the Argonauts, Zetes and Calis, the sons of the north wind. As a punishment for revealing by his prophetic gifts too much of the future, Phineas had been deprived of his sight and harassed by the Harpies. These monsters used to swoop down and carry off everything that he tried to eat, so that the poor blind king was dying of starvation. Zetes and Calis, who could fly as fast as the Harpies, attacked and drove them off, exacting a promise that they would harass Phineas no more. The grateful Phineas gave the Argonauts all they wanted and they started off again. They were in the Bosphorus and wished to issue thence into the Black Sea; but before they could do so, they had to pass through the Symplegades or Clashing Rocks. These opened to let a ship pass through and then closing crushed it to pieces. The Argonauts first loosed a dove and seeing it fly safely through the gap with the loss only of its tail feathers, rowed at the Rocks at full speed. The goddess

Athene pushed the Argo's stern and she reached the Black Sea with the loss only of her poop ornament.

In the Black Sea they came to the island of Ares, where they were attacked by huge birds, the feathers of which were iron-tipped like arrows; but they frightened them away by clashing their shields. On the island they found the sons of Phrixus and Chalciopé, whom Aetes had sent to recover their possessions in Orchomenus. The king had given them a crazy ship hoping that they would drown. The ship had foundered but Phrixus and his three brothers had swum to the island. Jason took them on board the Argo, to act as his guides to Aea, the capital of Aetes.

On reaching Aea, the Argonauts did not go all at once to Aetes' palace. Jason resolved to go alone with the sons of Phrixus. Chalciopé greeted her son, as a mother should; but Aetes was angry at the unexpected return of his unloved grandsons. They told of their shipwreck and introducing Jason said that he had come in search of the golden fleece. Aetes, who had murdered his son-in-law to get it was furious; but he disguised his rage and offered Jason the fleece, if he could yoke two brazen footed, fire breathing bulls, plough with them the field of the War god and sow it with serpent's teeth. The task was impossible, as Aetes well knew; nevertheless Jason accepted it and would have been killed, had Aetes' daughter Medea not fallen passionately in love with him. She was a mighty sorceress and once in love with Jason, she helped him with all her science. She gave him ointment that made his body impervious to wounds for a whole day. Jason rubbed himself and his weapons with it and went forth to do the task set to him. King Aetes and his Colchians were massed in thousands to watch him die. The brazenfooted bulls charged, but he caught them by the horns, threw them on the ground and yoked them to a plough. Then he drove them up and down the War god's field, sowing the serpent's teeth, as he went. When the sowing was over, he loosed the bulls and drove them off; but then he became aware that from the serpent's teeth warriors were springing up in the furrows. Medea had warned him and had told him to throw a rock among them. This Jason did and instantly the earth-born warriors turned to fight each other. As they did so, he rushed in and slaughtered them.

Jason's task was over; but Aetes had no mind to keep his word and give the stranger the fleece. Moreover he suspected that Medea must

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have helped Jason. She fled in terror to the Argo and that night led Jason to the secret grove where hung the fleece.

An unsleeping serpent guarded it, but Medea's song and charms put it to sleep. Over the unconscious monster Jason stepped and took the golden fleece from the oaktree where it hung. The hero and the maiden returned to the Argo at dawn and the Argonauts rowed off with the plunder. Some hours later Aeetes and the Colchian fleet rowed after them. One squadron under Aeetes' favourite son Absyrtus cut off the Argonauts and they seemed likely to fall into Aeetes' merciless hands. By treachery, however, Medea and Jason rid themselves of Absyrtus. On the death of their leader the Colchians scattered, and so the Argonauts escaped.

They had, however to expiate their treachery and this they could only do by visiting Circe, the sister of Aeetes. She lived on the far side of Italy and they had to sail or row the Argo there. Unfortunately the ancient Greeks knew very little of the course of the rivers of Central Europe; Apollonius made the Argonauts traverse Bulgaria, Servia, Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Adriatic, apparently by rowing up the Danube. They then crossed the Adriatic, entered the Po and sailing through northern Italy found themselves in some mysterious way in the Rhone. Thence they entered the Mediterranean. Coasting northern Italy, they reached the promontory, where Circe lived and found her washing her head in seawater. Surprised though she was, she heard her niece's story and absolved her of the guilt of fratricide. Then Hera sent Thetis, a sea goddess who had married Pelias, one of the Argonauts, to tell them to embark at once, promising to guide them through the Straits of Messina. In these straits a giant octopus called Scylla picked sailors off their ships and a huge whirlpool called Charybdis sucked down vessels into its depths. Thetis guided the Argo past these perils and brought them safely to Corcyra. Alcinous, the king of the island welcomed them; but suddenly a great Colchian fleet, hearing of Argo's course, overtook them. Arete, Alcinous' queen, persuaded her husband to refuse to separate Medea from Jason, who on the island had consummated their marriage.

The Argonauts were now close to Greece, but other troubles awaited them. They were blown out of their course as far as Libya or Tripoli. There the Argo was caught in the shoals, so they had to carry their ship for twelve days through the Libyan desert, until they were able to launch her again on the sea. They first made Crete of which the coast was

guarded by a brazen man called Talos. Him Medea killed by her magic and the Argonauts drew water and sailed without further adventure to Iolcus whence they had started.

At this point the *Argonautica* ends ; and to finish the story we have, like the readers of the original *Ramayana*, to seek elsewhere. The Roman poet Ovid is our chief authority and he relied on Greek legend. He has told us that the marriage of Jason and Medea did not turn out happily. On his return to Iolcus Jason found that the usurper Pelias had killed Aeson, Jason's father. Medea plotted to revenge this murder. She did so very effectively. She first cut up a ram, boiled it in a cauldron and from the pieces she drew forth a strong and healthy lamb. She thus persuaded Pelias' daughters to cut up and boil their father, promising to restore him to youth and vigour. But once they had done this, she refused to use her magic and Pelias remained dead. Jason hoped to recover his inheritance, but Pelias' son Adrastus drove him out of Thessaly. He and Medea fled to Corinth. There Jason abandoned Medea to marry Creusa, the daughter of Creon, king of Corinth. In revenge Medea sent her rival a poisoned garment. It set on fire not only Creusa, but the palace as well. It was burnt down and with it perished Creon. Medea thereafter killed her children by Jason and fled to Athens in a chariot drawn by winged dragons. There she tried to poison Theseus. Failing in this attempt she got into her dragon car and flew to Central Asia. She married an Asiatic king and bore him a son called Medus, who gave his name to the country known as Media. Jason was killed by the fall of Argo's poop, that crushed him as he slept near it.

Such is the story of the Quest of the Golden Fleece. It is immensely old, for it was referred to by Homer, who wrote some nine hundred years before Christ. It shares with the *Odyssey* and the *Mahabharata*, the honour of being one of the three finest stories in the world. It formed the subject of an epic poem by an Alexandrian poet in the third century B. C. It was retold in immortal prose by an English writer Charles Kingsley and hardly less well by an American author, Nathaniel Hawthorne. I have made use of it for my humble tribute to that talented and great hearted historian of the Marathas, Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai.



# THE POLICY OF MARATHA RULERS TOWARDS WILD TRIBES

BY

R. N. SALETORE, M.A.

One of the most important problems of the Maratha rulers, from the days of their contention for sovereignty down to the extinction of their independence in A.D. 1818, was to deal with the various wild tribes who played an important part in the history of Maharashtra. If these dealings of the Marathas with the Mīnās, the Ghāssias, the Bhils, Kolis and Bēḍars are carefully examined, it is possible to discover the trends of a regular policy promulgated by the sovereigns of Maharashtra towards these people of the forest as they are properly called by Kauṭalya.

Such a policy of the Maratha rulers towards these wild tribes was by no means a Maratha invention, for ancient writers on Polity like Kauṭalya, Śukrācārya and others had already laid down specified directions for dealing with such people from very early times. These injunctions may be broadly divided into two attitudes: one of repression and the other of conciliation. Of these two methods, the latter policy of conciliation appears to have been more often recommended by such writers on Polity, although the Marathas never ceased to enforce strong measures to crush the various risings of these wild people during the different periods of Maratha sovereignty.

The policy of repression must have been suggested by Kauṭalya and other writers out of sheer political necessity, because, when the foresters wrought havoc, the only just recourse to administrators in order to meet such a political emergency was to crush the disturbance. But as the extinction of the wild tribes was neither practicable, owing to their numbers, nor in any way desirable, especially owing to their utility in time of war, the shrewder and more sensible suggestion of conciliating and utilising their strength was recommended. Kauṭalya therefore suggested that "The king shall avoid taking possession of any country which is liable to the inroads of enemies and wild tribes."<sup>1</sup> He added that

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1. Kauṭalya, *Arthashastra*, Bk, II, Ch. I. p. 47. (Shamasastri's ed. 1929).

the Superintendent of Passports had to watch the movements of the enemies or wild tribes by sending information by flying the pigeons of the royal households with passes (*Mudra*) or causing fire and smoke at successive distances.<sup>1</sup> The capture of a fort was thought to be "conducive to the protection of territory and to the distruction of wild tribes."<sup>2</sup> In fact, these wild tribes were considered a perennial menace to the peace of a kingdom. "That land" said Kauṭalya "on the border of which there are a number of forts, giving shelter to bands of thieves, *Mlechas* and wild tribes, is a land with a constant enemy."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, according to Bhāradwāja, the driving out of wild tribes constitutes one of the duties of the ministers of a ruler.<sup>4</sup> Consequently Kautalya conceived that "whoever helps him (a king) against the enemy, the enemy's ally, his neighbour and the wild tribes is a friend affording enjoyment on all sides." (*Sarvātabhōgi*).<sup>5</sup> This was because brave thieves and wild tribes "make no distinction between friend and a foe"<sup>6</sup> and consequently no trust could be placed in them.

According to Śukra, however, the foresters were not to be forgotten in matters of war and peace. In an army, he recommended, that the first to be placed were the lower officers and servants, then the Commander, then followed the infantry, the cavalry, the men of the horse, the men on elephants, the attendants, the guns and ordinances, the bodyguards and aid-de-camps and finally the foresters.<sup>7</sup> These wild tribes were apparently to be paid 'conveyances' by the State, for, when dealing with the army, Śukra says that "*Kirāts* and people living in forests who are dependant on their own resources and strength (belong to this class)."<sup>8</sup> Such being the consideration which was to be meted out to them by the State, it is but natural that he should have suggested that such foresters were to be tried with the assistance of foresters only.<sup>9</sup>

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1. Kauṭalya, *op. cit.* Bk. II, Ch. XXXIV, p. 158.

2. *Ibid.* Bk. VII, Ch. IV, p. 302.

3. *Ibid.* Bk. VII, Ch. X, p. 322.

4. *Ibid.* Bk. VIII, Ch. I, p. 349.

5. *Ibid.* Bk. VII, Ch. XVI, p. 339.

6. *Ibid.* *op. cit.* Bk. XIII, Ch. III, p. 429.

7. *S'ukraniti*. Ch. I, lines 506-12, p. 34. (Sarkar), text (Oppert) p. 22.

8. *Ibid.* Ch. IV, Sec. VII, 28, p. 217, text p. 179.

9. *Ibid.* Sec. V, l. 44, p. 185, text p. 149. '*aranyāstu svakāih kuryāssārthikassarthikaisaha.*'

But the task of a statesman did not end with the destruction of wild tribes, for the shrewd Hindu writers saw that their power could be well utilised in increasing the prosperity of a State. Kauṭalya advanced several ways of making the best of such tribes. "Whoever among the neighbouring kings threatens an invasion, he may be made to incur the displeasure of wild tribes of his enemies."<sup>1</sup> "When a king, situated between a conqueror and his enemy, is possessed of forts, wild tribes<sup>2</sup> and kinds of help, he proves an impediment to the way of the strong.", Another of the ways was to employ them in the State army, which, of course, had to be paid. Referring to such levies Kauṭalya says that "one has to pay the army of wild tribes either with raw produce or with allowance for plunder."<sup>3</sup> Then, with the aid of a neighbouring king or a wild chief, "local enemies may be destroyed outside the kingdom."<sup>4</sup> The king may "harass the enemy's rear on all sides and he may devastate the enemy's country with the help of wild tribes."<sup>5</sup> When a country was conquered, whoever of the enemy's family is capable of wresting the conquered territory and is taking shelter in a wild tract on the border, often harassing the conqueror, should be provided with a sterile portion of territory or with a fourth part of a fertile tract, on the condition of supplying to the conqueror a fixed amount of money and a fixed number of troops, in raising which, he may incur the displeasure of the people and be destroyed by them.<sup>6</sup>

The sum and substance of this policy towards the wild tribes has been best described by the great Kṛiṣṇadeva Rāya, Emperor of Vijayanagara. "Finding the (small) faults of the forest chiefs, who have not extensive power, is like trying to clear a mud-wall by pouring water over it. If he (the king) gets angry at them, he cannot destroy them utterly. If (on the other hand) he attaches them to himself by kind words and charity, they would be useful to him in invading foreign territory and plundering their fortresses. It is inconceivable that a king would be able to meet a hundred faults with a thousand punishments."<sup>7</sup> There were other methods of attaching these fierce dwellers of the forest

1. Kauṭalya, *op. cit.* Bk. VI, Ch. VI, p. 284.
2. *Ibid.* Bk. VII, Ch. XIII, p. 331.
3. *Ibid.* Bk. IX, Ch. II, p. 372.
4. *Ibid.* Bk. X, Ch. II, p. 392.
5. *Ibid.* Bk. XI, Ch. I. p. 412.
6. *Ibid.* Bk. XIII, Ch. V, pp. 138-39.
7. *Amuktamālyada*, IV, vv. 222-23, 257. J. I. H. IV, pp. 67-72, B. A. Salletore, *The Wild Tribes in Indian History*, pp 11-12.



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to the State. One of the ways suggested was: "Increase the forts that are near your frontier fortresses, (*Gaḍi-dēs'a*) and destroy all those which are in the middle of your territory. Then alone you will not have trouble from robbers."<sup>1</sup> The third method was keeping one's promises with them. The forest wild tribes can be brought under control by truthfulness (keeping enemy's engagements with them.)<sup>2</sup> This Emperor knew very well the trouble which these wild tribes could stir up and he suggested yet another method of conciliating them. "If the people of the forest (wild tribes) multiply in any state, the trouble to the king and his people would not be small. The king should make such people his own by destroying their fears. Because they are people of very little advancement, faith, and want of faith, anger, and friendship, bitter enmity and close friendship result from (very little) insignificant causes."<sup>3</sup>

In the light of these theories advanced by various writers from time to time towards the *Vanacarāh* or the *Aṭavikāh*, as the wild tribes have been called, the policy of the Marāṭha rulers towards them may be examined in detail. It is interesting to note in this connection that the sovereigns of Mahārāshtra also adopted a two-fold policy of repression and conciliation towards the various wild tribes within their large and growing empire. The method of suppressing an insurrection and punishing the leaders was naturally adopted as the first resource by the Marāṭha State from early times of Marāṭha history. The simplest form of such a punishment was to imprison the arrested culprits. A dacoity occurred at Narayangām in A.D. 1774-75 and the Beḍars of Ārāvi in the neighbourhood, were imprisoned, pending an inquiry into their case.<sup>4</sup> The next step adopted by the Marāṭha Government against such rioters was the thrashing meted out to those arrested persons who would not confess their guilt and their property was attached. In A.D. 1775-76 a clerk in the government of Pāga, for such an offence, thrashed two Beḍars until they died, and sent their belongings to Poona.<sup>5</sup> This system of state confiscation was often followed in the case of refractory Bhils like Ditya whose servants and their families shared the same fate.<sup>6</sup> If a particular individual became a regular menace, then an

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1. *Amuktamālyada*, v. 256. p. 72.

2. *Ibid*, v. 225, p. 67.

3. *Ibid*, vv. 222-23. p. 67.

4. *Selections from Satara Raja and Peshwas' Diaries*, VIII (958). pp. 132-33.

5. *Ibid*, (900) p. 94.

6. *Ibid*, IX, (334) p. 302.

end was made of him by the infliction of a price on his head. Luhār Koli in A.D. 1765 for committing certain crimes became such an object of destruction.<sup>1</sup>

If a body of these tribes rose in revolt, sterner measures were adopted to crush the revolt. Whenever there was news of such a rising, the troops of the Government were rushed to the scene in order to nip the disturbance in the bud. On 25-12-1769 the Peṣwa Madhavrao I instructed Bālāji Janārdan to dispatch two hundred soldiers to Khandesh in order to crush a rebellion there as it was incited by Dabhāde, Toke and several Bhils.<sup>2</sup> A similar policy was followed in the case of Kolis who disturbed the public peace. In A.D. 1763-64 a force of 170 soldiers was sent to the fort of Rājmaci in the Mawal district in order to stamp out a Koli disturbance there.<sup>3</sup> If this rushing of these troops was neither feasible nor practicable, then the officers of the locality, where the disturbance took place, were given some latitude in order to restore the peace. In the *Parganās* of Bhāner in A.D. 1771-72, owing to the recrudescence of the Bhil riots, Hari *Kāmāvisdar* was granted the necessary sanction to entertain additional men to deal with the situation.<sup>4</sup> The terms on which the new establishment was to be entertained were specifically laid down by the State. Sadāśiv Somnāth was permitted to entertain in A.D. 1765, 50 additional soldiers on a monthly pay of Rs. 6 in order to destroy a Koli miscreant.<sup>5</sup> In A.D. 1765-66, the same rate of pay (Rs. 6 P.M.) was sanctioned for entertaining 100 soldiers.<sup>6</sup> The period of the employment of the new staff was settled beforehand and a full account of the establishment accounts had to be maintained. One Cintāman Hari was given similar instructions by the Poona Government.<sup>7</sup>

Failure to fulfil these obligations of government service meant forfeiture of office. In A.D. 1765-66 as Govind Hari, *Kamavisdar* of Bāglān, failed to subdue the recalcitrant Bhils, he was removed from his office.<sup>8</sup>

1. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, IX (326) p. 299.
2. *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar* 39, (119), pp. 120-21.
3. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, (324), pp. 296-97.
4. *Ibid.* , (334) p. 304.
5. *Ibid.* , (326) p. 299.
6. *Ibid.* , VII (458) p. 58.
7. *Ibid.* (330) p. 302.
8. *Ibid.* VII, (458), p. 58.

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All these extra duties of administration, owing to the insurrections of wild tribes, meant so much of expense to the government of the Peṣwās. As this was no doubt foreseen by the Marāṭhas, specific measures were enforced by them in order to recover the necessary revenue for this purpose. In A.D. 1773-74 as the village of Sūpa was troubled by thieves, one Nayak, on a monthly pay of Rs. 10 and three Beḍars on Rs. 13-8 for every month, were permitted to be entertained. This expenditure was met by the levy of a special rate on all the Sūpa residents including the privileged Brāhman.<sup>1</sup> The same principle was followed when dealing with the Bhils by the imposition of a new tax called *Bhilpatti*. This charge was recovered as an extra cess, over and above the other taxes, at the rate of 5 per cent. on the revenue payable to the government. This levy was imposed in A.D. 1776-77 on the *Mahāls* extending from Kāsarbhāri to Ajintha and this revenue had to be spent with care for safeguarding the people of the locality from the Bhils, while the accounts thereon had to be submitted to the Peṣwa Government at Poona.<sup>2</sup> Refunds of the charge were permitted from *parganās* which were made to pay this one, provided they were not affected by the Bhil trouble.<sup>3</sup>

More important and wiser than this system of organised destruction was the policy of conciliation attempted by the sovereigns of Maharashtra from time to time. The Marāṭha rulers often tried to reform these forest people by employing them in their administration. There is no doubt that during King Śāhu's reign Beḍars were employed in the Maratha government service. This can be proved from the extract of an order issued by this monarch to an officer, Jagdeo Nimbalkar to send 25 men, including Beḍars and Marathas along with the *Sarnōbat* on 12-9-1715.<sup>4</sup>

The Beḍars were entertained also as watchmen in A.D. 1777-78 on a stipulated monthly payment, when Kṛṣṇa Rao Anant was instructed to engage as watchmen in Satara 33 Māngs and Beḍars on a payment of Rs. 263 per month and half, and these were engaged temporarily at least as long as the trouble lasted.<sup>5</sup> Besides this, another measure which was

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1. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, VIII, (954), p. 131.

2. *Ibid*, VI (645) p. 153.

3. *Ibid* . VI (654) p. 167.

4. *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar*, 7. (25). p. 17. *Huzūr lōkāncē prayōjan āhē yākaritān lōk kilē majakūr paiki (25) paṇcaviś ānavilē āhēt tari bēraḍ va mahrāte milōn sadassarnōbatābarābari dēūn sitābinē pāthavanē.*

5. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, VIII, (954), p. 131.

enforced by the Marāthas was to grant certain privileges to the foresters with whom their State had to deal during the Peśwa regime. The Bhils, for example, were given specified rights or *haks* which were evidently recovered from particular localities or villages. These were granted to the Bhils in Khandesh in A.D. 1779-80 and were entirely within the gift of the Government, for as a Marātha record shows these *haks* were withdrawn from the Bhils whenever they disturbed the public peace.

These rights were granted on certain conditions. One of them was that they had to do police duty in some hamlets and promise to refrain from creating any disturbance.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes whole villages were granted to wild tribes apparently to make them more tractable and amenable to the dictates of the civil government. Two hamlets yielding revenues amounting to Rs. 400 or 500 were granted to three Koli families, in the year A.D. 1769-70 on the condition that they should serve under Government and no more stir up trouble.<sup>2</sup> In fact, such was the great desire of the Marātha Government to preserve this public tranquillity, that the Marātha State often entered into pacts with the wild tribes. The Peśwa administrators made an agreement with the Bhil Nāyaks of Khandesh, in the year A.D. 1789-90.<sup>3</sup> This was again renewed three years later in A.D. 1793-94, although the Bhils themselves were responsible for creating mischief.<sup>4</sup>

The Peśwa Madhav Rao made an elaborate agreement with the Kolis of the fort of Purandhar, on 22-8-1765, on the main condition of their maintaining continued loyalty to the Marātha State.<sup>5</sup>

What these *haks* or privileges were it is hazardous to specify, especially because they must have depended on various circumstances at different times. After the Maratha conquest of the Kolis of Nagām on 14-7-1739, they laid, before Cimāji Appa, the famous Marātha general, several claims prominent among which were their demand for 3 *khandīs* of paddy (*bhāt*), 200 pieces of wood, and 12 *khandīs* of paddy.<sup>6</sup> From

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1. *Selections from Peshwas' Daftar*, 36, (172), p. 144.
  2. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, IX, (332), p. 304.
  3. *Selections from Peshwas' Daftar*, 36, (172), p. 144.
  4. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, VI, (658) pp. 172-73.
  5. *Selections from Peshwas' Daftar*, 19, (32), pp. 33-37.
  6. *Ibid* , 34, (198), p. 152.

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this information it is likely that the *haks* of the Bhils, Kolis, Beḍars and their kindred tribes, consisted primarily of their demands in kind from villages, either assigned to them by the State or in which they were predominated.

The Marāthas made treaties with leaders of wild tribes. The Marātha government made a treaty with the Abai Rāṇi, queen of Jawhar State, a Koli principality, in A.D. 1784-85 when she was residing at Kalyān under English protection, regarding the allowance payable to her and to her establishment.<sup>1</sup> Likewise Mahādji Sindhia in A.D. 1809 was compelled by force of circumstances to make an agreement with the *Zamindār* of Sursa regarding the recruitment of the fiery Mīnās into the Marātha army, so that they could not any more harass the Marātha camp.<sup>2</sup> The failure to observe the clauses of this agreement had a fatal effect on the camp of Mahādji Sindhia in as much as all the Marāthas assembled there, the civil and military population, suffered severely from the savage attacks of the Mīnās and their friends the Gūjars from the adjacent hills about their scattered villages.<sup>3</sup>

When such wild people were actually employed by the Marātha state in their own forces, they were engaged on certain conditions. That the Beḍars, the Minas, the Bhils and Kolis when engaged as soldiers were actually paid in cash, there cannot be the least doubt. The amount of Rs. 2104/- a year was recovered from the wealthy citizens of Satara in A.D. 1777-78 for paying certain Beḍars, who were engaged as policemen in that town<sup>4</sup>. It is also quite clear that the Kolis in the Marātha army in A.D. 1762 were promised a share of the prospective plunder which was to be made with their assistance. At a consultation of the Bombay factors on the 28th of Feb. 1762, the following resolution was made: "Read likewise the letter received last night from Mr. Bowyer, wherein he represents that the Marāthas seem determined to reduce the place, and in such case promise the plunder thereof to the Kolis."<sup>5</sup> The Marāthas in this case were led by Dāmāji Gaekwād, who was bent on storming Cambay. This should not be interpreted to mean that such wild tribes employed by the Marātha statesmen were not paid. Even so late as A.D. 1809 there is evidence to prove that the Minas of Jajjghur,

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1. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries* VI, (582) pp. 103-4.

2. Broughton, *Letters from a Maratha Camp*, pp. 165-66.

3. *Ibid* , pp. 158-59.

4. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, VIII, (954), p. 131.

5. Gense and Banaji, *The Gaikwads of Baroda, English Documents*, I, p. 162.

who were recruited into the forces of Mahadji Sindhia, were actually paid like his own men. When this Maratha leader failed to fulfil his promises to these people they complained loudly of his attitude towards them, as they were paid only Rs. 500 since their arrival in camp and they were bent on falling back on their customary ravaging tactics if their demands were not met.<sup>1</sup>

It may now be seen how far the monarchs of Mahārāshtra followed the instructions of the classical writers. Contrary to the advice of Kauṭalya, the bold Marāthas conquered the very haunts of the Bhils and other dwellers of the woods. Khandesh was a Marātha possession while the Peṣwā levied tribute from the Bedars of Sūrapura<sup>2</sup> and subdued the Koli principality of Jawhār in A.D. 1759, the Rāni of which was granted stipulated allowances for her establishment.<sup>3</sup> As a consequence these became a constant source of irritation to the Marātha Empire. Nevertheless Marātha statesmen made capital of this apparently compromising situation by employing these foresters in their army and setting them up against their national enemies like the English or the Nizam who were harassed with their assistance. The Marāthas generally tried to keep their pledges with the Bhils, Kolis or Bedars, although there were exceptions like Mahādji Sindhia who sometimes failed to keep his word with the Minās, just to prove the rule. Whenever these were engaged as soldiers in the Marātha forces, as though in accordance with Kauṭaliyan sanction, the Kolis or Bhils, for instance, were promised a share of the spoils of war. But strangely enough contrary to the advice of Śukrācārya that the foresters are to be tried with the help of foresters, the Marātha Government, although it insisted on the proof of guilt before condemning any of the accused Bhils or Bedars, tried them according to Marātha canons of justice and once convinced of their guilt, meted out capital punishment to the unfortunate victims, probably to set an example to their kith and kin.

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1. Broughton, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-59.

2. *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, VI, (595), p. 115, (579), p. 101.

3. *Ibid.* (582) pp. 103-4.



# KANHOJI ANGRIA

BY

V. G. DIGHE, M.A., Poona

The homeland of the Marathas is the Deccan plateau which opens out in wide fertile valleys towards the east, but is cut off from the sea on the west by high mountain ranges of the Sahyadris. The poor soil of the Konkan and the forbidding aspect of the mountain tracts hold no inducement to settlers from the east. The Marathas like the Mughals are essentially a land race; the sea is ever a foreign element to them. In their career of conquest they spread their sway in all four directions, and though they overran the Konkan, established ports, built fleets, their power on the sea remained feeble as compared to their military strength on land. Their maritime activities were confined to guarding their ports and castles and protecting their sea-borne commerce which was inconsiderable in quantity. Among the galaxy of War-lords the race produced, only one name shines out of a naval commander, and that is the name of the dreaded Kanhoji Angria.

The conquest of Konkan brought Shivaji early in conflict with the Sidis of Janjira who commanded the western coast and taught him the necessity of building a strong navy. As Sir Jadunath Sarkar has remarked, "to the owner of Konkan it was essential that the Sidi should be either made an ally or rendered powerless for mischief. Without a navy his subjects on the sea-coast and for some distance inland would remain exposed to plunder, enslavement and slaughter at the hands of the Abyssinian pirates. The innumerable creeks and navigable rivers of the coast, while they naturally fostered the growth of rich ports and trade centres, made it imperatively necessary for their protection that their owner should rule the sea."

The year 1659 marks the date of the beginning of the Maratha navy. The shallow ports of Pen, Panwell, Kalyan, Bhiwandi evinced considerable activity in building small crafts for the Maratha navy and by 1664 Shivaji was able to fit out a fleet of sixty frigates for a distant expedition. The English President describes the Maratha vessels as pitiful things, so that one good English ship would destroy a hundred of them. Though



the small Maratha vessels appeared insignificant to the English merchants in comparison with their ocean sailing ships, they were active enough in harassing the Sidis and their new master the Mughal Emperor. Within twenty years Shivaji's fleet had grown to 400 vessels, most of them small galbats not more than fifty tons. The fighting strength of the navy was according to the English factory report, represented by about 160 vessels.

The aims and policy of the Maratha navy under Shivaji are well set out in Amatya's *Rajaniti*. "The Navy" says Ramchandra Amatya, "is one of the main pillars of the state. He who possesses a fleet rides the waves. The grabs (i. e. the fighting vessels,) should be of a medium size (unlike the big European ships sailing by wind and solely at its mercy). The fleet should be well equipped with guns, mortars, powder and shot. Five grabs with a flotilla of fifteen galbats should be formed into one squadron and placed under a commander. The navy should not subsist by plunder, but should have a fixed sum for its maintenance. Ports should be developed by giving protection and affording facilities to merchants visiting with merchandise." Ramchandra recognised that active oversea commerce and many merchant ships laid the foundation of a great sea power. "The fleet is not to remain bottled up in a cove," continues the Minister, "but is to constantly patrol the coast and watch for enemy ships. Under no circumstances are merchant ships to be molested; they are, by every means to be induced to open trade with Maratha ports. While trading vessels from the enemy's country may be detained, their goods are to be held as sacred trust to be released on payment of a fine. Should the fleet come across enemy war-ships, all the units are to co-operate in attacking them. An action is to be avoided if the wind favoured the enemy. Men or vessels are not to be exposed to unnecessary danger. An enemy ship is not to be boarded rashly, even if it showed signs of weakening. During monsoon the fleet is to winter in a sheltered place under the protecting walls of a castle. Strict discipline is to be maintained in winter quarters to prevent accident or treachery, especially among the foreign crew that man the major part of the fleet. The entire navy is not to concentrate in one place for wintering, but to disperse to various ports and there remain under strict watch while undergoing repairs."

The fortunes of the Maratha navy reached their lowest ebb by 1690. Sambhaji, the king of the Marathas, was captured and executed by the Mughals; their strongholds in the upcountry were occupied by them. A formidable army under Matabar Khan poured down the north Konkan passes and took Mahuli, Prabal, Karnala and several other forts and

established itself at Kalyan. While Matabar Khan pressed the Marathas from the North, the Sidi found the opportunity to assert himself; he recovered the territory lost during the last regime and his fleet scourged Maratha vessels and swept them off the sea. At a time when the political existence of the Maratha state was at stake, it was not to be expected that the Marathas would have the will or find means to save their fleet. The whole naval establishment crashed and went to pieces. In this critical condition the Maratha flag was kept flying aloft over the sea by the daring, resourcefulness and initiative of the famous Kanhoji Angria of Kolaba.

Little is known of the family and early days of Kanhoji. His daring activity and skilful seamanship are traced by European writers to his Abyssinian parentage, but nothing can be far from truth. The Angrias, whose family name is Sankhapal, hail from a tiny village, Angarwadi, in the Mawal hills, six miles from Poona. They are blue blood Marathas and would spurn to marry in families lower than those of Deshmukhs, Jadhavs, Jagtaps and Shitoles. Tukoji Sankhapal took service under the great Shivaji about 1658 and distinguished himself in several actions. He was rewarded with a command of 200, and posted at Suvarnadurg, an important naval post which occupies a menacing position hardly twenty miles south of the Sidis' frontier. Here Kanhoji first opened his eyes and passed his childhood. Here he watched Maratha ships making out for the open sea and falling upon the enemy's fleet, and here he received the practical training of seamanship from the crude but faithful Koli sailors.

Kanhoji made his mark during Shivaji's time and is honourably mentioned in the Chitnis *Bakhar*. The family history would have us believe that the Kiladar of Suvarnadurg, Mohite, being hard pressed by the Sidi, proposed surrendering the place. Kanhoji sent news of this treachery to the authorities and seized this chicken-hearted fellow. Taking on himself the command he not only declined yielding the place, but boldly attacked the besiegers. In one of the sorties he fell in the enemy's hand, but extricating himself from his confinement, Kanhoji managed to reach the walls of the castle and beat off the Sidi attack. He was then appointed second in command to Sidoji Gujar, the Sar-Subha of the Maratha navy. When the latter died in 1698, he succeeded him in the entire command of the navy making Kolaba his head-quarters.

His task was no easy one. The central Maratha authority had disappeared; the Konkan province had been overrun and devastated by

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the Mughals. There were no allies to help, no resources to rely upon and no reinforcements to be expected. On the other hand, in the absence of human allies his sea-girt castles and their geographical situation in a far away corner afforded Kanhoji excellent protection, and from here he sallied forth to attack enemy ships and prey upon their merchantmen. By 1700, Kanhoji is mentioned in foreign records as one of 'the most daring pirates' that infested the Malabar coast and made commerce hazardous.

To get a right perspective of Kanhoji's maritime activities they must be viewed as a part of the general struggle of the Maratha nation against the Mughal conquest of their homeland. This explains Angria's inveterate hostility to the Sidis who were the Mughal representatives afloat. The chief objective to which his policy was directed was to recover Maratha territory occupied by the Sidis during the interim that followed Sambhaji's execution, drive the Sidi to his island retreat, annihilate his independence and render him powerless for mischief. The western seas were to be Maratha waters and all who visited ports established in them were to be taught to respect Maratha sovereignty and secure his permission for trading in those waters by buying his passes. Whatever power refused to conform to his orders would do it at the peril of bringing on its merchantmen his strong hand. His bombastic claim was challenged by the Sidis as well as the Western powers, the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch, who on account of the important trading interests they had established in western waters found such a demand most galling and injurious to their commerce. With their strongly built ships they were confident of their strength on the sea, manned as their ships were by skilful sailors and equipped as they were with far superior armaments. Their chief factories being established in the Mughal's territory they were afraid that their recognition of Maratha claim and any assistance given in pursuance thereof, would antagonise them with the Emperor and draw upon them his wrath. Their interests therefore dictated that they ranged themselves on the side of the enemies of the Marathas when they could not maintain their neutrality. During the fifty years of *Sarkhelship* in the Angria family the Maratha power increased and almost overshadowed the Mughal empire. This growth of the nation is reflected in the annihilation of some of the maritime rivals of the Angria and the submissive attitude of the remaining in the halcyon days of its rule. But let us resume the thread of our narrative.

Angria's heavy hand soon fell on the Sidi and the Mughal. On 14 January, 1700 Bombay Factory recorded that "The Sidis lately had

several hot skirmishes with the Marathas who are very strong having about 8000 horses and 12000 foot, as reported at Marr, etc. and adjacent places to Danda Rajpore burning several villages and doing considerable damage to each other. The Sidi having blocked up by sea the entrances to Kanhoji Angria's castle, he being then abroad with his gallivats, took his opportunity whilst he was thus employed to the southward, to come to Thal and lay it waste with other places, and continues in these parts plundering and carrying away booty and people; he had with him ten gallivats, the Marathas have demanded half the revenues of Matabar Khan's jurisdiction, which he at first withstood but at last granted them  $\frac{1}{2}$ . So at present he sits in quiet." According to another letter of the Bombay Factory of 6 March, 1700 "the Sidi was lying full before Kolaba and Kennery, and tho' had great forces yet the Marathas found a way to go with their gallivats from one place to the other; as likewise go out a-robbing". The war went on intermittently without pause. On 2 April 1701 it is recorded that "there is not yet right understanding at present between the Sidi and Shivaji as thought; having had a skirmish of late where the former is reported hath had a considerable loss..... Sidi has been very urgent with us to send a surgeon to dress his wounded men". Though the Sidi sought the help of the Portuguese in the contest with the Angria, he was not able to make much headway against him and was forced to yield his opponent two-third of the revenue of Kolaba, Khanderi and Sagargarh and part of the revenue from Cheul.

As his resources increased Kanhoji began challenging foreign merchantmen that ventured on the sea without his passes. In 1702 a small trading vessel from Calicut with six Englishmen fell into his hands and was carried into one of his harbours. To a demand for its release he sent a word 'that he would give the English cause to remember the name of Kanhoji Angria.' In 1703 the Viceroy of Goa found it necessary to address him a friendly letter. "Two years later he is described as a rebel 'Independent of the Raja Shivaji' and Mr. Reynolds was deputed to find him and tell him that he could not be permitted searching, molesting or seizing vessels in Bombay waters to which he returned a defiant answer, that he had done many benefits to the English, who had broken faith with him and henceforth he would seize their vessels wherever he could find them." In 1707 the '*Bombay*' frigate was blown up in an encounter with Angria's ships. In 1710 a Dutch sloop of war was captured and the '*Godolphin*' narrowly escaped the same fate. In the same year another heavy blow was struck at the English Company's shipping when Angria fortified Kennery, hardly ten miles from Bombay.

and made it a base for his warships. In 1711 the Directors were told that he could take any ship except the largest ones; "along the coast from Surat to Dabul he takes all private merchant vessels he meets". The next year he captured the Governor of Bombay's armed yacht and the 'Anne' of Karwar and attacked the Somers and the Grantham East Indiamen. While thus already contending with the Sidi, the Portuguese and the English, he was in 1713 embroiled in the civil war between Tarabai and Shahu.

After the death of Aurangzeb Azam acting on the advice of Zulfiqar Khan released Shahu and allowed him to reclaim his patrimony. The Mughals becoming weary of the long drawn out struggle with the Marathas expected to create division among their ranks and profit by their dissensions. Their expectation was eminently fulfilled. Tarabai the dowager queen contested Shahu's claim to the throne, was defeated at Khed near Poona and retired to Kolhapur from where she continued the struggle. The arrival of the Nizam in 1713 who had no sympathy for Shahu's cause and the desertion of the *Senapati* to the Mughal once more heartened the Kolhapur party. Their adherents now became aggressive. Damaji Thorat, Udaji Chavan, Krishna Rao Khatavkar, all started plundering Shahu's territory lying between Satara and Poona. Kanhoji Angria, a staunch partisan of Tarabai, advanced to Rajmachi, defeated Shahu's Peshwa, Behro Pant, and threatened to march on Poona.

Though he had succeeded so far Kanhoji knew the limitations of his strength. He understood that when a sea-power acquired territory on land with a frontier open to the attack of a military state, it incurred a great danger. It was necessary for his success on the sea that his back-door should be secure with a friendly neighbour guarding the western passes. Balaji Vishwanath, Shahu's new Peshwa, convinced Angria of the wisdom of working in the confederacy, assured him how an alliance with Shahu would benefit both parties and finally won him over (28 February 1714). In consequence, while Angria acknowledged allegiance to Shahu, he was confirmed in the command of the fleet, granted twenty six forts and fortified places in Konkan, and promised assistance in a contest with the Sidi. As some of the places that had been made over to Angria by the treaty were yet in the hands of the Sidi, hostilities followed. The Sidi was no match for the joint forces of Angria and the Peshwa, was defeated and surrendered to Kanhoji valuable territory on the mainland.

While the negotiations with Shahu demanded his attention Angria was wise enough to patch up his differences with the English. He invited an

English agent to Kolaba and agreed that "in future English ships should be free from molestation, that no ships of any nation coming into Bombay harbour should be interfered with between Mahim and Kennery, that English merchants should have liberty of trade in Angria's ports, on payment of the usual dues and that Angria should be responsible for any damages done in future by the ships belonging to his Maratha superiors. In return the Governor engaged to give passes only to ships belonging to merchants recognised by the Company and to allow Angria people full facilities in Bombay."

Angria's position was never so strong before. The Sidi, his hereditary enemy, was humbled, and though he continued to hold a few Maratha strongholds his power was definitely on the decline. The peace concluded with Shahu added immensely to Angria's prestige, increased his resources and secured his strategical position. Strongly entrenched at Kennery, Kolaba and Gheria he could overawe his maritime neighbours, the English, the Sidi and the Portuguese and command the shipping that passed between Bombay and Goa. There was scarcely a creek, harbour and river mouth where he had not fortifications, or a boat station. The number and size of his ships had grown during the last twenty years of conflict, many of them carried 30 or 40 guns apiece and were manned by best native and foreign crew. He was now in a position to defy Western powers and to deride their efforts to check his aggressions.

The treaty concluded with the English proved but a temporary truce. With the arrival of Charles Boone in December 1715 as Governor, the Bombay settlement began to show great activity in equipping its fighting marine. Within two years it had built up a fleet consisting of "nineteen frigates, grabs, ketches, gallivats and rowing galleys, carrying two hundred and twenty guns besides a bomb-vessel and a fireship." This naturally alarmed Kanhoji and when he found the English engaged in war with the Sonda Chief he recommenced attacks upon Bombay shipping.

The immediate cause of hostilities was the capture of three merchant-men, the *Success*, the *Robert*, and the *Otter*, by Angria. Kanhoji contended that these vessels belonged to foreign merchants, and though laden with the goods of the Company could claim no exemption from his passes. The English retaliated by the seizure of one of Angria's shibar that visited Mahim and by attacking his coastal towns, war was formally declared on 17th June 1718 and an expedition against Angria's chief naval station Gheria was determined on. A graphic description of the attack

on Vijaydurg (Gheria) is given by Clement Downing, a sailor who was present in the action and which is our only source of information for this account. According to Downing,

“We proceeded down the coast for Gerey, which is not above twelve hours’ sail from Bombay, where we with all our navy soon arrived, and run boldly into the harbour. Captain Berlew Commodore, had ranged a line from the easternmost part of the fortifications to the outer part of the harbour, keeping all our small galleys and gallivats on the off-side under shelter. But they had strong fortifications on both sides; so that we left our strongest ships in the harbour, to make a breach in the walls, in order to storm the castle. The rocks were very high, and so slippery that one could hardly stand without a staff and consequently not a place convenient to draw men up in any posture of defence. We endeavoured to get the fireship in, but could not; for on the east part of the fort they had a cove or creek, where they had laid up a great part of their fleet, and had got a strong boom across the same; so that we could not annoy them any otherwise than by throwing our bombs and coehorns very thick into the garrison, which we did for a considerable time and were in hopes after the first and second day’s siege, that we should have drove them out of that strong castle, but we soon found that the place was impregnable. For as we kept throwing our shells as fast as we could in regular time, cooling our chambers before we loaded again; after we had beat over two or three houses in the castle, the shells fell on the rocks in the inside the castle, and their weight and force of falling would break them without so much as their blowing up..... As to storming the walls, they were so high that our scaling ladders would not near reach the top of them.

“After the second day we landed all our forces, taking the opportunity of the tide..... We got them all on shore, and marched up the country without molestation; only now and then the castle would let fly a shot or two, which did us small damage. We attempted to march the army down to their shipping, and to set them on fire; but when we came within a mile of the place the land was all swampy, and so very muddy by the spring tides flowing over that we could not proceed. On our retreat they galled us very much by firing from the castle, we being obliged to come near the castle walls to take our forces off again. Here the gallant Captain Gordon was slightly wounded.....

We drew off our forces on the 18th (June) and went up to Bombay.

The causes of the failure were obvious. The batteries the English ships carried, though effective against Angria's floating castles of wood, were powerless against the rocky walls of Gheria. The Company's soldiers at this period were ill-paid, ill-disciplined and had little training. The men in command were mere clerks, and the trappings of military dress could not transform them into soldiers who could hold their own against the astute Angria. While the English Squadron attacked more than a hundred miles away from its base, the communications of the fort with land remained safe so that it continued to draw support from the mainland.

Nothing disheartened by this failure, the English now turned their attention nearer home. On the close of the monsoon another expedition was fitted out against Khanderi. To hearten the men, Boone himself took the command in 'the Addision'. The squadron consisting of 'the Addision,' 'the Dartmouth', East Indiamen, 'the Victoria' frigate, the 'Revenge' and 'Defiance' grabs, 'the Fame' galley, 'the Hunter' ketch, two Bombay ketches and fifty gallivats sailed on 2nd November, 1718 and appeared off Khanderi on the next day. Khanderi was particularly prized by the Bombay Factory as it commanded Bombay harbour as well as the Nagothana river which sheltered Angria's fleet. Boone was determined on the conquest of the place and by his orders 'the Morrice' and 'the Stanhope' joined him a week later. He also expected much from the assistance and local knowledge of a renegade Portuguese, Manuel de Castro, who had been bribed to desert Angria's service. As soon as the fleet arrived near Khanderi it opened fire against the island; on account of distance however the shots fell short of the walls; the sea round Khanderi being full of rocky shoals, the ships could not venture near. It was therefore decided to land two parties under cover of fire, one at the main gate and one at the astern, and carry the works by assault. The attack miscarried owing to the cowardice and want of discipline of the men and the well-directed fire from the castle. Manuel de Castro who had been commanded to lie off the harbour and prevent succour reaching the besieged, failed to intercept Angria's vessels which slipped in under cover of night, carrying provisions and ammunitions to the garrison.

Two days later a second attempt at landing was made and was again frustrated. A small party which had succeeded in reaching the gate was driven back to the water and many were drowned by the surf breaking against the rocky shore. After a fruitless bombardment against the island and Kolaba the squadron hastily withdrew to Bombay (24 Nov.,



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1718) to defend it against Angria's fleet which had been called north from Vijaydurg. Angria then for a time lulled the Bombay authorities with talks of peace, but when the danger blew away he withdrew his offer.

The English Governor was determined to destroy Gheria which he regarded as the nest of the pirate Angria, and despite his two failures, fitted another expedition against that place. It consisted of nine ships of the line and several fishing boats for landing troops. On board were about 600 picked soldiers commanded by Walter Browne, one of the Bombay Factors.

On 19th September (1719?) the fleet arrived in sight of Gheria. The shells from the London and the Phram, a floating battery, burst in vain against the solid rocks of the Victory fort (Vijaydurg). The only alternative left to the besiegers was to destroy Angria's ships that had retired up the river; for attacking the castle from the land the party was altogether inadequate. The fort on the landside was covered by the town which must first be occupied before the walls could be assaulted. The fleet divided, marched in the harbour skirting walls and opened fire. A number of Angria's ships were destroyed, but this made little impression on the castle. Browne was no soldier, knew nothing of strategy, nor how to handle the men, and had no consistent plan of attack. The first attempt at landing having failed disastrously the men refused to embark on another fruitless trial. The squadron after making a demonstration against Deogarh, prepared to retire to Bombay when as ill-luck would have it, it fell in with pirates and was dispersed. Thus ended most ignominiously the second attempt on Vijaydurg.

Angria's career was unchecked and he now threatened to march his men to Bombay. The two heavy defeats made the English forget for a time their jealousy of the Portuguese and seek their co-operation in crushing their common enemy. The attitude of the Portuguese towards the English was marked with the greatest unfriendliness born of the sense of rivalry in the field of commerce. They had parted with Bombay with ill-grace, and strongly suspected the English of being in collusion with Kanhoji for destroying their trade. In addition, they held in low estimate the military power of the English Company which, they suspected, would desert them in the midst of a conflict with Angria. The union born of such distrust was not calculated to achieve its end and was sure to be dissolved at the first adverse turn of events. The repeated losses Portuguese shipping had suffered, however persuaded the Goa authorities to accept the overtures of the English, and a treaty

providing for a joint attack on Kolaba was concluded on 20th August 1721. According to the treaty the Bombay Council was "to furnish two thousand men and five ships and the Portuguese an equal number for an attack on Kolaba, the place to be occupied by the Portuguese while Gheria was to go to the English, none of the parties was to negotiate with the enemy without the consent of the other. The combined force was to assemble at Chaul and then march to Kolaba."

In consequence, there was feverish activity in Bombay, Bassein and Goa, and news of the hostile preparations soon reached Angria. He immediately made offers to compose his differences with the Portuguese; threw provisions and ammunition in the fort of Koloba and requested King Shahu to succour him.

The arrival of a royal squadron in Bombay under Commander Mathews further added to the strength of the allies. On 29th November the expedition sailed from Bombay and joined the Portuguese force at Chaul. The English contingent consisted of over 2400 men amply provided with artillery. The Portuguese assembled a still larger force which carried over 30 field guns. The combined army, 6000, assisted as it was by a powerful fleet, appeared invincible.

The country between Chaul and Alibag, a span of ten miles, is covered with wood and is swampy near Kolaba. The crossing of the Kundalika and the march to Kolaba with the heavy guns delayed the army on the road for over a fortnight. The time gained was sufficient for Pilaji Jadhav and Bajirao to pour their horsemen through the Konkan passes, and when the allies appeared before Kolaba on 12th December, they found themselves in great danger of being outnumbered by Maratha cavalry. While the Portuguese commander was surveying the field accompanied by Methews, a Maratha horseman suddenly sprang upon the party from behind a bush and wounded Mathews with his lance.

As the enemy's strength was daily increasing it was necessary to deliver the attack without loss of time. Not estimating the number of the army that was opposing them, the allies divided their force; the English undertook to assault the fort, while the Portuguese were to hold at bay the enemy that was encamping outside, and to defend the camp and the rear against surprise. The superiority of the allies lay clearly in their artillery, and their neglect of this advantage rendered them helpless against Maratha cavalry. While the little English party attacked the walls, Bajirao threw himself against the Portuguese column and sent it flying. The assaulting party under Col. Braithwaite met with a hail of shot and

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stone and when the Portuguese force dispersed, its rear was threatened, and was obliged to fall back. "All the field guns and a great deal of ammunition fell in the hands of the Marathas."

There were now bickerings among the allies; the English laid the blame for the miserable episode on the Portuguese, charged them with cowardice and their commander in a fury rushed at the Portuguese captain and roughly handled him. This insolent behaviour was not calculated to hold together the loosely knit alliance. Bajirao on behalf of Angria made overtures of peace which were honourable to both the parties and were readily accepted by the Portuguese on 9th January, 1722. The alliance that had been heralded with so much eclat broke up without achieving any of its object.

The war with the English continued with pauses at intervals. When pressed in other quarters Angria would hold forth the olive branch and express willingness to make peace on his own terms. Such an attempt was made in 1724 when Kanhoji wrote a friendly letter to the new Governor Phipps and requested him to depute an agent of credit to discuss terms of peace. The Governor turned down his request, charged him with piracy, asked him to renounce war and demanded a proof of his sincerity, by immediately setting at liberty English prisoners. This called forth Kanhoji's ire; he replied that "it little behoved merchants to say that his government was supported by violence, insults and piracies; for the great Shivaji founded his kingdom by making war against four kings; and that he himself was but his humble disciple; that he was ever willing to favour the merchants trading according to the laws of his country," and offered to release the English prisoners if his men, imprisoned by the English, were set at liberty. The negotiations were carried on in a languid manner on both sides and so long as the Marathas remained powerful on land the English wisely avoided hostilities with them.

What was the kind of vessel Angria developed and used for fighting his enemies? There were various types—the Pal, the Shibar, the Machwa, the Galbat or gallivat and the Ghurab. The chief war vessels were the ghurab (grab) and the galbat supporting the ghurab, and acting as its scout. The galbats according to Low were large row boats built like grabs but smaller, not more than seventy tons. They had two masts, a strong main mast and a slight mizzen mast, the main mast bearing a large triangular sail. Forty or fifty stout oars could send a galbat four miles an hour. Some large galbats had fixed decks, but most had spar

decks made of split bamboos. They carried six to eight three or four pounders.

About the ghurab, Groce says that "Angria's grabs are of two classes, two masters upto 150 tons (600 *Khandis*), and three masters upto 300 tons. They are broad in proportion to the length and draw little water. They narrow from the middle forwards, where instead of bows, they have a prow which stands out like the prow of a Mediterranean galley. This prow is covered with a strong deck, level with the main deck and separated from it by a bulkhead. Two nine to twelve pounder canon are planted on the main deck under the forecastle, pointing forward through port holes cut in the bulkhead and firing over the prow. The canon on the broad sides are from six to nine pounders." Both were excellent sailers in the light winds prevalent on the western coast.

In its method of fighting Angria's navy reproduced the guerrilla tactics which had proved so successful on land. The light Maratha boats sailed faster, and sailed round the clumsy merchantmen, and if pressed could find safety in the shallow creeks and river mouths along the coast where the European men-of-war could not pursue them. When the heavy enemy ship was becalmed in the sea and could not move, the small Maratha vessels propelled as they were moved by oars and not dependent on wind, found their opportunity. They prowled out of their hiding and reaching the stern of the enemy vessel, one by one they unloaded their prow-guns at a close range and sheared off to load their guns and return to the attack. Their strategy consisted in avoiding the fire from the broadsides of the enemy's ships. After the enemy guns were silenced two or three of the grabs ran aboard their victim and attacked sword in hand.

Kanhoji's relations with the central authority were marked with the greatest cordiality after the treaty of 1714. That treaty allowed him full independence in the management of his fief and assured him ample resources for the navy so long as he acknowledged the king of Satara as his liege-lord and paid him tribute. Shahu respected the admiral who almost single-handedly recreated the navy and when they two met at Jejuri in March 1718 the occasion was marked with great ceremony and pomp.

The last few years of Kanhoji's life were years of comparative peace. He had many sons of whom Sekhoji, Sambhaji, Manaji and Tulaji maintained their father's tradition of seamanship. He died on June 20, 1729.

No portrait of Kanhoji is available. He is described as a dark man with piercing eyes and stern countenance, very severe in his commands

and exact in punishing. He was liberal to his officers and soldiers with whom he affected a sort of military frankness. A shrewd, practical man, he could drive a hard bargain in negotiations as well as in war. He had a biting sense of humour which he was not afraid to use against that mendicant, Brahmendra, who had hypnotised the Peshwa and even the Royalty. He is one of the great personalities of Maratha history. A born leader of men, gifted with an iron will, crafty persevering, brave, he possessed just that combination of virtues and vices which is best adapted for an ambitious man to make his mark in troubled times.

*A note on authorities*—Marathi papers yield little information regarding early maritime activities of the Marathas. So far Kanhoji Angria is concerned the only source I have been able to utilise are, *Angrianchi Kaifiyat* published by Parasnis, *Cheulchi Bakhar* and *Chitnis Bakhar*, and a few papers to be found in the *Peshwa Daftar Selections* and *Rajwade*, volume III.

As regards English papers a few appear in *Forrest*, volume II Home series. *Col. Bidulph*, *Low*, and *Clement Downing* are invaluable in reconstructing the various engagements between Angria and the foreign powers.

Dr. Sen has also utilised Portuguese papers in his chapter on Angria.

# FRAGMENT OF A BHAO-BALLAD IN HINDI

BY

Dr. K. R. QANUNGO, M. A., Ph. D., Dacca

On December 16, 1937, Sir Jadunath Sarkar took with him two pupils of his, myself, and another young scholar of distinction travelling *incognito*, in a trip from Delhi to Panipat. Having reached Panipat at about 12-30 P. M., we went to a Jain primary school, the headmaster of which happened to be a Maratha Brahmin, domiciled in that part of Upper India. The kind old Panditji gave us a guide, one of the teachers of his school, to accompany us to "*Kala Am*", as the site of the third battle of Panipat is known in the neighbourhood. We started on foot from the outskirts of the town, and walking right across cultivated fields for about four miles reached "*Kala Am*". But the Black Mango tree under which Sadashiv Rao Bhao is said to have been slain—no longer exists. The Archaeological Department has raised a modest brick memorial on the spot where the historical mango tree once stood. Sir Jadunath had visited the place once before, and as such he came a second time to see something else than "*Kala Am*".

Sir Jadunath asked me,—a sort of interpreter between him and villagers,—to inquire of some cultivators working at a Persian wheel whether they knew of any *baoli* (*bavdi*=a well) near which the Marathas had a successful skirmish with a detachment of Durranis on November 22, 1760. § With these villagers I was quite in my own element, thanks to my long sojourn among the Jats. There was among these men an old peasant of about 70, a Brahmin by caste. He told me that he was acquainted with every inch of land for miles around, but he had never seen or heard of any *baoli* here with the exception of one now within the boundary of the village of Rajah-kheri, about a mile and a half from that place. I now began pumping out the old man. He incidentally mentioned that the place, where the memorial now stands was formerly a village called Suwa-kheri, and that the *jogi* or begging minstrel still sang the ballad of Bhao. It was altogether an unexpected piece of information. I went to Sir Jadunath and asked him to return

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§ Sarkar's *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, ii 302.

### *Fragment of a Bhao-Ballad in Hindi*

to Panipat and leave for Delhi, leaving me there with the villagers to explore the *baoli* and collect the Bhao-ballad.

I left "*Kala Am*" with the old peasant and two or three others who undertook to show me the *baoli* of Rajah-kheri, and promised me night's lodging and food and also the song of the *jogi*. But as we sighted the village the old man seemed to have become suspicious of my object of visit. On the outskirts of the village he began talking about me to some villagers, and pointing to a certain direction, he told me that the *baoli* was near about, which I should see and that he would wait till I returned. I went to the spot indicated by him but could see no well but huts of villagers and urchins playing in front of them. I returned disappointed where I expected to find my host; but I found that he had given me a slip.

Quite stranded in a strange place I assumed the severe mien of a government official, and going confidently inside the village I wanted the *lambardar* and *chokidar* of the village. But being unable to find out their houses I went direct to the village *chopad* or common-hall. Fortunately for me I found the *lambardar*, a Jat of ninety summers, who was all courtesy to me. He asked one young man to take me to the *baoli* situated at the other end of the village. On enquiry I learnt that within the memory of the present generation the old *baoli* was transformed into its present state by building up staircases leading down to water.

In the meanwhile the report of the appearance of a mysterious figure had created a stir in the village. When I returned to the *chopad* (common-hall) about 70 or 80 persons had already gathered there, and more were coming in. I told the *lambardar* that he should send for the blind old *jogi* to sing the ballad of Bhao, and accordingly a man on a bicycle was sent to fetch him. It was decided that I should pass the night there and have my *roti* from the house of a *bania*. About an hour I spent with the villagers from whom I elicited much information about a historical tradition coming down from generation to generation. After an hour's suspense the man alone returned from Risalu because the *jogi* had left the village in the morning abegging. Sorely disappointed I left the village for Panipat to catch train. About five miles I trudged on drawing my belt tight to the last hole.

However, my information proved correct. Sir Jadunath had kindly procured for me the following lines of the Bhao-ballad, which had been taken down by a local gentleman of Panipat exactly as they were sung

before him by the blind old *jogi* of Risalu. The text has been faithfully transcribed without any corrections and amendations of my own. But I have given them in the *Glossary of Words* and *Historical Notes* appended to the English translation of this ballad. I have not attempted a bare literal translation which is desirable in the case of a historical document. I have tried to be literal where it has been possible without affecting the spirit of the ballad as a whole. It may be a little difficult for a purely town-bred Hindi scholar to detect the rustic corruption of many words in this ballad. As a rule accents in the village side are *hard* where they ought to be soft : this was peculiar to the medieval Marathi also. I hope to discover some day some more Hindi ballads about the third battle of Panipat. I suspect we have already got some popular traditions about the Maratha activities during this period smuggled as accurate history in *Bhao-sahibanchi-bakhar*.

- 1 धनका सेती आ मिला वो सुरजमल ।
- 2 कहाँ खजाने गई फोज कहाँ गजदल ॥
- 3 सुनकर झुंका कंवरके आए नेत्रभल ।
- 4 दत्ताजी के मेरे पर गई फोजा चल ॥
- 5 वहीं खजाने खपी फोज वही गजदल ।
- 6 २९ दिनमें सिन्धियां कीता स्नान
- 7 टसरी की धोती की मुख चाबे पान
- 8 चीरा बांधा जरीका होता शुभ ध्यान ।
- 9 पंडित विप्र बुलाकर किया पुण्य दान
- 10 माला ली कपूर कीमुख भजता राम
- 11 कागज कलम मंगाकर लिखता परवान
- 12 नान सेती राम राम एक लिखता काम ।
- 13 तान तेरे भेजे हम आए चढ़ हिन्दुस्तान ।
- 14 अकल होश से करो राजमंत सोच नियत
- 15 काबुल और कंधार के बड़े फील जवान ।
- 16 जिस दिन उतरै नरवदा धालै धमसान
- 17 गिन गिन दहरे हिन्दु के धाम
- 18 साहव समरु आपना दनयाद कु मारी
- 19 खालिक मालिक मुल्क का है खेलखिलारी
- 20 एको चना चवावता एको पान सुपारी ॥



- 21 जगत चव्रीना कालका है लंक हजारी
- 22 हलकारा चला ब्रज से दक्खनकी तय्यारी
- 23 भुन्काजीके सांधियेने दर शुत्र विचारी ॥
- 24 पाखर भालर जरीके धुंगर घनकारी
- 25 रात दिनोकी करी दौड़ जा शुत्र विचारी
- 26 नानाजी तै बिनतीजा अर्ज गुजारी ॥
- 27 नाना तै करता राम राम जो करी जवाहरी ।
- 28 तिरे हिन्दमें खय गए जोधे सूरमे अहंकारी
- 29 सुनकै नाना राव ने निस आंझू डारी
- 30 खबर हुई रणवासोमें जानु कूंज भुन्कारी
- 31 पिया पिया कर कुकती दक्खनकी नारी ॥
- 32 साहव समरु आपना सच्चा करतार ।
- 33 पूने में नाना राव ने लाया दरवार ।
- 34 सारी दक्खन इकट्ठी की करता जवाव
- 35 हिन्दमें खप गए वड़े सूरमे फील जवान
- 36 वो जिस दिन उतरै नर्बदा मार करै विरान
- 37 सुनकर नाना रावकी ना दिया जवाव
- 38 लाओ भाउ रावको जिसका एतवार
- 39 हुजरे तै नाना राव के छुटे चोवदार ।
- 40 तुम याद करे हो पेशवा चलो राजकुमार
- 41 नाना सेती राम रुआ करी जवाहर
- 42 पास बिठा लिया पेशवा दिया बहुता प्यार ।
- 43 हिन्दमें भुन्का कंवरने जंग दिया हार ।
- 44 करो तय्यारी हिन्द की ना लाओ बार ।
- 45 मारो अहमदशाहने छूटो कन्धार
- 46 अकल हौशसे करो जंग नर करो तय्यार ।
- 47 भाउ उठ दरवार तै माता पै आया
- 48 तिरी माता बोही प्यारसे राव पास विठाया
- 49 अरे वेटा, तनै करी तय्यारी हिन्दकी भूला भकाया
- 50 अहमदशाह वादशाह पर तूने बोड़ा खाया ।
- 51 जो कोइ गया हिन्दुस्तानमें नही बोड़ा आया

- 52 अरे ओ भन्काजी से मर्दका मार खेत डिगाया  
53 दत्ता और साहवा दूढ़ा न पाया  
54 मिरे घर वै ने तपै राज, मिरे बहुती माया  
55 समर निगाही सुर स्वेत । गुन रब के गावै  
56 कलन्दरावाद पानीपतमें सुख बहुता पावै ॥  
57 हटरी अमर बावली क्या हमें डरावै ।  
58 मेरा लो लख नेजा दक्खनी कौन मोहरा आवे  
59 अहमदशाहने लूटंगा तरवारां दावा  
60 अटक नदीमें पागा घोड़ो जल प्यांवै  
61 काबुल की पकड़ै बेगमा दक्खन को लावै  
52 आगे चक्किया रखकर दाने दलवावै  
63 मुख सें मांस छुटाकर मुखपान खिलावै  
64 इतने साके कर सकें जब ब्रोड़ दक्खन आवें  
65 जैसे सकि करगपर राजा मानसिंह पूतकमें लावें  
66 भाउ की माता कह सुन भाउ मेरा  
67 अरे मिरे इकलोती कै राक लाह नाक रै वखेड़ा  
68 अरे तू जागा हिन्दुस्तान हिया लर जे मेरा  
69 मिरी तोरां गिनतो करै रात एकसे सबेरा  
70 महलो नही चांदा पड़जागा अंधेरा  
71 जैसा चन्द छुपा धर आपने हो गया अंधेरा  
72 मैं भेजूं गालिबसिहने करादे निम्बेडा  
73 मिरे घर बैठो तपै राज मिरे मालब तेरा  
74 हाथ जोड़ हाजिर खड़ी भाउ की रानी  
75 माता का कहना मानले समझावे स्यानी  
76 मैंने सुपना देखा रैनका यूँही रैन बिहाइ  
77 मैंने पूना देखा उतर दो फोज इन्ही सारी  
78 वो बुरके पैहरो लड़ै नार मैंने सुली पठानी  
79 हुक्म दो तो चढ़ं साथ सुख रहैं परानी  
80 वो काबुलकी बेगमा मैं दक्खनकी रानी  
81 मैं बांख, पटा, नेजा करूं ताजन थरानी  
82 अहमद शाहके दलोमें मिचा दू धानी

- 83 हुक्म दिया भाउ राव को लाओतो रनमें  
 84 सुरखा सबजी मंगसी समन्द कुलंज कुमैत संजाफी  
 85 केहरी अवलक सोरंग-दुमचियां जेरवंद गुलवाजे जंग—  
 86 ढलके पेशबंद-घोड़ो के गत धुंगर-रण चढ़ते जंग ॥  
 87 हुक्म दिया भाउराव को लाओ मन्ह ते  
 88 नाग जरी के नीर में मल दल के रते  
 89 जिनके दांदों चूड़े सोहेने थे ऊंचे मत्थे  
 90 संदूर हिरमजी रंग में कुंजर रंग रखे ।  
 91 हौदे जड़े जड़ाओं में जवाहर भड़ते  
 92 एक नाम दोनों व के नारी ओर कंथे  
 93 गोरी सट के सूरमे साबन्त ओर संते  
 94 भाउ धूर देवता मुक्त तका कर सान  
 95 मेरा शमशीरो से मामला तेगो के तान  
 96 अहमदशाह की हिन्दमें चढ़ रही कमान  
 97 और परान नदीपर पड़े खेत अब डालु घमसान  
 98 ऐसा कहिये कुतवजंग समंदखां धड़ीना एव अटका  
 99 तिरे सागरसे दरया ओंका मैने खेलिया भटका  
 100 अब केदे छोड़ तूफे दिखादू लटका  
 101 ग्यारा पै सन चुहतर, पानीपत मे मया चलतर  
 102 चांद जमादुस् सानी, दिन जुमा, रात जुमेरातकी  
 103 हार मरहठा, जीत दुरानी ॥

### ENGLISH TRANSLATION

There came Surajmal of fame, and joined Dhanka ;

"Where are gone the treasure, troops and the elephants ?"

Hearing this tears came to Kunwar Jhanka's eyes :

"The army scattered when Dattaji died,

The same field did treasures engulf, and troops and elephants too."

On the twentieth day his uncle's funeral bath did Sindhia perform;

The *dhoti* of *tasar* he tied, and chewed the *pan*,

A *cheera* gold-embroidered he wore auspicious,

And *Pandits* and *Brahmins* did he invite, and made pious gifts.

A rosary of camphor he took, and his lips muttered *Ram*.

Pen and paper he calls for, and writes a *parwana*

With greetings of *Ram-Ram* to Nana, and of an affair calamitous :

"At thy behest did my uncle march on Hindustan

And with tact, alertness and devotion did he serve thy cause.

And the day the warriors of Kâbul and Qandâhâr, strong as elephants,

Did the Narbuda cross, and a battle terrific burst

The Hindus did sweat profuse with the sweat of death."

\* \* \* \*

Kill worldliness in thee, and remember thy Lord,

The Creator as well as the *Malik* of this world that plays wanton,

And makes one munch the gram of misery, and another enjoy the *pan*

But alas ! this world the humble and the *hazari* alike,—

Is but a fare of parched-grain in the jaws of Time.

Apprehensive of foe at the door Jhankaji Sindhia did dispatch

From Braj a *harkara* for the Dakkhan bound ;

And day and night rode he, fearful of foe,

(A horse) with armour and clinking bells and trappings of gold.

*Ram-Ram*, said he to the Nana, and his woeful errand broke:

"Thy warriors proud, before whom immortals would tremble,—

The land of Hind no more they tread ;

Gone are they and gone beyond the bourne of life."

At this did Nana Rao moaned, and many a tear shed he.

And the news spread to the lady's bower, resonant with music sweet—

"My love! My lord! wailed the Dakkhan women for their mates  
disconsolate.

\* \* \* \*

Mind thee of thy Lord, thy Master Great!

In Poona a *Darbar* did Nana Rao call ;

The whole Dakkhan he did assemble there for counsel proper.

And said he, "Down went in Hind our sinewy warriors brave ;

"The day they crossed the Narbuda and all around havoc spread".

They heard, but Nana did receive no response brave:

"Bring hither Bhao Rao on whom I chiefly count" he did shout

And from the court of Nana did the *chobdar* hie.

*Fragment of a Bhao-Ballad in Hindi*

"Come, Noble prince", the *chobdar* cried "the Peshwa pleaseth to remember thee."

To Nana the Prince said "*Ram-Ram*", and made a reverence due;

By his side did the Peshwa make him sit in affection deep;

And said he—"Kunwar Jhanka could not plant his foot firm in Hind;

"Get thee ready for Hind, and take no women cumbersome.

"Slay Ahmad Shah, and loot Qandâhâr,

"Equip thy forces, and with tact and steadiness turn the tide of war."

The Bhao left the Court and to his mother came;

By her side she made him sit in affection deep;

"Ah! my son! a dupe thou hast made thyself by hieing for Hind.

"How durst thou take the betel against Shah Ahmad, King of Kings?

Ah! those who had gone to Hind did never see their homes again.

Silly boy; bravely did he strike Jhankaji down on the field.

And no search could Datta and Sahba's bodies yield.

Bide here with me and rule the realm, for much is my fondness for thee.

The valiant doth bleed for victory on the field of battle,

But songs they would sing in praise of the Rao.

Much comfort indeed await thee at Panipat, the abode of Qalandars poor!

\* \* \* \* \*

"Away! Ah, fond mother! wouldst thou thus frighten me?

Who shall face the nine lakh Dakhini lances of mine?

Sword in hand will I press on Ahmad Shah and strip him to the skin;

And my paga-cavaliers shall not stop till their horses drink the waters  
of the Attock.

"I will bring captive to the South the high-born dames of Kabul;

I will put hand-mills before them, and they shall grind corn!

Their mouths shall smack of meat no longer, and they shall chew the *pan*,

If such a fame (*sākā*) I live to achieve, the Deccan shall see me back  
again."

"Listen, Bhao, my darling" the mother rejoins,

"Be not wilful, grant this my sole request.

Goest thou to Hindustan? Ah, my heart trembles!

Days shall I count as nights when thou art out of sight;

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§ *Sākā*—Lit. an era; some heroic achievement of undying fame. In Rajputana, a *jauhar* rite was called *saka*. In its metaphorical sense *S. sak* was used in medieval Bengali also.

Dark will my palace be my darling without,  
Dark as the heavens when clouds hide the moon.  
I shall send Galib Singh ; with him every detail thou must settle ;  
And here in my palace shalt thou enjoy the *Raj*, and my Malwa will be  
thine.

\* \* \* \* \*

Then before Bhao stood his consort with folded hands,  
And full of wisdom did she urge him thus :

"Pray thee, do not disobey what mother speaks.

Yester night I dreamt a dream from which I woke and slept no more ;

Methought two armies halting near Poona for combat—

They fought, and both did wholly perish ;

And then veiled women rushed to fight, and so too I !

And a Pathani did I pierce and on my lance I bore.

I will go with thee, if thou wouldst permit and joy and happiness shall be  
mine ;

They are but *begams* of Kabul, and I the Deccan Queen !

Crooked dagger, straight sword and the long lance shall I wield

And before me their Arab chargers shall quake ;

And death and destruction I shall carry to the ranks of Shah Ahmad."

\* \* \* \* \*

And he (Nana) did order Bhao : "Take with thee to war,

My squads of war-horse (many-hued and of mettle true),

Brick-red and greenish grey, bay and black as *mung*, or blushing crimson  
like *karanja* ripe ;

And those of saffron colour, or sun-beam bright,

Or, moon-white like water-lily at eve-tide dusk".

Harnessed with *dumchi* and *zer-band*, and their *pesh-band* hanging loose,

On their necks strings of jingling bells they wore,

And carrying crack riders did they gallop eager for fray.

And he ordered Bhao Rao : "Take thou from me my elephants royal

"Bathed with the water of medicinal roots and rubbed clean and glossy ;

" Whose tusks are bound in stout rings, and who carry their shapely heads  
high".

With vermillion and red earth (*hirmiji*) the elephants did they paint :

The *howda* on their backs sparkled with with many a gem,

## *Fragment of a Bhao-Ballad in Hindi*

—Whose name signifies alike a woman handsome (?) and a beggar's wallet (*kantha*)—

And in his train followed damsels fair and warriors bold, brave captains  
of war and men of counsels sage.

\* \* \* \* \*

"Avaunt! Thou fool of a Bhao! what favour wilt thou show me?

"The sword alone doth concern me, and my sword replies a taunt.

"Against the land of Hind Shah Ahmad twangs his bow, and his army  
On the bank of the river lies encamped, and now a battle terrific we shall  
fight"—

Thus said Qutb Jang—(the Bhao) did seize him and Samand Khan, and  
none intervened.

"Of thine Ocean, Shah Ahmad", the Bhao rejoined,

"Unto whom dost thou bend thy course as rivers to the sea

"The feeder streams have I quaffed off at a pull (and the Sea remains).!

"How, then, can I release you now?—From gallows you must hang!

\* \* \* \* \*

In the year of eleven hundred and seventyfour of the Era of Flight, and  
on the first day of Jamadi-us-sani,

On Thursday night and the day of Juma (Friday),

Panipat quaked under the heels of armies closing to combat

And defeat befell the Maratha—the Durrani came victorious.

### **Glossary of Words**

Line 1—"Dhanka" appears to be a mistake for Jhanka. Surajmal is  
Rajah Surajmal Jat of Bharatpur, an ally of the Marathas.  
Dhanka does not seem to be the name of any *place*. "Seti", a  
corruption of "sainti", has been used here, as well as in line 12,  
—in the sense of English *to* and not *from*.

Line 6—Sindhias were Sudras and hence the bath of purification on  
the 29th day.

Line 13—"Tân has been used for "tât."

Line 16—"Narbuda" is a mistake for "the Jamuna."

Line 18—"ku" used for "ko."

Line 21—"Lank" „ „ "rank."

Line 22—"Halkara" is not the name of a person but a corruption of "Harkara" (messenger).

Line 28—"surmen" is a corruption of "sur.mâr" (also in line 35).

Line 32—"somru" " " "somrau" (also in line 18).

Line 44—"bâr" " " "bâlâ (women)"

Line 55—"nigâhi" and "rab" are mistakes for "niwâhi" and "Rao" respectively.

Line 65—*not translated* as allusions are vague.

Line 72—"nimbeḍa" has been taken to be a corruption of "nibeḍa".

Line 84—"kulanj" means a wicked horse that cuts behind in walking but it does not suit the context. It is probably a corruption of either "karanja", a well-known sour fruit familiar in the countryside or of "kalaunji" (*kala jeera*).

"kumait sanjaphi" offers a similar difficulty.

§ "kumait" is a countryside corruption of "kumud".

—"sanjaphi" means no *colour* but "border or fringe of garments etc." So I propose the reading "Sānjhâ pai".

Line 85—"gul-baz" should be read "ghor-baz" to yield any meaning at all that would agree with the context.

Line 86—the word "Jang" here and in the preceding line, has been used "in the sense of "jangi" (war-like), or "jangra" (brave).

Line 87—"manbate'" is either a mistake for "mahal-te'" (from the *mahal*, ) or it is a word of Jat dialect, *manah* (pronoun in the first person, singular number).

Line 88—"jari" should be read "jadi" (medicinal roots);

"rate'" is used in the sense of "râtâ" (glossy).

Line 90—There is no such word as "hirabhji"; it is evidently a mistake for "hirmiji" (well-known red earth with which cloth is dyed).

Line 91—"jaḍa" is used in the sense of "jaḍa-u" (studded with jewels).

—"jhaḍte" is derived not from the root "jhaḍna" (to drop); because jewels cannot be believed to have been dropping from the *howda* of elephants. It seems to have been derived from

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§ "Kumait"—is dark red colour acc: to राजव्यवहारकोश cf. इयामलस्तु कुमैतः  
स्वात्—164 Sanjaphi, Abalak (h) these also are shades of colours. *Editors' note*



*Fragment of a Bhao-Ballad in Hindi*

the root "j'haharna" (to blink eyes with pain by too much light)—which suits the context better.

Line 93—"sur-me'" is a mistake for "sur-mâr" (very brave).

Line 94—No accepted meaning of the word "dhur" suits the text. Soft consonants when pronounced by villagers sound *hard* to townsmen; and villagers do actually sometimes pronounce them *hard*; if so, "dhur" may be "dur" (be off!). In this line "Devta" has not been used in its proper sense, meaning god or lord. Near about Delhi, words "Devta" and "Mahatma" are used in quite opposite sense; e. g. "Devta" used with reference to a Jat (Jat-deota) carries a sense of half contempt and half pity—meaning *strange* or *uncouth*.

In this line "takâ" written as one word in the original transcript should be read "ta kâ". *Kâ* means here *what*, *ta* is used in the sense of *tu*.

Line 94—"Sân" is the abbreviation of the Arabic word *ihsan* (favour).

Line 95—"ketân" should be broken into "ke tân".

"tân" (musical notes) does not suit the context. The correct word is "tânâ" (taunt), which is derived from the Arabic word "ta'in" (slanderer).

Line 96—"kamân charhânâ" (to bend a bow) has not been translated literally.

Line 97—"parân" bears no meaning reconcilable with the context. The correct word must be "padâo" (encampment, camp).

Line 98—"kahiye'" should be "kahiya".

The last three words as they are written yield no meaning or sense; these should be written as "dhari na é'k âtkâ". In the text "aw" is a mistake for "ek".

Line 99—"khe'" should be "khâ"; there being no such idiom as "jhatkâ khe'ná". "jhatka khana" means *to receive a shock or pull*. But in this sense it does not apply to Bhao. If I remember aright "jhatka kha lena" is used by villagers *to eat up quickly or at a quaff*. It is also likely that the word "jhat" (quickly) has been expanded to "jhatka" for the sake of rhyming with "atka".

Line 100—"kede" is a typical Jat equivalent of "kaise" (how).

Line 101—"chalattar" is evidently some word coined from "chal" (movement, shaking).

Line 103—"san" or era used here is Hijri.

## Historical Notes

Line 3—Jhanka is the corruption of the name of Jankoji Sindhia, nephew of Dattaji Sindhia. Dattaji Sindhia fought with Ahmad Shah Durrani on January 9, 1760 and met with defeat and death. Jankoji Sindhia who renewed fight also received a bullet wound and was dragged out of the field by his followers. The Marathas could not recover the body of Dattaji. Mian Quth Shah, referred to in line 98, cut off the head from the dead body and took it to the Abdali (Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire* ii 222-23). We learn from *Bhao-sahibānchi-bakhar* that Goswain Ummed Gir, the Naga general of Shuja-ud-daula who joined the Abdali against the Marathas—recovered from the Abdali by the threat of desertion and a cash payment of two lakhs of rupees the severed head of Dattaji, and joining it with the trunk, performed the cremation of his body with sandal and *bel* wood. Such was the conception of duty and obligation of a Hindu to his brother-in-faith! (p.58-86).

Line 16—The river Narbuda is too evident a confusion for the Jamuna. The Durrani and the Ruhelas under the lead of Najib Khan secretly crossed the river Jamuna at night preceding the day of the battle of Barari-ghat, referred to in lines 16, 28, 35, 43 and 52. (*Fall of the Mughal Empire*, ii 222).

Line 34—Peshwa Bālāji received the official letter from the North on the 15th or 16th February, 1760. The *darbar* referred to was held not at Poona but at Patdur, 27 miles south-east of Jalna on 10th March, 1760. Sadashiv Rao Bhao was recalled by the Peshwa from Ausa after he had crushed the Nizam's army at the battle of Udgir. (*Ibid*, p. 237).

Line 40—Sadashiv Rao Bhao was the son of Baji Rao I's younger brother, Chimnaji Appa. His mother Rukhmā Bai, and his wife Parvati Bai are the ladies referred to in the ballad. The ballad has not done justice to the mother of Bhao.

Line 53—"Sahba" is Sabāji Sindhia who fought but did not die at the battle of Barari-ghat.

Line 56—Qālanderabād—Panipat :

Qalandar is a holy Muhammadan ascetic who abandons the world and wanders about with shaven head and beard, independent of any brotherhood. Qalandars have many shrines

*Fragment of a Bhao-Ballad in Hindi*

in the Punjab. Shah Chokha Qalandar is the patron saint of Meos, who hold that the Shah has given away married women to abductors. "The most famous Qalandar shrine is that of Abu Ali or Bu Ali Qalandar who is buried at Panipat" (see Rose's *Glossary of Punjab tribes*, iii, p. 257). It is perhaps for this reason that Panipat became known as Qalandarabad.

Line 72—Ghalib Singh is perhaps a fictitious person.

Line 74—the *rani* of Bhao referred to was Parvati Bai. She and Lakshmi Bai, wife of the Peshwa's son, Viswas Rao with a host of other women did in fact accompany their husbands. These two ladies managed to escape to the South through the exertions of Malhar Rao Holkar (Sardesai's *Marathi Riyāsāt*, part II, p, 204).

Line 94-100—These lines describe a scene at Kunjpura, a place about 50 miles north of Panipat. Bhao arrived before Kunjpura in the evening of 16th October, 1760. Next morning Mian Qutb Shah and Abdus Samad Khan—Qutb Jang and Samand Khan of this ballad—attacked the Marathas. Abdus Samad Khan was shot dead, but Qutb Shah fled wounded into the city of Kunjpura. He along with Nejabat Khan, governor of Kunjpura, fell prisoners into the hands of the Marathas. Nejabat died of wounds but Qutb Shah met with a more cruel fate than gallows. When he was brought before Bhao, he is said to have reviled the Marathas (Sarkar's *Fall of the Mughal Empire* ii p 269-71).

*Bhao-bakhar's* narrative, though not historical, wonderfully agrees with the ballad in saying that Qutb Shah and Saimand Khan Kattalbaz (Abus Samad Khan) were both captured by the troops of Gaikwad and brought prisoners to Bhao. We read in this *bakhar* the exchange of words between Bhao and Qutb Shah, who along with Saimand Khan were afterwards ordered to death (P. 122). Qutb Shah asked for water when he was being led to the block; but the Marathas, remembering what he had done with the dead body of Dattaji Sindhia, refused him water saying, "the scoundrel should be made to drink urine"; and they cut off his head, leaving the carcass as food for crows and vultures; Saimand Khan was also similarly beheaded (*Ibid* p. 123).

Lines 101-103 The third battle of Panipat was fought on January 14, 1761. According to *Bhao-bakhar* the battle was fought on Wednesday, 8th day of the bright fortnight of the month of *Paus*, 1682 Saka Sambat, which is not correct (P. 143).

Unfortunately, this ballad breaks at a point where the main theme, the battle of Panipat, should begin. I heard from villagers of Rajah-kheri many more interesting things which their untutored memory still retain. It is said that the Gadaria (goatherd) in Bhao's camp was in league with the Pathan. The Pathan told the Gadaria to help him in winning the battle this time, and thereby save his credit with the Durrani. The *wali* of Kunjpura whom Bhao had refused food during captivity uttered a curse upon the Marathas that they should similarly starve during this expedition, and hence the scarcity in the Maratha camp. During the critical stage of the battle of Panipat the Bhao was induced to come down from his elephant by that Gadaria. The traitor now began to wave a blue flag from the elephant signalling to the army that all was over as the blue flag indicated the death of the commander-in-chief, namely Bhao. Then a general rout began and the Gadaria fled with the connivance of the Pathan. The Bhao then made his last stand under the historic *kalam* or black mango tree and died fighting there. Here is perhaps a faint echo of Malhar Rao Holkar's alleged treachery and his friendship with Najibuddaula, a *dharma-putra* of Holkar. The curious coincidence of the hints thrown out by this ballad with the narrative of events in the *Bhao-bakhar* regarding the Mian Qutb Shah affair at Kunjpura raises very strong suspicion that the *Bhao-bhakar* was compiled long after the battle of Panipat from popular traditions enshrined in ballads like one we have traced.



# FIRST ANGLO-MYSORE WAR, 1767-'69§.

BY

DR. NARENDRA KRISHNA SINHA, M.A., Ph.D., Calcutta.

Hyder Ali first came into collision with the British Government in 1767. He had consolidated his position in Mysore and had openly assumed royal authority. In the south, inter-state relations were in the hopeless tangle imaginable. The Marathas, the Nizam, Hyder Ali and the British were seen in varying combinations and everchanging alliances. The Nawab of Arcot was another complicating factor because unlike as in Bengal much power was left to him, 'the British playing the secondary part in politics, the first in the field.' Mahammad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot and Hyder Ali were sworn enemies. Hyder had given shelter to the son of Chand Sahib and Maphuz Khan, the disgruntled brother of the Nawab of Arcot. Taking their cue from Mahammad Ali, the British in Madras looked upon Hyder as a troublesome and dangerous neighbour. He was ambitious, he had vast treasures, he was a good general and was inclined towards the French. But it is clear that he had no prejudice in favour of the French but he hoped that if the French made conquests in India, he would also be able to extend his dominion. The Madras Government was not altogether unconscious of the fact that Hyder was the best barrier to the Carnatic against the Marathas. It must further be admitted in favour of the Madras Government that Lord Clive from Bengal had advised a policy of enmity with Hyder. He wrote on the 17th October, 1766, "The chief strength of the Marathas is horse, the chief strength of Hyder Ali infantry, cannon and small arms. From the one we have nothing to apprehend but ravages, plundering and loss of revenues for a while, from the other extirpation.....whatever, power may be added to the Marathas by lessening that of Hyder Ali may be recovered by an alliance with the Suba of the Deccan who will soon begin to think coolly of his own interest."<sup>1</sup>

The sheet anchor of British foreign policy in the South was an alliance with the Nizam. On the 12th November, 1766, the Madras

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§ (Based entirely on the records in the Imperial Record Department)

1. Select Committee Proceedings-21st Sept., 1767.

Government entered into a treaty with the Nizam, 'of honour favour, alliance and friendship engaging in mutual assistance to esteem the enemies of one, the enemies of both'. One of the articles stipulated for the Nizam, the assistance of British troops. The Madras Government thought that the Suba wanted to attack Hyder Ali in conjunction with the Marathas and with the assistance of the British. But the Nizam showed very little confidence in his new allies. The war with Hyder was not prosecuted by him with vigour and when he reached the borders of Mysore, he began to negotiate with Hyder. The Madras Government was alarmed, as it was not in a position to cope with an alliance of the Nizam and the ruler of Mysore. The whole weight of Hyder's resentment would fall on the British as they had unprovoked joined the Nizam against him. The British in Madras naturally tried to secure the most important passes leading into the Carnatic. Near Bangalore the Nizam had an interview with Hyder. He settled with Hyder for twenty lakhs of rupees and two lakhs for Durbar charges and dismissed the British troops remaining with him.

Hyder negotiated an alliance with Nizam through Maphuz Khan. There was always the possibility of this dual alliance against the British becoming a triple alliance with the Marathas joining Nizam and Hyder. Faced with the prospect of Carnatic being invaded at any time, the best plan was to strike before the allies could gather strength and make a dash at Hyderabad. The Madras Government talked in the heroic strain that they would root out Hyder Ali and establish the ancient family of the Hindu Raja of Mysore. There was a talk of an alliance with the Marathas; the Maratha Vakil at Arcot 'made proposals of an alliance to the Nawab and amongst them the entire extirpation of Nizam Ally and the whole family of Nizam-ul-mulk from the Subaship of the Deccan and that one of King Shaw Allam's sons should be appointed in their room'<sup>2</sup>. The Madras Government treated this outline of policy with silence as it would be extending their views rather too far and might mean playing into the hands of the Marathas. The general of the Madras Presidency was Colonel Smith. He secured the pass of Uppadivaddy and encamped near Malpaddy. But Hyder had entered the valley of Baharramarkel to the South of Kistnagerry, and marched upon Covrepatam. It was a mud fort of indifferent construction. Colonel Smith decided to take post near Trinomalee intending to march to its relief. On the 28th the garrison at Covrepatam surrendered. Hyder's position was so strong both before and after the siege that he could not be

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2. Select Committee Proceedings, 3rd Oct., 1767.

attacked without great risk. The river Punna full of water was in their front and a ridge of mountains in their rear. Smith proceeded to Changama. Hyder's horse continually alarming the outguards and flinging rockets into the camp. When the British army was on its march, while passing a small river one afternoon, it found Hyder's troops posted on the right flank on the other side of the river. Near the river there were bushes, beyond these three steep hills. These hills were covered by Hyder Ali with horse, with his Sepoys behind, the bushes being occupied by the troops of the Nizam commanded by Ruccunud-Doulah. The battalions of Cook and Cockly attacked the hills and drove the troops of Hyder. Hyder had made a mistake in not securing these with infantry. At the head of his choicest troops he now attacked the hills but was repulsed, his brother-in-law being killed and he himself receiving a wound or a contusion in his leg. Ruccun's troops were next dislodged from the bushes and driven across the river. It was six or seven at night and there could not be any pursuit. The British army next morning continued its march, Hyder's troops hovering at a distance, plundering the baggages. The British army reached Trinomalee "a march of 27 hours without the least refreshment for man or beasts who were never unloaded."<sup>3</sup>.

The battle of Changama was a very indecisive fight. The British Commander-in-Chief was constrained to admit—"The enemy's horse got into the Carnatic by various passes before me. I found large bodies of them near Trinomalee". One curious feature of the events of these days was the desertion of Lt. Hitchcock "an example considering all circumstances unexampled"<sup>4</sup>.

As Smith was marching towards Trinomalee, Hyder's horse numbering 10,000 were found on the right. The advanced British corps wheeled round and marched upon the troops of Mysore and compelled them to fall back and rejoin the main army. An attack on the main army was planned but was abandoned as in the space between the two armies there were only swamps and bushes. The confederates also showed no inclination to fight. Colonel Joseph Smith marched back to Katatcharkel. The condition of the army from the point of view of supplies was most pitiable. The British Commander-in-Chief wrote, "We have neither grain nor rice and you will be convinced we can draw nothing from the country, ravaged by 40,000 of the enemy's horse". Hyder Ali and the Nizam succeeded in obstructing convoys and spreading terror throughout the country.

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3. Select Committee Proceedings ( 13th Oct., 1767. )

4. *Ibid*-Copy of a letter from Colonel Joseph Smith to the Secret Dept. at fort St. George.



In view of the military position, a change of the plan of operations was considered by Bengal Government as absolutely necessary. If the confederates could manage well they would protract the war and ruin the Company's revenues, and investments. The expenses of the army in the field exceeded five lakhs a month, very much beyond the capacity of the Madras Government, even assisted by Bengal. Colonel Smith was unable to bring his opponents to a decisive action and they maintained a great superiority in cavalry and continued to harass and distress the camp. In these circumstances, it was thought that the best policy was an immediate attack on Hyderabad. Such a diversion would compel the Nizam to separate from Hyder Ali, but the Madras Government wanted first to give Colonel Smith a chance to bring the confederates to a decisive engagement. The military stalemate made the Madras Government think of resuming the project. It was arranged that a similar diversion on the Malabar coast would be made by Bombay.<sup>6</sup>

The main army under Colonel Joseph Smith found the confederates posted so strongly that they could not be attacked. Constant heavy rains made the soldiers of the British army sick. The field officers therefore thought it expedient to go into quarters at Arcot or Vellore but the Madras Government feared that such a step would result in the entire destruction of all the open towns and villages in the Arcot country and some important forts very necessary for communications might easily fall. British military prestige would in that case receive a serious blow. Positive orders were therefore given to keep the field and if the situation continued to be unfavourable to choose some convenient place near Chinaport or Trinomalee until reinforced. The aim should be to fight or to compel the confederates to quit the Carnatic. About this time the strength of the confederate army was as follows—

Hyder's army—30,000 artillery 47 pieces manned by 180 Europeans.

Suba's army—50,000 „ 50 pieces of cannon<sup>7</sup>.

The Polygars in the Carnatic were plundering the villagers. The Nawab of Arcot was unable to make the payments he had promised. The shipments of the Bengal Government alone enabled Madras to continue. But from the military point of view it seemed rather unusual that the confederates with their numerous army could secure themselves against any possible attack. A diversion to Hyderabad became even more

5. Camp at Kalatchavakel. 16th Sept.—Copy of a letter from Colonel Joseph Smith.

6. Select Committee Proceedings—20th Oct. 1767, p. 305–307.

7. *Ibid*—24th Oct. 1767.

necessary than before. How difficult the situation was can be inferred from the fact that a party of Hyder's horsemen advanced as far as St. Thome. 'The Governor, Mahammad Ali Khan and his son, together with Colonel Call and almost all the council very narrowly escaped being taken in the country house in the Company's garden. Happily for them, a small vessel, that by accident was opposite the garden, furnished them with the means of escaping'.<sup>8</sup> The detachment consisting of three to four thousand horsemen carried off some inhabitants and plundered some villages. The tension was at this stage relieved by a victory which Colonel Smith gained over the confederates. The battle of Trinomalee was fought on the 25th September, 1767. Colonel Smith reported that Hyder attempted to turn a warm corner upon the British left. But it was not possible for Smith to come upon the confederate army as there was a morass in front. The British army then attempted to turn the left of Hyder around some hills. A general action followed. The confederates returned a smart fire but it ended in their defeat. The British loss was small as they had advanced very rapidly. They bivouaked in the battlefield all night and began the pursuit in the morning. In this action Colonel Smith seized nine guns and then succeeded in getting possession of 50 pieces of cannon which they could not carry off in their precipitate retreat. Colonel Smith regretted, '2000 good horses would have put us in possession of both the enemies' armies'.<sup>9</sup>

The confederates quarrelled and then separated. The Bengal Government, always bolder than Madras now advised the Madras Council that this blow should be followed up against the Suba and concessions must not be made too early. "Something similar to the Government established in these provinces might we think be set up to advantage on the coast without extending the Company's influence quite far or reducing that of the Suba so much \* \* \* \* the expedition to Hyderabad may still be pushed with vigour \* \* \* \*. If it should be necessary

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8. *Vestiges of old Madras* II. p. 596. The news of this raid was magnified into a story of the capture of the town of Madras. The price of the Company's stock fell from 275 to 222.

—Select Committee Proceedings—27th Oct. 1767 p. 327

9. Select Committee Proceedings—27th Oct. 1767 p. 330, Acc: to De La Tour Hyder withdrew his army into the camp without leaving the English any mark of victory, except one of the iron three pounders they themselves had lost before. The English made no prisoners except a Portuguese officer. The number of killed in the army did not exceed 400, pp. 316-317.

to bring about a change of persons in the Stateship, we shall exert our influence with the King to have the appointment sanctioned by the royal Sanad"<sup>10</sup>. The Madras Government was not altogether averse to the idea of having a puppet Nizam but wanted to know 'If the king might be inclined to send any of his sons or any of the royal race and if he can supply money or give any security of reimbursing the expurse we may be at to support any appointment he might make of a Suba to the Deccan'<sup>11</sup>. British Imperialism, born on the battlefield of Plassey had got a firm hold on the mind of the British statesmen in Bengal and they wrote—"The grand power we ought to aim at is to have the Carnatic, Mysore country and the Deccan under the influence of British power and form an effectual barrier against the Maratha encroachments"<sup>11</sup>. The Padshah went to the extent of issuing a blank royal Farman for any appointment to the Subaship of the Deccan that might appear as most consistent with the interests of the East India Company.

By the end of the year the Nizam made his approaches for peace and wanted to manoeuvre the British into the position of a power suing for peace but the Madras Government demanded that he must either quit Hyder Ali and throw himself into the hands of Colonel Smith or retire immediately to Hyderabad.<sup>12</sup>

After its defeat Hyder's army retreated to Conjeveram, plundering and devastating. Hyder kept the field with every prospect of renewing the conflict as early as possible. Having sufficiently recouped, he seized Nimambaddy and laid siege to Amboor. Hyder battered it for 11 days, tried to take it by assault but Captain Calvert's resolute defence compelled him to withdraw. His main army then retreated to Veniambaddy. Colonel Smith reached Amboor soon after and then marched to Veniambaddy. After a feeble resistance Hyder's army withdrew to Covrepatam. The British took possession of Tripatour and then marched upon Covrepatam. Smith found Hyder strongly posted. He waited for a convoy. Hyder attempted to cut off the convoy and marched out with 4000 horse, 1000 sepoys and five guns. Major Fitzgerald was sent with 2 companies of grenadiers, a battalion of sepoys and 2 guns to reinforce the convoy. Hyder attacked him at Singerpatta but had to retreat with considerable loss. Colonel Wood was sent in pursuit. In the meantime Lt. Colonel Hart took possession of

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10. Select Committee Proceedings—27th Oct. 1767 p. 332-334.

\*. *Ibid.*—17th Oct, 1767. p, 396.

11. *Ibid.*—20th Dec, 1767. p. 458.

12. *Ibid.*—p. 462.

Commamet, which has been described as the key to the Deccan. The Nizam now detached himself from Hyder and expressed himself desirous of a reconciliation. He remained encamped opposite Dalmacherry pass, waiting to see what Hyder alone could do. Want of provisions hampered the progress of the British army at every step. Colonel Wood had to give up his pursuit. As the last resource, the Nawab of Arcot was requested to proceed to the camp and take charge so that his authority over the amildars might ensure plenty in the bazar. The British plan of campaign was to send Wood to take the offensive against Hyder Ali and if he remained at Tingaracottah to endeavour to invest him there or if he retired one party has to march in pursuit of him while the other was employed in having such places as might be necessary for depositing provisions and stores and for securing communications with the Mysore country". Hyder retired to Bangalore with the greatest part of his force.<sup>13</sup>

As Nizam Ali was effectually detached from Hyder, their friendship had been from the beginning very unreal and it could not stand the strain of defeats. Moreover, the Nizam saw with dismay Commamet, so important strategically, passing into the hands of the British detachment commanded by Captain Hart. He also heard that an army was getting ready for the reduction of Hyderabad. This very threat was sufficient to unnerve Nizam Ali. Ruccun-ud-Dowiah and Raja Ramchandra were sent by the Nizam to negotiate with the British. It is characteristic of the tortuous nature of the diplomacy of the Nizam's Durbar that a messenger was at the same time despatched to Hyder Ali to reassure him that the negotiations would be spun out till the Suba got the assistance of 10,000 more horse<sup>14</sup>. Instead of being the dupe of the Nizam for the second time the British now kept themselves in readiness to march through the Damalcherry pass. There was not much difficulty in making the Nizam agree as Ruccun-ud-Dowlah was sensible of the British power to remove his master. Moreover Colonel Peach had already made himself master of Warangle and was encamped five Kos from thence on the road of Hyderabad. A treaty was concluded between the Madras Government and the Nizam on the 2nd March, 1768. The 9th article of the Treaty runs as follows: "Asaf Jah recognises Hyder Naik as a rebel and a usurper and as such divests him of and revokes from him all Sanadas, Power and distinctions conferred by him or any other Suba of the Deccan"<sup>15</sup>."

13. *Ibid.*—10th Feb. 16th Feb., 2nd March.  
and 10th March, 1768,

14. *Ibid.*—18th March, 1768 p. 145, 146,

15. *Ibid.*—27th April, 1768 p. 217.

The English army in two divisions was engaged in driving out garrisons of Hyder Ali from different strong places. Colonel Wood took Tingaracottah and Darampury and marched against Salem and Ahtour. Colonel Smith took possession of Covrepatam and then went to Kisnagarry. The Government of Bombay consented to assist in the operations against Hyder Ali by sending a force for the reduction of the possessions on the Malabar Coast. They sent an army of about 400 Europeans and 800 sepoys under the command of Major Gavin by land and Mr. Watson by sea and they possessed themselves of Mangalore and the largest section of Hyder Ali's fleet. Thereupon Tipu advanced to Mangalore with 1000 horse and 3000 foot. Major Gavin went out to meet him and a skirmish took place. His next plan was to march upon Bidnore. As soon as the Madras Government heard of the descent on the Malabar coast, they settled their plan of campaign. It was expected that Hyder would direct his attention towards the protection of his territory on the Malabar coast. Colonel Wood was told that after the reduction of Salem and Ahtour he should endeavour to take possession of the pass of Gazzalhetty which commands the entrance from Coimbatore and the Southern countries. If this plan could succeed, Coimbatore, Dindigul and other countries South of Cavery would be easily reduced and supplies to Hyder Ali from the South would be cut off. The next step would be to lay siege either to Bangalore or to Seringapatam.<sup>16</sup>

But Hyder was equal to the occasion. A Mysore army commanded by Tipu got possession of the Mangalore bazar on the 2nd May but was repulsed from the fort. On the 9th May the British army near Mangalore heard that Tipu was joined by the reinforcement of 4000 foot and 2000 horse with a train of heavy artillery and that Hyder Ali himself had come down to join them. In consequence, the British detachments embarked on the night of the 11th May and went to Tellichery. The retreat itself was so panicky and precipitate that they left all their sick in the hospital, all the fieldpieces and practically everything except 250/300 muskets. The sick in the hospital included 80 of the European infantry and 170/80 of the Bombay sepoys and they fell into the hands of Hyder Ali who thus succeeded in completely crushing the rebellion on the Malabar coast and driving the English into the sea.<sup>17</sup>

In the meantime Colonel Wood took possession of one fortified place after another—Namull on the 25th May; Earod, a strong fort on the South

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16. *Ibid.*—27th April, 1768. p. 208.

17. *Ibid.*—20th July, 1768 p. 291-93.

side of the Cavery on the 8th June, Venkatagerry on the 16th and Satyamangalam very soon after. Wood now marched towards the Guzelhetty pass. Colonel Campbell next secured Mulivakel and marched towards Colar which he took on the 20th June and then marched against Hussar, a strong fort 25 miles south-east of Bangalore which surrendered on the 11th July. Preparations were made for the siege of Bangalore. Meanwhile Colonel Wood having got possession of Guzelhetty marched to Coimbatore which surrendered without much opposition. Next, he secured Dindigul on the 4th August, thus completing the subjugation of the Southern countries.<sup>18</sup> He was now to join Colonel Smith and of the two armies one would carry on the siege of Bangalore and the other would watch Hyder. Hyder, however, had in the meantime with the greatest part of his force arrived near Bangalore which prevented the British Commander from making an attempt till the army was supplied with the necessary guns and stores.<sup>19</sup>

Murari Rao, as an ally of the British, was in their camp. On the night of the 23rd August, Hyder with 6000 horse and one battalion of Sepoys made an attempt on Murari Rao's camp which was half a mile on the right of the British encampment. He broke through the entrenchments with elephants and entered it but the Maratha Chieftain forbade his people to mount, got Hyder's horse entangled in tent and obliged his men to retire leaving 300 killed and wounded and several elephants.<sup>20</sup>

Colonel Wood's detachment joined the main army on the 6th October. Hyder could have cut off the detachment at Budjocota but for the vigilance of Smith. After the junction the whole army marched to bring Hyder to an engagement but he retreated too fast for them. He went towards Guramcondah, a detachment being sent after him and the remainder marched to cut off, if possible, his return to Bangalore. Most probably Hyder's principal design in this manœuvre was to recruit his army and overawe his vassals who had been emboldened by his ill success. The British army gathered at Colar, ready to commence the siege of Bangalore but Smith and the field deputies were of opinion that 'So long as Hyder remained in the field with so numerous an army, the attack on Bangalore would be too arduous an attempt and that he must be first defeated before it could be undertaken with a prospect of success.'<sup>21</sup>

18. Select Committee Proceedings—10th August, 1768 p. 428.

19. *Ibid.*—31st Aug. 1768. p. 485,

20. *Ibid.*—p. 563-64.

21. *Ibid.*—13th Dec. 1768 p. 662.

An excellent opportunity of concluding the war was now missed by the Madras Government owing to excessive greed. Hyder made offers of accommodation to Colonel Smith when being pursued towards Gurramkonda. The terms which he offered were quite reasonable but the Madras Government demanded a reimbursement of all their expenses, calculated on an extravagant scale and wanted that a barrier should be set to the Carnatic consisting of some forts and they further wanted territorial cession worth six lakhs of annual revenue to defray the cost of garrisoning them. Fallen though his fortunes were, Hyder Ali could not accept such terms. The Madras Government took a very shortsighted view of this matter. They only thought that they were going to restore territory worth 30 lakhs of rupees annually and Hyder was called upon to cede territory worth 6 lakhs of annual revenue. Malleison comments-- "Rarely have rapacity and extortion met with a prompter punishment. Driven to bay, the wild and untutored genius asserted itself. From the recovery of Muluwal began to series of successes ending in the triumph of Hyder Ali."<sup>22</sup>

Finding himself only pursued by a detachment of the army Hyder returned to Muluwal which he succeeded in taking by surprise through either the neglect or the treachery of the garrison consisting of the Nabab's troops. Colonel Wood who commanded the separate detachment marched to its relief but he was too late. He attempted to take it by escalade but was unsuccessful. The next day the 4th October, a battle took place. The British army sustained a loss of 1 captain, 2 ensigns 17 noncommissioned ranks, 28 Sepoys were killed and 125 wounded.<sup>23</sup> It is said that Hyder had lost about one thousand men. But more such battles as that of Muluwal would place him in a position to dictate terms. In fact only the presence of mind of Captain Brooke who had with the companies left to guard the baggage made it appear by shouting the name of Smith the British Commander-in-Chief, that he had come to assist the army and thus had thrown the enemy into confusion and enabled Wood to draw his men together.

At this stage the Madras Government recalled Colonel Smith and Muhammed Ali also had to return. Colonel Wood left in sole command was responsible for incredible bungling. Under his command the operations of the army consisted in little else but marching and counter-marching and there was no possibility of bringing Hyder to an action.

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22. Mallison--*The Decisive Battles of India*, p. 221.

23. Select Committee Proceedings--13th Dec. 1768, p. 663.

He detached a considerable force towards the South and forcing the pass of Gazelhatty through the treachery of the Nabab's troops, took possession of Coimbatore and some other places. Hyder himself with the greatest part of his force entered the valley near Covrepatam. But without entering the Carnatic as the Madras Government expected, he marched to south, advanced with great rapidity and soon repossessed himself of every place that had been taken before by the British. Such an easy reconquest can be explained by the fact that these places had been put under the management of the Nabab and every place was left practically without provisions and the troops had not received any part of their salary so long in arrears. Every fort therefore yielded on the first summons. Hyder now sent parties of his horse to plunder the Trichinopoly country and the Carnatic. The British army could not attempt to recover these lost places because it now became necessary to remove the stores from Colar to Vellore, a distance of about one hundred miles.<sup>24</sup>

The resources of the British in Madras had by now dwindled so much that it was impossible to maintain an army in the field and the state of things was so bad that the British felt almost compelled to make the first overtures inspite of the degradation of it. If Hyder Ali was really apprehensive of the Marathas, it was hoped he would readily agree to a cessation of hostilities in order to make room for negotiations.<sup>25</sup>

The Madras Government proposed a truce for forty days and wanted that during the negotiations Hyder's army would be at Ahtour and the British at Jagadurgun. Hyder, however, proposed that his army should be at Wandiwash, the British at Conjeverum and hostilities would cease for 7 days. But that would place him in the heart of the country whence with his swift cavalry he could be near Arcot or Cuddalore before the British. The truce negotiations failing, the armies were constantly in motion, without the British being able to approach nearer than a day's march and Hyder moving from place to place.<sup>26</sup> Colonel Smith who had been re-appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the British army, approached within a distance of 12-13 miles of Hyder. Hyder threw some breastworks with a view to outwit him and suddenly marched northward, with 8,000 foot and 12,000 horse by a road that lay to the east of the British army. Colonel Smith heard of it 8 hours after and began to

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24. Select Committee Proceedings—1st March, 1769, p. 101.

25. *Ibid.*—p. 106.

26. *Ibid.*—21st March, 1769—158,



follow. Hyder suddenly turned westward, went to Wandiwash and sent a *hurcurrah* desiring to negotiate but finding the British coming close behind,<sup>27</sup> he returned to the south, made a show of attacking Cuddalore, sent most of his sepoy with guns and baggage to the Ahtour pass and then pushed by the British army. His celerity of movement enabled him to appear in the bounds of Madras on the 29th March, 1769. He sent a letter the same evening to the President and one to Du Pre and expressed the pleasure of seeing the latter as soon as possible, assuring that he "may return again to the Governor in 2 garries". There could not now be any question of standing on punctillio. There was "but provision for 15 days in the black town when the peace was concluded",<sup>28</sup> though the fort might undoubtedly have held out till the arrival of Colonel Smith. A Treaty was concluded on the 4th April, 1769. The Treaty provided for a mutual restitution of conquests except the fort of Karur and its districts, which would be held by Hyder, but this had been formerly cut off from the dominions of the Mysorean. It also provided that in case of either of the two parties being attacked they would mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out. Some difficulty was caused in the wording of the Treaty as neither the Nawab of Arcot nor Hyder Ali would give to the other his proper titles. The difficulty was obviated by the Nawab agreeing to give to the British power to settle for the Carnatic Payenghat in general terms. Bombay was included within the terms of the Treaty and in lieu of the ships of Hyder taken on that coast the Madras Government surrendered the stores at Colar. Hyder gave up his demand of two lakhs of pagodas.<sup>29</sup>

The Anglo-Mysore war of 1767-'69 is interesting as it was the first war which the British Government finished by asking peace of the Indian power. Hyder is said to have ordered a caricature to be made, representing the Governor and his Council kneeling before him. Hyder was shown holding Du Pre by the nose, depicted as an elephant's trunk, pouring guineas and pagodas. Colonel Smith was in this picture, holding the treaty in his hand, breaking his sword in two.

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27. Early in 1769, Hyder offered to come to terms, but Bouchier vacillated and while affecting to treat, directed Smith to threaten the enemy's force. Hyder lured Smith to the southward (*The Indian Records Series—Vestiges of Old Madras*, Vol. II, p. 597).

28. Josia Du Pre to Robert Orme. Select Committee Proceedings—21st April, 1769, p. 207.

29. Select Committee Proceedings—21st April, 1769. To the President and Governor and Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort William, from p. 222-228.

The overwhelming superiority of the European soldier to his Asiatic rival, impressed on the mind of the Europeans in the battle of St. Thome had been confirmed by the issue of the engagement at Kaveripak, Plassey, Kondur and Machhlipattam, Bidewa, Undwahnala and Buxar. The failure of the British in this campaign requires some explanation. General Smith's greatest handicap was the inferiority of his cavalry. De La Tour writes, "The excellence of the English cavalry is acknowledged in Europe and its advantages consist less in the goodness of the horse than in the choice of the horsemen. The officers who were first entrusted with the formation of a body of cavalry in India, thought to establish and preserve the same discipline among them, without attending to the great difference of time, place and persons. The recruits sent from England to India were in general libertines and people of bad character, and as the Company will not dismiss a soldier, all the punishment inflicted on a horseman is to reduce him to serve in the infantry so that a man is sooner put among the cavalry than he is sent back again to his former station<sup>30</sup>". Smith's army was so weak in cavalry that he had to reduce the theatre of operations as much as possible to the mountainous country. He could not prevent Hyder from ravaging or cutting off the convoys. But the greatest element of weakness from the military point of view was the constant interference of the Council of Madras. Even admitting the view that "Strategy is not mumbo-jumbo but the application of common sense and experience to military conditions, illuminated by a flash of imagination", we must acknowledge that there was no civilian government less fitted to interfere with the generals in the field than the Government of Madras between 1767-69. It had no wellfounded knowledge of the forces of Hyder or of the nature of the country in which the hostile armies were operating and it was always tripping over a new fact or tumbling into an ignored pitfall. It was incessantly giving orders contrary to the views of the general or to every rational principle of war. But to crown all these disabilities was the dishonesty of this remarkably inefficient yet meddlesome Council. They supplied the army by means of contractors with whom they were in league to plunder. De La Tour points out that the Madras Government supplied their troops with rum instead of *arrack* because the latter article could be easily procured in the country whereas the former had to be secured from Batavia and afforded an opportunity of plundering. Oxen were taken by force from people on hire at 1 pagoda per month and after the expiry of a month or so, they would be informing

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30. De La Tour—*The History of Hyder Ali* p. 262-64.

the owner that the beast was dead and then it would be passed to the account of the company as purchased at full value. As a consequence of all this, Colonel Smith found it very difficult to secure oxen for the conveyance of artillery, ammunition and baggage<sup>31</sup>.

The Madras Government attributed their defeat to the want of a prudent reserve of funds, 'the rock upon which the French were wrecked in the last war'<sup>32</sup> As early as January, 1768, the Madras Government was very hardpressed for want of money, the monthly expenses of the army in the field exceeding 5 lakhs. Want of money was practically the theme of every letter they wrote to Bengal. The Madras Government asserted that they could not assemble a sufficient body of cavalry because they apprehended that their means would be exhausted before those troops could be brought to act. "Had the Nabab of Arcot before it was too late exerted his utmost powers, it might have been effected and this amongst others, is a striking proof of the dangers of a divided power". It was varily a coalition of cripples.

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31. *Ibid*, p, 267,

32. *Ibid*. p. 167.

# THE MARATHA-AFGHAN DIPLOMATIC TUSSLE ON THE EVE OF PANIPAT

BY

DR. ASHIRBADI LAL SRIVASTAVA, M.A., Ph.D. BIKANER.

An exhaustive and critical account of the circumstances leading to the final struggle between the Marathas and Ahmad Shah Abdali of Kabul assisted by Indian Pathans, commonly known as the Third Battle of Panipat (1761), is now a matter of common knowledge among the serious students of Indian history, thanks to the scholarly labours of such veteran historians as Sir Jadunath Sarkar and Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai, and it is therefore unnecessary to recapitulate them here. For months together before the battle the foreign invader had been in occupation of the north-western India ; he had obtained an extra-ordinary success in the battle-field of Barari-ghat (January, 1760) and as a consequence established his rule over the imperial city of Delhi and the upper half of the fertile region between the Ganges and the Jamuna. All the Indian Pathan Chiefs, moved by racial and religious, no less than political considerations, had joined him with thousands of troops, and the allies were maturing schemes for a complete expulsion of the Marathas from northern India. In order to meet this danger, to avenge the wrongs of Barari-ghat and to drive the invader out of the land and make an example of the unpatriotic Indo-Pathans the Peshwa despatched a powerful force under the command of Sadashiv Rao Bhau. Despite many a handicap, caused by the inadequate strength of his army, want of sufficient funds to finance the enterprise, and his own ignorance of Hindustan and its people the Bhau began his journey with high hopes, and marching by way of Sindkhed (16th March), Burhanpur and Sironj reached Gwalior on 30th May. Then he crossed the Chambal near Dholpur, and halted on its northern bank from 8th June to 12th July, sending messages and envoys to all important non-Pathan Chiefs for assistance against the foreign invader. At this place Malhar Rao waited upon the general, and Surajmal joined him on 30th June.

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A final struggle being inevitable, each of the two parties began to beat up for allies. Ahmad Shah had already written letters to all the important rulers of Rajputana and other powerful Indian chiefs commanding their allegiance and requesting them to join him in a campaign of driving back the Marathas, the enslavers of northern India, to their homeland in the South. The Bhau's agents also waited upon all the Rajput Rajahs and non-Afghan Muslim Chiefs with appeals to to make a common cause with the Marathas in their coming contest against the foreign invader. But, although naturally more sympathetically disposed towards the Marathas, they gave evasive replies in view of the past Deccani record in the north and decided to adopt the safe policy of neutrality till one of the combating parties gained a decided advantage over the other and it became imprudent for them to remain aloof in political isolation for any length of time.

Shuja-ud-daulah's place among the Indian rulers of the time was unique. He ruled over a more extensive, fertile and populous dominion, comprised as it was of two of the most important *Subahs* of the country, than that possessed by any other prince, except the Nawab of Bengal, who was but a nominee and a helpless puppet in the hands of a foreign mercantile community. His army was among the very best in the country. It was composed of two powerful elements, namely, the *Qizilbashes*, numbering six to seven thousands, most of whom had once belonged to Nadir Shah's forces and had subsequently taken service under Safdar Jang, and the *Naga Gosains*, ten thousand strong, who were a race of most valiant and reckless fighters, and whose leaders were popularly believed to be expert in witchcraft and proof against bullets and cannon-balls. His artillery was unquestionably the best in the land, if we omit to include the European guns recently introduced by the English and the French, from the point of the quality, variety and calibre and range of his guns and the efficiency of service. The financial resources of his dominion were great, and to them was added a well-filled treasury bequeathed to him by his father and grandfather. Shuja-ud-daulah's father had ruled the Empire as its Wazir for over five years, and this had supremely enhanced the prestige of the ruler of Oudh to whom habitual difference as to a superior was shown by most of the provincial chiefs including Najib-ud-daulah. The Nawab of Oudh therefore appeared to be a most valuable prospective ally, only if he could be persuaded to interest himself seriously in the approaching contest for supremacy. Hence each of the two antagonists strained every nerve to draw him over to his side.

Even before he entered into the heart of Malwa, the Bhau had issued clear orders to Govind Ballal to make every endeavour to persuade Shuja-ud-daulah to join him, and if he were reluctant to take an active part in the war on their side, to secure his neutrality at all costs. Realising that this object could be gained only by a clever combination of force and diplomacy, he ordered that as many boats as possible be collected and a bridge thrown over the Jamuna near Etawa so as to enable his army, upon their arrival, to quickly cross into the Doab, interpose a wedge between the Afghan possessions in the upper Doab and Shuja-ud-daulah and exert military pressure on the latter and thus prevent him from going over to the foreign invader, should he manifest any such intention. But Govind Ballal failed to carry out these orders owing to rains which set in very early that year, and as a consequence the Maratha diplomacy suffered from a serious handicap in as much as it had to function without being backed by force, and as we shall see, it ultimately proved ineffective. On the other hand, the Pathans were highly favoured by the circumstances. While the Bhau was still south of the Chambal, and Govind Ballal could not move out owing to early rains, Najib-ud-daulah advanced to Etawa, captured Shikohabad and swept away almost all the Maratha possessions in the Doab as far as Bithur,<sup>1</sup> near Cawnpore, bringing thereby the territory under the Shah's influence in close direct touch with Shuja-ud-daulah's frontier in that direction. As Ahmad Shah himself with all his force lay encamped at Aligarh, not far from the western frontier of Oudh, the Afghan negotiations with Shuja-ud-daulah had military sanction behind them and this was one of the reasons why they proved successful in the end.

#### THE MARATHA NEGOTIATIONS WITH SHUJA-UD-DAULAH

As early as 28th April, 1760 the Peshwa wrote to Govind Ballal expressing the hope that Shuja-ud-daulah would come over to his side willy nilly, when a strong Maratha force reached Hindustan,<sup>2</sup> and the very same day the Bhau sent him (G. Ballal) orders to beat up for allies<sup>3</sup> among whom was, of course, to be included the Nawab of Oudh. It was impressed upon Shuja-ud-daulah that their interests were perfectly identical, that is, saving of the country and the Mughal imperial house from destruction from the hands of a greedy foreign invader assisted by the Pathan traitors at home. Moreover, the Marathas had been hereditary

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1. Rajwade, Vol. I. 199,

2. *Ibid*, Vol, I. 173,

3. *Ibid*. Vol, I. 174 & 176.

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well-wishers and allies of his family, there having existed great friendship between his father and the Sindhia and Holkar chiefs, and the relations between him and the Marathas, specially Malhar Rao Holkar, were as cordial as could be desired<sup>4</sup>. Shuja-ud-daulah was further assured that after their victory over their common foe the administration of the Empire would be carried on by them jointly, (i. e., by Shuja and the Marathas)<sup>5</sup>. These preliminary negotiations had been carried on by Govind Ballal, but there was also a long direct correspondence between the Bhau and Shuja-ud-daulah, and the Maratha general on his arrival in Malwa sent a personal letter soliciting an alliance with the Nawab. Although Shuja-ud-daulah was meditating to follow the policy of playing with both the parties and joining neither of them,<sup>6</sup> yet sometime after he certainly became favourably inclined to the Maratha alliance. Wishing the Bahu victory, he held out hopes to the former that he would join him as soon as the Maratha army arrived in his vicinity.<sup>7</sup> Encouraged by the response, the Maratha Commander-in-Chief despatched an envoy of the name of Shamji Rangnath to the Oudh Court to negotiate terms of the proposed alliance.<sup>8</sup> But before this envoy reached Lucknow, the Nawab had definitely expressed his willingness to cast in his lot on the Maratha side on certain conditions, which in his own words were: "Give me the *Wizarat* and make Ali Gauhar Emperor. If you write that solemnly, then I shall come over to your side."<sup>9</sup> And we may be sure that the Bhau gave the undertaking without hesitation. But, meantime Najib-ud-daulah and Jahan Khan with their troops pushed on to Bithur and the great military and diplomatic pressure from the Abdali shook Shuja-ud-daulah's faith in Maratha alliance. Anxious to avoid the displeasure of either party, he reverted to his original conviction, the harmless path of neutrality, and abhorring the constant dinning by envoys from the combating rivals, he left his capital in the direction of Patna and gave out that he was going to join Shah Alam.<sup>10</sup> But informed of the Pathan military progress to Bithur and nervous about the safety of his western frontier, he returned to Lucknow and marched towards Qanauj so as to be in touch with the proceedings of the Afghan in the near vicinity of his frontier.

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4. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 173.

5. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 179.

6. Kashiraj. 5 ; Imad. 178-79.

7. Bhau's letter to Govind Ballal. 15th. May, 1760. *Ibid.* I, 187.

8. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 189,

9. Bhau's letter to Govind Ballal. 28th. May, 1760, *Ibid.*, Vol. I. 191.

10. *Ibid.*, Vol. I. 196 and 199.

All this disturbed the Bhau beyond measure, and in a final letter he stressed the hereditary friendship between Shuja-ud-daulah and the Marathas, appealed to him in the name of patriotism and loyalty to the Mughal throne to co-operate with him in expelling the foreign invader who, in conjunction with the Indian Pathans, the long natural enemies to the Oudh ruling house, was bent upon supplanting the Timurides on the throne of Delhi, and once again promised solemnly to install prince Ali Gauhar as Emperor and elevate him (Shuja-ud-daulah) to *Wazirship*, if they were blessed with victory. He explained that he did not mean to request the Nawab to join him with his forces and take an active share in the approaching battle: all that he desired was that the Nawab should lend him his normal support, remain at his capital and not pay heed to the enemy's overtures.<sup>11</sup> But neutrality was no longer possible in view of the presence of an envoy of Najib's diplomatic talents at the Court of Oudh. The disappointed Bhau made one more and final effort, and urged Govind Ballal to negotiate with Nawab's mother<sup>12</sup> (Sadrunnisa Begam), who possessed boundless influence over her son and was his supreme adviser in all matters, private or public; but this too proved to be of no avail.

#### THE ABDALI NEGOTIATIONS WITH SHUJA: NAJIB WINS

##### HIM OVER

Then Shah was equally, if not more, anxious to secure the adhesion of Shuja-ud-daulah, for he realised that "should he be gained over by the Marathas, the worst consequences must arise from it."<sup>13</sup> Accordingly he offered him the same bait as the Bhau, namely, the office of the Minister of the Empire and declared that his object was to give a fresh lease of life to the Mughal Empire under Shah Alam II.<sup>14</sup> But inclined as Shuja-ud-daulah then was towards the Maratha alliance, he was not at all moved by the Abdali's professions. The invader therefore took the extraordinary step of sending Malka-i-Zamani, the venerable and universally liked widowed queen of the late Emperor Muhammad Shah, to Lucknow to put the weight of her influence and persuasion in the scale of negotiations on the Afghan side.<sup>15</sup> But her mission, however, much it might have shaken the Nawab's faith in the Maratha alliance, did not at all prove a success. Rightly realising that the task of winning Shuja-ud-daulah

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11. Imad, p. 79.

12. Rajwade, Vol. I, 196.

13. Kashiraj, 10.

14. S. P. D., Vol. XXI. 186; Rajwade, Vol. I, 196.

15. Rajwade Vol. I. 202.



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was beyond the strength of an ordinary envoy, he decided upon deputing Najib-ud-daulah himself on this important diplomatic enterprize. Armed with a treaty embodying the terms, the *Wizarat* to Shuja-ud-daulah and the Empire to Shah Alam, under the Shah's seal and that of his Wazir, Najib marched to Mandighat on the Ganges, below Qanauj, where the Nawab of Oudh was then encamped. Shuja-ud-daulah accorded him a courteous reception, and when they came to business, Najib delivered the Shah's message and presented to him the sealed treaty he had brought with him. The Nawab thereupon acquainted the guest with the terms offered him by the Marathas, showed him the Bhau's letter in the original and expressed his own resolution to be neutral. The Marathas, he added, did not expect anything more, and even after their victory in the war they would remain friendly to him. With the shrewdness of a diplomat Najib characterised the Bhau's letter "a net of deception",<sup>16</sup> and said that the Maratha policy, which required no elucidation even to a lay man, was one of enslaving the whole of Hindustan. The Bhau he added, bore mortal hatred to all Muhammadans, and whenever he had power to show his enmity no Musalman whatever would escape from his clutches<sup>17</sup>. Then, at this psychological moment, he came forward with his trump card, the last weapon of communal leaders to excite the religious frenzy of their co-religionists, to the fever heat and exploit it for their own ends. It is not a war between a foreign invader and the chiefs of India, nor one between the Afghans and non-Afghan as the Bhau had fondly misrepresented it to be, urged the clever Pathan (who, like most of our modern Indo-Muslim leaders knew how to enlist the active sympathy of his brethren in faith by giving a communal tinge to an important secular problem and uttering the familiar cry of 'Islam in danger'), but "a war between Infidelity (Kufr) and Islam"<sup>18</sup>, a holy war in which it was the duty of every Musalman and more so of a noble of Shuja-ud-daulah's exalted position, to participate. Obviously this stirring sermon roused the religious feelings of the Nawabs who said, "By God, it is a thousand times better to fight against the Marathas and be slain, rather than endure the Abdali's taunt (for refusing to take part in the holy war)"<sup>19</sup>. Yet for certain reasons he would like to remain neutral. In the first place, he was an Indian, and secondly he belonged to

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16. Imad, 79.

17. Kashiraj. 11

18. Imad 79-80.

19. *Ibid.* 80.

the Shia faith, and hence it was not easily possible for him to pull on with the Shah and his officers who were foreigners and Sunnis. Moreover, he feared Ahmad Shah might even now be harbouring feeling of antipathy and revenge<sup>20</sup> against him in view of his father's victory over the Shah at the field of Manupur as early as March, 1748. At this stage of the negotiations Najib-ud-daulah must have felt very optimistic, for he had narrowed down Shuja-ud-daulah's objections to the minimum, and these also were of a purely personal nature. A good player of the game of diplomacy, he answered the Nawab's objections in these words, "What has Your Excellency to do with the officers of the Shah's army? God is my witness that even if the Shah himself casts a stern eye at your Excellency, I shall dig out both his eyes with these two fingers; and if I do not do so I am not the son of my father. You should look upon about one and a half lakhs of Afghans in India as your servants." Then striking a personal note, he made an appeal to Shuja-ud-daulah on his own behalf. "I should have no cause of complaint," he said, "if Your Excellency had to deal with some other (envoy), and had not consented to go (and join the Shah). Now that I, depending upon your kindness and grace have myself come, I hope you will not trample upon my word (of honour), and kindly do one of the two things. Either your Excellency should come with me (to the Shah's army), or here is the dagger and here is my neck, you should cut it off with your own hands. If you order, I may hand over a written paper under my signature and seal absolving you of the (consequences of) murder."<sup>21</sup> Thus in the most solemn manner Najib-ud-daulah pledged his word of honour for the Nawab's safety, and gave him the fullest assurance of the Shah's intention to abide by the agreement.

The die was cast, and Shuja-ud-daulah was won over. Still he took two or three days more to deliberate over the *pros* and *cons* of the momentous step he was going to take and to declare himself finally. His old and faithful officers, remembering the foreign policy of Safdar Jung, favoured an alliance with the Marathas, and advised the young Nawab to sit on the fence, as an alternative, and watch the issue of the contest, and then decide what to do.<sup>22</sup> His mother too was not quite sanguine about the safety of her son in Durrani's camp, who, she feared, had not forgotten the humiliating defeat he had suffered at the hands of her

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20. Kashiraj. 10.

21. Imad. 80.

22. Rajwade, Vol. I, 215.

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husband.<sup>23</sup> But all these misgivings were dispelled from Shuja-ud-daulah's mind by the solemn assurances of Najib, and he decided once for all to cast in his lot on the side of the Afghans, if and when similar assurance for his safety and investiture for *wazirship* were conveyed to him from the Shah himself. The Marathas hereafter made more than one serious effort to persuade him to remain neutral, but without success.

### SIGNIFICANCE OF NAJIB'S SUCCESS

It is hardly possible to over-estimate the importance of this diplomatic triumph of Najib-ud-daulah. A defensive and offensive alliance however temporary, between Oudh and its natural enemies the Pathans was indeed an unnatural political phenomenon. But thanks to the diplomatic skill of Najib, it became an accomplished fact. The history of the relations between the Indian Pathans, especially the Trans-Ganges Ruhelas and the Bangashes of Farrukhabad, and the ruling house of Oudh was an almost unrelieved story of mutual rivalry and war.<sup>24</sup> To say nothing of other Ruhelas, even Najib-ud-daulah himself had been the most powerful and effective instrument of Imad-ul-mulk in inflicting defeats after defeats on Safdar Jang and banishing him from Delhi to Oudh in 1753. Ahmad Khan Bangash had more than once attempted to wrest the Allahabad *Subah* from Shuja-ud-daulah's hands. True, the Nawab had rushed to the relief of Najib-ud-daulah besieged at Shukartal by the Marathas some months back, but that was due not so much to an excess of zeal for the latter's welfare as to his anxiety to maintain the balance of power in the north, and the integrity of his own dominion, for the fall of Ruhalkhand was bound to re-act adversely on the independence of Oudh. The history of the Maratha relation with Oudh, on the other hand, was not one of constant antagonism. All through Safdar Jang's tenure as a minister at the Delhi Court (1743-1753) except for a brief period of six months at the end, the Sindhia and Holkar chiefs had been his allies and supporters. Since Shuja-ud-daulah's accession they had maintained friendly relations, and had exerted military pressure to save him from the hostile Wazir in 1757. No doubt the Maratha policy was one of self-aggrandisement and extortion from Shuja-ud-daulah of the three important seats of Hindu pilgrimage in his dominion, and even reducing him to the position of a mere tribute-paying vassal, if the Peshwa's dream of the conquest of Bengal and Bihar could ever be fulfilled. And yet, paradoxical as it may seem, Shuja-ud-daulah's attitude towards

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23. Kashiraj.

24. See my *First Two Nawabs of Oudh*, Chapters, XIII, XIV and XV.

them was far from unfriendly. He was an aspirant for his father's post of the grand *Wazir* of the Empire, and he rightly realised that he could not attain to that supreme dignity, and if he somehow succeeded in gaining this his long cherished ambition, he could not function as *Wazir*, without moral and military support of the Marathas, the supreme controllers of the Court of Delhi at this juncture. In fact he looked upon Najib and Imad-ul-mulk and not the Marathas, as his real rivals, for of the formers the one possessed the intense ambition of becoming the supreme dictator at Delhi, while the other had enjoyed it for long and never relished the idea of being displaced by Shuja-ud-daulah or anybody else. This cardinal fact of the situation has been missed by almost all the modern historians of the period without exception, and it has been supposed that thoroughly disgusted and alarmed as he was, like all other north-Indian princes owing to the Maratha policy of loot, enslavement and horror, Shuja-ud-daulah readily consented to form an alliance with the Afghans for driving out the hated Deccanis to the South. A close study of the situation and of the details of the diplomatic negotiations prove this view to be erroneous. It is worth noting in this connection that Shuja-ud-daulah's hopes from the Marathas were not without foundation. The Peshwa was seriously thinking of displacing the delinquent Imad-ul-mulk and elevating the Nawab of Oudh to the *wizarate*, and in his letter to the Sindhias (Dattaji and Jankoji), dated 21st, March, 1759, he had directed the latter to effect this change, if Shuja-ud-daulah agreed to pay them for this service<sup>25</sup>. Hence, if a free choice were possible, and if Najib-ud-daulah had not thrown his tact, diplomacy and personal influence in the scale, and above all if he had not enacted the final scene (by placing of his neck under the Nawab's dagger, etc.) that he did, Shuja-ud-daulah would have either joined the Marathas, or, and it is more probable, would have remained neutral. In either case he would have obliged the Marathas, got the *Wazir's* post and the Peshwa's backing in the discharge of his duties at the Imperial Court.

Shuja-ud-daulah's alliance with the Shah proved to be of immense benefit to the Afghans. His presence on the side of the foreign invader gave the latter's cause an enormous accession of moral prestige. But for it, general public of the time would have regarded the war as one between the foreign Afghans and Indo-Afghans on one side and the Marathas on the other for supremacy over India that it really was, and not one between the Marathas and non-Marathas, which it was the

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25. *Aitihasik Patren Yadi wagaire Lekh*, L. Nos. 167 and 171.

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anxiety of Najib and the Shah to make it appear to the contemporary Indian world. Although Shuja-ud-daulah's adhesion alone might not have led to important military results, his troops were by no means negligible. Their disciplined rank remained in its position to the last, and made a material contribution to the Afghan victory.

# GLIMPSES INTO THE HISTORY OF BENGAL

## THE 14TH AND EARLY 15TH CENTURY

BY

N. B. ROY, M.A., Mymensingh

The medieval history of Bengal is shrouded in utter obscurity. The darkness is, however, only occasionally illumined by the writings of Delhi historians, evidence of coins issued by the rulers of Bengal and the accounts of foreign travellers. The Muslim rule was firmly implanted in Bengal by a soldier of fortune, Ikhtiyar-uddin Muhammad, son of Bakhtiyar Khalji about 1202 A.D.,<sup>1</sup> but far more than one hundred years, the Muslim rulers had to content themselves with rule over an inconsiderable portion of northern and western Bengal. Ancient Banga or eastern Bengal, the country to the east of the delta formed by the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, lay outside the pale of Muslim dominion.<sup>2</sup>

It was during the reign of Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz Shah that the victorious banners of Islam were implanted in Banga or eastern Bengal<sup>3</sup> and carried to distant Sylhet<sup>4</sup> 703 A.H. (1303 A.D.). Not long before this, another captain of War, Zafar Khan had laid the foundations of Muslim rule in South Bengal by the conquest of its capital Satgaon (Saptagram) 698 A.H.<sup>5</sup> (1298 A.D.). Shamsuddin Firuz Shah was thus the first Sultan who held sway over the two capitals of Bengal<sup>6</sup> ruled as far as

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1. The date accepted in *Cambridge History of India*, III, p. 46, is not at all authoritative as admitted by Sir W. Haig himself.

2. All the coins of the Bengali Sultans prior to the rule of Shamsuddin Firuz Shah were issued only from Lakhnauti.

3. Coins bearing the mint name of Sonargaon were issued in 705 and 710 A.H. (Catalogue of coins in the Shillong Cabinet, 2nd edition. Allahabad, 1930).

4. Sylhet was conquered by Sikandar Khan Ghazi (*J. A. S. B.*, 1922, p. 413).

5. *J. A. S. B.*, 1870 pt. 1. pp. 285-6.

6. Coins of Shamsuddin Firuz Shah issued from the Lakhnauti are dated from 702 to 720 A.H. (Catalogue of coins in the British Museum, and in the Indian Museum, in the Shillong Cabinet, also Initial Coinage of Bengal.)

Magadha.<sup>7</sup> His fairly long reign extending from 1302–1320 A.D., was chequered by struggle amongst his sons and brief spells of power exercised by some of them. The numismatic evidence alone affords us a glimpse into this internecine struggle. Shamsuddin's rule over Bengal is attested by his coins issued from Lakhnauti in 1302 A.D., and from Sonargaon in 1305 and 1310 A.D., but this unbroken continuity of his reign was soon disturbed by the successful assertion of independence by his son Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah who seized Lakhnauti in 1310 A.D.<sup>8</sup> His tenure of power was very brief for Lakhnauti was regained by his father in 1312 A.D.,<sup>9</sup> but six years later 1318–9 A.D. Lakhnauti again changed hands. It appears that the struggle between the father and the son exhausted both of them and afforded an opportunity to Shihabuddin Bugrah Shah<sup>10</sup> to assert and occupy Lakhnauti but this usurpation again proved to be of short duration for his father Shamsuddin succeeded in making good his hold over Lakhnauti in 1320 A.D.<sup>11</sup> in which year he died<sup>12</sup> and was succeeded by his third son Nasiruddin Ibrahim. Nasiruddin's power in its turn was short lived for he seems to have been supplanted ere long by his brother Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah who seized the crown of Lakhnauti in 1321–22 A.D. The Delhi historians do not afford us any clue to this struggle for ascendancy but this drama of the

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7. *J. A. S. B.*, 1873, pp. 249–50 (His son Hatim Khan was the ruler of Magadha).

8. This is attested by the coin issued from Lakhnauti in 711 A.H. (*B. M. Catalogue*, Initial Coinage of Bengal and 710, 712 (Shillong Cabinet),

9. In 712 and 713 (?) A.H. coins were issued from Lakhnauti by Shamsuddin Shah. pp. 135–6 (Shillong Cabinet.)

10. *J. M. C.*, p. 148, Shillong Cabinet, p. 140—Coins of Shihabuddin Bugrah Shah were issued from Lakhnauti and dated in the year 718 A.H. There is a coin illustrated in the Initial Coinage too but without the mint name and date, p. 52.

11. Coins issued from Lakhnauti and dated in the year 720 A.H. *I. M. C.*, p. 147, Shillong Cabinet (the reading is doubtful), *I. C.*, p. 49.

12. According to Blochmann (*J. A. S. B.*, 1874, p. 289), Shamsuddin Firuz died in 717 or 718 A.H. (1317–8). Iswari Prasad places his death in 722 A.H., on the evidence of coins (*Qarauna Turks*, p. 24); but there is no coin in any catalogue except that of Thomas dated in the year 722. But this coin is not illustrated in Thomas. Thomas's reading is most arbitrary and without verification; his casual reference cannot be relied upon, *Catalogue of I. M.* and that of the Shillong Cabinet refer to coins of Shamsuddin, dated 720 A.H., though the date of Shillong Cabinet is marked with a query. Again coins of Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah, dated 721 A.H. (without the mint name in *I. M. C.*) and 722 A. H., minted at Ghiyaspur and Lakhnauti go a good deal to show that Shamsuddin's death should not be placed later than 720 A.H.

tripartite conflict for possession of the capital is unfolded by the evidence of coins only.

The first independent ruler about whom we possess a fair knowledge is Sultan Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah. The history of his reign is illuminated by the light shed by coins, Delhi historians and the account of the African traveller Ibn Batuta<sup>13</sup>. Fakhruddin emerges suddenly into prominence in 1336 A. D. Silahdar (chief of armoury) under Bahram Khan, he seized the eastern capital of Bengal on the latter's death and asserted his independence by assuming the title of Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah in the same year<sup>14</sup>.

The Delhi Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq was now in the plenitude of his power and to put down this rebel he sent Qadr Khan of Lakhnauti, Izzuddin Yahiya of Satgaon and Firuz Khan of Kara at the head of large army to Sonargaon.

Fakhruddin was defeated and took to his heels. All his treasures and baggage fell into the hands of Qadr Khan who remained encamped in the eastern capital of Bengal. The rainy season soon set in, horses began to die out, discontent grew in the army. This was the opportunity for Qadr Khan who came out of his retreat and won over discontented soldiery to his side. A conspiracy was hatched and Qadr Khan was slain by his own troops.<sup>15</sup>

Fakhruddin now re-seated himself on the throne of Sonargaon and sent his slave Mukhlis to fill the vacant viceroyalty of Lakhnauti. Lakhnauti was plundered and occupied but this mastery over Lakhnauti was very shortlived. Mukhlis, Fakhruddin's deputy, was slain by Ali Mubarak muster-master of Qadr Khan's troops who now rose into prominence in Lakhnauti.

He sent a representation to the Sultan whereupon the latter sent Malik Yusuf but he died in course of his march to Bengal and Muhammad Tughlaq pre-occupied with widespread rebellion left Bengal to itself. Ali Mubarak assumed royal titles and declared his independence under the title of Alauddin Ali Shah 1341-2 A.D.

Freed from the fear of the Delhi Sultan the two chiefs of Bengal, Fakhruddin and Ali Shah launched upon a bitter struggle for supremacy.

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13. Sanguinetti's *Ibn Batuta*, III pp. 209-10.

14. I. C. (Initial Coinage) p. 55, Shillong Cabinet, Lakhnauti 722 (?) Ghiyaspur 722 A. H.

15. The authorities cited above state that Qadr Khan had hoarded plenty of money but his niggardliness to the soldiers bred discontent in the army.



## *Glimpses into the History of Bengal*

Fakhruddin would dash upon Lakhnauti with his fleet of boats in the rainy season while Ali Shah would fling himself upon the eastern capital in winter.

Taking advantage of this struggle, Shayda who had been appointed governor of Satgaon by Fakhruddin rose in rebellion and murdered a son of the Sultan. The quick march of Fakhruddin took Shayda by surprise and checkmated all his plans. The rebel fled to Sonargaon where he was seized by the people who handed him over to the royal troops. He was beheaded and his accomplices were put to death by the Sultan's order.<sup>16</sup> Though unable to regain his hold over Lakhnauti Fakhruddin made up for this loss by an extension of his sway over Sylhet. His rule thus extended over a fairly large kingdom comprising Satgaon,<sup>17</sup> Sonargaon and Sylhet.<sup>18</sup>

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16. *Ibn Batuta*, IV, 212.

17. That Satgaon was included in the dominions of Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah admits of no doubt. Zia Barani p. 450, Nizamuddin Ahmed p. 205, Ferishta p. 134, Ibn Batuta are unanimous on this point.

Ibn Batuta's Sudkawan has been identified with Chatgaon by Yule (*Cathay and the way thither* p. 45), Dr. Bhattasali (*Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans of Bengal* pp. 145-9); but this identification is not correct. Ibn Batuta gives the pronunciation of the word and uses *sin* and not *jim* which would have been the case if he meant Chatgaon.

The argument that Satgaon is far from the sea is not very convincing because there are places which were on the sea board in ancient times but are now far from the sea e. g. Tamralipta.

Again Ibn Batuta distinctly states that the Ganges to which the Hindus go in pilgrimage and the Jumna unite near Sudkawan before falling into the sea. Dr. Bhattasali has interpreted this statement to have meant Chatigaon by various arguments which are utterly hollow. He himself says that Chatigaon is 90 miles below the confluence of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra. So even taking for granted that the traveller made a confusion between the Jumna and Brahmaputra which is doubted by Col. Yule himself, it is incomprehensible how the Ganges and Brahmaputra unite near Chatigaon which is 90 miles below the confluence.

That the rivers, the Ganges, & the Jumna united near Satgaon is on the other hand borne out by Abul Fazl, *Jarett* Vol. 11 p. 120-1.

Then again the identification of Sadkawan leads Dr. Bhattasali into another error for he says that Fakhruddin went to fight with the king of Tipperah. This is an unwarranted assumption which is not borne out either by Delhi historians nor by numismatic evidence.

18. Ibn Batuta's journey to Shaikh Jalal has been reasonably concluded by Col. Yule to be that at Sylhet.

Sultan Fakhruddin was an excellent ruler who loved the poor and was particularly devoted to saints (*darwishes* and *sufis*). His care and concern for them was very great. Their journeys by boats were made free of all charges and provisions were ordered to be liberally supplied to them.

Heavy taxes were exacted from the non-Muslim population. "Half of their harvest" says the African traveller "was collected as taxes and there were also other contributions."

Despite the taxes, agriculture was flourishing. All the way from Sylhet to Sonargaon down the blue river (*nahar-al-zarq*) a journey of 15 days was dotted with smiling villages and gardens "on its banks" says the traveller in enchantment, "as it were, there are wheet-wheels, orchards and villages to right and left like the Nile in Egypt. We travelled down the river for 15 days between villages and orchards just as if we were going through bazaar."<sup>19</sup> Boats loaded with various commodities glided up and down the river and greeted each other by beating drums. It appears from the traveller's itinerary that river was the highway of communication and distant journeys were undertaken with as much quickness as with ease and facility.

The prices of the necessities of life were extremely cheap. "Bengal is a vast country abounding in the rice and nowhere in the world" says the traveller, "have I seen any land where prices are lower than there."

Muhammad-al-Masud who had lived in Bengal for a long time narrated to the traveller in Delhi that food-stuffs purchased with only eight dirhams<sup>20</sup> were sufficient to maintain his wife, himself and a servant. The keen and penetrating traveller incorporates into his account a list of the current cheap prices of the necessities of life.

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19. Gibb's *English translation of Ibn Batuta's travels*. pp. 267-71.

20. Eight dirhams were equal to a silver dinara and a gold dinara was equal to ten silver dinaras (Yule's *Cathay* etc. p. 439. Thomas' *Chronicles of the Pathan King*, p. 227 F. N.) A silver dinara was the approximate equivalent of a modern rupee.

The weight of a silver dinara of Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah varied between 162.5 to 168 grain [I. M. C. 11 p 149] which approximately equalled the weight of a modern rupee (160 grains of pure silver plus fifteen grains of alloy). Any attempt however at computation of prices of commodities in those days in terms of modern money and weight would be neither correct nor scientific because the ratio between gold and silver has not remained constant. The medieval ratio for instance was 1 : 10 as contrasted with the present ratio of 1 : 70 silver being seven times dearer in those days.

[Continued on next page.]

## *Glimpses into the History of Bengal*

Eight fat fowls at one silver dinara.

A milch cow        three silver dinaras.

Fifteen pigeons    one dirham.

A fat ram            two dirhams.

A piece of cotton of the finest quality measuring 30 cubits—two dinaras.

A beautiful girl one gold dinara.

Ibn Batuta himself purchased a slave girl named Ashurah of exquisite beauty at about one gold dinara whereas one of his companions bought a little slave called Lulu for two gold dinaras.

Rice at rate of 25 *ratl*<sup>21</sup> of Delhi sold at one silver dinara.

Paddy—80 *ratl* of Delhi    8 dirhams.

Syrup—one *ratl*        „        8        „

Sugar        „        „        4        „

Sesame oil „        „        2        „

Ghee        „        „        4        „

The traveller's account thus affords us an interesting glimpse into the plenty and prosperity that prevailed in Bengal, but these advantages were off set by the severity of its climate, so that men from Khorasan called it a "*dozak pur niamat*", a hell crammed with blessings.

After Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah's reign came to a close, a more glorious epoch dawned in the history of Bengal.

A soldier of fortune, Ilyas Haji by name, made himself master of almost the whole of Bengal and laid the foundation of a dynasty of independent kings who ruled with pomp and authority for more than a century. Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah, his son and successor Sikandar Shah were strong and able rulers who hurled back the Delhi army and

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*from last page* ]

Again the use of metallic currency was much limited in these days and exchanges were carried on by means of barter and non-metallic tokens to an extent undreamt of in these days. So to compare the prices of articles in terms of coins is not likely to yield us correct and scientific results.

The table of prices current in Bengal (1345 A.D.) indicated in Dr. Bhattasali's *Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans of Bengal*, is accordingly misleading and unscientific.

21. Delhi *Ratl* has been indicated to be nothing but *man* (*Coins and Chronology of the Early Independent Sultans of Bengal*, p. 144) and the weight of *man* has been said to amount to 28·8 lbs. avoirdupois (Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings*, pp 161-2).

embellished the capital city with many splendid edifices. Sikandar Shah's successor was Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah who preserved in tact the heritage bequeathed by his predecessors.

The story of his correspondence with the poet Hafiz of Shiraz and his quiet submission to the sentence passed upon him by the *Qazi* for wounding the only son of a widow have added a romantic interest to his reign but of his character and administration we know little or almost nothing.

Quite unexpectedly, however, the refreshing account of a Chinese, Mahaun, an interpreter attached to the Chinese embassy that visited Bengal about 406 A.D., affords us a glimpse into the life of the Bengali people of that period. His description, brief and meagre is of unsurpassed interest, for it brings to light for the first time the dress, manufactures, chief products, and amusements of the Bengali people.

Bengal, says the traveller, is an extensive country whose products were abundant and the people numerous. They engaged themselves actively in trade and maintained commercial intercourse with foreign nations.

The people, whom he saw, were Muhammodans who were dark skinned, although light complexioned persons were to be seen. The men shaved their heads which were adorned with white turbans. A long loose robe formed their chief apparel which was fastened at the waist by a broad coloured handkerchief. Their foot-wear consisted of pointed leather shoes. The dress of the people very much pleased him which, he says, "was becomingly arranged."

Among the manufactures, the varieties of fine cotton fabrics struck him most. "One variety known as *Pi-chih* was of a soft texture, three feet broad and made up in length of fifty-six or fifty-seven feet. The other was a ginger-yellow fabric, four feet or more wide and fifty feet long, very closely woven and strong. The third fabric was five feet wide and twenty feet long. The fourth variety was three feet wide and sixty feet long but the meshes of this texture were open and regular. The fifth was made up in lengths of forty or more feet, two feet and five or six inches wide. The sixth was made up in lengths of twenty feet or more and four feet wide."

Silk industry was flourishing for the mulberry tree and silk-worms were found there. "Silk handkerchiefs and caps embroidered with gold, painted ware, basins, cups, steel, guns, knives and scissors were all to be had here". The manufacture of paper was made from the bark of a tree which he says is smooth and glossy like a deer's skin.

### *Glimpses into the History of Bengal*

Various kinds of corn and fruits grew in abundance, e.g., rice, wheat, sesamum, all kinds of pulse, millet, ginger, mustard, onions, hemp, quash, brinjals and many kinds of vegetables. The chief fruits were plantains, jackfruit, mangoes, pomegranates, sugarcane, whitesugar, granulated sugar, various candied and preserved fruits. Betel nut was offered to the guests.

The people delighted in various kinds of amusements. Feasts and entertainments were held and enjoyment of the people on those occasions was heightened by music and dance.

A class of people whom he describes as the mountebank put on a very gay dress on festive occasions. They fastened to their shoulders a string of coloured stones and coral beads, and bracelets of dark red stone on their wrists. Thus attired they discoursed sweet music to the audience. Conjurers were very common. They played many tricks and exhibited many performances, one of which particularly excited his curiosity.

A man attended by his wife paraded the streets with a tiger bound with an iron chain. When he began his performance he set the tiger free and then stripping himself off his cloth danced in front of the animal and enraged it by kicks and blows till it became furious and sprang violently upon him. The two then became engaged in a death-grapple and rolled down on the ground. When the animal panted, the man put his hand into its mouth and struck at the throat, but the tiger could not cause the least injury to his person. After this the animal was tied again with the piece of chain.

This account of Bengal is illuminated by only a casual reference to the character of the people who, in his opinion were open and straightforward in their dealings.<sup>22</sup>

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22. *J. R. A. S.*, 1895, pp. 529-33.

# INTRODUCTION TO AN ANONYMOUS DOCUMENT

BY

DR. PRATUL C. GUPTA, M.A., (Cal.), Ph. D. (Lond.).

Towards the end of the year 1936, I came across a document on the administrative system of the Marathas, in the archives of the India Office, London. It was a fairly long manuscript, and even at a cursory glance seemed to be of some importance. As I went through the pages, it became apparent that this manuscript must have been written by a servant of the East India Company, soon after the last Peshwa Baji Rao II had been defeated by the English, and pensioned off in 1818,

The document runs from page 323 to page 439 of volume 531, in the series of papers known as the Home Miscellaneous. On the top of the document, its name appears as "Original Papers on Mahratta Institutions." In the manuscript itself as well as in Hill's Catalogue of Records in the Home Miscellaneous series, there is a note describing it as of unknown authorship, though it is referred to as "No. 16 in Miss Cumming's list." It opens with a very brief account of the administrative system introduced by Shivaji, and proceeds to give a general idea of the administration under Baji Rao II. The author found that though "the late Peshwa had a better opportunity than any of his predecessors of amending the laws or of fixing whatever was considered equitable" by his subjects, he had "neither ability nor inclination for a task of the kind". So the author warned his readers that owing to the mismanagement of affairs during Baji Rao's regime he would "frequently have to mention rather what is generally considered right than what was the course of proceeding."

These preliminary observations are followed by a number of answers to questions on legal procedure in the Maratha country. They are more than 100 in number, and include topics such as the *Panchayet*, the means of procuring the attendance of witnesses, public feeling regarding the *Panchayet*, the office of the *Nyayadhish*, forms of pleading in court, administration of oaths, boundary disputes, dispute about caste, imprisonment for debt, bankruptcy, punishments, usual modes of execution and imprisonment. Then follows a description of the police system in Poona

## *Introduction to an Anonymous Document*

and in the country. In the end, the writer of the document answers what are called "general questions". They are 17 in number, and contain observations on the character of the Marathas, prevailing crimes and educational institutions. To the author, all Brahmans "spoken of generally" were intriguing false and cunning", and "when in power, coolly unfeeling and systematically oppressive". The *Kumbis* or cultivators were "very good people, hospitable, humane, industrious and inoffensive". The author found the Maratha gentlemen to be "great braggars", [braggarts] who considered it "almost degrading to be able to write", and had "all the vices of the Mogul, without any of the taste or magnificence, which the latter comparatively" might "be said to possess". But at the same time, the author acknowledged that some of the Maratha administrative machineries, especially the police were "certainly very efficient even to the last", and he also admitted that "notwithstanding all" which he had had "occasion to mention", he believed that the inhabitants of the country were "better people" than were "generally met with in India".

It may be interesting to trace how the manuscript found its way into the India Office. The note referring to it as No. 16 in Miss Cumming's list, serves as a valuable clue. Among the Cummings who came over to India in the 18th or the beginning of the 19th century, there was one James Cumming, who entered the service of the Board of Control in 1793. Unfortunately, James Cumming is a shadowy figure. His name does not appear in the lists of the Civil Servants at Madras or any other establishment in India, and the only mention I have found of him, is in the Dictionary of National Biography. According to this publication, he was appointed "head of the revenue and judicial department under the Board of Control". He also "assisted in drawing up" the Fifth Report of the Select Committee. In 1823, he retired broken in health, and died in Berkshire, England, in January, 1827.<sup>1</sup>

After Cumming's death, this manuscript along with 19 others, all on Indian subjects, was discovered among his possessions.<sup>2</sup> His sister Ann Cumming, (who undoubtedly is the same person referred to as Miss Cumming in this manuscript) offered the whole lot for sale to the East India Company.<sup>3</sup> On the 13th August 1827 she addressed a letter to the Committee of Correspondence, part of which reads as follows:—"I am unfortunately precluded from indulging my own wishes by offering

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1. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. V (1908) p. 296.

2. Home Miscellaneous Series Vol. 525, pp. 1-33.

3. *Ibid.*

them (manuscripts) to the gratuitous acceptance of the East India Company, for a sacred obligation is imposed upon me to discharge, so far as I can gather means, those unavoidable incumbrances which he left, and which were occasioned by the protracted and distressing illness involving endless expense, which only ceased with his existence.....

"Under circumstances so deeply painful to me from every consideration, I indulge a hope that the possession of the papers in question by the East India Company may be in part the means of enabling me to relieve my brother's memory and my own feelings from an obligation which at present presses most heavily upon both....."<sup>4</sup>

T. L. Peacock, an officer in the Examiner's Department, who had been asked to examine those papers, submitted his report on the 14th August 1827, in the course of which he stated that these papers "relate principally to matters of permanent interest, and must therefore be always valuable, both as materials of reference", and as "condensations of information."<sup>5</sup> On the 15th August, the Committee of Correspondence advised the Court of Directors that the Company "should possess the documents in question", and recommended that Miss Cumming "be presented with the sum of £ 400, in consideration of the advantages which the Company must derive from acquiring possession of the said papers."<sup>6</sup> On the same day the recommendation of the Committee was accepted by the Court of Directors.<sup>7</sup>

From the observations made by the Committee of Correspondence, it is clear that it is a document of some importance, and one only hopes for some information about its authorship. Fortunately, however, though the document has always been described as anonymous, the text itself contains certain indications, unmistakably pointing to its author. When I first read the manuscript, paragraph six seemed vaguely familiar to me. Subsequently I found that it bore strong resemblance to certain lines in Grant Duff's *History of the Maharattas*.<sup>8</sup> Not only the general

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4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid*—from a note added in pencil.

8. Compare the lines—"The late Peshwa had a better opportunity than any of his predecessors of amending the laws, or of fixing whatever was considered equitable by the generality of his subjects, but that prince possessed neither ability nor inclination for a task of the kind.....even the administration of Nana Furnaveese, corrupt and had as it was is now spoken of with applause....."

(From the manuscript in the India Office)

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## *Introduction to an Anonymous Document*

idea, but the language also is very much similar. This may be due to two causes. Either, both these works came from the same person, or while writing the '*History of the Maharattas*' Grant Duff made use of this document. At first I considered the second presumption to be more probable. But later on, other considerations prompted me to believe that Grant Duff himself was the author of this anonymous manuscript. It appears from the text that the author of the document regulated the bazar and the police at Satara. "I re-established" the *Shatee Mahajan*<sup>9</sup> "the first day. The *Kotwal's* office I at first did not restore....." So he must have been a high official at Satara, and probably the officer in charge of the district. This fact becomes very significant if it is remembered that in April 1818, Grant Duff had been appointed the Political Agent to the Raja of Satara, with Balaji Pant Natu "as his principal native agent."<sup>10</sup> He held this post till 1822, when he was succeeded by Colonel Briggs. Again, in his "Report on the territories conquered from the Peshwa" Elphinstone, while describing the nature of the Maratha Brahmans refers to Chaplin's opinion that they were an "intriguing, lying, corrupt, licentious, and unprincipled race of people," and observes that "Capt. Grant adds with equal truth" that 'when in power, they are coolly unfeeling, and systematically oppressive and now' generally discontented and only restrained by fear from being treasonable and treacherous."<sup>11</sup> The above is clearly a quotation from the anonymous document in the India Office. Cited by Elphinstone as Grant Duff's opinion, it is almost a conclusive proof that Grant Duff was the author of this document. It should be noted however, that the quotation in Elphinstone's Report does not exactly tally with the lines in the

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Continued from previous page ]

"Defective as the system was under Mahdoo Rao Bullal, the Shastree who then superintended and directed the *Punchayets* was a person of strict integrity, and that Peishwas reign was always referred to as the time when a poorman had justice; even the administration of Nana Furnaveese was spoken of with applause; but Bajee Rao, the only Peishwa who had full leisure to amend the civil Government, had neither ability nor inclination for the task". Grant Duff.—*History of the Maharattas* (Ed. by Edwardes) Vol. II, P. 431.

9. The duties of the *Shatee Mahajan* being "to assist in regulating the bazar".

10. Bom. Pol. Pro. 1818, 26th May p. 3134.

11. Elphinstone—*Official Writings*, p. 260.

manuscript; there is a variation of a word or two.<sup>12</sup> But that may be due to a slip on Elphinstone's part, or perhaps those changes occurred in the copy Elphinstone used.

A word may be said to explain the conditions under which this document was in all probability written. The war with the Peshwa commenced early in November 1817, and in December Elphinstone was appointed sole Commissioner for the settlement of territories conquered from the Peshwa. After the fall of Satara, Elphinstone nominated Grant Duff as Political Agent to the Raja of Satara "with full powers for the arrangement of the affairs of the state". There were four other officers under Elphinstone, in charge of separate districts. The city of Poona with the adjoining district was placed under the care of Henry Dundas Robertson, the regions between the Bhima and Chandor hills under Pottinger, Khandesh under Briggs, while Chaplin of the Madras Covenanted Service was in charge of the territories above the Ghats.<sup>13</sup> According to Elphinstone's statements in his "Report of the territories conquered from the Peshwa," circular letters containing questions on civil and criminal jurisprudence of the Marathas and other matters were sent by him to his agents.<sup>14</sup> It is also evident from the manuscript itself that it was compiled as answer to a number of questions put to the author.<sup>15</sup> The officer to whom this manuscript was addressed had apparently some knowledge of the Maratha country, for "to remark" to him "what Bajee Rao was" seemed "superfluous". The reasonable conclusion is that this document was compiled by Grant Duff in answer to the circular letter issued to him by Elphinstone. It would have been interesting to learn what reply was given to Elphinstone by other officers. But unfortunately, we do not know if any report came from Pottinger, Robertson or Briggs. But at least one of them, Chaplin, sent a report to the Commissioner, of which an acknowledgment has been made in Elphinstone's own writing. It was subsequently published and I have seen a copy of it, in the India Office Library.

It is difficult to believe that a writing of a Grant Duff should so long remain unnoticed. But perhaps it would not appear so strange, if it is

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12. Compare the lines in the manuscript "All Brahmins spoken of generally are intriguing, false and cunning, and where they have power they are coolly unfeeling and systematically oppressive.....They may all be considered discontented and nothing but fear prevents their becoming treasonable and treacherous".

13. Grant Duff Vol. II. pp. 520-21.

14. Elphinstone, *Official Writings*, pp. 260, 274.

15. "I shall now endeavour to reply directly to your queries", also "I have now I believe furnished answers to almost all your queries directly or indirectly".

### *Introduction to an Anonymous Document*

remembered that Grant Duff's manuscripts were handed over to the Bombay Literary Society, and since believed to be lost. A copy of one of them found its way into the archives of the India Office and has been luckily preserved. The Home Miscellaneous Series where this document has been found, is a curious collection of various matters, and it might have easily escaped attention.

This document on Maratha Institutions as well as Chaplin's "Report on the territories above the Ghauts" furnished some of the materials on which Elphinstone built up his "Report on the territories conquered from the Peshwa". Much of our knowledge of Maratha life and their military administration in the days of Baji Rao II is derived from two contemporary works, Tone's "*Institutions of the Marathas*" and Broughton's "*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*". Both these publications are interesting in their own way, but neither of them has very much to say on the civil administration of the country. This gap is filled up by the manuscript in the India Office, and it would prove of immense value to those interested in civil and criminal jurisprudence of the Marathas and their police system during the administration of the last Peshwa Baji Rao II.<sup>16</sup>

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16. I take this opportunity of thanking the Under-Secretary of State for India for permitting me to edit and publish this manuscript.

# THE GĀṄGA KING AND THE TITLE *GURJARĀDHIRĀJA*

BY

Dr. A. VENKATASUBBIAH, M.A., Ph.D.,

In a controversy that was carried on recently in the pages of the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, (Vol. X, p. 337 ff. and 582 ff.), Dr. D. C. Ganguly and Prof. Dasaratha Śarma have both had occasion to refer to the expression—*Satyavākya-Komguṇivarmma-dharmmamahārājādhirājasya Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya*—that occurs in lines 6–8 of a *Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa* inscription published in EI. V, 176 ff. by the late Dr. Fleet. This inscription was first published by the late B. L. Rice as no. 38 in his edition of *Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa Inscriptions*; and following him, Dr. Fleet translated the epithet *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya* as “who became known as ‘the king of the Gurjaras’ by conquering the northern region for Kṛṣṇarāja (III)” on p. 179 l. c. This translation has been repeated by R. Narasimhachar also on p. 11 (*Translations*) of the second edition of *Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa Inscriptions* that was brought out by him in 1923; but, he has in addition observed in footnote 3 that the expression may also mean ‘who became acquainted with the king of the Gurjaras during Kṛṣṇarāja’s conquest of the northern region.’ Dr. Ganguly and Prof. Dasaratha Śarma, in their papers mentioned above, make no reference to the latter translation, but have unquestioningly followed (see pp. 340 and 584 l. c.) the translation of Dr. Fleet. And it is thus generally believed by all scholars that there was, in the ninth century A. D., a Gāṅga king named Mārasimha who had the title *Gurjarādhirāja* or ‘King of the Gurjaras.’

This belief is wholly unfounded.

In the first place, Fleet’s translation of *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya* as “who became known as ‘the king of the Gurjaras’ by conquering the northern region for Kṛṣṇarāja (III)” is a most improbable one. The term *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijayaḥ* is a *ṣaṣṭhi-tatpuruṣa* compound (*Kṛṣṇarājasya uttara-dig-vijayaḥ*) and not a

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*caturthī-tatpuruṣa* (Kṛṣṇarājāya uttara-dig-vijayaḥ); and it signifies 'Kṛṣṇarāja's conquest of the northern region;' similarly the term *vidita-Gurjarādhirājaḥ* too is, without doubt, a *bahuvrīhi* compound (*viditaḥ Gurjarādhirājaḥ yena saḥ*); and it can signify only 'who became acquainted with the king of the Gurjaras,' and cannot, in any circumstance, signify 'who became known as "the king of the Gurjaras."' It is most improbable therefore that the expression *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya* can, as believed by Fleet, mean "who became known as 'the king of the Gurjaras' by conquering the northern region for Kṛṣṇarāja (III);" and Mr. Narasimhachar was wrong in believing that the expression admits of the latter translation also.

Again, in none of the inscriptions of the Gaṅga king Mārasimha that have come down to us is the title *Gurjarādhirāja* applied to him; and this too shows that he did not have that title. According to Dr. Fleet (*Dynasties of the Kanarese Districts*, Bombay Gazetteer, 1896, Vol. 1, part 2, p. 305), Mārasimha succeeded his father Būtuga as king in about 963-64 A.D., while his campaign against the northern region on behalf of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Kṛṣṇa III must have been conducted some time after the year 949-50 A.D. inasmuch as the Lakṣmeśvar inscription of Mārasimha (*Ind. Ant.*, 7, 101) which mentions this fact applies to Kṛṣṇa III the epithet *Colāntaka* and Kṛṣṇa's conquest of the Cola king took place in about that year. The inscriptions that mention the titles of Mārasimha and that belong either to his own time or to those of his descendants are, beside the Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa inscription mentioned above, the following :—

EC. III. T. N. 93 (p. 165) of unknown date; refers to Mārasimha as *Ṇolambāntaka Pemmāḍi*.

EC. IX. Cp. 143 (p. 203) of unknown date; mentions.....  
*rājādhirāja Koḷālāḷa-pura-vareśvara Nandagiri-nāthaṃ  
janad-uttaraṃ.....kulāntakaṃ samarai.....kadana-  
kanthiravaṃ śrī-Permānaḍigaḷ.*

EC. XII. Tp. 103 (p. 99) dated in Śaka 894 Âṅgīrasa or A.D. 972; mentions *Satyavākya Koṅgaṇivarma-Dharmamahārājādhirāja Koḷālāḷa-pura-vareśvara Nandagiri-nātha calad-uttaraṃga śrīman-Ṇolamba-kulāntaka Ś'rīmat-Permānaḍigaḷ.*

EC. IV. Ng. 51 (p. 218) of the year 972 A.D.; mentions *Satyavākya Koṅgaṇivarma-Dharmamahārājādhirāja*

*Kuvalāḷa-pura-vares'vara Nandagiri-nātha calad-uttaraṅga śrīman-Noḷamba-kulāntaka Permānadigaḷ.*

EC. VIII. Nr. 35 (p. 248 ff.) belonging to the year 1077 A. D. This is an inscription of the Śāntaras who claim descent, on the mother's side, from the Gaṅgas of Gaṅgavāḍi; and it mentions in connection with Mārasimha the titles *Noḷamba-kulāntaka, Pallava-malla* and *Guttiya Gaṅga*.

*Mysore Archaeological Report for 1911* (p. 37): an inscription at Karagaḍa, of the year 971 A. D., applies to Mārasimha the titles *Koṃḡunivarma-Dharmamahārājādhirāja, Kuvalāḷa-puravares'vara, Nandagiri-nātha* and *Noḷamba-kulāntaka*. Another inscription at Nēraḷige, mentioned on the same page and also of the year 971 A. D., mentions *ś'ri-Mārasimha-deva Satyavākya Permānadigaḷ* and applies to him the titles mentioned in the Karagaḍa inscription.

It can readily be seen that the title *Gurjarādhirāja* is applied to Mārasimha in none of these inscriptions; and what is more, the above-mentioned Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa inscription itself does not mention *Gurjarādhirāja* as a title of Mārasimha, although, in lines 105-108, it gives the following long list of the titles borne by him: *Gaṅga-vidyādharaṃ Gaṅgaroḷ gaṃḍaṃ Gaṅgara siṅgaṃ Gaṅga-cūḍāmaṇi Gaṅga-kandarpaṃ Gaṅga-vajraṃ Calad-uttaraṅgaṃ Guttiya-Gaṅgaṃ dharmāvataṛaṃ jagad-eka-viraṃ nuḍidante-Gaṇḍaṃ ahita-mārttaṇḍaṃ kadana-karkaṣaṃ maṇḍalika-triṇetraṃ ś'rīman-Noḷamba-kulāntaka-devaṃ.*

This list of Mārasimha's titles is a very full one: it is not conceivable that the author of the inscription which is wholly devoted to the praise of Mārasimha, should have left out the title *Gurjarādhirāja* in case Mārasimha had really got that title; and its absence in this inscription and in the other inscriptions referred to above shows that Mārasimha never had such a title.

It is interesting to note in this connection the contrast offered by the title *Noḷamba-kulāntaka*. As pointed out by Mr. Rice (*Mysore and Coorg from Inscriptions*, p. 46), this title was assumed by Mārasimha 'because he brought the Noḷamba family to end:' and this title, it will be noticed, has been mentioned in connection with Mārasimha, not only in the Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa inscription in question, but also in EC. III. TN. 93; IX. Cp. 143; XII. Tp. 103; IV. Ng. 51; VIII. Nr. 35 and in the

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inscriptions of Karagaḍa and Nēraḷige referred to above, that is to say, in *all* the inscriptions that give the titles of Mārasimha. There can be no doubt that, in case *Gurjarādhirāja* had been a title of Mārasimha, it too would have been mentioned in the above inscriptions in the same way as his other titles have been.

It thus becomes plain from the foregoing that Mārasimha did not have a title like *Gurjarādhirāja*, that Fleet's above-given translation of the expression *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya* is erroneous, and that the correct translation of that term is 'who became acquainted with the king of the Gurjaras during Kṛṣṇarāja's conquest of the northern region.' The question then arises in one's mind, why should the author of the Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa inscription take pains to mention that Mārasimha 'became acquainted with the king of the Gurjaras?' What is there remarkable about such acquaintance, or about the king of the Gurjaras who ruled over a territory which, when compared with that ruled over by Mārasimha (this comprised not only Gaṅgavāḍi 96000 but Banavase 12000, Nolaṃbavāḍi 32000, Sāntaḷige 1000, Purigere 300 and Belvoḷa 300 also; see Fleet, op. cit., p. 306) was very small in extent? To this question there is no satisfactory answer. On the other hand, it will be noted that the expression *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya* does not suit the context in lines 5-22 of the Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa inscription which read as follows:

tasya jagatī-taḷottunga-Gaṅga-kuḷa-kumuda-kaumudī-  
mahātejāyamānasya Satyavākya-Komgunivarma-dharma-  
mahārājādhirājasya Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gur-  
jarādhirājasya vanagaja-malla-pratimalla-balavad-Alla-  
dūrpa daḷaṇa-prakaṭikṛta-vikramasya Gaṇḍa-mārtanda-  
pratāpa-parirakṣita-simhāsanādi-sakaḷa-rājya-cihnasya  
Vindhyāṭavī-ṇikaṭavartī.....ṇḍaka-kirāta-prakara-bhaṅga-  
karasya bhuja-baḷa pari.....Mānyakheṭa-praveṣita-cakra-  
vartī-kaṭa.....vikrama.....śrīmad-Indrarāja-paṭṭabandhot-  
savasya.....samutsāhita-samara-sajja-Vajjaḷa.....  
gha.....nasya bhayopanata-Vanavāsi-deśādhi.....maṇi-  
kuṇḍala-madadvipādi-samasta-vastu-grā.....samupa-  
labdha-saṅkīrtanasya pranata-Māṭūra-vaṇś'ajasya.....  
suta-s'ata-bhuja-bala-valepa-gaja-ghaṭāṭopa-garva-durvṛtta  
sakaḷa-Nolaṃbādhirāja-samara-vidhvaṃsakasya samunmī-  
lita-rājya-kaṇṭakasya etc.

Saving only *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-vidita-Gurjarādhirājasya* every one of the epithets used in the above passage refers to some

martial exploit of Mārasimha; and there can hence be no doubt that the author intended this expression too to refer to such an exploit. In other words, there can be no doubt that the phrase actually used by the author of the inscription is *viṣṭa-Gurjarādhirāṣya*, and that the engraver, through a lapsus, has omitted the curved upward stroke belonging to the letter *ṣi* and has thus made it look like *di* (see in this connection Plate LXIII A 1 in the second edition of *Śravaṇa-Belgoḷa Inscriptions*, and note how the absence of the stroke referred to above converts a *ṣa* into a *da*). *Kṛṣṇarājottara-dig-vijaya-viṣṭa-Gurjarādhirāṣya* signifies 'who conquered the king of the Gurjaras in the course of Kṛṣṇarāja's victorious campaign against the north;' and hence it is quite in place with the other epithets used in the above passage in connection with Mārasimha.





# PRAKRIT GOHA

BY

DR. S. M. KATRE, M.A., PH.D.

Language, like the verifiable facts of history such as documents and inscriptions, when properly analysed by the methods of correlation, comparison, sifting, etc., yields interesting results. The history of words is primarily the recorded usage with reference to time the secondarily connected with etymology and semantics. From this point of view it is necessary to study the rich mine of words preserved for us in all dated and undated records so that Linguistics may act as a useful handmaid to History. The present paper has very little connection with History and particularly Marāṭhā History as such, but it deals with an interesting word which has puzzled many scholars and which, to my mind, has left some traces in the dialects of Konkani and Marāṭhī. This fact alone is the connecting link between this short paper and the present volume which is being offered to one of the greatest of living Marāṭhā Historians.

The word *goha* occurs in the second act of *Mṛcchakaṭika*. When the Gambler and Māthura catch hold of the Samvāhaka who owes them ten pieces of gold the Gambler cries : "laddhe *gohē*" in a dialect which Pṛthvidhara calls *Dhakkī* and the Sanskrit *chāyā* reads: *labdhaḥ puruṣaḥ*. Again when Darduraka intercedes on behalf of Samvāhaka and causes a strife between the Gambler and Māthura the Gambler says : "Bhaṭṭā, jāvadeva amhe Daddurena kalahāvidā tāvadeva so *goho* avakkanto" where again the *chāyā* gives the equivalent as *puruṣaḥ*. The sense appears to be the equivalent of English "rascal.". In the *Deśināmamālā* Hemacandra cites this as a Deśī word, (cf 2.89) where it is equated to *gāmanī*, *gāmauḍo*, *gāmagoho*; at the end of his comment Hema. says *goho bhata ity anye, puruṣa ity eke*.

Among the citations of this word the *Pāiasaddamahāṇṇavo* mentions JACOBI, *Erzählungen* (p. 31, line 35) *esa rāyā tāva mama piyā, anne ya gohā*, in the sense of soldier, a meaning accepted among others by J. J. MEYER, J. CHARPENTIER and W. WUEST, but criticised by P. THIEME (ZDMG. 91.115) who suggests "servant" as the proper sense. The meaning of "Jāra, upapati" is given in *Pāiasaddamahāṇṇavo*

with reference to *Upadeśapada* (p. 115). On this interesting word PAUL THIEME and WALTHER WUEST have made some fundamental observations (respectively in *ZDMG.* 91 and *Bull. S. O. S.* 8.). Wuest ultimately suggests a \**gobha* as the origin of Sk. *gobhila* and Middle Indo-Aryan *gohā*.

In this mass of conflicting evidence regarding the significance of the word itself we have to be guided by the context on the one hand and the old lexicons on the other. So far as the Mṛcch. and Erz. passages are concerned we agree with THIEME in reading the word as "rascal, servant, a person belonging to the lower order," but what about the meaning recorded by Hemacandra with reference to the village leader?

The Mṛcch. passage, as pointed out in the beginning, is in Dhakkī which is a peculiar dialect. Mārkaṇḍeya in his *Prākṛtasarvasva* calls this ṭakkī and defines it as

Ṭakkī syāt Saṃskṛtam Śaurasenī cānyonyamiṣṛitam

Hariścandras tv-imām bhāsām Apabhraṃśa iticchatī

and comments: *Drāviḍim apyatraiva manyante*. The linguistic features of the dialect as coming down in Mṛcch. Mss. are not very clear, but Pṛthvīdhara defines it as: *va-kāraprāya Dhakkavibhāṣā Saṃskṛtaprāyatve dantya-tālavya-sa-śa-kāradvayayuktā*. That is Sk. ś > Dh. ś, but Sk. ś. s > Dh. s. This has a striking parallelism with Romani dialects; European Rom. has s < ś, ś < s and ś, while Syrian Rom. has s < ś, ś < s. On account of this connecting link as well as the lack of agreement among the grammarians on its affinities we believe that this dialect spoken by the Gambler is in reality a Gypsy tongue, probably belonging to that part of the country which coincides with modern Orissa.

When we investigate the origin of the word we are faced with Koṅkaṇī forms *ghōu*, *ghōv* in the sense of "man" i. e. husband. It is well known that women never refer to their husbands in India by name, and certain peculiar circumlocutions have come into existence. This is not the place to deal with them. It is enough for our purpose to recognize the existence of such circumlocutions. MOLESWORTH in his dictionary (p. 249) has the following entry:

**goho** *m.* In familiar language, a husband. 2 One grown up into manhood, adult. 3 Used popularly as our word for *man* or boy. Ex. *mī tyācā goho āhe. majapuḍhe yeūm dyā.* I am the *man* for him; I am

the *lad* to teach him. Ex. *hē auṣadh pittācā goho āhe*. This is the medicine for bile. It signifies the word *match* or the *masterer* of any person or matter.

On p. 265 of the same work he says :

**Ghov** m. (Ratnagiri) A familiar term for a husband. See **goho**.

**ghovkarin** f. R. A wife ; a woman having a husband.

**ghovki** f. Virility.

**Ghovganda** m. A general term for a husband, husband's brother, and other such natural protector ; or a careless term for a husband.

**ghovdi** m. R. A man or mister :—opp. to a mistress or woman.

**ghovpan** n. *ghovpaṇā*—m. Virility.

Monsenhor DALGADO in his Konkani-Portuguese dictionary gives the word as *ghov* in the above sense, and connects it with Sk. *grāhaka*. In the Saraswat dialects we have *ghôvô* as the second member of a compound meaning addicted to ; *dārl-ghôvô* addicted to men's company, *bāil-ghôvô* addicted to women's company. Practically in all Konkani and Marāṭhī dialects the word is used to refer to English *man* in the primitive sense, that is as a husband. The etymology suggested by DALGADO is not possible as Sk. *grāhaka* becomes in MI-A. dialects *gāha* (*k/g/y*) *a* and in the inflected form Sk. *grāhako* : MI-A. *gāhao*, Ap. *gāhau* or at the most *ghāau*.

If the original sense is man, husband, we can easily get on the one hand the extension to virility, and then to headman, soldier, and on the other to servant, or even to knave or rascal as in the Mṛcch. passage. The point we have to consider is the relationship between the different series. In modern English *man* as opposed to *gentleman* has a derogatory sense, and this also explains how MI-A. *goha* in Mṛcch. is used in the derogatory sense, while in the New Indo-Aryan dialects such as Marāṭhī or Konkani the primitive sense is kept up.

We have only to consider the etymology of the word in order to make our case complete. In the circumlocutions referred to above we have specially the word *ghar* used in Konk. and Mar. used by women to refer to their husbands. Owing to the taboo of the husband's name the woman has to invent such expressions as Mar. *gharāt* with reference to the husband. Similarly in the Saraswat dialects of Konk. the same

word is used : *gharāntū*, *āmgelē ghārā* etc. Thus the word for house is extended to the man as husband. We have in a similar manner in Sk. *grhā* m. an assistant, servant (and later) n. house, habitation, and a wife ; as m. also a householder, *grhin* a householder, *grhinī* mistress of a house, wife, the householder standing for the husband. Now Sk. *grha* corresponds to MI-A, *giha* generally ; we have indeed in Sk. itself the word *gehā*. derived from OI-A. *grhā*. Pāli gives us the clue for corresponding to Sk. *grhastha*. Pāli has *guhātṭha* beside *gahātṭha*. Just as the *i*-treatment of vocalic *r* gives us MI-A, *giha*, so' also the *u*-treatment gives *guha*, and corresponding to Sk. *gehā* from MI-A *giha* we have MI-A. and NI-A. *goha* from MI-A. *guha* from Sk. *grhā*. This is the only etymology which justifies all the facts we know of the interesting Prakrit word *goha*.

# THE INDIAN THEORY OF THE UNIVERSAL STATE

BY

DR. BAL KRISHNA, M.A., Ph.D., F.R.E.S., F.S.S., F.R. Hist. S.

## 1. *Classification of Aryan States.*

The political philosophers of Europe trace the idea of the universal state to Alexander the Great. Subsequent attempts culminated in the form of the Roman, the Holy Roman and the Napoleonic Empires. Thus during twenty-one hundred years there were established in Europe only four empires which gave an idea of the universal state. But in the long history of the continent of India hundreds of attempts were made to secure paramount suzerainty. Each series of conquests was celebrated by some great sacrifice in which the subordinate kings, allies and friends were invited to take part.

The *Rājasūya*, *Vājapeya*, *Aśvamedha*, *Sarvamedha* and *Viśvajita* were some of the great sacrifices to proclaim the suzerainty of a conqueror.<sup>1</sup> The lord of the world-state alone was consecrated with the *Mahābhiṣeka* or *Aindra Mahābhiṣeka* ceremonies.

The *Sūkraniti* in classifying the states on the basis of their revenue, gives eight grades of territories under a *Sāmanta*, *Māndlika*, *Rāja*, *Mahārāja*, *Svarāt*, *Samarāt*, *Virāt*, and *Sārvabhauma*. The last four enjoyed an income of 5-10, 10-100, 100-500 and above 500 million *Karshas* respectively. The *Sārvabhauma* is defined by Śukra as the sovereign "to whom the earth with its seven continents is ever bound". The assumption of one of these titles was signalized by the performance of an appropriate sacrifice. According to the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, *Prajāpati* became *Rāja* by the *Rājasūya*, *Samrāt* by *Vājapeya*, *Svarāt* by *Aśvamedha* and *Virāt* by *Purushamedha* sacrifice. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* gives instances of *Sārvabhaumās* by the performance of the *Rājasūya*, while the *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra* and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* enjoin *Aśvamedha* for supreme overlordship. In short, a symbolic ceremony was performed to give publicity and confirmation to the status assumed by a state in the comity of nations. The feudatories

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1. See N. N. Law-Anc. *Indian Polity*. Ch. IX for detailed description of these ceremonies.

and representatives of the conquered and allied states used to be present to recognise the status proclaimed by the sacrificing sovereign. The *Sabha Parva* (Ch. 33) gives a vivid description of assembled kings in the *Rājasūya* sacrifice performed by Yudhishthira after the completion of his victorious expedition (*Digvijaya*) to all parts of Greater India including Nepal, Simbahala (Ceylon), Singapur, several Mlechha islands and countries.

A *Cakravartin* is described to be the supreme lord of the six continents of *Bharata Kshetra*. His empire is said to be bounded by the ocean on all sides and he has four or five types of military forces, out of which the navy is one. There are emperors styled as *Sarvādhipati* or lord of all, like Vasudeva. Similarly, the titles like *Ekarāt*, *Virāt*, *Samrāt*, *Sarvabhauma*, *Sarvarāt*, *Rājārāja*, *Mahārājadhirāja*, *Caturānta*, or *Akhandabhlūmipa* (the monarch of an undivided earth) were used to signify emperors. We are told that these enjoyed the earth with absolute or indivisible sovereignty (अनन्या पृथिवी सुद्धत्ते).

## 2. Territorial significance of the Empires.

The Holy Roman Empire under Charlemagne included only France and Germany, and afterwards only Germany. The German Empire from 1871 to 1914 was limited to Germany alone. The Empire of Austria-Hungary included these two countries. The Ottoman or Turkish Empire in 1914 covered Turkey. The sway of the Emperor of Japan extended to a few islands in 1910. If the rulers of these countries could be recognized as emperors in the 20th century, we should not refuse to style Harshavardhana, Pulikesi, Kanishka, Kharavela, Pushyamitra, Mahapadma Nanda, Candragupta, Asoka and the Gupta sovereigns as emperors. The empires of these Indian monarchs were more extensive than those named above. The following comparison will give an idea of the empires on the two continents.

<i>European Empire</i>	<i>Indian Empires</i>
1 Alexandrian Empire	1 Maurya Empire
2 Roman Empire	2 Śunga Empire of Pushyamitra
	3 Kanishka's Empire
	4 Andhra Empire of Śatakarni & others
	5 Kharavela's Empire
	6 Gupta Empire
	7 Harshavardhana's Empire
	8 Pulikesi's Empire
3 Holy Roman Empire	9 Pala Empire from Dharmapala
	10 Chola Empire from Rajadhiraja
	11 Chalukya Empire
	12 Vijayanagara Empire

Similarly, the empires of the epic kings Jarāsandha, Śiśupāla, Yudhishtira and his successors were decidedly far more extensive than their European prototypes. Then the empires of Rāma and Rāvaṇa were greater than the Roman empire. We should not forget that India is equal to Europe *minus* Russia. In ancient times Greater India sometimes extended to Persia on the west, Pamir on the north, Nepal and Tibet on the north east, Burma on the east, the Indian Archipeleago and Ceylon to the south. Various conquerors again and again extended their conquests to regions lying outside the natural boundaries of India. The Bhatti Rajputs ruled Afghanistan till they were expelled by the Muslims. Kanishka's Empire extended to middle Asia and covered Afghanistan, Kashmir and the Punjab. In short, it is evident that we can have several contemporary emperors on the continent of India.

### *3. Distinguishing features of the European and Indian Empires.*

Three vital differences distinguish the empires of India and Europe—

(1) In India the ruling family was not dethroned nor was its territory generally annexed into his dominion by the conqueror. All the rulers who accepted submission, were to retain their sovereignty. A loose empire was created which used to be dismembered after the death of the emperor as did the Alexandrian and Napoleonic Empires, or the empire broke up as soon as weak descendants came to the throne. To take two familiar cases of Muslim history, the empire of Ala-ud-din Khilji broke up after his death, but the Mogul Empire flourished under Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. Even six more successors were emperors up to its dissolution. We have its counterpart in the Maurya and Gupta Empires. On the other hand, the ancient solar dynasty of Ayodhya is famous for a long succession of universal sovereigns.

(2) It is worth noticing that in the Epics and Purānas these emperors have not been regarded as gods. They are considered human beings even if their rule extended over the whole earth. But in the Roman world Julius Cæsar was known as *Davus Julius* and so was every other emperor after his death considered to have become a god. Not only this, Augustus was regarded as a god in his life-time. He was personally worshipped and sacrifices were made to him in Italy and the provinces. Thus the Roman people were more superstitious and submissive than the ancient Indians were.

(3) The greatest sin of the Greek and Roman emperors was their attempt to Hellenize and Romanize the provinces and countries under them. Even to-day the process of Germanizing, Anglicizing, Europeaniz-



ing, Russifying, Americanizing and Nazifying is proceeding apace in all the dependencies and territories under the charge of the great nations. The rights of nationalities are ruthlessly trampled down. The Indian emperors did not commit this sin. They allowed autonomy to the nationalities under them, and thus created a loose confederation which was ever on the verge of dissolution. Such empires could not last long, and at all times these required a strong central power. Consequently, frequent conquering expeditions were led to create new empires and to keep the old ones in tact.

#### *4. Stimulation of the idea of Universal Sovereignty.*

The idea of universal sovereignty was deeply and constantly entertained by every king, however insignificant his status might have been. The ideal was never allowed to go into the background. The whole people, not the military class alone, but even the sacerdotal classes, fanned this idea of paramount sovereignty. The coronation ceremony laid down in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇ* is full of many interesting details regarding this subject. Every independent king, however petty or potent he may be, had to undergo a similar inaugural ceremony. Before a person could be installed on the throne, he had to utter several verses of the Veda which put before him the ideal of universal sovereignty on this earth, of achieving distinction as a pious, high-souled and righteous king in administration here below, and of obtaining after death by reason of his exceptional merits independent kingship even in the regions of *Prajāpati*. Finally, death could not put a stop to his sovereignty. This elemental body might be dissolved, but even hereafter in whatever worlds his soul might be transported, he should contrive to rule even there, not *grovel in dust or sink in hell, but by might of his high deeds he should conquer the celestial regions, be their sole monarch and rule them for a long time.*

Such exceptionally high ideals could not but produce great heroes and righteous monarchs. In order to fully grasp this noble ideal, let us go through the very words of the *Ait. Brāhmaṇa*. (pp. 503-4).

‘May Agni ascend thee, O throne, with the *Gāyatri* metre; May Savitar ascend (thee) with the *Ushnih*, Soma with the *Anushtubh*, Brihaspati with the *Brihat*, Mitra and Varuna with the *Pankti*, Indra with the *Trishtubh*, and the Vis’ve Devah with the *Jagati* metres. After them I ascend this throne to be a ruler, to be a great ruler, to be an universal ruler, to obtain all desires fulfilled, to be an independent and most distinguished ruler (on this earth) and to reach and world of

Prajāpati, to be there a ruler, a great ruler, a supreme ruler, to be independent and to live there for a long time '.

After having repeated this verse the king was to ascend the throne, with his right knee first and then with his left. The consecrating priest as a representative of the four classes strengthened that very idea in the heart of the new king by uttering such magnetic words as would fire the imagination and inflame the ambition of even an ordinary man. "Be the ruler over kings in this world. Thy illustrious mother bore thee as the great universal ruler over great men; the blessed mother has borne thee. By command of divine *Savitar* I sprinkle (thee) with the arms of the *Āsvins*, with the hands *Pūshan*, with the lustre of *Agni*, the splendour of *Sūrya*, the power of *Indra*, that thou mayest obtain strength, happiness, fame and food".\*

In connection with the above, the following words repeated by the installed king on descending from the throne are also interesting. Standing with his face towards the east, he utters thrice the words "Adoration to the *Brahma*". Then he says aloud, "I present a gift for the attainment of victory (in general), of victory everywhere (*abhiṣiti*), of victory over strong and weak enemies (*viṣiti*), and of complete victory (*Samṣiti*)".†

The materials employed in the installation ceremony were looked upon as metaphorically conveying certain ideals which have thus been expressed in the *Brāhmaṇa*. The *Udumbara* represented enjoyment, the *Āsvatha* universal sovereignty, the *Plāksha* independence and freedom from the rule of another king. The priest, by having these woods brought to the spot, makes the king participate in all these qualities of universal sovereignty, etc. Further on, it is said that rice with large grains represents universal sovereignty. Therefore, by bringing sprouts of such grains, the priest places universal sovereignty in the king.‡

##### 5. The ceremony of *Aindra Mahābhisheka*

(*Īndra's great Coronation*) was meant for great sovereigns alone. A few details will throw light on the idea of universal sovereignty.

"This one is among the gods the most vigorous, most strong, most valiant, most perfect. He carries out any work to the best of his abilities. Let us instal him to the kingship over us." They all consented

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\* *Ait. Br.* p. 505.

† *Ibid.* p. 509.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 521.

to perform just this ceremony of *Mahābhisheka* on Indra. The gods bestowed on Indra universal rule by proclaiming him as "universal ruler," by proclaiming him "as enjoyer of pleasures", they made him father of pleasures; by proclaiming him as "independent ruler," they granted him independence of rule; by proclaiming him as "distinguished king," they conferred on him royal distinction: by proclaiming him "king", they made him father of kings; by calling him one who has attained the highest desires, they granted him fulfilment of the highest desires.

The gods then continued proclaiming his heroic virtues in the following manner. The "Kahatra is born: the supreme master of the whole creation is born; the destroyer of the hostile castles is born; the devourer of hostile tribes is born; the slayer of the Asuras is born; the protector of religion is born. The protector of the Brahma is born."§

Prof. Keith does not recognise 'the existence of any great kingdoms, but only petty princes who despite their titles and claims to universal sovereignty were doubtless rulers of limited territory.' But Weber saw the conception of a real empire in the Aindra *Mahābhisheka*.\* The ideal was an empire bounded by the sea. The Epics and the Puranas distinctly mention that this ideal was achieved by several conquerors. Even if their dominions did not reach the sea on all sides, these must have been sufficiently extensive to enable to celebrate the *Aśvamedha*, *Viśvajit* or *Sarvamedha* sacrifices, or to undergo the rites of the great coronation.

#### 6. The Coronation Oaths

Let us now realise the significance of the oath which the king must take before the priest performs the ceremony. The priest who, with this knowledge about the *Mahābhisheka* ceremony, wishes that a Kshatriya should conquer in all the various ways of conquest, to subjugate all people, and *that he should attain to leadership, precedence and supremacy over all kings and attain everywhere and at all times to universal sovereignty*, enjoyment of pleasures, independence, distinguished distinction as king, the fulfilment of the highest desires, the position of a king, *of a great king and supreme mastership, that he might cross (with his arms) the universe and become the ruler of the whole earth during all his life which may last for an infinitely long time, that he might be the sole king of the earth up to its shores bordering on the*

§ Ait. Br. P. 516. For the coronation ceremony see *Rāmāyana*. *Sānti* P. Ch. 40; *Sabbā* P. Ch. 33-45. *Vana* P. Ch. 254; *Kauśika Sūtra*, 17-1-29. *Atharva Veda*, III, 4-2; IV. 8; *Vaj. Samhitā*, 10. 17-18; *Rig Veda*, X.-157.

\* *Rig Veda Brahmins* Translated, p. 45.

ocean, such a priest should inaugurate the Kshatriya with Indra's great inauguration ceremony. But before doing so, the priest must make the king take the following oath; whatever pious works thou mightest have done during the time which may elapse from the day of thy birth, (to the day of thy death), all these together with thy position, thy good deeds, thy life, thy children, I would wrest from thee, shouldest thou do me any harm'. Then the Kshatriya who wishes to attain to all this, should well consider and say in good faith all that is above mentioned, 'thou mayest wrest from me, etc.' \*

Several instances of deposed kings have been given by Kauṭilya, Kāmandaka and Śukra, but the Udyoga parva (Ch. 74) gives a long list of seventeen kings of the pro-Bharata times who were dethroned on account of tyranny.

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|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1 Udāvartta of the Haihayas     | 9 Hayagrīva of the Vaidehas      |
| 2 Janmejaya of the Nīpas        | 10 Varayu of the Mahaujavas      |
| 3 Bahula of the Tālajanghas     | 11 Bāhu of the Sundarvegas       |
| 4 Vasu of the Krivīs            | 12 Purūrava of the Dipākshas     |
| 5 Ajabindu of the Suvīras       | 13 Sahaja of the Chedi-Matsyas   |
| 6 Rushādhika of the Saurashṭras | 14 Vrishadhawaja of the Pravīras |
| 7 Arkaja of the Balhikas        | 15 Dhārāṇa of the Chandravatsas  |
| 8 Dhautamūlaka of the Chīnas    | 16 Śama of the Namdivegas        |
| 17 Vigāhana of the Mukaṭas      |                                  |

#### 7. *Permanent effects of the empires.*

Illustrative lists of universal rulers are given in several works. Some names are common in a few books though these were composed in distant places and times. The repetition of names signifies that destructive time could not put into oblivion the heroic deeds of these emperors who had made a home in the minds of the masses by their thrilling adventures.

The selection of the names of deposed kings and universal sovereigns from numerous dynasties, proves the unity of the Aryan race and the comprehensive character of Hindu imperialism or Indian nationalism. The fact that kings separated from each other by thousands of miles and thousands of years, should be inspired by the same Vedic ideas and inaugurated by the same Vedic rites, further elucidates the universal and lasting sway of Aryan culture on the whole continent of India. This

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\* Ait. Br. pp. 516, 519.

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fundamental unity of the Indian races was again and again verified by the conquests of *Vijigishus* aspiring to the rank of an *Ekarāt* or a *Sārvabhauma* and establishing *Pax Indica* in the whole Aryan world. This living unity was observed by H. Tsang from Kashgar, Kandhar, Kashmir, Khatmandu, Kamchivaram, Cape Camorin, and Kathiawar even as late as the 7th century A. D.

### *8. Emperors of the Vedic & Epic Ages.*

The glories of hundreds of conquerors who were the performers of the *Aśvamedha*, the *Rājasūya* or *Viśvajita* sacrifices, or who had earned the titles of *Chakravartins*, are sung in the Vedas, the epics, the *Brahmanas* and the *Puranas*.

We may mention only a few names from the famous Solar Dynasty up to the great conqueror, Rama. Yuvanaśva, his son Māndhātṛ and grand-son Purukutsa, then Harischandra. Bāhu, Sagara, Dilīpa and Raghu.

Pururavas and Prithu; Uśinara and Śivi of the Ānava line, Kritavīrya and his son Arjuna, then Tālajangha of the Haihayas; Prātardana and his grand-son Alaraka of Kaśī; Paurava and his successors Dushyanta, Bharata, Rantideva, Suhotra, Hastina, Ajamida, Jahnū; Nimi, and Bhima Satvata, Sasabindu and Usanas of the Yadavas; Sudāsa, Sahadeva and Somaka of the Panchāla country; Aśvapati Kaikeya; Kuru, Yudhiṣṭhira, Parikshit and his son Janamejaya; Vasu and Brhadrat of Magadha; Śiśupāla Chedi; Briharatha and Jarasandha Kaurava, are some of the great conquerors up to the Mahābhārata period. Many more empire-builders could have been named, but as they belong to the most ancient period of Indian history, I have merely referred to their names here.

### *9. Empires during Budhistic and Hindu periods.*

More attention will be devoted to the historical personages of the Budhistic and Hindu periods. The earliest among these is Udayana.

This ruler of the Vatsa country was already master of the Chedi and Videha kingdoms. He secured his dominions by making alliances with his two powerful neighbours, the kings of Ujjain and Magadha. Then he started on a conquering expedition in which he brought under his paramountcy the kings of Kashi, Kalinga, the Vindhya tribes, Chola, Kerala, Lat, Sind, etc. He has been the popular hero of dramas written by the most famous dramatists of ancient India like Bhasa and Kalidasa.

Story books like *Kathā-Saritsāgara* and *Brihatkathāmanjari* have described his victories. The Buddhist literature is full of references to this Buddhist ruler of the 5th century B. C. The Tibetan and Chinese literature too give valuable information about him. Such a great hero of India deserves a high place in the history of the world.

1. The Nandas, and the Mauryan Emperors like Chandragupta and Asoka are too well-known to require any detailed information here.

2. *Pushyamitra Sunga* (150 B. C.) was justified in his claim to rank as the paramount power in Northern India by his victories over the *Yavanas* and all over rivals. He performed the horse-sacrifice to signalize his victory over Menander and Buddhism.

3. *Kanishka's* conquests have made him immortal in Indian history. His kingdom included Afghanistan, portions of Persia, Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan above the Pamirs, Kashmir and the whole of Northern India up to the Vindhya. This Buddhist king followed Asoka in propagating the Buddhist religion in China and other countries of the world.

4. *Khāravela, king of Kalinga*, not only secured independence from Magadha but twice defeated its great Emperor Pushyamitra himself. He even captured the Magadha capital Pataliputra and carried away its treasures. He is said to have produced consternation among kings of Northern India. He then sent his forces against Satakarni I of Andhra, humbled the Rāṣṭrikas of the Maratha country and the Bhojakas of Berar. Thus this Jain conqueror being a contemporary of Pushyamitra and Satakarni ruled about 170-150 B. C.

5. *Śatakarni Āndhra* (150 B. C.) twice proclaimed his suzerainty by the performance of the horse-sacrifice.

6. *The Āndhra king G. Ś. Śatakarni II* (120 A. D.) was master of the whole country watered by the Godavari, of Berar, Malwa, Gujarat, Kathiawar, and even the northern Konkan.

7. *Sivaskandha Varman Pallava* made extensive conquests and performed the horse-sacrifice about the year 150 A. D.

8. *Samudragupta*, the Indian Napoleon, conquered all India and made alliance with rulers from the Oxus to Ceylon. In celebration of his victories he performed the horse-sacrifice in 351 A. D.

9. *Vikramaditya* (380-415 A. D.), the Gupta hero of a hundred legends, extended his empire to the Arabian Sea by subjugating Malwa, Gujarat, Kathiawar, and annihilating the Śaka rule there.

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10. *Kumargupta I* who ascended the throne in 415 A.D. after his most famous father Vikramaditya, celebrated the horse-sacrifice as an assertion of his paramount sovereignty after expelling the Huns from his empire.

11. *Ādityasena*, a Gupta king of Magadha, is known to have performed the horse-sacrifice in the 7th century A. D. in token of his rank to supreme power.

12. *Dharmapāla* ( 800 A.D. ) was the founder of the Vikramaśīla University. He was known as 'the sole ruler of the entire earth;' he installed the illustrious king of Kānyakubja, who was readily accepted by the Bhoja, Matsya, Madra, Kuru, Yadu, Yavana, Avanti, Gāndhāra, and Kirāt kings bowing down respectfully with their diadems trembling and for whom his own golden coronation jar was lifted up by the delighted elders of Panchāla. His rule extended from the Bay of Bengal to Delhi and Jallandhar in the north and the Vindhya in the south.

13. *Rāmapāla* was another Emperor ( 1084-1130 A.D. ) who extended the territory bequeathed by Dharmapāla by conquering Kaivarta, Mithila, Champaran, Darbhanga, and Assam.\*

14. *The great Harsha* of Kanauj immortalized by H. Tsang and Bana, is well-known to the students of history, but there were three other emperors in the same Maukhari family.

15. *Īśanavarman the Great* of Kanauj made himself the resplendent moon in the sky of the circle of princes.

16. *Sarvavarman*, the Paramesvara, was a paramount sovereign over a territory extending from Asirgadh to the Brahmaputra and from Nirmand to Raivataka. Thus almost the whole of N. India was under him.†

17. *Yaśovarman* of Kanauj shone above all in every quarter like the resplendent sun.

18. *Bālītāditya* of Kashmir, the conqueror of Yaśovarman, was another ruler who claimed to be a paramount sovereign, as he had vanquished the rulers of Kanauj, the Tibetans, Bhutanis and the Turks on the Indus.

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\* V. A. Smith-*Early History of India*, pp. 209, 212, 219, 221, 303, 307, 316, 332, 413, 416.

† E. A. Fries, *The Maukharis* pp. 85, 90, 94, 137, 146.

19. *Mihira Bhoja* was, in the words of Smith, beyond question a very powerful monarch, whose dominions may be called an empire without exaggeration.\*

The three emperors of the Chalukya dynasty like (20) Pulikesin, (21) Vikramaditya I and (22) Vikramaditya II of Badami, the two victorious conquerors (23) Krishna I and (24) Govinda III of the Rashtrakuta family, then (25) Somesvara I and (26) Vikramaditya VI, (27, 28) two Chalukyās of Kalyani, were sovereigns of great fame.

29. *Pārantaka Chola* (909-947 A.D.) after capturing the Pallava kingdom, conquered the Pandya capital Madura and invaded even Ceylon.

30. *Narsinhavarman Pallava* (625-645 A.D.) extended his conquests over Mysore and the Deccan.

31. *Rājarājadeva the Great* (985 A.D.) was beyond dispute the Lord Paramount of Southern India, ruling a realm which included nearly the whole of the Madras Presidency, a large part of Mysore, Laccadives Maldives and Ceylon. †

32. *Rājendra Chola* (1018 A.D.) possessed a powerful navy, so that he annexed the whole kingdom of Pegu to the Chola Empire.

33. *Anantavarman Ganga* reigned for 71 years (1076-1147) and carved out for himself a considerable kingdom extending from the Ganges to the Godavari.

The long dynasties of Āndhra and Vijayanagara have many kings who emulated the glorious deeds of their predecessors. The southern empires had sway over such lands as Maldives and Laccadives, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Ceylon, etc. The very names of these places are of Sanskrit origin. Thus Greater India existed to the south as well as to the north of India up to the 12th century A.D., while the famous Hindu Empire of Vijayanagar lasted from 1350 to 1670 A.D.

## 10 INDIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

Even in the pre-historic times from 4000 to one thousand years before the Christian Era when the whole of Europe including Greece was immersed in dense darkness, India had given birth to hundreds of Alexanders, Scipios, Cæsars, Hannibals, Charlemagnes, Fredericks, and Napoleons.

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\* V. A. Smith—*Early History of India*, pp. 393-94.

† *Ibid* pp. 472, 485-86.



Each one of these conquerors attempted to establish a world-state extending from sea to sea and exercising universal imperialism. The vision of a world-empire was partially materialized by more than 130 conquerors who gradually extended the Aryan rule over the continent of India. After the epic victory of Rāma Aryanism was supreme from the western extremity of Kandhar into the eastern boundary of Tirhut and from the Himalayas to Ceylon. A federation of the Asiatic world including parts of Persia, Central Asia, Tibet, Burma, Ceylon and several islands of the sea was established by Yudhisthira after the second epic war of Mahābhārata. There is a long interregnum of 700 years or more up to the Mauryan rulers. This historic gulf cannot be filled up as yet. From the Mauryan ascendancy Pan-Aryan Imperialism or Greater India was several times established by Chandragupta, Asoka, Samudragupta, Vikramāditya and many other mighty heroes in the known history of this country. Yet Prof. Max Muller ventured to record that "there were no heroes to inspire a poet, no history to call forth a historian. India has no place in the political history of the world. An expedition like that of Alexander could never have been conceived by an Indian king, and the ambition of native conquerors never went beyond the limits of India itself".\*

When a scholar of classical Sanskrit could be oblivious to the facts recorded in these pages regarding Indian imperialism, the European public could be hardly expected to assign a place to India in the political history of the world. But these pages must have proved to the hilt the existence of Greater India and its dominance in the political and cultural spheres of the ancient world. It was Indian philosophy which first formulated the ideal of the world-state, of the unity of the human race, and of universal peace, Indian monarchs alone through their military genius, first carved out extensive empires on which the sun did not set, and in which they established *Pax Indica*.

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\* *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 30-31.

# THE VALUE OF KANNADA SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF THE MARATHAS, THE BIJAPUR AND MUGHAL SULTANS

BY

DR. B. A. SALETORÉ, M.A., Ph.D. (Lond.)

Few even among scholars are aware of the existence of Kannada sources for the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries A.D. By Kannada sources is meant records written in Kannada as distinct from records written in non-Kannada languages but found in Karnāṭaka. While scholars have made plentiful use of the sources in various languages for the reconstruction of the history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they have not utilized the Kannada sources at all. This is partly due to the fact that these sources have been written in a language which was supposed not to contain any useful matter pertaining to reigning families other than those of Karnāṭaka origin. But with the considerable advance which research has made in Karnāṭaka, and the laudable attempts of scholars in and outside Mysore to tackle the history and culture of Karnāṭaka and the adjoining regions, we are now in a position to allude to some sources in Kannada which throw an interesting light on problems connected with the history of the Mughals, the Sultans of Bijāpur, and the Marāṭhas. It is the object of this paper to draw the attention of scholars to some of these sources written in the Kannada language.

✓ These sources may be grouped under the following heads—epigraphs which comprise both stone and copper-plate inscriptions, traditional accounts relating to prominent Karnāṭaka families like the Desāyis, Desapāndes, etc., and literary works. Of these we shall say nothing for the present of the traditional accounts of families nor of the bakhairs written in Kannada. The literary works are by far the most important of the sources, since they are accounts written by gifted Kannadigas whose kāvyas contain an array of facts of considerable interest not only for the history of the three royal families mentioned above, but also for that of the Vijayanagara, Keladi, and Mysore kingdoms; not to mention that of very many smaller royal families, all

## *The Value of Kannada Sources for History*

of whom played such an important part in the history of southern and western India till the end of the eighteenth century A.D.

The three most important Kannada works which bear directly on the history of the Mughals, the Bijāpur Sultans, and the Marāthas are the following—

Poet Linganna's *Keladinṛpaviṇaya*,

Poet Govinada Vaidya's *Kaṇṭhīravanarasarājendraviṇaya*, and

The anonymous author's historical account called *Hyder-nāmā*.

The two former are *kāvyas* of great merit. Linganna's work is a regular chronicle of the Keladi kings, while that of Govindayya is an account of the wars of the remarkable Mysore king Kaṇṭhīrava Narasa Rāja Odeyar. And *Hyder-nāmā* is an excellent biography of Hyder Ali, the well known Sultan of Mysore. Dr. M. H. Krishna to whose indefatigable labour we owe the discovery of this last mentioned work, has styled it, for want of a better name, *Nallappa Ms.* All these three works, viz., *Keladinṛpaviṇaya*, *Kaṇṭhīravanarasarājendraviṇaya*, and *Hyder-nāmā* were completed by the end of the eighteenth century A.D. Thus Linganna is supposed to have completed his work by A.D. 1763; Govinda finished his work by A.D. 1648; and *Hyder-nāmā* was completed by A.D. 1782.

Now let us briefly allude to some of the sources pertaining to the history of the Mughals, the Bijāpur rulers, and the Marāthas. I have dealt with the history of the Mughals in Karnāṭaka in some detail elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> It may suffice here to mention one or two sources concerning the Mughals. It is generally believed that the contact between Karnāṭaka rulers and the Mughals began only in the time of Aurangzeb. But Linganna tells us that even in the days of Akbar, the Padashah of Delhi was aware of the rulers of Karnāṭaka. This is related in the long account of the victory which Sankanna Nāyaka won over Ankuśa Khān in the court of the Delhi Sultan.<sup>2</sup> The connection between Karnāṭaka and the Delhi court seems to have been more intimate in the time of Emperor Shah Jahan. This is proved by a copper plate record dated A.D. 1629 which was found at Kuppaṭūr. It enables us to assert that the Mughal jurisdiction extended as far as the Kuppaṭūr

1. My article "*Mughal Rule in Karnāṭaka*" to be published in the Woolner Commemoration Volume, Lahore.

2. Linganna, *Keladinṛpaviṇaya*, p. 47 seq. (University of Mysore Oriental Library Publications, Kannada Series, No. 9, Mysore, 1921).

*sīme* in the Sohrab tāluka of the Mysore State. For it mentions 11,000 *varāhas* as the Mughal levy from that province<sup>3</sup>. This fact is of interest in as much as it helps us to correct the view that the limits of the Mughal Empire in the reign of Shah Jahan (A.D. 1636) were only ~~at~~ the Ghod *nadi* on the Western Ghats.<sup>4</sup> An interesting point is raised here. How did the Mughals succeed in casting their sway over the Kuppattūr-*sīme* seven years earlier, *i. e.*, in A.D. 1629? Future research may enable us to answer this question with satisfaction.

Continuing the question of the hold of the Mughal government over the outlying districts of Karnāṭaka, we note that two stone inscriptions are of some use in this connection. They were found at Dodḍa Baḷḷāpura and Ballālasamudra, Hoḷalakere tāluka, Mysore State, and both are dated in the year A.D. 1691. On the basis of these inscriptions it may safely be maintained that the control of the Mughal government over the distant province of Sīrā was complete by A.D. 1691. The stone record found at Dodḍa Baḷḷāpura is doubly important.—Firstly, because it deals with the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, and, secondly, because it contains many details about the history of the fort of Baḷḷāpura under the Marāṭhas<sup>5</sup>. The other stone inscription from Ballālasamudra confirms the fact of the Mughal jurisdiction over the Hoḷalkere province in A.D. 1691.<sup>6</sup> Under Bahadur Shah too the Sīrā province continued to be part of the Mughal Empire, as is proved by the Āñjaneya temple stone inscription found at Jājūru, and dated A.D. 1716–17.<sup>7</sup>

Of greater value than the above stone and copper-plate records are the literary works. It is commonly supposed that Hindus as a rule were not gifted with the art of chronicling historical events. In most instances this charge seems to be well founded. Even with Kannada writers like Ādi Pampa and others, the fashion was to put historical facts into the background while dealing with the reigns of their royal patrons. But so far as the three authors under discussion Linganna, Govinda, and the anonymous writer of *Hyder-nāmā* are concerned, it can hardly be maintained that the Hindus were not endowed with the power of writing historical narratives.

3. *Epigraphia Carnatica*, VIII. Sb. 266, p. 43.

4. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, 1. p. 44.

5. This record contains an earlier Kannada portion and a later Persian portion. *E. C. X. D. B.* 31, pp. 66–7.

6. *Ibid.*, XI, Hk. 126. p. 135.

7. *Ibid.*, Hk. 63, p. 123.

Of these we shall first deal with Govinda. He was the son of Śrinivāsa Paṇḍita. He does not tell us anything about his native place ; but from his excellent description of Śrirangapaṭṭana<sup>8</sup> (Seringapatam), it seems that he was a native of that city. Under the patronage of General Nanjarājendra he wrote his *kāvya Kanṭhiravanarasarājendravijaya*. It is from the concluding portion of this work that we know it was finished in Śaka 1570 (A. D. 1648).<sup>9</sup>

The greatest interest of this work lies in the detailed description which Govinda gives of the campaigns of the Bijāpur general Randullah Khan in Karnāṭaka. Randullah Khan figures in the history of Khān-i-Zaman's campaigns of A. D. 1636.<sup>10</sup> And again Randullah Khan is known to have invested the city of Ikkēri which was the capital of the Ikkēri Nāyakas. The value of the accounts of both Linganna and Govinda may be seen when we compare them with the historical accounts of the Muhammadan historians. Sarkar basing his remarks on the latter, tells us that Randullah Khan led his campaigns into Karnāṭaka in A. D. 1635 and again in A. D. 1637.<sup>11</sup> Linganna gives the exact date of the siege of Ikkēri. It was in *Śalivāhana Śaka 1560, Īśvara Samvatsara, Puṣya Bahula Daśami* that the Ikkēri capital was besieged by the famous Bijapur general.<sup>12</sup> And Govinda gives a lengthy account of the siege of Ikkēri in his eleventh *sandhi* entitled *Karnāṭakakke Khānanu bandudu*.<sup>13</sup> Sarkar speaks of a huge fine of thirty lakhs of *hūns* imposed on the ruler of Ikkēri (Virabhadra Nāyaka) ; and of the latter's deposition at the end of the second campaign of A.D. 1637.<sup>14</sup> But we know from Kannada records that Virabhadra Nāyaka averted a formidable invasion of Bijāpur, and that he gave protection to the southern kings who were alarmed by the great army of the Pātushah (*i. e.*, the ruler Ādil Shah of Bijāpur)<sup>15</sup>. Govinda's account of the siege of Ikkēri is particularly valuable because it was written only one year after the event. It is perhaps the only Hindu account of that event from

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8. Govinda Vaidya, *Kanṭhiravanarasarājendravijaya* pp. 81-114. (University of Mysore Oriental Library Publications, Kannada Series, No. 15. Mysore, 1926).

9. *Ibid.*, p. 498.

10. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, I, pp. 46-47.

11. *Ibid.*, I, pp. 253-54.

12. Linganna, *Keladinṛpavijaya*, p. 98.

13. Govinda, *Kanṭhiravanarasarājendravijaya*, p. 198 seq.

14. Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, I, pp. 253-54.

15. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions*, p. 158.

the south. Indeed, the entire history of the relations of the Bijāpur Sultans with their southern neighbours, the kings of Karnāṭaka, needs to be re-written on the basis of the admirable accounts left by Govinda and Linganna. For nowhere will such a well written account of the siege of Seringapatam by Randullah Khan be found as that given by Govinda, who relates how the glorious Narasendra (*i. e.*, Kanṭhīrava Narasa Rāja of Mysore) drove the enemy out, and saved the entire southern country from becoming a province of the Bijāpur Sultans.<sup>16</sup> It is only when Govinda's admirable account of the doings of the Bijāpur general in Karnāṭaka is studied in conjunction with the narratives of the Muhammadan historians, that any history of the Bijāpur Sultans in the south may be said to be complete.

These very few details we have mentioned above are by no means exhaustive. But we must now pass on to the value of the Kannāḍa sources for the history of the Marāṭhas. In this direction too we have very many interesting details. The intimate relationship of the Kannadigas with the Marāṭhas dates to at least two centuries before the rise of the kings of Vijayanagara under whom the Marāṭhas received their political tutelage. I have reserved this topic for discussion in a separate work. It is enough for the present to draw the attention of scholars to a few points of interest in the writings of Linganna and of the anonymous author of *Hyder-nāmā*. Linganna's account covers a wide range of Marāṭha history, but we shall select only a few details pertaining to Śāhji and Śivāji the Great. Linganna has some strange things to say about the parentage and lineage of Śivāji. While narrating the events of the reign of the Kelādi queen Cennāmāji in the ninth *sarga* of *Kelādirbhaviyaya*, Linganna gives a detailed account of the parentage of Rāma Rāja (*i. e.*, Rāja Rāma, as the Kannadigas called him), who sought shelter at her court when he was pursued by the Mughals. And Linganna goes back to the early days of the parentage of the forefathers of Rāja Rāma. Linganna would take the history of the Marāṭhas three or four generations earlier to that of Śivāji, that is to say, to that of Śivāji's father Śāhji, and to the latter's predecessors whose history he gives thus in the same ninth *sarga*. The progenitor of the Marāṭha royal house was one Rāna who was originally the master of a fortress called Cittoda which Linganna would place to the north-west of Delhi. Cittoda was an original place of the Kṣatriyas (*Kṣatriyarige mūlasthānamāda*). This Rāna whom we shall style the I of that name, was a Kṣatriya of the Bharadvāja gotra. The principality over which he ruled extended over

16. Govinda, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-15.

five *yojanas*, and was noted for its wealth and prosperity. In his line arose another ruler also called Rāṇa whom we shall style the II of that name (*ā-Kṣatriya-kulaparampareyoḷ-udbhavisida Rāṇanemba rājan-ā-Cittoḍasamsthānaḍoḷ-opputirdan*). That Rāṇa II was a contemporary of the Mughal Emperor Akbar is evident from the few facts which Lingaṇṇa narrates about Rāṇa II, his beautiful daughter, Padmini, and the Emperor Akbar himself. On hearing of the extraordinary beauty of this maiden, whom Lingaṇṇa calls also Padmini, Akbar is described to have besieged the fort of Cittoda for twelve years; and to have at last succeeded in entering it while in the service of one Rāma Singa whom Lingaṇṇa makes the nephew (or son-in-law) (*aḷiya*) of Rāṇa II: *ā-Rāṇanemb-ātange rūpavatiyāda Padmini-jātiya-kumāriya-udi-sal-ā-kumāriyam pōṣisuttam-ā-Rāṇam rājyavāḷuttiral-ā Padmini-jātiya kumāriya rūpa-lāvaṇya-guṇa-silamam Dilliyān-āḷutirda-Akabara-Pādūsahan kēḷḍu sainya-samētanāgi tānē teraḷḍ-aṭtand-ā-Cittoḷa-emba gaḍamam vēḍhaisi-nela-daṇḍiḷidur-ā-samsthānamam-sādhisavelk-endur-penneraḍu-varuṣambaram bahu-vidha-ḥrayatnam-baḷḷoḍam āgaḍam sādhyam-āgaḍirppudam kaṇḍu praçchanna-veṣadinda Akabara-Pādūsāhan-ā-gaḍaman-oḷa-pokku Vasiṣṭha-gōtrajan-āda Rāṇana aḷiaya Rāmasingana baḷiyōḷ mukhyasevakanāgi-varttisutta-irrd-ond-avasaradoḷ Rāmasinganemb-avana sangadame tān-aramaneyan-oḷa-pokku* etc. But Akbar did not annex this fortress. On the other hand, he handed it over to Padmini herself, who, however, refused to have it on the ground that it was a gift from an invader. Then both Akbar and Rāṇa II agreed to lock the gates of the fortress, and Rāṇa retired to a neighbouring place called Udayapura which he made his capital. Here his wife gave birth to a son called also Rāṇa by Lingaṇṇa. While this prince Rāṇa III was one day riding in the city of Udayapura, he chanced to see a lovely girl of the carpenter caste. Lingaṇṇa does not give her father's name but merely says that she was the daughter of a carpenter woman (*ā kumārānge Rāṇaneudu pēsan-ittu poṣaṇanum māḍuta-int-irutirdda ā-Rāṇan-ond-avasaradoḷ svārimārggamam pōgi baruttam tat-puradoḷ-irppa-orvva Vardhikiya magalām kaṇḍu kāmisi ākeyam ḥarigralisi kelakālam varttisuttam-iral-ā Baḍagiya magala garbbhaḍoḷ-irvar kumāraru-udbhavisal-avarge Śivāji Sambhāji nāmakaraṇamam racisi poṣisuttam-iral*). Before we proceed further, it may be observed here that Lingaṇṇa has given expression to a view which seems to suggest a partial non-Kṣatriya origin of Śivāji the Great.

This is apparent not only from the mention made of the *Baḍagiya magal*, i. e., the daughter of the carpenter, whom Rāṇa III married, but

also from the continuation of the story relating to the two sons Śivāji and Sāmbhāji born to her by Rāṇa III. These two brothers regretted the fact of their lowly origin, since it came in their way of their assuming the reins of government. However they spent their life in praying to the Onkāreśvara *linga* in Udayapura, and god Onkāreśvara who appeared to them in the form of a Brāhmaṇa assured Śivāji in a dream the following—That Śivāji would while a-hunting come across a treasure which would enable him to build a small principality for himself. With this treasure the two brothers Śivāji and Sambhāji went to Kāśi where a learned Brahman Nāgabhaṭṭa told them that although they were born of a mother who was of humble origin, yet their father being a Ksatriya, he would perform their *upanayanam*. The two lads then became famous as Vazirs. And in their family was born Hariji whose son was Ētoji whose son was Śāhji whose son were Śivāji (the Great) and Yekōji (*i. e.*, Venkōji). Linganna makes Śāhji an illustrious ruler—*ā vara-Sājiya sukurār-parikise vilasat-Śivāji-Yēkoji valam*). Śivāji was the son by the elder wife Jājabayi, and Venkoji the son by the younger wife who is not named. Śivāji had two children-Sāmbhāji by his elder wife Jīvābāi (Jitābāi), and Rāja Rāma by his younger wife Tārābāi. This latter lady is made the daughter of Jādhava Rāya, and Rāja Rāma is also called Rāje Rāma by which name he seems to have been known in Karnāṭaka.<sup>17</sup>

Whatever may be the credence which we are prepared to give concerning the above account of the family of Śivāji the Great, it appears that so far as the knowledge of the Marāṭhas in Karnāṭaka was concerned, they were prepared to style the founders of the Marāṭhā kingdom Kṣatriyas of an inferior stock. As regards Linganna's assertion that there was a marriage connection between the Kṣatriyas proper and a maiden of the Badagiya or carpenter caste, it seems to have been based on a wrong conception of the community to which Śivāji belonged. This point need not detain us further; and suffice it to note that, according to Linganna, the beginnings of the great Marāṭhā family are to be traced to a local origin.

In the same *āśvāsa* and in the following ones, Linganna gives interesting genealogical details about the Mughal Sultans, the kings of Bijūpur, Golkonda, Ahmednagar, and Bidar which last the poet calls Bideri.<sup>18</sup> And after narrating these details, Linganna gives a further account of the dealings of Śivāji the Great with the Bijapur and Mughal monarchs.<sup>19</sup>

17. Linganna, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-40.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 140 seq.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 149 seq.



The poet has a detailed account to give concerning Rāja Rāma's escape from the Mughals and the refuge which he sought at the court of the Keladi queen Cennamāji. This is related with reference to the attempt made by Aurangzeb to capture Rāja Rāma and the gallant endeavours the Keladi queen made to save the Marāṭhā ruler who is called the son of Śivāji, the *adhirāja* of the Āreyars. (Āreyara 'adhirājanāda Śivājiya putranāda Rāma Rājanam').<sup>20</sup>

If Linganna's narrative is valuable for the earlier decades of Marāṭhā history, that of the anonymous author as given in the *Hyder-nāmā* is important for the latter periods of the history of the Marāṭhās. This work which is a contemporary account of the reign of Hyder 'Alī, is to be distinguished from its namesake which was written by Appanna Śeṭṭi in the 19th century.<sup>21</sup> In the work under review we have an authentic and detailed account of the many phases of Hyder 'Alī's administration, his wars, and his manifold public activities. But we are concerned here only with his wars, especially against the Marāṭhas. There seem to have been several Marāṭha invasions. The first took place in A.D. 1756 when the Marāṭhas invaded Mysore with a large army of one lakh horse and one lakh infantry. The Rāja of Seringapatam made peace with them by promising to pay a fixed sum of 32 lakhs of Rupees. But since all this money could not be paid at once, only six lakhs were paid in cash, and thirteen tālukas (named) were ceded to the Marāṭhas till the balance was cleared up. The Marāṭhas placed Raghoba Bāji Rao with 6,000 horse in charge of the thirteen tālukas and returned to Poona.

The second invasion of the Marāṭhas took place in A.D. 1758 when they invaded Bangalore. Their leader this time was Mukunda Rao. The Mysore Rāja (Immaḍi Kṛṣṇa Rāja) sent Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao against the Marāṭhas. Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao camped at Bangalore from where he plundered the Marāṭha stronghold of Hosakote. Mukunda Rao being in straits appealed to the Marāṭha leaders Mirci Gopala Hari in Arcot and Malhar Rao in the neighbourhood of Mysore, both of whom were collecting *cant*, to help him against the Mysore commander. The Marāṭhas then put into the field 40,000 horse, and besieged Bangalore, Maddūr, and Cennarāyapaṭṭana. It was now the turn of Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao to cry for help to his master the king of Mysore and to his own father Barakki Venkaṭa Rao. But the Mysoreans were afraid to

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20. *Ibid*, p. 166.

21. Narasimbachar, *Karnāṭaka Kavacarite*, III. p. 231.

cut through the ranks of the enemy and to supply their people with foodstuffs. There was one person, however, who was undaunted. This was Hyder 'Alī who now came to the rescue of Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao. Hyder 'Alī led the Mysore army against the Marāṭhas and crushed them in the battle of Cennarāyapaṭṭana. Peace was at once concluded, and the Marāṭhas left the Mysore country on Hyder 'Alī promising to stand surety for the balance to be paid to them.

In A.D. 1760 the factions at the Court of Mysore gave an opportunity for the Marāṭhas to intervene in the affairs of Mysore. Khaṇḍe Rao and Hyder 'Alī were the leaders respectively of rival parties. The former appealed to the Marāṭha leaders Bēnī Visāji Paṇḍit through Bukkaṇoji, and secured a contingent of 8,000 horse.

Three years later (1763) occurred the second Marāṭha invasion when Peshawa Mādhava Rao invaded Mysore. Hyder 'Alī met him with 10,000 horse, 20,000 *bar*, and 20,000 armed peons. The Marāṭhas succeeded in capturing Barakki Śrīnivāsa Rao, and other Mysorean leaders. But when Medakere Nāyaka charged the enemy, the captives were allowed to make good their escape. However the Marāṭhas could not be beaten so easily; and so Hyder 'Alī made peace with them by ceding to them Penugonḍa, Kodikonḍa, and other important places, and agreed to pay at the same time a tribute of thirty-two lakhs of Rupees. On the 23rd of March 1765 the Peshwa returned to Poona.

But it was only to attack Mysore once again. And so we have the fourth Marāṭha invasion in February 1767 when the same Peshwa met the Mysore army under Mir 'Alī Khan near Sīrā. The Mysoreans were completely defeated in the battle of Sīrā, the Marāṭhas having succeeded in conquering the districts of Maddagiri, Cennarāyapaṭṭana, Cikka Baḷḷāpura, and Dodḍa Baḷḷāpura. Hyder 'Alī once again concluded peace with the Peshwa who returned to Poona in May of the same year (1767).

But in A. D. 1769 the Peshwa marched against Mysore. The causes of the fifth Marāṭha invasion were the following—Firstly, the defeat suffered by the Peshwa's deputy Mahimāji Scindhia stationed at Gurrumkonḍa; and secondly, the levying of tribute by Hyder 'Alī from the Pāḷeyagārs of Karnūl and other places which were considered by the Peshwa as belonging to the Marāṭha Empire. In the battle of Cikka Baḷḷāpura Hyder suffered defeat; and the Marāṭhas won again in another encounter at Maddagiri in May 1769. They captured Dēvarāyadurga and met the Mysoreans at Nijakal. Here in the battle of Nijakal the Mysoreans again suffered complete defeat, although the Peshwa lost his

brother and about 10,000 men in the conflict. Entrusting the work of capturing Seringapatam to Tryambaka Viśvanātha Rao, the Peshwa Mādhava Rao returned to Poona in May 1770.

After many incidents of great interest, the Marāṭhas besieged Seringapatam for two months (April–May 1771). But a surprise attack by Hyder 'Alī on the plain of Karighaṭṭa proved successful, and the Marāṭhas raised the siege of Seringapatam and left Mysore. On the death of Peshwa Mādhava Rao in December 1771, Hyder 'Alī concluded peace which his brother Nārāyaṇa Rao who had become the Peshwa.<sup>22</sup>

Thus continues the *Hyder-nāmā* with numerous details about the Marāṭhas which deserve to be verified by other sources. As in the case of Govinda, the author of this work writes about contemporary events. The value of *Hyder-nāmā*, therefore, as a contemporary document cannot be over-estimated. That there is some difference in the account of the Marāṭhas and that left to us by other sources is inevitable. But the Kannadigas were very intimately connected with the Marāṭhas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and any account of the latter by the former is bound to be of immense value for historical purposes. It is to be hoped that historians of the Marāṭha people will utilize these and other Kannada sources which have been written without any bias and which contain sober details.<sup>23</sup>

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22. *Mysore Archaeological Report for 1930*, p. 80, seq.

23. These sources are fully discussed in my next work entitled "Marāṭha Dominion in Karnāṭaka" which will be published soon. B. A. S.

# A NOTE ON THE ANNEXATION OF JAWLI

BY

DR. SURENDRA NATH SEN, M.A., B.Litt., Ph.D.

In 1655 Shivaji annexed Jawli. The reason was obvious. With Jawli in unfriendly hands, Shivaji could not expect to extend his territories towards the south. The annexation, however, could not be effected by peaceful persuasion. It involved the death of the ruling chief and the arrest and execution of many of his kith and kin. So far there is no difference of opinion. The main fact of conquest and annexation, apart from minor details, remains undisputed. But the methods form a subject of keen controversy. Until recently Sabhasad's story was widely accepted and there was no substantial difference between his version of the Jawli incident and that of Malhar Ramrao Chitnis. If Sabhasad is to be credited, the conquest of Jawli was facilitated and completed by a series of premeditated murders committed with Shivaji's previous approval by his trusted agents. One of them, Raghunath Ballal, proceeded to Jawli, apparently on a friendly mission, sought a private interview with the unsuspecting chief and availed himself of the earliest opportunity of stabbing him and his brother Suryaji Rao to death. Shivaji promptly appeared on the scene and captured Jawli with little difficulty as the defending forces had been completely demoralised by the unforeseen calamity. The Mores, however, soon found another champion and rallied under the leadership of Hanumant Rao who had his head quarters at Chaturbet. Shivaji decided to remove "this thorn" and Sambhaji Kavji successfully repeated the feat of Raghunath Ballal when a third More succumbed to an assassin's dagger. Such, in short, is the story which gained currency in Maharashtra and abroad since 1694.

A different story is told by the anonymous author of a later chronicle. The late Rao Bahadur D. B. Parasnis published a brief chronicle of the Mores of Jawli in the now defunct *Itihas Sangraha* (*Sphuta Lekha*, pp. 21-29). According to this chronicle, the founder of the Jawli family distinguished himself in the service of the Adilshahi ruler of Bijapur and earned the golden opinion of his master by killing a ferocious tiger single handed. His prowess was fittingly rewarded with the hereditary

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title of Raja and the principality of Jawli, then a wild tiger-land ordinarily shunned by peaceful people. The first Chandra Rao was succeeded by seven rulers in turn, when the main line came to an end and the mother of the last Raja adopted a young man from a co-lateral branch of the family. It was from this prince, Krishnaji Baji, that Shivaji conquered Jawli after four months of arduous fighting. Shivaji was prepared to treat his captive with all honour and consideration but the unfortunate man, unable to reconcile himself with his lot, opened a secret correspondence with Shivaji's enemies. The conspiracy was promptly suppressed and Krishnaji Baji was forthwith put to death.

Parasnis himself did not accept this account in toto. In '*A History of the Maratha People*', a joint work of Messrs Parasnis and Kincaid, it is admitted that Balaji More and his brother met their end at the hands of Raghunath Ballal and Sambhaji Kavji while engaged in a private interview, but it is denied that their murder was premeditated. On the other hand it is contended that Shivaji made repeated attempts to conciliate Balaji, the ruling prince of Jawli, but without any effect. When friendly negotiations failed Shivaji had no other alternative but to declare open war against the recalcitrant prince. Messers Kincaid and Parasnis tried to justify Shivaji's conduct, but the main story as told by Sabhasad, remained unchallenged. It was left for the late Mr. C. V. Vaidya to call the Maratha Court historian's veracity into question.

Mr. Vaidya relies mainly on the evidence of two contemporary works—*Shiva Bharat*, a Sanskrit epic by Parmananda, a Brahmin scholar of note, and the chronological notes ascribed to the Jedhes. Parmananda says that Shivaji captured the impregnable fort of Jawli after defeating Bajraj, Krishnaraj and their father Chandraraj. The Jedhe chronology refers to the reduction of Jawli after open fighting in *Paush. 1577* (December, 1655) which was followed by the capture of Rairi four months later when Chandra Rao More was induced to surrender by Haibat Rao and Balaji Nayak Silimbkar. On the face of it, this evidence appears quite conclusive, but it is difficult to explain why Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad of all persons should go out of his way to fabricate a false story about the conquest of Jawli and gratuitously defame Shivaji whom he apparently revered.

Krishnaji Anant was a contemporary of Shivaji conversant with the events of his times. He occupied a position of trust and influence at the court of Jinji. He was specially commissioned by Rajaram to compile a biography of Shivaji and Krishnaji Anant completed this task in 1694,

only thirty-nine years after the Jawli incident. At that date many of the junior contemporaries of Shivaji were still alive and they would certainly not let a lie about the great king, pass unchallenged. Nor was it likely that a courtier of Krishnaji Anant's position would lightly libel his master's father in a work meant for that master's eyes. The obvious conclusion is that Sabhasad's account was by no means unfounded and the contradiction of the Jedhe *Karina* and the Jedhe chronology is more apparent than real. The brief notes in the Jedhe chronology may not after all be irreconcilable with the more detailed account of Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad.

It is sometimes ignored that "Chandra Rao" was the hereditary title of the ruling chiefs of Jawali, not a personal name, and when the Chandra Rao died his successor automatically assumed the title. In this connection, reference may be made to the term "*Chandarajapada*" of verse 209, canto 18 of *Shiva Bharat*. We cannot discard Sabhasad's story without establishing the identity of the Chandar Rao whom Raghunath Ballal interviewed and killed. According to the *Javalikar More Bakhar*, the last Chandar Rao's personal name was Krishnaji Baji (While the *Mahabaleshwar Bakhar* calls him Balaji). This was obviously an error, for the same chronicle asserts that he had been adopted by the widow of Balaji Chandar Rao, mother of Daulat Rao Chandar Rao. His name, therefore, should have been Krishnaji Balaji and not Krishnaji Baji supposing that the first name was correct. In all probability confusion is made here with Krishnaji Rao and Baji Rao of the *Shiva Bharat*, sons of that Chandar Rao whom Shivaji had overthrown. In case, however the adoption was made by Daulat Rao's wife, the second name of Krishnaji should have been Daulat Rao instead of Baji. Mr. Vaidya thinks that Krishnaji's father was installed as his guardian at Jawli but this assumption is hardly supported by the *Shiva Bharat*. The "Janaka" (Progenitor) of Krishnaji could not style himself as Chandar Rao, though according to the chronicle, he was a More unless he was the ruling Chief of Jawli. Yet the *Shiva Bharat* definitely asserts that Shivaji overthrew or chastised Bajraj, Krishnaraj and their father Chandra Raj. Obviously, therefore, neither Krishnaji nor Baji could have been adopted sons, their father was a ruler of Jawli or he would not be styled as Chandra Raj by a contemporary poet. Once this view is accepted, there hardly remains any inconsistency between Sabhasad's account and the brief notes in the Jedhe chronology. It was Krishnaji and Baji's father whom Raghunath interviewed and his death was followed by Shivaji's conquest of Jawli. Sabhasad is silent about the sons of Chandar Rao. Apparently they fled

### *A Note on the Annexation of Jawli*

to Rairi and the elder of the two naturally assumed the ancestral title. So when Rairi fell in *Vaishakha* of 1578, the chief who surrendered is mentioned by his title and not by his personal name.

It may be objected that the *Shiva Bharat*, a contemporary work, definitely asserts that Shivaji overthrew Chandar Rao in a battle. We should not forget the *Shiva Bharat* is a poetical work and is not free from poetical licenses. Contemporary *povadas* about the Afzal Khan incident and the reduction of Singhar are not free from exaggerations and inaccuracies. Moreover Chandar Rao and his sons are mentioned in the same verse (No. 4 of Canto 18). Obviously the poet is giving only a brief outline of the incident, and we need not be surprised if he magnifies a minor scuffle, which must have taken place in that lonely chamber where Raghunath interviewed the unfortunate chief, into a real battle. At best Sabhasad was guilty of an omission. He certainly did not fabricate a false story to ruin the reputation of his sovereign.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar thinks that a reconstruction of Sabhasad's story is necessary. In the first edition of his *Shivaji and his Times* he mixed up the details given by different chroniclers. He is now inclined to assign to *91 Qal'mi Bakhar* a place second to Sabhasad alone in importance and reliability. This is hardly justified by a critical examination of the text. I have dealt with this question elsewhere. (See *Shivaji Nibandhavali* Vol. I.) Suffice it to say that Sabhasad nowhere says that Raghunath Ballal went to the Jawli court to negotiate a matrimonial alliance. Apparently a confusion was made by Malhar Ramrao Chitnis, and the author of the *91 Qal'mi Bakhar* who asserts that Shivaji sent Raghunath to solicit on his behalf the hand of Chandar Rao's daughter. According to the *Shivadigvijaya*, Raghunath proposed a marriage between Shivaji and Hanumant Rao's daughter. There is no inherent inconsistency in Sabhasad's account of the conquest of Jawli. Raghunath went on a political mission and murdered Chandar Rao and his brother Suryaji Rao. Shivaji immediately fell upon the demoralised forces and captured Jawli. But he found that Hanumant Rao could not be easily dislodged from Chaturbet and Sambhaji Kavji sought a private audience with Hanumant on the pretence of negotiating a matrimonial alliance. It is to be noted that the same trap was not laid for Chandar Rao and Hanumant Rao and the latter might have been genuinely anxious to bring the feud to a satisfactory close, as the power of the Mores was certainly on the wane. There is no reason to reject any part of Krishnaji Sabhasad's story, for it was undoubtedly checked by well informed persons,

because later chroniclers in their ignorance mixed up the order of events. Even Sir Jadunath Sarkar seems to be uncertain in his attitude, for while he definitely ascribes the murder of Hanumant Rao to Raghunath Ballal Sabnis in his revised account of the conquest of Jawli (p. 44, 3rd Ed.), he later accepts the original story of Sabhasad and describes Sambhaji Kavji as "The Murderer of Hanumant Rao More" (p. 65). Sabhasad is not guilty of such inconsistencies and the authenticity of his story is not shaken by Mr. Vaidya's criticism. Shivaji was a great man in more sense than one, and his reputation does not rest on isolated incidents. If he conquered Jawli by fraud intermixed with force, he did so in pursuance of a great ideal, the achievement of Swaraj, the foundation of Maharashtra Padshahi.





# RĀMARAYA OF VIJAYANAGAR

BY

RAJASEVASAKTA DEWAN BAHADUR DR. S. KRISHNASWAMI

AIYANGAR, M.A., Ph.D., M.R.A.S., F.A.S.B., etc.,

It is a well known fact that the Empire of Vijayanagar did suffer vital injury at the so-called battle of Talikotta, much more fittingly Rākshasatangadi, in 1565. The Empire held out intact, though, from another capital farther to the south and much better placed for defence against the enemies, in Penugonda. The last great ruler who can even be credited with having succeeded to a great extent in bringing the Empire back to its original greatness was the great Venkaṭapatirāya, Venkaṭa I of Vijayanagar, who ruled from 1586 to 1614. As he was usually in residence at Chandragiri for most of the period of his reign, he is sometimes spoken of as the Raja of Chandragiri. The Empire, which had been marked off into three divisions for convenience of administration and placed under the rule of the three brothers, Śrīranga remaining at head-quarters in Penugonda, Rāma taking charge of his viceroyalty with head-quarters at Śrīrangapaṭam, and Venkaṭa remaining in Chandragiri and taking charge of the rest of the Empire. By the subsequent deaths of the two elder brothers, Venkaṭa became the sole ruler and managed to rule the Empire with energy and bring into allegiance even those of the governors who showed a tendency to throw off the yoke of the Empire. The last of these powerful feudatories was Lingama Nāyaka of Vellore, and it was a war against him that brought him down, during five or six years at the beginning of the 17th century, into residence in Vellore, thus making some of the European travellers speak of him sometimes as the King of Vellore. As his reign was drawing to a close, he could already see the signs of the coming war of succession which destroyed the Empire and left it altogether injured beyond possibility of recovery.

We take some extracts<sup>1</sup> from the correspondence of the officials of the East India Company on the Coromandel coast which throw some

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<sup>1</sup> These extracts are taken from *The English Factories in India* edited by Sir William Foster.

considerable light upon this feature, and we shall try to expound them in this note. Venkaṭa had two of his young nephews, the sons of his brother Rāma, the viceroy at Śrīrangapaṭam at his court. When viceroy Rāma, the elder brother died, Venkaṭa sent the elder of his two sons, to succeed his father and kept the younger, called Ranga or Śrīranga, with him. Not only this. He seems early to have designed him for the succession, and brought him up as almost the heir-apparent to the Empire, even giving him the title Chikkarāya, which as it was understood at the time meant the heir-presumptive. One of his queens, however, who remained childless, and was believed to be so even by Venkaṭa himself, apparently cherished other ambitions and had a baby, which she claimed to be her own child, brought up in the palace without Venkaṭa doing anything to prevent it, with the result that she got confirmed in the belief that she had the countenance of the Emperor in regard to the presumptive claim of this putative boy. On his death bed, however, Venkaṭa, notwithstanding the protests of prince Ranga, his nephew, installed him as the Emperor, and thus brought about a conflagration which wellnigh destroyed the Empire completely.

The queen who claimed to have a child belonged to a powerful family of Gobbūri chiefs, and her brother called Jaggarāya, was, in consequence, perhaps the most powerful nobleman of the Empire, and possessed of the highest resources in the state next only to the Emperor. He probably found it would be more advantageous to himself, and would meet the needs of his ambition better, if the boy-nephew were placed on the throne instead of Ranga who had received already some training as prince, and may be expected to take his own line in the government of the Empire. Immediately after the installation of Ranga, Jaggarāya started a movement, trying to enlist the nobles of the Empire on his side. This was made easy for him by certain acts of the new King. It is not our purpose here to discuss the history of this movement on this occasion.<sup>2</sup>

This gradually developed to the extent of a great many of the feudatories of rank in the Empire joining Jagga, and left the Emperor almost without any loyal chieftains among those of rank, with the exception of one doughty champion of the Emperor's cause in the Velugoṭi chief named Yāchama Nāyaka, the founder of the family of Venkaṭagiri.

In a short time it became clear that everybody worth the name joined the opposition, and the King was left almost alone. Taking advantage of

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2. For details refer to *The Journal of Indian History*, Vol. V (1926) pp.164-188.

his relationship to the royal family and the dominant influence that he wielded at court, Jaggarāya was able gradually to surround the King, making him powerless, and actually imprisoning him in one of his palaces under his own guard, proclaiming his own nephew Emperor instead. This was opposed by Yāchama Nayaka single-handed, and he gradually developed his resources by gaining a few allies, and thus began the great war of succession in Vijayanagar. It took two years before this struggle could come to a final decision. It is a massacre of the royal family that precipitated the war, Jaggarāya having ordered the wholesale murder in cold blood of Ranga and all his family. Before the day appointed for the purpose, Yāchama Nayaka managed cleverly to secure possession of one of the sons of Ranga, his second son by name Rāma, who was about ten or twelve, the elder brother being a grown up young man for the purpose, as the arrangement was for a washerman to smuggle the boy out of the fort. After a number of skirmishes, the war was ultimately decided by the battle of Toppūr, the village now being called Tōhūr, quite close to the Grand Anicut on the southern bank of the Kaveri. Among the principal viceroys, the Nāyaka of Tanjore was the only one that remained loyal, all the other Nāyaks having joined the side of Jaggarāya. The battle went against the allies, Jagga fell in battle, and this young prince Rāma was installed as Emperor by Ragunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore at Kumbhakonam, where there is a temple built to God Rāma in memorial thereof. This Rāma who was a tender boy at the time of this fateful accession to the throne, ruled over Vijayanagar down to the year 1630; the father having hardly ruled for more than a month. When he was installed in due form as Emperor in 1616 or 1617, he could count upon the support of Ragunātha Nāyaka of Tanjore who officiated at his accession, and the loyal chieftain Yāchama Nāyaka with perhaps a few more chiefs of comparatively minor rank. All the other feudatories of the Empire were up in arms, or at least had compromised themselves by taking up arms against him, and it was a question of almost conquering the Empire over again before it could be brought into loyalty to him. He had to struggle all the years of his reign from 1616 to 1630, for which we have no direct sources of information. That his reign was disturbed throughout is borne out by the few extracts that we bring to notice here, and that is about all the information we so far seem to possess.

The period of rule of Emperor Rāma corresponded to the period of struggle of the English East India Company to get out of Masulipatam and found a place on the coast of Coromandel, where they could build a factory, fortify it for purposes of safety, and carry on their trade with the

inhabitants of the interior unmolested, and without being subjected to the extortions that they complain of from the Nawab of Golkonda and his officers at Masulipatam. They had to change from one place on to another till at last they secured the site, on which they built Madras. They found themselves uncomfortable at Masulipatam, and found it even-impossible to maintain themselves at Pettapolee, and were on the lookout for a better place to the south under the rule of Hindu kings. They first settled at Pulicat with the Dutch, and finding that not up to their liking, changed to Armagon, and ultimately secured the site of Madras. The letters that the agents of the Company wrote home in the course of their search for a suitable locality, give us some information regarding the condition of the country. Writing from Pulicat, they refer to the state of affairs as under —

“Trust that these goods, which cost first penny 13,017 pagodas 10 (6/11 fanams, equivalent to 24,774 rials 6) will give satisfaction. Could not procure all the ‘tappie grandes’ and ‘tappie chinds’ desired, owing to the recent hostilities. The natives complain that they gain nothing by the woven cloths, especially the ‘camgoulows, tappie grandes and tappie quechills’, and probably this is correct. Think that the merchants deserve some increased benefit, particularly as they have to be responsible for the money advanced through them to the weavers and painters, ‘which oftentimes pays them with a farewell’. If the English had to deal direct with these persons, ‘att the years end, when wee expected to be invested of our goods, wee should undoubtedlye come shorte of half our quantitye, besides undergoe a hazard of their runing away wher ther were no hope for us to fynd them out or recover our monies’. Moreover, as the water here is so bad and brackish that cloths washed in it ‘have noe good lusture’, the natives have to carry them to ‘Slaves, att the least six Jentes (Gentoo) leagues, and being in another government are forced to pay junkan uppon every cloth or painting’. This year, however, they were obliged to remain within the limits of Pulicat, for fear of the enemy. Some of the native merchants express astonishment at the English quitting Petapoli to come and live at Pulicat at much greater expense, affirming that cloth made at the former place is far better and cheaper than that of the latter; ‘the only difference in the sorts of each fardell not their performed (as?) heer, neyther the borders and richcos so neatly and clearly wrought,’ though perhaps the provision of patterns might induce them to remedy this”.<sup>3</sup>

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3. *The English Factories in India, 1622-23.* pp. 104-105.

The document quoted above has reference to the years 1622-23, and is actually dated July 26th, 1622, which explains first of all the difficulty that the Company's agents experienced in the purchase of cloth. This had to be purchased from manufacturers, actually individual weavers who had to be advanced money and the cloth taken when finished. They had to operate therefore through Indian agents who knew the people and could be sure of advancing money and collecting the money or the cloth. Pettapolee was well situated for the purpose, and had certain obvious advantages in regard to the quality of the cloth and the facility for purchasing, but had to be abandoned because of the extortions, as they complained, of the Muhammadan officers of Golkonda. They found that their settlement at Pulicat under the hospitality of the Dutch proved to be a matter of great disadvantage, and that is what they complain of in the extract given above.

The second extract complains of the difficulties that the Company's officials experienced at the hands of the Dutch, who secured the privilege of building a fort from the old Emperor Venkaṭa in 1606, and had fortified the place for themselves. They had to accommodate the English factors in the locality as best as they could. Naturally the accommodation was unsatisfactory, and, as they were both engaged in the same kind of a trade, their interests clashed. Apart from that there were other difficulties in the locality. That is what is referred to in this extract.

"After paying their debts and reserving a sum for Fort charges, they have invested the rest of the money sent. Hope that Batavia will soon receive a further supply. The Dutch refuse to allow them a voice in the engagement or disposal of the garrison; they have added to the common charges, and evidently 'their proceeding is more to weary us then otherwise, which on our partts wee wish might shortly come to pass'. The end of the Dutches government is approaching, haveing but 10 mont(h)s to come;<sup>4</sup> and the said government bestowed on greatt Nayco (Nayak) of the cuntrey, who is to send (serve?) the sayd Iteraj (Itiraja), lord of this place, uppon all his occasions, who remaine as fearfull of

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4. Mr. Heeres (*Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum*, p. 159) prints the grant by 'Itteragie' to the Dutch, dated August 28, 1620 (N. S.). In this the former is stated to be governor over forty 'Jentjsche' miles of land. From L. C. D. Van Dijk's *Zes Jaren uit het Leven van Wemmer Van Berchem*, p. 30, we learn that 'Itterragie' was brother to 'Jaggeragie' (Jaga Raja), the principal noble of King Venkaṭa I.

the succeding tymes: which Nai (c)o is to furnish likewise 4,000 men att all commands. What alterations their may be by this change wee are to attende, butt may feare wilbe worse for our negocyations. Ther is doubted ther wilbe such polling and taxing of the poore, I meane weavers and painters that have imployment in our afaires, that will peradventure cause them forsake the placce, which is common in theise sorte of people to exacte".<sup>5</sup>

The contract that the Dutch obtained was drawing to a close, and is stated that the concession was made to them by one Itteragie (Yatirāja). This Yatirāja as viceroy entrusted this part to the government of a Nāyak, who had to supply 4,000 men to Yatirāja's army, and the extract dated July 26th, 1622 complains that this new governor was likely to be exacting, and would make the position of the weavers difficult; and therefore the Company's agents were likely to be put to difficulties to get the cloth that they required, or even to recover the advances made for the purpose, as any oppression or bad government generally turns out these people from the locality, those that had advanced money, of course, would stand to lose. This Yatirāja, referred to in the correspondence here is no other than Gobbūri Yatirāja, the brother of the traitor Jaggarāya, the arch enemy of the ruler Rāma. Probably he took possession of the extensive government of his brother when the latter fell in battle at Toppūr, and was in all probability the most powerful governor in the Empire, only disaffected to the present ruler. Naturally therefore the Emperor or those who managed the business for him had to beat him into submission, and that is what we find referred to in the next two extracts dated 20th and 21st October 1622.

" Our old friend Chemenique (see p. 139), as we understand hath adjoynd his forces and is sett forward with two or three thousand men towards theese partes; the brute of whose cominge hath strocken such a feare in theese countrey people hereabout that makes them flie to Pallicatt with bag and baggage, and within theise seven dayes here are retired above two thousand people. What will ensue hereupon we are yet ignorant, but must leave it to the triall of time. Here hath fallen within this eight days great store of raine; insomuch that wee remaine incirculed with water, which is a suffient defence against the enemye and hath brought no small content to the inhabitants of Pallicatt." <sup>6</sup>

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5. *The English Factories in India, 1622-23*, pp. 106-7.

6. *Ibid* p. 133.

" Much rain has fallen and more is anticipated, ' by the demonstration of the heathenes '. ' The cowardlie enimie is com on forward with a small force, but durst not visitt in Pallicatt, he beginninge his pranckes as he did the last yeare, and yesterday sett upon an emptie village within three miles of Pallicatt and sett it on fire, the inhabitants beinge two dayes before fled hether. They have but a cold time of itt, all the countrey beinge all over with water; wherefore I suppose sett those poore houses on fire to warme themselves' ".<sup>7</sup>

The letters speak of Cheminique, which seems to stand for Ēchama Nāyaka, rather a corrupt form of Yāchama. This is an attack upon the district round Pulicat for dispossessing Yatirāja and taking possession of it. Yāchama Nāyaka apparently is the loyal chief who was practically instrumental in bringing about Rāma's succession, and must have been the officer whose loyalty and interest alike demanded the dispossessing of the disaffected officers, among whom the chief must have been Yatirāja, the younger brother of Jaggarāya. These extracts refer to the years 1622-23. The next long extract gives more detail about this war between Yāchama Nāyaka on one side and Yatirāja on the other.

Little news, except of 'the approach of our last yeres enmye, who the 20th of October entered a small village neare borderinge, and within sight of Pallecatt sett the same one fire, and burnynge all to the ground their raysed a forte of mud and other combustable (*sic*) mixed together, which they finished in two dayes and two nights, bringing with them coules (coolies) for the purpose. But Iteraja, who is lord of theise partes, having notice thereof, presently assembled his forces, beinge to the number of four or five thousand persons, and the 28th ditto beseiged the said forte, the enmye beinge within noe more then 300 persons, which notwithstandinge held out a day or two, till the Dutch were faine to send hym, the said Iteraja, two peeces of ordnance out of the forte, with two or three gunners to his assistance; which the enmye perceivinge, fearinge the worse, demaunded caule and they would deliver up the forte and retire themselves; which was performed, and the ordnance brought againe into the forte the 30th ditto; whereupon there was a great man interposed himselfe beetweene them both in the waye, as supposed by a frendly disposition, to make a league of frindshipe and accord; and standing both to his sensure, assigned eash (each) his quarter or portion of land which formerly they held, which was devided by a river which parted the same. And conditions being drawne and writtings past beetwene them, the said Iteraja, as void of any further suspition, began to remove

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7 *Ibid* p. 134.



his forces, and came even att the towne of Pallicatte, mindinge to retorne to his whome, left the fort without any person therein, only one parte of these tender walles have rayssed to the ground in the meane tyme. And the day followinge the aforesaid enymie, as false as politicke, whose hed hath name Cemenique, in the nyght retorned with 2,000 persons and raysed againe the said forte and made itt somethinge larger, and hath put therein 500 persons, and soe remaines himselfe neare in company with 10,000, this beinge within three myles of Pallicate. This Iteraja on the contrary understandinge of this false afore pretended dishonest, dealinge, avowed by all their fidelities and pagodas to be truly kept one both sides, which now beinge so treacheously broken, the said Iteraja, with much rage and discontente, requiringe assistance of his brothers and other his frinds, hath againe taken the feild and lies now within a mile  $\frac{1}{2}$  of his enymie with four thousand, and dayly attends a further supply. He is a man by all reported of a stoute corrage; his onlye want is money to supply his occasions att present, whereof the other is well stored and therefore is of more forse. They both strive for that they have noe right unto, but patronize as their owne untill the Kinge be established, which is yett younge; besides he is held in small esteeme as yett. What will follow by these chains of troubles, the conclusion will make appearance; but in the meane time we greatly feare, yea verily beleeve, our negotiations wilbe greatly hindered, if not in our expectation wholly frustrated; for this Cemeniqua, whose drifte and ayme is for Pallectat, to bringe itt in subjection under his government, that he might have the sacken of the inhabitants, who is possest they enjoye an infinitt of means, and therefore would faine be plucking of their feathers; which having soe subjected, would lett them rest till they were growne out againe and fully ripe. This fort which he the enymie injoyes is just in the high waye from Pallicate into the country, whereby you may perceive the danger that depends thereon. Pallicate of itselfe affordeth noe manner of commoditie for our employment, only most parte of the persons employed therein; and for our best paintings, they are most parte salure and mayer, by reason of the water att other places abrod in the country, a Jentesh (see p. 104) league from hence; whereby you may partly imagin what incorradgment these people can have to sett themselves aworke in these troublesome tymes, when on all sides their is burnynge and spoyllinge where they come'. The Dutch Governor on his arrival, finding the English in a small cottage, gave them a better one to their content, being the house of the gunner, who had been sent to Batavia for some offence."<sup>8</sup>

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8. *Ibid* pp. 138-40,

There is a sentence in the middle of it which says that "both of them strive where they have no right to patronise as their own until the king be established who is yet young: besides he (king) is already in small esteem as yet". The English as well as the Dutch perhaps were certainly in doubt at the time what would happen to them and their interests if Yāchama Nāyaka succeeded in gaining Pulicat, which, according to them, was clearly his object.

This has reference to the November of 1622, and that is above five to six years after the battle which placed Rāmarāja upon the throne, and this state of things appears to have continued almost to the end of his reign, although we do not appear to have many references to these. But a letter dated August 20, 1629 has the following extract —

"The greate king of the Gentewes is nowe in his wares growne soe powerfull that hee hath conquered and regayned all his former dominions save only our Naige of this place, who (it ?) is supposed cannott long subsist: wherfore perforce must leave his country. What alterations these proceedings will bring unto our masters affayres in this place wee must refer unto tyne, and with that smale force wee have vigilently to stand upon our owne gards untill God send us more force; yet wee have noe cause to doubt butt that hee wilbee comformable to reason, as this our Naige hath formerly bene. But in whatt manner the Dutch will proceede with the King upon these alterations wee knowe nott, but have reason to doubt of them by reason of there former underhand dealing".<sup>9</sup>

This extract gives us the indication that the king had at last got so much control over his Empire that the Company felt they would be in a position to negotiate with him through the Nāyak of the locality round Armagon. It was the establishing of a settlement there that they were considering about, and shows clearly that the authority of the Emperor was getting to be more or less firmly established. We have evidence of literature that Yatirāja was father-in-law of Rāma. This fact is referred to in a foot-note to one of the extracts above on the authority of a Dutch writer. We know further from literature that Yatirāja's daughter was the second wife of Rāma, Rāma having had another wife. This would indicate it was a diplomatic marriage, and possibly entered into with a view to bringing Yatirāja over to the interests of Rāma. We could well believe that not merely war and subjugation, but other means as well were adopted for bringing the rebel feudatories

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9 *The English Factories in India, 1624-29 pp. 346-47.*

to a feeling of loyalty to Rāma. This must have been a gradual process, and must have taken a long time. The extract above is dated just one year before the end of the reign of Rāmarāja. We may therefore say that poor Rāma, who could be no more than a young man of 24 or 25 at the time has had to struggle practically all his reign to get the Empire under his control, and hardly succeeded before his reign came to a close. It was this continuous war among the chieftains of the Empire that left it to an extent permanently damaged. We have references to the exclusion by these Nāyaks of the Dutch not only from Armagon, but even Kottapalli much farther north in the Nellore District is specifically referred to. Golkonda could not have advanced so far south as yet, and the boundary, as Sir William Foster suggests, was probably along the Gundlakamma river. So we see that the decisive engagement in the war of succession and the defeat and death of Jaggarāya took place early in the year 1617, and young Rāma, who then could not have been more than 14, succeeded to the throne actually in the latter part of that year. His reign came to an end in 1630, giving him length of rule of twelve to thirteen years, the greatest part of which, up to 1629, he was engaged in bringing his rebel vassals back to loyalty to him. He could hardly have had a year after that when he died comparatively a young man, and this conclusion is confirmed by the fact that he left no successor notwithstanding his two marriages, and the succession had to go to a collateral.

# CASTE-NAME "GĀBĪT"

BY

P. K. GODE, M. A.

In November 1937 my friend Rao Bahadur Wasudev Anant Bambardekar of Bandra (Bombay) requested me to throw some light on the history of the caste-name "*gābīt*." Being interested in the antiquity of caste-names now current in India and particularly those current in the Deccan and having already written a short note<sup>2</sup> on the antiquity of the caste-name "*śeṇvī*," I could not resist the temptation of going a little deeper in the history of this caste-name, though by habit and training I can hardly call myself either a philologist or a historian qualified to undertake a complicated problem of a historical study of Indian caste-names. I was, however, convinced that for a true understanding of these caste-names a systematic record of the actual usages<sup>3</sup> of these names in definitely dated historical documents was an essential preliminary before any attempts are made to interpret them. In short textual criticism should be the *terra firma* on which all interpretative criticism should be based.

1. Vide *Castes and Tribes of Bombay* by R. E. Enthoven, Vol. I, Bombay, 1920, pp. 347-350. *Gabits*—number 24233 (11569 males, 12664 females) reside on the Sea Coast—Ratnagiri, Kanara, Savantvadi—a few families at Surat, Kolaba, Thana and Janjira—Call themselves Konkani Marathas—descendants of Marathas who manned Shivaji's navy—Some of them are still called *Gurabitandels*—they are chiefly fishermen and sailors—in some places they have *gotras*,—probable Maratha origin of the Caste—*Goa*, the original home of *Gabits*—During Portuguese insurrection they fled to Ratnagiri and Kanara—those who remained in Goa were converted to Christianity—their *gotras* according to some accounts:—Atri, Bābhavya, Bhāradvaja, Gārgya, Kapila, Kāśyapa, Kauśika, Sāṇḍilya, Vasiṣṭha, Vatsa—According to other account the whole caste has only one gotra *Kāśyapa*—family stocks: Bhosale, Jadhav, Ghorpade, Dabhade, Dhamale, Shinde, Chavan, Kubal, Tawade, More, Nikam—Polygamy is allowed and practised but polyandry is unknown.—Widow re-marriage, permitted—*Gabits* follow the Hindu law of inheritance and belong to Hindu religion—Saṁkarācārya of Sankeshwar is their spiritual guide—Their priests are Chitpavan or Karhādā Brahmins—The dead are either burnt or buried—Śrāddha is performed annually.

2. *Jour. Bomb. Uni.* May 1937, pp. 152-155.

3. Such record of chronological usages will be found in such works as *Hobson-Jobson* (second edn, by Crooke, London, 1903) and other scientifically compiled lexicons as the Oxford Eng. Dict.

Let us now turn to some of the explanations of the term "gābit" as are found recorded in the Marathi dictionaries.

The *Mahārāṣṭra Śābdakośa*<sup>1</sup> that is being published by the Mahārāṣṭra Kośamandal, Poona explains the word as follows:—

GĀBTĪ or GĀBDĪ—(Masc.), (Rajapur), GĀBIT; GRABTI; KHĀRVĪ; KOLĪ; a fisher-man; a Konkan caste; (vide Jñāna-kośa, p. GA—101).

Arabic—*Ghurāb-Grāb* (*Gurāb*)—an Arabic shipping vessel. The Maratha warriors who manned such a ship were called GRABTĪ or GĀBTĪ. This word became current in the time of the great Maratha king Shivaji.

Proverb.—"Gāvyās gurūn, gurākhyās tārūn.

GRABTĪN—fisher-woman.

I have rendered into English the extract from the *Śābdakośa* without disturbing its sense with a view to investigate the problems it raises, viz.—

1. That the word "gābit" is a caste-name.
2. That it is derived from the Arabic name: GHURĀB, grāb or gurāb, meaning a vessel.
3. That the word became current in Shivaji's time.

According to the information recorded in the *Mahārāṣṭra Jñānakosha*<sup>2</sup> the total population of the GĀBTĪ caste in 1911 was 24,818. Men of this caste generally reside on the sea-coast and are found in the districts of Ratnagiri, Kanara and Savantwadi state. The origin of the word GĀBTĪ (GĀBIT or GRABTĪ) is traditionally explained by its reference to the Arabic word, GRĀB which means a 'gunboat'. The Konkani Marathas who manned these gun-boats were called GRĀBTĪ or GĀBTĪ. "The word GĀBIT is not the true word"<sup>3</sup> but it is only used in the Census Reports. The ancestors of the Gābtī caste people of the present day were formerly employed by Shivaji in his navy, and consequently men of this caste are found in large numbers in sea-side places like Jaitapur, Vijayadurga, Devgad, Malvan, Vengurle, which were formerly the bases of the navy. After the abolition of the Maratha fleet at the close of the Peshwa period of the Maratha history the Gābtīs took to fishing, having

1. *Mahā. Śābda*. Poona, 1934, Part III, p. 978.

2. *Mahā. Jñānakosha*. Part XII, Ga. 102.

3. *Ibid.*

lost their war-like occupation. (Vide Census of India, Vol. VII—Information supplied by Mr. K. V. Kubal).<sup>4</sup>

The investigation of the several problems connected with the foregoing jumbled mass of tradition, history, philology and the pride of pedigree is quite beyond the scope of the present paper. I would, therefore, combat only some definite statements made in the foregoing explanations, on the strength of documentary evidence.

It is said in the above information recorded in the Jñānakōśa that "the word GĀBĪT is not the true word" but that it is a term used in the Census Reports. This statement is definitely wrong. The following documentary evidence shows that the term GĀBĪT is three hundred years old, being used in definitely dated documents of A. D. 1633 and 1723. The oldest forms of this caste-name if they vary from the form GĀBĪT current in A. D. 1633 will have to be proved by textual evidence. In A. D. 1723 also the form current was GĀBĪT as I shall show below. I shall be happy to know any variations from this form recorded in early documents.<sup>1</sup>

4. See *Bombay Gazetteer*, under *Gabit*, a caste of Fishermen, in Ratnagiri District, X, 127, 155, 171; in Savantvadi State, X, 406. 415; in Kolaba District, XI, 68; in Kanara District, XV, pt. i, 305, in the Belgaum District, XXI, 156.

1. Though such early documents (especially before A. D. 1600) are quite rare in the Maratha records there are good many of them in the *Peshwa Daftar* edited by Rao Bahadur G. S. Sardesai. Not only men of the *Gābīt* caste were recruited in the Maratha navy but also men from other sea-faring castes were availed of. A study of these castes and their history is yet a desideratum in spite of the information about them recorded in the *Gazetteers*. Now that the Maratha Navy as such has ceased to exist it is worth while putting on record the nautical terminology that became current during the vigorous career of this Navy but some of which has now become obsolete. Though I cannot undertake such a study at present I shall record below as specimen a few naval terms used in the documents of the *Peshwa Daftar* to denote different kinds of ships and boats as also their equipment :—

- (1) गुराव—P.D. 40 (46) C. 1747 A.D. ; P.D. 34 (9) 1737 (गुरावा) ; P.D. 34 (80) 1737 ; P.D. 34 (110) C. 1738 (reference to "डुर्बिन नली" or telescope used for naval reconnoitring) ; P.D. 34 (120) 1738 ; P.D. 33 (10) 1733 P.D. 33 (14 and 22) 1733 ;
- (2) सिबाड—P.D. 40 (46) 1747 ; P.D. 40 (63) 1750 ; P.D. 34 (80) 1737 (pl. सिबाडी) ; P.D. 33 (63) 1733 (सिबाडी) ;
- (3) तराडी—P.D. 40 (63) 1750 ; P.D. 34 (9) 1737 (तराडे) ; P.D. 33 (14) 1733 ; P.D. 33 (65) 1733 ;

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The other statement made in the information supplied by the Śabda-Kośa and Jñāna-Kośa referred to already is that the term became current in Shivaji's time. My evidence shows that this statement also is not true to history. The use of the word GĀBĪT in a document dated A. D. 1633, when Shivaji was three years old and hence too young to think of a navy or the allied question of employing Konkni Marathas on his gun-boats (or Grābs<sup>1</sup> or Gurābs or Ghurābs) definitely proves the fixity of the form Gābīt in the Marathi language not only in A. D. 1633 but much

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- (4) महागिरी—P.D. 40 (63) 1750 (महागिन्या pl.); P.D. 34 (61) 1737 ;  
 P.D. 33 (14) 1733 (माहेगिरी, माहगिरी) ; P.D. 33 (17) 1733 ;  
 P.D. 33 (22) 1733 (माहेगिन्या) ; P.D. 33 (51) 1733 (महिगिरी) ;  
 P.D. 33 (65) 1733 ( माहागिन्या ) ;
- (5) गलबतें—P.D. 34 (9) 1737 ; P.D. 33 (10) 1733 and many times.
- (6) होडी—P.D. 34 (31) 1737 ;
- (7) पदग्या—P.D. 34 (36) 1738 ; P.D. 34 (61) 1737 ; P.D. 34. (99) 1738 ; P.D. 34 (120) 1738 ;
- (8) फतेमारी—P.D. 34 (42) 1737 ; (9) कची (=कच्छी जहाज) ; P.D. 34 (57) 1738 ;
- (10) फरगतें—P.D. 34 (61) 1737 ; P.D. 34 (99) 1738 ; P.D. 34 (120) 1738 ;
- (11) मचवे—P.D. 34 (80) 1737 ;
- (12) जहाज—P.D. 34 (81) 1737 ; P.D. 34 (166) 1739 ;  
 P.D. 33 (63) 1733 (ज्याहाज) ;  
 P.D. 33 (65) 1733 ( जाहाज ) ;
- (13) तारवें—P.D. 34 (85) 1737 ;
- (14) पाल—P.D. 34 (120) 1738 ;
- (15) ढोण्या—P.D. 34 (61) 1737 (पांचशें ढोण्या). Men employed to work on these vessels were *Kolis, Bhandaris, Christians, Muhammedans* [P.D. 34 (61) 1737] as also *Arabs* [P.D. 34 (80) 1737]. The following references to allied terms may be found interesting :—“सफरी चार” [P.D. 34 (35) 1737] ; नाला=Small guns (दोन पंचरसी हातभर लांब व येक अडीच हात लांब) ; P.D. 34 (57) 1738 ; The *Arabs* sometimes proved traitors (आख होते त्याणी झकटभेद केला) P.D. 34 (80) 1737 ; Parts of equipment of a गलबत [P.D. 34 (94) 1737—“गलबतें अलाथ, आवदाण, अवजार सहवर्तमान”] ; दर्याबंदी, दालदी, पाटिल कुरये [P.D. 34 (94) 1737 ; P.D. 33 (92) 1733]. The names “राम तडिल” and “अमद तडिल” used in P.D. 33 (29) 1733 are quite typical of Hindu-Moslem Unity !

1. Vide article on GRĀB in *Hobson-Jobson* (1903) pp. 391–392. The term is now obsolete. Vide also *Bombay Gazetteer* xiii, pt. i, 348. The proper Arabic word for *Grāb* is *ghorāb*, adapted into Marathi and Konkani as *gurāb*. Chronological usages of the word:—

- (1) A.D. 1181—“a *ghurāb* from Tripoli” (Arabic letter of Archbishop of Pisa etc.)

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earlier. At any rate one cannot exploit Shivaji's navy, of which I am equally proud along with my fellow-countrymen, for explaining the term GĀBĪT. My evidence easily pushes back the antiquity of the term to about A. D. 1550 allowing a period of about half a century for it to be naturalised in the country of its adoption, even supposing that the term GĀBĪT was derived<sup>2</sup> from a foreign word.

To come now to the usage of the term GĀBĪT recorded in documents. In a bundle of papers kindly lent to me for reference by the Bharata Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Poona, and designated by them as

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- (2) c. 1200—"Ghurab". Cornix, Corvus, galea.
- (3) 1343—"Ghorab" (Ibn Batua iv, 59).
- (4) 1505—"Gabra"="gorāb" (Vocabulary of Pedro de Alcalá).
- (5) 1554—"Ghurābs" (Sidi'Ali Kapudan in the narrative of his fight with Portuguese).
- (6) 1610—"Gourabe" (Pyrard de Laval Hak. Soc. i. 312)
- (7) 1660—"Ghrāb" (Muhammad M'asum, in Elliot. i, 250)
- (8) 1679—"Grob" (Hedges, Diary, Hak. Soc. ii, Cl xxxiv).
- (9) 1690—"Ghorāb" (Hyde, Note on Peristol, in Synt. Dissertt. i, 97).
- (10) 1673—"Grob" (Tryer, 153).
- (11) 1727—"Grabs of war" (A. Hamitton, i, 250, ed. 1744, ii, 253).
- (12) 1750-52—"Goerabhs".
- (13) 1754—"Grab".
- (14) 1760—"Grab".
- (15) 1763—"Grab".
- (16) 1810—"Grab".
- (17) 1820—"Ghorab".
- (18) 1872—"Ghurab" (Burton, Sind Revisited).

The *Mahārāṣṭra Śabdakośa*, Vol. III, p. 1006 records under "Gurāb" the following line from the *Mahābhārata* (in Marathi verse) by the celebrated Mahārāṣṭra poet Moropant (A.D. 1729 to 1794):—

"स्वर्वाङ्गि मंडपेच्या भवसिंधुतील वा गुराबा ज्या ।" (*Udyoga* p. 13, 173).

The above usage of the word *gurāb* for purposes of poetical imagery shows the extent to which it had become naturalised in the Marathi language inspite of its Arabic origin.

2. The Marathi lexicons must record Chronological usages of the term GĀBĪT in the manner of Hobson-Jobson before an attempt is made by them to connect it with the word GRĀB and its phonetical variations. Perhaps the Portuguese records may throw some light on the derivation of the word GĀBĪT.



Salshi Daftar I find the following document in which the term GĀBĪT is used no less than three times :—

No. 27—This is a sale-deed dated *Salivahan Saka 1555, Caitra Sud Pratipadā Brasaptavār* corresponding to Thursday, 28th February 1633. It contains at the top a square seal in Persian as also three lines<sup>1</sup> in Persian covering a space 6 in × 1½ in. There is also a circular seal in the right-hand margin, in Persian characters. The document contains the names of about 15 witnesses. The parties to the document together with the witnesses had assembled at Dabhole<sup>1</sup> (Dābhole grāme) where this duly attested document was drawn up. In this document the following usages of the word GĀBĪT are recorded :—

- (1) line 3 from the top—"Mokam GĀBĪT MUMRĪ tape Sālsī".
- (2) name of a witness in the margin followed by his designation "mokādam GĀBĪT MUMRĪ".
- (3) name of witness No. 9 at the bottom recorded as follows :—"Mārte rāut bin Sekhu raut GĀBĪT MUMRĪ".

The word GĀBĪT in all the three usages given above is always coupled with the word MUMRĪ, the exact meaning of which will have

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1. My friend Prof. B. D. Verma has kindly given me the following translation of these lines though he cannot read the contents of the Seal as they are rather smeared with ink and hence illegible :—

"In the Court of the noble religious law it was recorded that on 20th Zil-quā deh *Shuhur* year Salas.....wa....., Malik Mir Husain Miranchi the former Mokasa holder of the village of Dābhole, tapā mentioned above, presented himself and said on oath and willingly and he acknowledged, as also the witnesses, about the order given below in Hindawi language".

"*Hindawi*"—This term has been used in a grant dated A.D. 1299 made by Raja Bimba to Purushottampant Kavale ("Mutābik 1221 *Hindawi*") Vide *Appendix A* in the *History of Sukla Yajurvediya Brahmins* by N. V. Vaidya, Bombay, 1884.

1. This Dābhole is identical with village *Dābhole* shown in the Map (No 47 H—Ratnagiri). It is about 2 miles from *Jamsande* and 4 miles from Devagad. About 4 miles from Dabhole we find on the Map a village called *Mithmumbri*.

to be determined. Curiously enough the expression GĀBĪT MUMRĪ current in A. D. 1633 was current in A. D. 1723 also as will be seen from the following letter of Kanhoji Angria, which uses the word GĀBĪT coupled with the word MUMRĪ only once where it signifies the name of a place GĀBĪT MUMRĪ in the vicinity of the village JAMSADE<sup>1</sup> (near Devagad). At three other places in the same letter the term

2. This *Gābīt Mumrī* near Jamsade ("गाबीत मुमरी जामसडे") appears to be connected with *Mīḥamumbri* (मीठ मुंबरी) shown on the Map at a distance of about 4 miles from Jamsade. In a document (आज्ञापत्र) kindly lent to me by Mr. Y. N. Kelkar and dated A.D. 1780 (समामीन मया व अलफ) from the Peshwa we find the following villages in order:—जामसडे, कुणकेश्वर, मीठमुंबरी, मीठबाव, इलये, दाभोले.

Rao Bahadur Bambardekar in a private communication dated 15th January 1938 writes to me that a friend of his, Mr. Kubal who belongs to *Gābīt* caste was not aware that the term *Gābīt* is as old as 1633 A.D. It appears from the old documents in the possession of Mr. Kubal that the term may have become current within the last 200 to 250 years or so. Mr. Kubal knows that a place of the name *Gābīt Mumrī* is situated near Devagad. "*Mumrī*" is the name of the village. There is a river near this village. The other bank of this river has got the locality known as "*Mīḥ Mumrī*" inhabited by people of the name "*Gāvade*" or "*Mīḥ Gāvade*". In Savantwadi State also there are people of the *Mīḥ Gāvade* name. These people manufacture salt.

I have no documentary evidence to prove the antiquity of the term "*Mīḥ Mumrī*" prior to A.D. 1780.

1. The Salshi Daftar contains more than 20 documents which are sale-deeds of properties in favour of the ancestors of the Thakurs of Jamsade. The years of these documents and the names of the ancestors of the Thakurs mentioned in them are noted below:—

A.D.

1633—Rām Thakur  
1640—Vitthal Thakur and Rām Thakur  
1645—Vitthal Thakur  
1649—Jān Thakur  
1650—Janoba Thakur  
1651—Jan Thakur  
1654—...Do...  
1656—Do...*Saudāgar*  
1656—Do Do  
1656—Jan Thakur and Ram Thakur  
1657—Ant Thakur and Jan Thakur  
1659—Narayan Thakur *Mokādam*  
1659—Jan Thakur, Narayan Thakur

A.D.

1660—Sale-deed by Rogbhat bin Gopalbhat Ranadiya (Ranade) in favour of Jan Thakur bin Ram Thakur—property of Narayan Thakur mentioned.  
1660—Jan Thakur  
1668—Vitthal Thakur bin Jan Thakur  
1669—Vithal Thakur  
1659—Jan Thakur  
1659—Do  
1670 }  
1676 } Vitthal Thakur  
1679 }  
1685—Vithoba Thakur

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GĀBĪT caste. As Kanhoji Angria's letter uses the word in two different contexts thereby distinguishing the meanings of the expression GĀBĪT MUMRĪ and the term GĀBĪT in one and the same letter I am reproducing it below from a copy<sup>1</sup> available to me:—

श्री                      तालीक  
( सीका आहे )

“ अभयेपत्र राजकार्यधुरंधर विश्वासनिधि राजमान्ये राजश्री कान्होजी आंगरे सरखेल तां सीव तां मालवणकर हाली वा गाबीतमुमरी जामसडे सुहुर सन सलास अशरीन मया व अलफ. दिव्हे अभयपत्र येसीजे. तुवा येऊन अर्ज केला कीं कमीन साहेबाचे कौलवरून जजीरे देवदुर्गीच्या आसरीयानें मानसे व होडि दोनी आणून वसाहित्य केली आहे. होडीस दर्यावर्दी नाही याकरितां साहेबी कृपाळू होऊन दर्यावर्दी आणखी आणावया कौल सादर करितील तरी आपण मालवणाहून गाबीत चौगपांचजण घेऊन येईन म्हणोन अर्ज केला त्यावरून तुजला हे अभयेपत्र सादर केले असे तरी उमेद धरून गाबीत जे येतील ते घेऊन येणें. तुझे होडीस एकसाल महसूल माफ केला असे. गाबीत आणसील त्यास जलजल ज्याजती होणार नाही. दीव्हासा भरून आणून होडी चालती होये तें करणें. अभये असे छ २५ जीलकाद ” ( मोर्तब आहे )

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There is also in this Daftar a letter of Kanoji Raje Prabhāvalikar (addressed to Narayan Thakur) with his seal and *mortab*. The writer of this paper is a direct descendant of Naro Rayaji Thakur who led the Mudāgad expedition of 1748 A.D. against Tulaji Angria (Vide *Bombay University Journal* Vol. V, Part IV pp. 31 to 54) The native village of Naro Rayaji was Hadpid about 15 miles from Jamsade. The Thakurs of Jamsade and the Thakurs of Hadpid are identical as they have the same *gotra* (Kāśyapa), same *Subcaste* (Karhada Brahmins), same *Surname* (Thakur) and same *family deity* (Mahālakṣmī). The salededs mentioned above enable us to reconstruct the genealogy of the Jamsade Thakurs for three generations (from A.D. 1633 to 1685) viz. *Ram Thakur-Jan or Janoba Thakur-Vitthal or Vithoba Thakur*. As Jan Thakur is called. "*Saudāgar*" it appears he was a merchant carrying on trade in coconuts and allied products as all the properties purchased by the Thakurs are coconut gardens. Narayan Thakur mokadam appears to belong to a cousin line separated from the line of Ram Thakur, his son and grandson very early i. e. before A.D. 1600. Naro Rayaji Thakur possibly belonged to this line.

1. Copy kindly lent to me by Mr. Y. N. Kelkar of Poona from Otavkar Daftar with him. Another letter in this Daftar dated A.D. 1758 (समान खमसेन मया व अलफ) is a कौडनामा from Naro Tryambak (Soman) Peshwa's Subbedar of Janjira Vijayadurga addressed to बाबाजी सीव तडिल सुमरकर requesting him to join service with his boats and men and assuring him freedom from molestation of any kind. After the destruction of Tulaji Angria's fleet in February 1756 by the joint expedition of the Peshwa and the English many of the sailors in the employ of the Angria had possibly run away

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In the above letter Kanhoji Angria Sarkhel assures an applicant freedom from molestation to men of the GĀBĪT caste whom the applicant intends to bring from Malvan with a view to man his two boats plying at sea under the protection of the fort of Janjira Devadurga. The applicant wanted to bring about 4/5 men of the GĀBĪT caste who were evidently experts in manning the boats. Apparently Kanhoji Angria as the Head of the Maratha navy exercised strict control over maritime shipping encouraging at the same time all legitimate efforts of seafarers. In the case of the present applicant he promises remission of the tax on his boat for one year by way of stimulus to his occupation. The expression "Hāli Vasti (वा) GĀBĪT MUMRĪ, Jamsade" may mean "now stationed at GĀBĪT MUMRĪ in the vicinity of Jamsade." This expression clarifies to a certain extent the meaning of the expression GĀBĪT MUMRĪ used three times in the sale-deed of A.D. 1633. I am inclined to hold the view that the men of the Gabit caste resided in groups at different places on the coast. The places of their residence may have been termed "GĀBĪT MUMRĪ" though the exact meaning of the word MUMRĪ I cannot make out at present.

The evidence recorded in the present paper from unpublished sources clearly proves the existence of the word GĀBĪT prior to A.D. 1633 and I await more light on the problem of the antiquity and definite origin of this term<sup>1</sup> from interested men of this caste as also from philologists and historians.

*Contd. from page 220. ]*

through fear but were apparently eager to serve their new master the Peshwa ("तुवा दशवर्दीयाचे धास्तीमुळे परागंदा होऊन मालवणास गेलास. हाली यावयास उमेद्वार आहेस"). The subheddar of the Peshwa assured the present sailor that he and his father would be re-employed in the Peshwa's fleet ("कील सादर केला असे.....निबोन येणे माणस पाहोन मरंजाम करून सेवा घेऊन चालविले जाईल"). This sailor is called मुमस्कर because he possibly was a resident of गाबीतमुमरी in the vicinity of मीरमुंबरी near जामसडे.

1. Among Mahi Kantha States (See *Bom. Gaz.* V, 427) we find a state of the name *Gābat*. The Gazetteer states that the Chief of the State is a Makvana *Koli*. The Makvanas is a special community of part foreign descent (*Bom. Gaz.* IX, pt. ii, p. 11). There are Hindu Converts from Makwana tribe of Rajputs or Kolis, Sunni in faith (ibid pp. 65-66). Vide also Vols. IX, pt. i, 130; Vol. I, pt. i, 140; Vol. VIII, p. 115. An account of Mahi Kantha Makvanas appears in *Bom. Gov. Sel.* XII, 18. From the phonetical similarity, of the Caste-name *Gābīt* with *Gābat* the name of the State mentioned above and the existence of the Koli ruler therein of the Makvana Community can we establish any historical connection between the *Gābīt* Caste of fishermen on the Coast with the Makvana Kolis in Gujrat and Kathiawar? The point needs investigation.

*[ Contd. on page 222.*

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Contd. from page 221. ]

Since this paper was written Rao Bahadur Bambardekar has drawn my attention to the heroic role played by a person of the Gābīt Caste by name Gaṇoji Tāṇḍel in saving the life of the Maratha King Shivaji the Great. The incident occurred at Bānde, a village now included within the jurisdiction of the Savantwadi State and an account of it is given in the *Chitraguṇṭha Bakhar* (pp. 123-124) published by Mr. Sane in the *Kāvyaṭihāsa Saṅgraha*.

Gaṇoji Tāṇḍel alias Gaṇbā Tārī originally belonged to the village Bande. His descendants are still living at this place. He had five sons. A temple of the goddess "Bhāvai" the family deity of Gaṇoji still exists and is situated near the temple of Bāndeshvar, the presiding deity of Bande. The original name of Ganoji's family was 'Desai' as Mr. Kubal informs us. Some land belonging to Ganoji still belongs to his line. His descendants are still called *Desais*. Ganoji's occupation was to carry passengers across a river near Bande. The way to Goa lay across this river. Anant Sheṇvi, the vakil of the Portuguese once carried 10000 troops across this river and Ganoji while he did this work of carrying the troops to the other bank of the river overheard the conversation of Anant Sheṇvi, which revealed a plot to attack Shivaji at midnight. Gaṇoji lost no time to give a report of the intended attack to Shivaji Maharaj. This timely warning of the treacherous attack put Shivaji Maharaj in an attitude of defence and he immediately made his troops take up a strategic position for attacking the enemy's troops. The enemy was vigorously attacked and completely routed as described in detail by the *Chitraguṇṭha Bakhar* referred to above. [Vide also p. 197 of the *Life of Shivaji* by Krishnaji Arjun Keluskar, 1920; pp. 121-122 of *Gomāntak Shuddhichā Itihāsa* by Shankar Dhondo Kshirsagar; pp. 9-10 of *Life of Govind Janardan Borkar alias Shri Gajanan Svami Jyotishi*]. I am not aware if the incident about Gaṇoji Tāṇḍel's heroism as described in the *Chitraguṇṭha Bakhar* (Composed in about Śaka 1681 i. e. A.D. 1759) is corroborated by any contemporary or subsequent references in the Maratha records. It would be worth while to study the whole incident in all its aspects including an examination of the claim made by Mr. Kubal on the strength of traditional and other evidence that Gaṇoji Tāṇḍel belonged to Gābīt Caste.

# THE PLASTIC REPRESENTATION OF GOD AMONGST THE PROTO-INDIANS<sup>1</sup>

BY

Rev. H. HERAS, S. J.

## INTRODUCTION

In an article contributed to the *Journal of the University of Bombay* I described the religious tenets, practices and rites of the Proto-Indian inhabitants of Mohenjo Daro, as I could gather from the inscriptions.<sup>2</sup> In this paper we shall study the different representations of God, the Supreme Lord, which have been found in the course of the excavations not only at Mohenjo Daro, but also at Harappa.

The Supreme Being is called in the inscriptions  $\bar{A}n$ , the Lord, which became the  $\bar{A}n\bar{d}avar$  and  $\bar{A}n\bar{d}ivanan$  of the Tamils and the *Tambūran* of the Malayālis, which are different names of God Śiva. An inscription says :



*Kōvil ella kaḍavuḷ adu Ān*, "the Lord of all the gods of the temple".  
How is this Supreme Lord represented ?

## I. SEATED REPRESENTATIONS OF $\bar{A}n$

The most interesting representation of  $\bar{A}n$  is on a seal which has often

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1. With this denomination I refer to the people of the Indus Valley whose civilization is known to us through the ruins of Mohenjo Daro, Harappa and Chanhū Daro.

2. Heras, *The Religion of the Mohenjo Daro People According to the Inscriptions*, *Journal of the University of Bombay*, V (Hist. Section), pp. 2-30.

3. Photo, M. D., 1928-29, No. 4741.

### *The Plastic Representation of God Amongst the Proto-Indians*

been described as the *Paśupati* of Mohenjo Daro.<sup>4</sup> (Fig. No. 1) God is represented seated on a low throne surrounded by animals, a buffalo, a rhinoceros, an elephant, a tiger and an ibex. This image or a similar one may certainly have originated the idea of the *Paśupati* at a later period, but it cannot be called the *Paśupati*. It is the representation of *Āṇ* surrounded by five, (or perhaps six, for a corner of the seal under study is broken) *totems* of Proto-Indian tribes.

The image of *Āṇ* is represented in the male form, completely nude with a prominent *ūrdhva liṅga*. His legs are not crossed as usual in images of Buddha, Mahāvira and other ascetics, but in such a way as to have the soles of the feet touching each other. Round his waist there is a zone or ribbon. Hanging from the neck he wears a huge necklace that takes a triangular shape with the point below. Eleven armlets are round his arms. Three of them, in the wrist, in the elbow and near the shoulder are larger than the rest. His hands rest upon the knees. His face looks emaciated, as it befits a yogi and apparently he is three-faced. The front nose specially is most prominent. The most remarkable feature of this image is the headgear about which says Sir John Marshall: "Covering his head is a pair of horns meeting in a tall head-dress."<sup>5</sup> What appears like horns and headgear are a trident as will be seen when studying the two following carvings.

Sir John Marshall easily recognized that this figure is "a Prototype of the historic Śiva".<sup>6</sup> Indeed, its state of nudity is still shown in some Śaivite images for instance Bhairava and in all the images of Śiva of Bengal,<sup>7</sup> which all have an *ūrdhva liṅga*. The three faces of this god correspond to the three faces of Śiva in the image usually called *Mahesamūrti*. These three faces correspond to the three functions of god as Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the world. The following inscription symbolically describes the first and the last function:



4. Marshall, *Mohenjo Daro and the Indus Civilization*, I, p. 54; Mookerji, *Hindu Civilization*, pl. V; Autran, *Mithra, Zoroastre et la Prehistoire Aryenne du Christianisme*, p. 52 (Paris, 1935); Mackay, *The Indus Civilization*, p. 70.

5. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, p. 52.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Cf. Bhattasali, *Iconography of Buddhist and Brahmanical Sculpture in the Dacca Museum*, p. 117.



Fig. No. 1.

Seal representing Ān, seated and crowned with a Trident, surrounded by the totems of some Proto-Indian tribes.

(Copyright, Archaeological Survey of India )




Fig. No. 2.

Seated image of Ān, between two devotees and two snakes.

( Copyright, Archaeological Survey of India )




Fig. No. 3.

Copper images discovered at Khafage, Sumer : In the centre nude image of Ān with trident upon his head and locks of hair hanging over his chest.

( From Frankfort-Jacobson-Preusser, *Tell Asmar and Khafage, The First Season's Work in Eshnunna*, 1930-31 ( Chicago, 1932. ) )





Fig. No. 4.

Images of Ān, Enlil and Ama discovered in Khafage, Sumer in 1936-37.  
from *Illustrated London News*.



Fig. No. 5.

Sealing showing image of Ān, with mane and trident upon his head, over a pipal tree. Next to him Ram-Fish double-formed image of Ān.

(Copyright, Archaeological Survey of India ).



Fig. No. 6.

Sealing showing from right to left:  $\bar{A}n$ , with trident on his head, over a pipal tree; the Ram-Fish double-formed image of  $\bar{A}n$ ; a colossal trident and an unidentified object.



Fig. No. 7.

$\bar{A}n$  with trident on his head, under an arch-like pipal tree.



Fig. No. 8

$\bar{A}n$  under an arch-like pipal tree.



Fig. No. 9.

$\bar{A}n$  under an arch-like pipal tree



Fig. No. 10.

Broken Torso of a standing  $\bar{A}n$  from Harappa, front views,

( Copyright, Archaeological Survey of India )



Fig. No. 11  
Broken Torso of a standing Ān from Harappa. Back views.



Fig. No. 12.  
Harappa. The Tandavan  
( Copyright, Archaeological Survey of India.)

*Tēr nād pērāl uyarel*; "the high sun of Pērāl (Perumā) of the chariot and cultivated fields". The chariot and cultivated fields are primarily symbols of war and peace and secondarily of destruction and generation. As regards the second function, the inscription itself engraved on this seal under study gives sufficient evidence. This epigraph runs thus.



*Ān nand valkei kuḍa mīn adu Ān*, i.e., "the lord of the Jar and of the Fish is the weakening and strengthening of the Lord." In this inscription God is called the Lord of the Jar and the Fish which are the two months corresponding to autumn. In cold countries as in Sind, where Mohenjo Daro is situated, the whole nature seems to lose its strength in autumn; trees lose their leaves, the mountains are covered with a mantle of snow, the limbs of our body seem to be deprived of part of their vitality; but this very weakening of the whole nature has an extraordinary effect. Nature finally recovers its strength and man feels stronger on account of that apparent loss of strength. In such a way the second function of conservation is described in this seal.

The trident placed over the head of God is not usually placed on the head of Śiva. Yet the trident is one of the symbols usually put in one, of his hands. The trident as a symbol of God was worshipped from those very ancient times<sup>9</sup> and was found erected in the fields just as at present in Southern India. For instance: <sup>10</sup>



*Kāval nād vėl*: "the trident of the fields of the Kāvals".


Apparently, the trident symbolised power. That is the reason why it is placed on the head of God. Some kings of the Ancient Dravidian

8. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M. D., No. 37.

9. Cf. Heras, *The Religion of the Mohenjo Daro People according to the Inscriptions*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.


10. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M.D., No. 301.

nations were called *vēl*, "trident".<sup>11</sup> Such kings are also found in Mohenjo Daro inscriptions and are referred to by the figure of a trident.<sup>12</sup>



*Dug vilāl vēl ire mīnan mīn ir mīn edu odu kaḷekoḍi adu*: "that is the complete month of the Ram of (during which) the two fishes of Mīna of the Mīnas had (captured) the king of the despised Bilayas".

The trident placed over the head of *Ān* at times takes very fanciful shapes, for instance in another seal<sup>13</sup> which represents *Ān* seated on a stool as in the previous case, in the same state of nudity more remarkable than in the other seal, for he wears neither waist band nor collar, only bangles on his two arms. The middle point of the trident upon his head develops into three stemmed flower, which seems to be an allusion to a very old tradition recorded in the *Pattupāṭṭu*. A chief named Nallia Kodan being afraid of his enemies prayed to Murugan (Subramanya) for help. The god appeared to him in his dream and ordered him to pluck a flower from the well and to throw it against his enemies. When he went to the well in the morning, instead of a flower, he found the very trident of Murugan and throwing it at his enemies, he destroyed them. In memory of this victory, Nallia Kodan founded the city of Vellūr (Vellore) in the place where he found Murugan's trident (*vēl*).<sup>14</sup> That this tradition has its origin as far back as the Mohenjo Daro period, the following inscription is a clear proof.<sup>15</sup>



11. Cf. for instance coronation inscriptions of Viravel, (*Travancore Archaeological Series*, I, p. 105) and of S'ivalavel (*Ibid.*, p. 106).

12. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M.D., No, 87.

13. Photo, M.D., 1930-31, Dk. No. 12050. The writer regrets not to be able to publish this and the following very interesting seals, because the Archaeological Department refuses to grant permission, since both seals are not yet published by the Department. And both were discovered eight years ago.

14. *Pattupāṭṭu*, III, 11, 172-173.

15. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M. D., No. 52.

*Vēlūr naṇḍukal alar ire paṭi vēl adu*, i.e., "That is the village trident that has the Naṇḍukal flowers of Vēlūr".

Similar to this is another representation of  $\bar{A}n$ , found on a broken seal.<sup>16</sup> God in this case is also represented in the same way, though no throne or stool is shown under him. He is nude, but wears the waist ribbon as in the first seal. He is given a very prominent pot belly, His chest is bare, but his arms are also covered with bangles. A trident of fanciful shape appears above his head. The most striking difference from the two previous representations is found in his head. It is shown in profile turned to the right. On the left a long mane (the end of which is not seen on account of the fracture of the seal) falls from the back of his head. This is a very characteristic feature which we shall see reproduced in other representations of God from Mohenjo Daro and even from outside India. In fact the original sign for  $\bar{A}n$  in the Mohenjo Daro script



is,<sup>17</sup> which afterwards became simplified as—



(On account of this simplification this sign may be easily



confused with the sign for *āl*, "man").

There is still another small seal without inscription that shows God seated on a stool in the same pose as in the previous representation.<sup>18</sup> (Fig. No. 2) The impression of this seal is rough and small details are missing. On each side of the image of God there seems to be a devotee and behind each of them a *nāga* raises its hood.

## II REPRESENTATIONS OF $\bar{A}N$ IN SUMER

Elsewhere I have shown the connections between Mohenjo Daro and Sumer.<sup>19</sup> It will therefore not be out of place to compare the above representations of  $\bar{A}n$  in Mohenjo Daro with two statues of  $\bar{A}n$  recently found in Khafage by the Expedition of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.<sup>20</sup>

The first of these two images was unearthed during the season 1930-31. It was found entangled with two other images of similar type and manufacture. (Fig. no. 3) The three images are of copper and represent men standing, nude, except for a narrow girdle, in the same way as the

16. Photo, M.D., 1930-31, No. 7997.

17. It occurs in a seal from Harappa not yet published.

18. Photo, M.D., 1929-30, No. 7991.

19. Cf. Heras, *Mohenjo Daro and Sumer, Monumenta Nipponica*, III, p. 1.

20. Khafage is a site 15 kilometers east of Baghdad.

## *The Plastic Representation of God Amongst the Proto-Indians*

Mohenjo Daro representations. The three of them have beards. Yet there are two striking differences between the main image which is 36" high and the other two which are 28" and 29". The two smaller images have their hair bobbed on the level of the nape of the neck, but the highest one has two long curled locks of hair falling down one in front of each ear down to the level of the armpit. Moreover, the two small images have a small knob-like protuberance on the top of their head as if it were a knot of hair. But the large image has a trident on his head. This trident, however, is of a very peculiar nature. It has four points, evidently, not to be seen all at the same time. The purpose of these four points seems to be that the trident should be seen not only when one faces the image, but also when the image is seen from the other sides. Thus three points, and therefore, the trident, are seen from any position.

Mr. Conrad Preusser while describing the excavations supposes that these three icons are representations of priests<sup>21</sup>. The two smaller images seem to be priests, who at least in their religious functions wore no clothing<sup>22</sup>. Yet the difference in size and attire of the other image suggests a different degree of dignity. The comparison between this image and the Mohenjo Daro representations gives us sufficient arguments to state that this is an image of the Sumerian *Ān*, very rarely represented because of its prehistoric character in the Sumerian Dynastic period<sup>23</sup>. Like the Proto-Indian representations of *Ān*, this figure is specially characterized by the trident on his head and by his long hair. The state of nudity and the girdle round the waist are also common representations.

Still another similar figure, probably more archaic, was discovered by the same expedition in the season of 1936-37 at the same spot. This image was found together with two other images of different type from the previous ones. (Fig. No. 4) They also are made of copper, with inlaid eyes, and represent two men and one woman all naked. The two men have locks of hair just like the image described above, but longer as they cover the nipples of the chest. Both wear a girdle round their waist. One of these figures representing men is several inches higher than the other two. This difference in size shows the difference in dignity. The highest image seems to be a representation of *Ān*, the shorter figure of a man seems


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21. Frankfort-Jacobson—Preusser, *Tell Asmar and Khafage, The First Season's Work in Eshnunna*, 1930-31, p. 78 (Chicago, 1932).

22. For instance, cf. Woolley, *The Development of Sumerian Art*, pl. 54a.

23. Cf. Radau, *Sumerian Hymns and Prayers to God Nin-'IB*, p. 1 (Philadelphia, 1911).

to be an icon of Enlil; the figure of a woman represents Ama.<sup>24</sup> These three great gods of Sumer have their proto-types in Mohenjo Daro. The following inscription speaks of them in general:<sup>25</sup>



*Uda mūn per kaḍavul adu kalak uir*, i. e. "the united life of the joined three great gods". Their respective names in India are Ān, Ānil and Ama.<sup>26</sup>

### III STANDING REPRESENTATIONS OF ĀN

There are several standing representations of God on the seals and amulets of Mohenjo Daro. The main one and the proto-type of all is one on a seal published by Sir John Marshall when dealing with the religion of the people of the Indus Valley. It is a square seal of a unique variety on account of the number of persons and objects represented on it. (Fig. No. 5) In the right upper corner there is the stylized representation of a pipal tree in the centre of which is a figure which is described by Marshall as the female spirit of the tree.<sup>27</sup> Elsewhere<sup>28</sup> I have exposed my views about this figure after the study of the inscription that refers to tree worship. First, the image does not represent the spirit of the tree. Second, it is not a female figure, for though no sign of the male sex is traceable, yet this is due to the fact that the figure "is very small and roughly portrayed", as Sir John Marshall himself acknowledges. On the contrary we may also state that there is no evidence of the female sex, for instance, breasts. Third, the figure is nude, wearing a number of armlets having a long and thick mane, falling behind his head which is turned to the left and showing a clear trident over his head. All these characteristics show that it is the same figure of Ān, as shown in the previously described seals. Sir John Marshall himself acknowledges the striking similarities.<sup>29</sup> Fourth, Ān

24. Cf. Radau, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.

25. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M.D.

26. Cf. Heras, *The Religion of the Mohenjo Daro people*, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-18, 30.

27. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, p. 64.

28. Cf. Heras, *Tree Worship in Mohenjo Daro*, *journal of the Bombay Anthropological Society*, Jubilee No.

29. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, p. 63.




is shown in the pipal tree not as the spirit of the tree; but as God whose fertility or creative power the tree properly symbolises.

The same figure surrounded by the branches and leaves of the pipal tree is seen in a small object without inscription; the only difference being that in this case the mane is not seen.<sup>30</sup> (Fig. No. 6)

In a clay cylinder we have also the same representation without the bangles on his arms. The pipal tree is here shown forming an arch over the head of Ān, whose trident is clearly seen.<sup>31</sup> (Fig. No. 7) Similar is the figure on a round sealing, though in this case, perhaps on account of the small size of the object, the trident is omitted.<sup>32</sup> (Fig. No. 8) Such is also the case of another small sealing.<sup>33</sup> (Fig. No. 9)

#### IV METAMORPHIC REPRESENTATIONS OF ĀN

According to the Mohenjo Daro inscriptions Ān has eight forms<sup>34</sup> which are the eight constellations of the zodiac.<sup>35</sup> Since Ān is identified with the Sun<sup>36</sup>, and the Sun passes successively through all the houses of the Zodiac, Ān seems to take all these forms successively. Therefore, in the course of the year Ān passes through a complete cycle of metamorphoses. Yet these forms were plastically represented in shrines or temples permanently, as the following inscription seems to imply :



*Adu tali per min orida et kadavul.* i. e. "That (is) the eight (formed) God, whose one side (form is the sprinkled great fish." Here the Fish is the form of God. The fact that it is sprinkled (with water or any other ritual liquor) seems to prove that it was a material image of a fish representation of Ān. Another inscription speaks of the Ram representa-

30. Photo, M.D., 1931-32, Sd. 3089.

31. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, pl. 12, No. 13.

32. *Ibid.*, No. 14.

33. *Ibid.*, No. 19.


34. *Ibid.*, III, M.D., No. 42.

35. Cf. Heras, *The Religion of the Mohenjo Daro People*, *op. cit.*, p. 8-9, Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M.D. No. 37.

36. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M.D. No. 37.

37. *Ibid.*, No. 419.

tion of God,<sup>38</sup> other images seems to have been a combination of two forms of Ān in one image.<sup>39</sup> The inscription placed on top of the large seal with Ān represented in the centre of the pipal tree also refers to a double form of Ān :



*Nila naṇḍūr ēdu mīn adu Ān val*, i. e. "Let the Lord of the Ram and the Fish of Naṇḍūr that has lands be happy". In this epigraph the Ram-Fish form of God is referred to. This double representation of God seems to have been the God of Naṇḍūr, whose temple was endowed with lands, just as the majority of South Indian temples are at present.

Fortunately, in this very seal there is a representation of this double form of God. (Fig. No. 5.) Sir John Marshall described this figure "a composite ānimal, part bull, part goat (?) with human face."<sup>41</sup> He easily realized that there was something queer in that animal, but not being able to read the inscription he could not find out the real elements of the composition. The body is the body of a colossal ram, in comparison with the kneeling human figure in front of it, with the head of a fish placed upwards. Over the mouth of this fish the two horns of the Ram are placed. Sir John Marshall was misled by one of the fins of the fish which looks like the nose of a human face.<sup>42</sup>

## V STATUES OF ĀN

All the representations of Ān described above are carved on the small seals of soap-stone, or impressed on lumps of clay. Fortunately

38. Photo, M.D., 1928-29, No. 6380.

39. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, pl. CXVI, No. 23. Cf. Heras, *The Longest Mohenjo Daro Epigraph*, *Journal of Indian History*, XVI, pp. 231-238.

40. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, pl. XII, No. 18.

41. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, p. 64.

42. The present writer has already expressed his views about Naṇḍūr which he identifies with Mohenjo Daro itself. This gives hopes that some day, this double image of God, or fragments of it, may be found under the mounds of earth that still cover an extensive area of the Mohenjo Daro ruins.

two statues representing the Supreme Being have been found at Harappa. Both the statues are the subject of some controversy, for some scholars could not imagine that such beautiful nudes could ever be produced by those early people.<sup>43</sup> But Sir John Marshall who first considered them to be Greek has finally settled the question proving that they are produced by the people of the Indus Valley.<sup>44</sup>

The first of these statues is a headless nude torso with broken legs and arms, but it is evident that the statue is the statue of a man standing in a straight and steady pose. ( Fig. Nos. 10 and 11 ) The slightly prominent abdomen, which Sir John Marshall classifies as characteristically Indian, allows us to compare this statue with the third representation of seated Āṇ described above. The beginning of the neck of the statue is uniformly cut and polished in its upper edge. This and the socket that appears in the centre of the neck show that the head could move around giving therefore an impression of life which our statues cannot emulate. Similar sockets exist in the shoulders for the attachment of the arms, which accordingly were also movable. Moreover, another characteristic feature of this statue is described by Sir John Marshall as "a large circular depression in front of each shoulder, with a smaller circular protuberance off in the middle of it". What these depressions were for is not clear, concludes Sir John. Yet at present we know that God was at times represented with two pairs of arms, just to show that he is something above man and beyond nature. The sign of the Proto-Indian script that stands for the generic name of God, *Kaḍavul*, is the pictograph of a man with four arms.<sup>45</sup>



The two circular depressions described above were made for inserting these two additional arms which also could turn round the middle protuberance or shaft. Thus this magnificent figure of Āṇ could be shown at different times in different poses, which changes would produce a tremendous impression on those early people. This is to my knowledge the only attempt at producing a living statue in the history of stone sculpture.<sup>46</sup>

43. Compare them with the statues of King Gudea of Sumner, and with some statues of the early Pharaohs of Egypt, Cf. Heras, *The Origin of the so-called Greco-Buddhist School of Art of Gandhara*, JBBRAS, XII (N.S.), pp. 90-92.

44. Cf. Marshall, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 45-46.

45. Cf. above, p. 1 of this paper.

46. After writing the above lines I have traced another sample in a statue of the Mother-Goddess of the Minoan people of Crete. The upper part of the body of the statue could turn round the waist, by means of a shaft that fits into a socket opened in the lower part of the body. Cf. Evans, *The Palace of Minos*, I, p. 504. It is worth noticing that the Minoans of Crete are an early branch of the Mediterranean family racially connected with the Proto-Indian people.

The other statue is rightly described by Sir John Marshall as the proto-type of a youthful dancing Śiva. (Fig. No 12) The twisted representation of the torso and the lifted position of the left leg, leave no doubt about it. Also in this case the head and hands were movable as the holes in the neck and arms show. Sir John says that "it was ithyphalic since the *membrum virile* was made in a separate piece". This author gives a sketch to illustrate the complete appearance of this statue which much resembles the historic statues of Natarāja.

But was Ān in any way acknowledged as a dancing God in those early days? There is a sign in the Mohenjo Daro script the deciphering of which is of great interest in this respect. The sign in question is this.




Prof. Langdon compares this sign with the Egyptian hieroglyph meaning "pass over", "go beyond".<sup>47</sup> Now, this hieroglyph



meant originally "to transgress", "to invade" (apparently both morally and physically). The word *theh* in Egyptian means: "to attack", "to transgress", "to invade".<sup>48</sup>

Now in Dravidian languages the verb *tāṇṭu* or *tāṇḍu* expresses the meaning of crossing, stepping over, skipping over, surpassing, leaping across, transgressing. Now since our sign does not show the action of passing over only, but actually the man who passes over, the word corresponding to the sign will be "he who jumps" or "dances", i.e., "the dancer", *tāṇḍavan*. Now it is well known that this is a name of Śiva who is supposed to be Natarāja, or the king of the dancers.

Unfortunately, practically all the inscriptions that have this sign are broken. The following one is the only complete epigraph.<sup>49</sup>



47. Marshall, *op. cit.*, II, p. 447.

48. Cf. Wallis Budge, *An Egyptian Hieroglyphic Dictionary*, p. 858 (London, 1920).

49. Marshall, *op. cit.*, III, M.D., No. 449.

## *The Plastic Representation of God Amongst the Proto-Indians*

*Tāṇḍavan ir nāl maram*, i.e., "The four trees in which Tāṇḍavan is", i.e., the many trees or the forest. The inscription evidently speaks of a sacred forest where the Tāṇḍavan was venerated.

### VI CONCLUSION

The ancient representations of Āṇ amongst the Proto-Indian people of Northern India clearly show that Āṇ was the proto-type of Śiva. His nudity, his three faces, his four arms, his pose, his dance, his trident— all are characteristics of the future Śiva. This is a further confirmation of the inference drawn when studying the names and characteristics of Āṇ according to the inscriptions.<sup>50</sup>

These representations of God, the Lord, show furthermore that the Proto-Indians were basically monotheists.

As regards the representations themselves, the two statues described at the end of this paper are a proof of the extraordinary development and perfection of their plastic arts.<sup>50</sup>

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50. Cf. Heras, *The Religion of the Mohenjo Daro People*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–12.

# MAHADJI SINDHIA'S LALSOT CAMPAIGN,

1787

BY

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, Kt., C. I. E. Hony. D. Litt. Hony.

M. R. A. S., Cor. Member, Royal Hist. Society

## 1 *Events that led to Mahadji's Invasion of Jaipur*

The year 1786 was one of harassing anxiety to the Maratha nation : their chief in Puna was engaged, with very inferior armaments of his own and the dubious aid of a Hyderabad contingent, in a deadly contest with Tipu Sultan at the head of a superb cavalry and a matchless artillery worked by Frenchmen. And it was only on 26th February 1787 that this war was ended by the Treaty of Gajendragarh. The Dasahara came (2nd October 1786) and went, but Mahadji Sindhia could not set out on any campaign for many months after.

He was *Wakil-i-mutlaq* or Supreme Regent of the Delhi Empire ; but the portion of that Empire which still belonged to the Padishah was yielding no revenue ; it had shrunk into the middle portion of the Ganga-Jamuna Doab and the Delhi-Agra districts. But even here much of the land had been alienated by Mirza Najaf Khan as military fiefs, and what little remained under the Crown had not yet recovered from the ravages of fifteen years of anarchy and civil war and the continuous drought of the last three years. Sindhia tried one chancellor after another, in his attempt to raise a revenue from Hindustan, but he could as soon have drawn blood out of stone. This failure, which he wrongly ascribed to the negligence or peculation of his *diwans*, almost drove him mad and he wanted to see if more money would flow from his doing the *diwan's* work himself ! Such an attempt meant in effect that he threw himself into the arms of irresponsible and incompetent lowclass officials or smooth-spoken cheats, like Naubat Rai. Old men sadly noted this infatuation of the supreme executive head of an Empire, but could do nothing to avert his ruin. By the end of 1786 the Emperor's monthly allowance of Rs. 1,30,000 was already five months overdue, and the pay of the troops had fallen still more heavily into arrears. To add to it, during his recent long halt at Vrindavan, Mahadji had lavished large sums on the temples and priests in prayers for the gift of a son and heir.

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Finally, leaving Vrindavan on 17th November 1786, he arrived on the bank of the Jamuna at Chirghat, 15 miles northwards and close to the little fort of Shergarh. About the tenth of the next month he moved to Nandgaon (15 miles south-west of Shergarh) in order to overawe the rebels of Mewat. Then, marching through parts of Mewat, he reached Pingor, eight miles north of Hodal, on 30th December, so as to be nearer to Delhi and more speedily conclude his negotiations for bringing the Emperor to his camp. This attempt failed, after two months' waiting, for lack of funds, and at last, on the last day of February 1787, he set his face southwards for Dig, where he celebrated the Spring Carnival ( *Holi* ) on 4th March and twelve days later began the Invasion of Jaipur in person.

The fact was, the Jaipur Rajah had no wish to pay anything. "Every time, after great effort and the assembling of an army against him, a little money could be collected from him." (Ghulam Ali, iii. 231. *Ibratnamah*, ii. 162.) In addition to this persistent default, Sawai Pratap Singh had sent his ex-diwan Daulat Ram Haldia to Lucknow (May 1786) to intrigue for the hiring of an English brigade against the Marathas. This agent spent eight months there, and though the new Governor-General Lord Cornwallis definitely forbade any English intervention in the quarrels of the Indian States, some local British officials (notably William Kirkpatrick) out of alarm at Sindhia's designs in the Doab, encouraged Daulat Ram's hopes of armed aid from their Government. Haldia returned to Jaipur in the middle of January 1787 and was installed as prime minister once more, while his rival Khush-hali Ram Bohra, who stood for friendly relations with the Marathas, fell out of favour and with his partisans had to flee to the camp of Sindhia for their lives. Meantime, Mahadji had proposed to the Jaipur Court a marriage between his little daughter and their young Rajah, but it was declined on the ground of disparity of caste.

With the return of Daulat Ram to power, the Jaipur Government took up a vigorous policy of resistance. A close defensive alliance was formed with the neighbouring Rajah of Jodhpur, and the Kachhwa vassals were everywhere ordered to refuse payment of the assignments of revenue made on their estates in favour of Sindhia by last year's treaty. The Rajah shut himself up in his capital and prepared to stand a siege, abandoning the idea of fighting the invaders in the open. The Tortoise ( *Kachhwa* ) drew his head into his impenetrable shell and lay in motionless security there, shutting his eyes to his realm outside which was abandoned to the invader's ravage.

Rāyāji Patil had been left behind by Mahadji Sindhia as his agent in Jaipur, with a force of 5,000 Deccani horse, when he withdrew from that

kingdom in June of the preceding year. This general at first gained some success and occupied some of the outlying parts of the Kachhwa kingdom. Then came the Rajput reaction. Towards the end of December 1786, he lost 700 men in an abortive assault on a local mud-fort. The situation became steadily worse after the Haldia's return, and at the end of February Mahadji had to send a strong force under his *Bakhshi* Jiva Dādā to support Rāyāji. Rayaji's position was rendered still weaker by the enemy's busy seduction of his faithless Mughalia contingent with promises to pay their arrears of salary which Mahadji had neglected to clear. He, therefore, wrote "daily urging his master to advance speedily to his succour."

## *2 Mahadji's Advance into Jaipur: First Stage of the Campaign*

Mahadji took prompt action. Leaving Dig on 16th March and marching daily without a halt, he reached Dāosā on the 24th. This place lies 32 miles east of Jaipur City; the advanced division of the Maratha army under Rayaji stood near Sanganer, seven miles south of that capital. Envoys from Jaipur attended Mahadji's Camp, discussing the amount of their tribute. But there was a conflict of policy in Sindhia's inner council: the ever-sober Rana Khan Bhai and the practical Rayaji Patil advised him to accept a moderate tribute by way of compromise and retire immediately from Rajputana, so as to avoid the increasing summer heat and also to overawe his numerous secret enemies by occupying a more central position like Mathura. But the Rao Rajah (of Alwar) and Khush-hali Ram Bohra appealed to his vanity by pointing out that after coming to the gates of Jaipur in person he could not, consistently with his dignity, retire with only the small tribute which had been offered to his servants before. These two selfish courtiers fed Mahadji's ambition and pride by assuring him that at his mere appearance before the gates of Jaipur that City would fall in terror of his arms and that he would be able to annex the whole Kachhwa Kingdom and thus extend his dominions without a break over the vast region from Ujjain to Delhi and from the Ganges to Ajmer. Faced by these two rival policies, Mahadji seemed to have lost for a time his keen political vision and instinctive sense of reality. "He came under unlucky stars and his eyes were clouded by sloth," as his admirer Faqir Khair-ud-din the historian explains. He cried out in exasperation at the Jaipur Rajah's persistent breach of faith, that he would "empty the Jaipur capital of its defenders and seize it, as he had done Gwalior and Gohad." (*Ibr.* iii.3. Dy. 210). On 8th April he moved with his army to Bhankri, which is only 13 miles from Jaipur, in



### *Mahadji Sindhia's Lalsot Campaign*

order to increase his pressure on the Rajah, while Rayaji advanced from Sanganer to the very gates Jaipur City.

But a settlement was rendered impossible by the stiffening of the Jaipur attitude as allies began to gather for the defence of that State. "The Jaipur Rajah offered to pay four lakhs of Rupees immediately, and demanded the surrender of Khush-hali Ram Bohra, after which he would clear the balance of the tribute. Mahadji refused to set off against his claims any amount on the score of damage to crops by his troops (*pāi-māli*) or to surrender Bohra. Hence a rupture took place." No regent of an Empire could accept such terms with honour, (Dy. i. 220 PRC. i. p. 169).

Nothing was now left for Sindhia but to throw his sword into the scale. But even for a trial of arms his relative superiority had vanished during the recent delay. Thanks to Daulat Ram's vigorous action, the Jaipur Rajah had time to assemble his feudal levies, numbering about 20,000. His ally of Jodhpur sent to him 5,000 of the wild Rathor horse and 5,000 mercenary Naga musketeers under his general Bhim Singh. Worst of all, the Jaipur diwan was meeting with success in seducing the the old Najaf Khani troops, both Mughalia horse and Hindustani trained sepoys, now under Sindhia's banner as Najaf Khan's successor. The allied Rajputs now put a bold face, on and issuing from the capital (1st May) encamped some miles south of it in order to bar any further Maratha advance. Their Rajah himself joined this camp the next day. Sindhia now judged it unsafe to remain near Jaipur, and adopted the plan of seizing the forts of the Kachhwa Rajah's vassals and annexing their lands. Recalling Rayaji Patil from Sanganer, he (on 5-7 May) fell back from Bhankri to Sawlia, 20 miles southwards and the same distance west of Lālsot. He publicly declared that in thus falling back his object was to draw the Rajputs into the open country, where he would be able to engage them with greater advantage. But the Rajputs were rightly exultant at this retreat of their enemy. All the country was up in tumult; outside the Maratha camp the roads could not be traversed in safety, their caravans of provisions began to be constantly looted.

#### *3 Desertion in Mahadji's Army: His Retreat*

By this move Sindhia had interposed himself between the main Jaipur army (now at Sanganer) and the southern districts of that kingdom. He marched through the latter region, raiding villages, levying contributions and seizing forts like Jhalai, Navai, etc., till he reached the Banas river near Sarsop, close to the Bundi frontier. Meantime his north-Indian troops continued to desert him every day, though in small numbers at first.

On 6th May two eminent captains Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Mansur Ali Khan, secretly went over to the enemy with their contingents. The climax came on the 25th of that month when the greatest Mughalia general Muhammad Beg Hamadani joined the Jaipur Rajah, to the intense terror and despair of the Maratha army. He was promised Rs. 3,000 a day and given a royal welcome by his new master who made him the leader of the defence, as his unquestionable ability and fame deserved.

Muhammad Beg's defection enforced a total change of plan on Mahadji. He could not trust a single Hindustani soldier after this. It now became a question with him how to save his life and the families of the Maratha generals who had come with him. He sent off urgent orders to Khande Rao Hãri and Ambaji Ingle to hasten to his aid from their respective stations in Bundelkhand and Karnal, also begged the Emperor to issue from Delhi and join his camp in order to lend the prestige of his name to the acts of his Regent. Then he fell back from Sarsop to Piplai, 15 miles south-east of Lãlsot, arriving there on 4th June.

As soon as the invading army began its retreat the Rajputs advanced from Sanganer, and on the 10th of that month their Rajah occupied Madhogarh, 17 miles north-west of Lãlsot. Two days later they pushed a strong detachment on to Daosa, thus blocking Sindhia's northern path of retreat, via Balahari and Dig, to Agra, and menacing the kingdom of his ally the Rao Rajah of Alwar, which was thus laid utterly bare of defence. But, for a fortnight after Muhammad Beg's defection the enemy took no vigorous offensive and merely wasted their opportunity and slender money resources in idle talk, while a quarrel broke out with their Rathor allies about the promised war expenses. Sindhia, therefore, determined to put a bold face on it. Giving up all ideas of retreat, he countermarched towards the enemy's position, arriving on the 15th at a *Bhãia-kã-Bãgh*, a few miles south of the Lãlsot pass. On the same day the Rajput force at Daosa pushed a detachment southwards to occupy Ramgarh, which is only six miles north-west of that pass.

But, though Mahadji had boldly turned at bay, he was really not in a position to risk an action. There was daily an increasing desertion from his Hindustani contingent owing to his failure to pay their salary when wheat was selling at famine prices in his camp, (six *seers* to the Rupee). His own faithful Deccani troops cherished a rooted distrust of their north-Indian comrades and ever stood on the guard against any treacherous attack from that side of the camp. Sindhia was, therefore forced to put off an action and bide his time till he should be joined by the trusty Khande

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Rao Hari (with 10,000 veterans and two disciplined battalions of De Boigne's sepoys and their excellent artillery) and Ambaji Ingle (with his 15,000 men and possibly a force of hired Sikhs). The Rajput army, in spite of the tall talk of their generals and the ignorant clamour of their rank and file, really dreaded a trial of strength with Sindhia; they had a salutary fear of his more modern and better served artillery and his fine sepoy battalions led by French Commandants like Lesteneau, Le Vassoult and De Boigne. Mahadji abandoned his first idea of surprising the immobile Rajput camp at night. He trusted to time for the speedy dissolution of the illknit Rajput confederacy; he would fight a field action when his superiority in artillery and trained musketeers would have full effect.

#### *4 Second Stage : Mahadji Assumes the Offensive*

At last, on 23rd June when the junction of Khande Rao's contingent was expected on the morrow, Mahadji assumed the offensive. The strictest precaution and order were enforced by this grey veteran chief. His plan was that his main camp should remain behind, a few miles south of Lalsot, with the baggage guard; next Mahadji himself, surrounded by 7,000 men and ten large guns, should proceed 4 or 5 miles ahead of it, with light kit, and encamp; then Rānā Khān Bhai with the main body of his army should advance 3 or 4 miles further from his master, while the vanguard, led by Rayaji Patil and Shivaji Vithal Bapu, should take post two miles in front of Rānā Khān and scout for the enemy's approach. In every advance that was made Rānā Khān took up Rayaji's position of the previous night and Mahadji similarly occupied Rānā Khān's deserted camping ground. This course was methodically followed throughout the ensuing campaign.

After thus arranging to "keep his powder dry", Mahadji turned to prayer. The eve of the momentous forward movement was spent in vigil and worship. Three hours before dawn he summoned his chosen generalissimo Rānā Khān, washed and clothed him in pure new robes, made him prostrate himself before the idols, rubbed his forehead with the ashes of the *hom* sacrifice just finished, and sent him off invested with Sindhia's own sword and shield (*Ibratnamah*. iii. 11.) In the course of the next day, Rānā Khān occupied the Lalsot pass, which the Rajputs had evacuated a few days before. On the 26th Khande Rao rode into Sindhia's camp with 3,000 Deccani horse, De Boigne's two battalions 1,300 strong, two thousand Naga monks, and some 300 foot of Rajdhar Gujar (the Rajah of Samthar). Next morning their muster was taken in Mahadji's presence

and the new arrivals sent forward to join Rānā Khān. On the 30th of the month the Khan advanced about three miles beyond the pass, encamping below the Jowana hill north-west of its mouth, probably at the modern village of Didwana. A wide plain lay between him and the fort of Rāmgarh in the north.

### 5 *The Theatre of War Described : Lālsot*

It is necessary to take a clear view of the theatre of these operations. Thirty miles south-east of the City of Jaipur stands the large village of Lālsot, near the end of a long chain of low hills and outcrops that runs north-eastwards for many miles up to the Bāngangā river (near the modern railway junction of Bāndikui) and even beyond it. The entire northern and western sides of the Lālsot district are enclosed, as if held in the tentacles of a gigantic octopus, by countless ravines which roll down to the Morel river, a feeder of the mighty Banās. The eastern side is effectively blocked by the long diagonal chain of the Jowana hill mentioned above. The south side is comparatively open, and through it runs the road to Kerāuli (42 miles east of Lālsot) and Dholpur and Bharatpur, still further off. Lālsot village itself blocks the southern mouth of a pass bearing its name, which leads by a direct but difficult path to Dāosā, 22 miles due north, where the traveller strikes the shortest and most frequented route between Jaipur and Agra. This road runs roughly parallel to the Bānganga river and has been followed by the modern railway.

Proceeding from Lālsot through the pass immediately north of it and skirting on his left the mass of hillocks known as *Lālsot-kā-Dungar*, the traveller arrives after three miles at the village of Didwānā overlooked by two isolated peaks. Then the level country begins. Turning a little to the left from Didwānā, he enters, across two narrow ravines, the wide plain of Rāmgarh, named after a village and mudfort standing four miles north-west of Didwānā.

From Rāmgarh four miles further to the north-west, the path strikes the Morel river at a very easy ford free from ravines and *nalas* opposite the village and fort of Bidākha. From Bidākha the path passes between two *nalas* for a mile, and thereafter begins an almost unbroken plain, dotted with human habitations for six miles till Tungā village is reached. This Tungā was now the base of the main Rajput army that had come out for the fight, their Rajah being encamped two miles behind at Mādhogarh. The battle of 28th July was fought in the plain between Tungā and Bidākha, some two miles south-east of the former place and therefore *fourteen miles* from the village of Lālsot after which it is wrongly named. The

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advancing Marathas had their back to the Morel river, which they guarded by their recent conquest of Bidākha fort, and their moving camp lay behind that river to the south-east near Rāmgarh. Further to the south-east the long line was held by the troops guarding Mahadji Sindhia and the light field camp, and last of all by the stationary base-camp two or three miles south of Lālsot village.

#### *6 Sindhia's Army Advances : Preliminary Skirmishes*

The forward movement of Mahadji's army began on 23rd June, but the decisive encounter did not take place till more than a month later. To this delay both sides contributed. Sindhia was waiting till he should be joined by the unaccountably slow Ambāji Ingle, and he was also expecting to see the Rajput coalition dissolve quickly. The Jaipur Rajah, on his part, repressed the ardour of his supporters for a fight, as he was waiting for the junction of helpers from Bikaner, Bundi, Khechiwara and other Rajput centres and particularly for a large body of hired Sindi musketeers who were fondly believed to prove more of a match for Mahadji's French-led sepoy battalions than the Rajput levies mostly armed with the sword and the spear. Nor was he without hopes of starving the invader out by raiding the paths of his grain supply.

Mahadji's salvation lay in the character of the Jaipur Rajah, "a man deficient both in spirit and conduct, a young man immersed in pleasure and exceedingly deficient in judgment, if not also in courage." (W. Kirkpatrick.) This prince's one policy was to avoid a decision by always putting things off for the future. In the daily skirmishes before the great battle, the fighting was done by the Rathors from Jodhpur and the troops of Hamadani. That Mughal general angrily complained to the Kachhwa Rajah, "If such be the valour of your clansmen that throwing every affair on our shoulders they would stand aloof, then do you entrust all this business to me, so that I shall see what I can do. If today (the 13th of July) the Rajputs had bravely exerted themselves, the war would have been decisively ended." Sawai Pratap Singh replied, "The war cannot be decided by skirmishing. On the day of the pitched battle you will witness the valour of the Rajputs."

On 10th July a further advance was made by Rānā Khān to three miles nearer to the enemy, i. e., towards the Morel river, while Mahadji Sindhia stepped into his general's last camp, at Didwānā. Contact was now established between the rival outposts and henceforth skirmishes took place almost daily, but these were barren of any result. As Captain Kirkpatrick reported, "The two armies, although they have somewhat

approached each other, continue to be nearly as inactive as ever. Their operations are confined to the picking up of straggling cattle, the intercooping of small supplies of provisions, and the parading of their respective picquets opposite to one another, but always at such a distance as to preclude the effusion of much blood."

On the 13th and 27th of July the fights between the patrols were of a severer character and the casualties were heavy. There was no activity in the Maratha army for four days from the 15th of that month when Mahadji's little daughter (aged  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years) was taken ill. She died in the night of the 16th, and her fond father was stricken down by grief; he told Rānā Khān, "Act as you think fit for the next two or three days, but do not ask me, as I am not in the mood to give any reply."

The mourning over, in the night of the 19th Mahadji received a written challenge from the Jaipur Rajah worded thus: "You are Regent of the Empire and a veteran in war. Come out of the shelter of your guns into the open field if you dare, and fight a pitched battle with the Rajputs, and we shall see to whom God gives the victory." (S. J. ms. 23, PRC, i. p. 207.)

Mahadji then called his generals together and told them, "If after this I make terms with the Jaipur Rajah without fighting one battle, I shall not be able to show my face in Hindustan. A man cannot live for ever. Let what will happen, happen." They objected, saying that their soldiers would not fight unless their arrears were paid, and that up to now they had fed their followers by selling their own private property and equipment. He offered Rs. 20,000, which they refused as too little; his army bill was Rupees twelve and a half lakhs a month and he was already six months in default to his troops.

On the 21st Rānā Khān pushed on to Bidākha on the Morel river' which barred his road to the Jaipur camp; his vanguard under Ambaji Ingle crossed that river and raided the villages beyond up to two miles of the enemy camp. On the arrival of Rānā Khān in full force (23rd July), the defenders of Bidākha agreed to capitulate with honour. But "when the garrison was coming out, a *pāgā* trooper laid his hand on a Rajput's wife; the Rajput slew the man, fighting began between the two sides with the loss of 30 to 40 men, and the garrison went back into their fort and renewed their opposition. Afterwards Rām Sewak (the Rāo Rajah's agent) conciliated them and evacuated the *garhi* under his protection." During the day the main Jaipur army made a half-hearted demonstration to save their brethren in Bidākha and then withdrew to their base. Next day

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there was no movement owing to rain, but Rānā Khān dismantled the mud fort of Bidākha to make the river crossing safe for the future.

Thereafter life in the Maratha camp became unbearable owing to the total stoppage of food supply and the threatened mutiny of all sections of the army in exasperation at Mahadji's failure to pay their dues. Their starved horses were unable to carry any rider. His captains assembled in a council of war cried out with one voice, "Better fight and die than perish from famine." Mahadji agreed to stake his all on one field fight and ordered five lakhs of Rupees to be paid to his soldiers (25th July) in order to hearten them for the coming battle. A second challenge was received from the Jaipur Rajah on the 26th, "If you wish to seize my kingdom and will not accept tribute, why are you delaying to fight? Come on tomorrow; I, on my part, will be ready." The entire Maratha army was informed that their master would take up the enemy's gauntlet immediately.

#### *7 Battle of Tunga, 28th July 1787 : Rival Dispositions and Movements*

An exceptionally severe skirmish on the 27th of July prepared the ground for the decisive battle of the 28th. On that eventful day, Mahadji Sindhia, after long prayers and *pūjā* at midnight, took two hours' sleep, then rose up at 4 o'clock in the morning, issued the orders of the day to all his generals, ate the holy communion (*prasād*) and at break of day mounted his horse named *Desh-pūjya* and rode forth to Rānā Khān's camp, some two miles ahead of his own halting place. The command for the ensuing battle had been entrusted to this Khan, with whom Sindhia kept constant touch by a chain of swift couriers mounted on camels. Rānā Khān marched about two miles ahead of his master with all his troops and sent his light division a mile further on. At each step that this army took to the front, Sindhia too advanced the same distance behind it, ascending successive hillocks and observing his troops through a field glass and sending forth despatch-riders with his fresh instructions. In this methodical way, giving not the least chance for a surprise by the enemy or disorder in his own ranks, the veteran went forth to seek the long looked for decision at last.

Rānā Khān forded the dry bed of the Morel at Bidākha, passed clear of the ravines that skirt the two sides for a mile after the crossing, and drew up his line in the plain beyond, a mile further off. First he spread a loose screen of scouts for bringing news of the enemy's dispositions and movements. Then came the artillery, and behind it the infantry battalions which were to receive the first shock of the enemy's onset. In the third line were

the Maratha horse, held in reserve for supporting any hard-pressed point in the front lines, and with this body stood Rānā Khān himself. The last reserve, especially in guns and munitions, was kept under Mahadji himself, two miles behind the battle front, on the further ( i. e. eastern ) bank of the Morel. The Maratha artillery, on reaching the battle ground, threw up a line of earth-works before them by digging into the sandy soil, and thus their front was protected by an entrenchment a mile or two in length. Sindhia's army stretched west to east : the first line was formed by Khande Rao Hari with De Boigne's two battalions, the Afghan mercenaries under Murtaza Khan Barech, Ghāzi Khān and other captains, and the Naga force of Motigir Gosain ( Left Wing ); then came the discontented and passive Hindustani sepoy of the old Najaf Khani service ( Centre ); and lastly the two brigades of six battalions each under the faithful Lesteneau and Le Vassault, together with the Rajput levies of the Macheri Rāo Rajah ( Right Wing ).

The Jaipurians began their advance about the same time that they saw the Maratha army moving towards them across the Morel. They too threw up earthworks before their line of guns. On their side the brunt of the battle fell on the Rathor cavalry under Bhim Singh (the *bakhshi* of Jodhpur) who had vowed in Sawāi Pratāp Singh's presence not to return alive without victory, and the Mughalia deserters under Muhammad Beg Hamadāni, these two generals respectively leading the Right and Left Wings of their army. Their Centre was formed by the Kachhwas, who idly kept themselves back exactly like Mahadji's Hindustanis facing them.

#### *8 Battle of Tunga ; First Stage : Rajput Attacks Repulsed*

After the usual light skirmishes between the rival patrols, the battle started about nine in the morning with a mutual cannonade which did more injury to the Marathas, because their guns, dragged from a more distant base and across a wide stony river-bed, were lighter pieces than those of the Rajputs whose camp was close behind. "As the Jaipur guns were larger, their balls reached Sindhia's army, and many men and horses were killed, while Sindhia's shots did not touch the enemy. The Jaipur balls were found to weigh from five to fourteen *seers*." On hearing of it, Mahadji ordered four large guns to be taken to Rānā Khān.

A little before eleven o'clock the distant cannonade ceased, as if by mutual consent. Then a tumultuous shout was heard on the enemy's right, and through the smoke screen burst four thousand Rathor horsemen at the gallop. These desperadoes, after taking a last lingering pull at their pipes of opium, drew their swords and charged the Maratha left with wild



cries of "*Hān ! Hān ! Kill them ! Kill them !*" Sindhia's batteries ploughed through their dense ranks, opening bloody lanes at each discharge. But heedless of their fallen comrades the survivors swept up to the Maratha guns, sabred the gunners and still advancing fell upon the supporting infantry. Their terrific impact broke the first line of the Maratha left wing; hundreds of Nāgās and Afghans were slain, and even De Boigne's sepoys after firing a few volleys were forced back in confusion along with their Maratha comrades. The cool Savoyard led his disordered ranks obliquely to the rear, formed the survivors again, and reopened small arm fire, but "the Rathors heeded it not."

Rānā Khān promptly sent up reinforcements of Deccani horse under Shivāji Vithal ( Bāpu ), Rāyāji Pātil and Khande Rāo Hari ( Apā ) who rallied the fugitives and renewed the combat. The bloodiest and most obstinate struggle of the day raged here. The situation at one time became so critical that the sons of Murtaza Khan Barech dismounted and fought on foot, which is the last expedient of Indian warriors when driven to bay. More guns at last came up from the rear and the Rathors were driven back, but not before they had inflicted over 300 casualties, including Ghazi Khan ( brother of Murtaza Khan ), Shambhuji Patil and one jamadar slain, and Malhar Rao Pawār, Chimnāji Khande Rao ( Bāpu's *diwan* ), the nephew of Bāpu himself and one jamadar wounded. For this the Rajputs had to pay a heavy price, suffering one thousand casualties including high officers like Shivārām Bhāndāri and Bhim Singh's brother-in-law, besides a score of lower officers slain.

### *9 Concluding Stage of the Battle*

But the greatest loss to the Rajput cause was the death of Muhammad Beg Hamadani, which broke the spine of their offensive power. This general, the most famous Muslim warrior then living in Northern India, had sent his troops on to attack the Maratha right wing while he sat on an elephant in the shade of a tree watching them from behind. A cannon ball struck the tree above and rebounding knocked him down to the ground, tearing one side of his body open. Then the branch, broken by the shot, fell down crushing him underneath. His advancing troops, unaware of his fate, shook the Maratha right wing and penetrated to their baggage, but were repulsed by the Deccani horse hurried up from the reserve by Rānā Khān.

The Rathors during the rest of the day made three or four advances as if to fall upon the Maratha guns again, but found no opportunity of carrying out their design. The Mughalias, deprived of their chief, did not

stir again. After repulsing the first two enemy attacks, Sindhia's army stood on the defensive, the Maratha portion of it quaking in fear lest at the first successful break through by the Rajputs their treacherous Hindustani comrades should join the enemy and turn their guns upon Mahadji's own men! But thanks to the successful defence by Rāyāji Pātil and others, the traitors got no chance of doing so. In fact, after the first hour's close tussle the moves of the Rajputs became spasmodic and lacked vigour, the Maratha line held firmly, their men breathed freely, their wounded were transported to the rear tents in the *palkis* which had been promptly sent up by the ever-watchful and considerate Mahadji, and their munition supply was replenished by the same alert chief. But there was no further advance on the Maratha side, partly because Hamadani's death was not known to them till after nightfall, and mainly because it began to rain in the afternoon, making that sandy plain difficult for artillery movement and the Marathas were rightly afraid of the ravines in front (so convenient for ambushes), the oncoming darkness and the lack of water in that tract. So, each side fell back to its camp and resorted to random firing till an hour after sunset in order to guard against any surprise in the darkness. And the battle of Tungā, miscalled that of Lālsot, "though sanguinary, had no decisive result." \*

#### 10 Criticism of Campaign : Mahadji's Wrong Strategy

The battle of Tungā has been universally acclaimed by the Rajputs as "an entire victory." *Tactically* it had no right to that name: the Rajputs delivered successive charges on the Maratha forces in the field and failed to dislodge them; all their attacks were repulsed, and at the end of the day each side returned to its camp in the rear, as was then the usual practice. The day after the battle the Maratha army reappeared on the same field and advanced up to gunshot of the Jaipur camp, but none on the opposite side ventured to stir out. That is not the conduct of a victorious army. Their Rajah even begged for a two days' truce for burying and burning his dead. Nor could the Rajputs boast of having taken a single Maratha gun, and their own casualty list was much heavier than that of the Marathas.

And yet it was not a victory for Sindhia either. He had failed to crush the enemy in the field, or to rout them out of their camp. He had not captured any enemy gun. Therefore, his offensive must be adjudged

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\* De Boigne: "Cette action sanglante qui n'eut aucun resultat." (*Memoire*, p.68.) "Although the battle was obstinate, it was by no means decisive." (Kirkpatrick in PRC. i. p. 232.)

### *Mahadji Sindhia's Lalsot Campaign*

a failure. True, when four days after the battle he was forced to beat a hurried but marvellously well-conducted and safe retreat, it was not due to the threats of the enemy, but to treachery and dissension in his own ranks and the utter failure of his provisions. Not a single Rajput soldier barred his retreat or appeared near enough to exchange blows with his rear guard. The Maratha despatch-writers and Mahadji himself boasted that *in the field* his army had been victorious. That they had in one sense been; but the impartial historian must say that, as at Sheriffmuir, so here too "none won."

Considered in its *strategy*, the Lālsot campaign as a whole was a failure for Mahadji; and the failure was due to his lack of a single clear objective steadily pursued, and his blunder in concentrating every available soldier for the field fight which left his line of communication with Kerāuli fatally unprotected and made it impossible for him to spare an adequate escort for the vitally necessary grain convoys. He was, indeed starved out of Rajputana.

For this failure he alone was to blame. He had begun the invasion of Jaipur in the confident expectation that time was on his side and that the Rajput confederacy would automatically break up if he kept facing it long enough. But such a waiting game presupposed that during that interval of inaction the food supply of his own camp would be assured and his communications with his base near Agra kept open. He had no doubt of the result in an actual clash of arms with the raw feudal levies opposed to him; but how was he to meet his incomparably larger army bill and keep up his munition supply in that far off and backward country? On this point he made a miscalculation, and he paid the price of his mistake by one full year of loss of power and fame. Indeed, his clearness of vision, unfailing sense of reality, and practical skill seem to have deserted him from the commencement of May 1787; otherwise how could such an old leader forget that "a modern army marches on its stomach"?

# FEROZ SHAH'S FISCAL REGULATIONS

BY

PROF. SRI RAM SHARMA

Our information about the pre-Mughal administrative system in India is admittedly very meagre. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that there are still many dark corners therein where it is difficult for us to gain very much even if we take a good peep thereat. The information about the numerous aspects of the administrative machinery lies scattered about in the various chronicles which give us tantalizingly few hints about the methods of administration as a whole.

One subject, however, receives more than its due attention from time to time. The fiscal regulations of various kings and rulers are described at some length either when changes are introduced or when a judgment is passed on the work of a ruler. The question of interpreting the various passages describing fiscal arrangements, however, presents many difficulties mostly because we do not know much about the background of many of these regulations. It is intended here to discuss only a part of this large question, the Fiscal Regulations of Feroz Shah's reign.

To understand what Feroz Shah did we have to go back a little. The traditional fiscal methods were rudely changed by Ala-ud-Din Khilji. It is not however very easy to understand what actually Ala-ud-Din did. At one place we are told that he introduced the system of measurement, that he demanded one half of the produce as the share of the state, and that in addition to the land revenue, he imposed a grazing tax as well<sup>1</sup>. Elsewhere, however we are told that the Hindus (peasants?) were so squeezed that they were not left with more than their yearly subsistence. It is wrong to hold, as Moreland does, that these latter measures concerned the Hindus of the upper classes alone. Ala-ud-Din is manifestly describing in this passage the measures that he took for the purpose of subduing the Hindus in general. Are we right in holding then that the payment of the land revenue at the rate of one half of the produce, plus an unspecified grazing fee along with the customary payment of the *jazya*,

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1. Barni, 287 & 292

left not more than their bare subsistence with the Hindus? But exactly what did this subsistence consist in? The passage of Barni leads one to suggest that they were not allowed to store corn, milk, and other things. But how did measurement help in the assessment of land revenue? Our records are silent again. Was a schedule of demands per *bigha* for every crop adopted? If so, how was it prepared? Was land revenue collected in cash or kind? When land revenue was paid in cash, how was it calculated? Were local prices or the standard prices used for this conversion? Ala-ud-Din discontinued the payment of salaries by jagirs. How was the cash necessary for the payment of salaries in cash obtained? These are some of the questions on which one would like some information.

The next stage in the story of the revenue organization comes in the reign of Ghias-ud-Din Tughlaq. Again the only definite thing that we know about him is that giving up the use of measurement as an aid in the assessment of land revenue, he reverted to the method of sharing the produce of the crop. There is not much difference between what he aimed at and what Ala-ud-Din had tried to attain. The Hindu (peasant) was neither to enjoy affluence enough to become refractory, nor was he ground down to the dead level of poverty which should make impossible for him to pursue his hereditary calling, cultivation. The headmen seemed to have been paid by holding rent free lands in the villages.<sup>2</sup>

When we pass on to the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq, we get either too vague or too unintelligible information. He is said to have increased the land revenue tenfold. As such it would have been several times the produce of the land instead of being a share thereof. No peasantry would have stood it, least of all the Indian peasantry which knew that the state depended on its income from the lands they cultivated.

We may assume then that Feroze Shah Tughlaq inherited the system of Ghias-ud-Din as modified by the practices of Muhammad Tughlaq. He seems to have ignored the fantastic experimentation of his predecessor's reign. Barni uses almost the same language in describing his system as he had used earlier for the reign of Ghais-ud-Din Tughlaq. We are told<sup>3</sup>, *Kharāj-o-jazīyah bar hukm hāsīl shud ki bisitanand qismat-o-ziyadat talabiha wa nabudaha wa mutadaha-i-tasavvuri bakulli az miyāni ria-aya bardashtand*. This is almost a paraphrase of what had been said earlier in the reign of Ghias-ud-Din. We have there<sup>4</sup>, *Khiraj-i-*

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2. *Ibid* 429

3. *Ibid* 574

4. *Ibid* 429

*balad-o-mumalik bar jādah-i-madalat bar hukm-i-hasil tā'aiun farmud wa muhaddisat wa qismat-i-būd-o-nabudaha ra az ri-aya-i-balad-o-mumalik bardashtand.* Both the systems described here represent 'Batai,' Ghias-ud-Din is said to have relieved the cultivators from innovations (Ala-ud-Din's use of measurement?) and division based on averages taking into consideration bumper crops and crop failures. Feroze Shah is described as having relieved the peasants entirely from sharing, increments in demands, crop failures, and figures based on surmises. Barni further adds that an additional cess on land revenue was remitted<sup>5</sup>. Afif describes the settlement of land revenue in Delhi as being settled on the principle of the rule of observation, and credits the king with the remission of some customary cesses like, *Rasum-i-guzashtagan wa qanun-i-pishinian* besides the remission of the advances made to the peasants by his predecessor<sup>6</sup>. We are further told that the revenue of the kingdom was settled at 6,85,00,000 tankas and that this was not varied during the forty years of Feroze Shah's reign.

We have thus three statements about Feroz Shah's land revenue system. It was based on the principle of '*Hukm Hasil*' according to Barni and *Hukm Mushahda* according to Afif. The total revenue was fixed in cash for the Doab as well as the entire kingdom and it remained the same throughout his entire reign. *Hukm-i-Hasil* and *Hukm-i-Mushahda* are two terms used by two authors. Do they imply the same thing? *Hukm-i-Hasil* undoubtedly means the principle of sharing the produce. *Hukm-i-Mushahda* would be the principle of observation. Moreland has suggested that *Hukm-i-Mushahda* might be appraisal or *kankut*. It would then be one of the methods in use when *Batai* is practised. The state, it seemed, claimed its share of land revenue, not by claiming a share of the harvest when it had been cut and garnered. It based its demand on an estimate of the total yield arrived at while the crops were still standing.

Now the '*Kankut*' enables the state to claim a share in kind of the crops cultivated. The money value of the revenue so collected would vary with the crops sown and the area under cultivation. It may be presumed that ordinarily the Indian cultivators, mostly practising subsistence farming, would go on cultivating the same crops and that the cropped area each season would not vary very much. Ordinarily

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5. *Ibid* 574

6. *Aff* 91 & 94

7. *Ibid* 296, 94

### *Feroz Shah's Fiscal Regulations*

such a presumption may be safely made. But Feroz Shah's reign came after the stormy days of Muhammad Tughlaq when the cultivators had been so much harassed & troubled & when a good deal of the land had gone out of cultivation as well. We are assured elsewhere by Afif that as a result of Feroz Shah's beneficent reign, new villages came to be established and more land was brought under cultivation. What happened to these lands? Was any land revenue charged thereon? Of course the settlement of the land revenue took six years. Naturally the lands brought under cultivation during these six years might have been included in the estimate of the total revenue of the land. But the problem of an unvarying land-revenue in cash still remains unsolved. Even the same crops on a constant cropped area would not always produce the same cash value unless the prices remained constant. Are we to assume then that during the entire reign of Feroz Shah prices remained the same? That would be a very tall order particularly when we remember that Ala-ud-Din had to set up an elaborate economic organization of his own to secure that the commodity prices fixed were not interfered with. If the level of prices was apt to remain the same during the medieval period, we would not have found Ala-ud-Din taking much elaborate precautions for securing the success of his price fixing machinery. They reveal that he had the fear of changing prices constantly in his mind.

But without any machinery of such a type it was impossible for Feroz Shah to secure the sameness of prices throughout his entire reign. If that is so, the statement of Afif about a never changing total of land revenue in cash in the Doab and also the entire kingdom must assume another meaning. Is it possible that despite Barni's statement about *Batai* being the method of land revenue in use, some other method of land revenue may have been adopted by Feroz Shah? Such a method would be the usual Islamic mode of levying the land revenue in cash on a particular area. We know that Feroz Shah was a very strict follower of the Islamic regulations even in matters of raising taxes. Several unauthorised taxes were abolished by him. He levied the irrigation dues only when he had been assured by the 'Learned in Law' that these could be lawfully levied. Is it possible that he settled the land revenue to be paid to him in cash following Islamic injunctions? Now any such method could well have been described by Afif as '*Hukm-i-Mushahda*', levying of the land revenue after a scrutiny on the spot. Nothing that he says elsewhere on the subject contradicts this interpretation. It would make better sense of the statement made by him with pride that during the rest of Feroz Shah's reign the revenue was neither revised nor raised.

Are we then to assume that Feroz Shah settled the land revenue permanently in cash? We have yet to tackle Barni's statement that Feroz Shah introduced the principle of sharing the crops and abolished demands based on imaginary surmises (*mutadha-i-tasavvuri*) crop failures, (varying of demands due to crop failures). He could not, by his orders, secure that there should be no crop failures, increments and classifications. Now all these things would hold true of Feroz Shah's land revenue system as we have tried to interpret it above. All these things can with equal justice be said of the *bilmuqta* system of land revenue usually favoured by the Muslim jurists. No, with more justice. Moreland in his notes on the translation of this passage interprets *mutadha-i-tasavvuri wa nabudaha wa qismat* as additional cesses abolished by Feroz Shah. It is surprising to find him varying the essential meaning of avowdly technical terms within two reigns and in the work of the same author. When some of these terms occur in the passage above cited about Ghias-ud-Din's reign, Moreland translates them as methods of assessment or considerations taken into account when assessment was made. Herein while translating the same terms, when employed with regard to Feroz Shah Tughlaq's reign, he considers them as cesses. Now there is nothing to suggest that during the course of the one intervening reign the meanings of these terms had changed. There is nothing else cited by Moreland nor anything that could have been cited to support this view. We are reluctantly compelled to give up Moreland's fanciful translation of the second passage and adopt the plain meaning of these terms as he had himself done it in the earlier passage. It would not be necessary to do violence to the text of Barni in order to arrive at a true meaning of the passage cited.

But if the rest of the passage in Barni is capable of supporting the thesis that Feroz Shah settled the land revenue on cash rates, the main description of the system as *Hukm-i-Hasil* still remains. I think it is either a mistake of the chronicler or he describes the system which Feroz Shah tried to introduce at first but gave up in favour of settling land revenue after a careful scrutiny '*Hukm-i-Mushahda*'. I do not think that it is necessary to bind ourselves to Barni when we find Afif plainly implying something else.

But one question still remains unanswerable. Who paid the land revenue so fixed to the king? Not the peasants. There is little to support the view that the Tughlaqs dealt with the peasants directly. The country, we are told, was apportioned among various types of state servants. The administrators, the soldiers, and the pious and the learned realised their salaries from the portions assigned to them by the king. Afif goes to



the length of saying that all the villages and *Parganahs* were given in assignments by the king.<sup>8</sup> Moreland has tried to cast some doubts on this statement by suggesting that the king must have had some revenue for himself which presumably, Moreland implies, could come from the crown lands. It is necessary to remember that the king had several other sources of revenue open to all. The *Jazya*, the irrigation dues, the export or import duties, and the tributes from the chiefs must have brought in a large amount of money. The chiefs were the local rulers who had not been dispossessed but were allowed to continue in their districts on the stipulation that they paid a fixed tribute – not revenue as Moreland has suggested – to the king. These tributes must have formed a fruitful source of revenue. But the distribution of the districts under the direct control of the crown to assignees of various types does not exclude the idea of the king's getting revenue from them. We know that several assignees were given areas which sufficed not only from their own maintenance as also of their soldiers and servants, but left a good deal of surplus. This they had to remit to the king. It seems likely that when the administrative officers in charge of the *Parganahs* or bigger units (*Iqiahs*) were given land they stipulated to pay to the king a *fixed* amount as the surplus from their districts. We find them remitting this surplus every year to the king who gave orders that the value of their presents should be considered part payment of their annual dues.<sup>9</sup>

How was the surplus arrived at? We learn that the grants were not changed during the forty years of Feroz Shah's reign.<sup>10</sup> We know further that Feroz did everything to make these grants hereditary. On the death of an assignee, his assignment went to his son, in the absence of a son to his son-in-law, if a son-in-law was not forthcoming, the late assignee's slaves claimed it and if everything else failed the widow of the assignee was allowed to have it.<sup>11</sup> It would thus become feudal in nature. But was this a general order or did it concern the individual soldiers only who had got grants for their subsistence? It is likely that these orders concerned only those public servants – civil and military – whose work was neither specialised nor of a highly technical nature. It is true we find a son succeed his father even as a Finance Minister but it is likely this was an exceptional case. Ordinarily only individual soldiers

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8. *Aff*, 95, 270 & 297.

9. *Ibid.* 268 & 269.

10. *Ibid.*, 94.

11. *Ibid.*, 97.

and state servants of similar status would have been allowed to their jagirs descend from them to their descendants. In such jagirs probably there was no surplus to be accounted for. The assignment just covered the salary due.

But surplus arose in connection with assignments where administrative work was to be performed. There the charge under a *shiqdor* or *Muqtai* was an administrative unit which was also held by him in jagir. He performed the administrative duties, drew his own salary, and that of his staff and dependants from his charge and was expected to pay to the state the surplus. It is possible that a scale of cash salaries may have been current at that time and that the surplus to be paid was the difference between the total revenue of an administrative unit and the cash salaries assigned to the officer-in-charge including his dependants. He would undertake to pay to the state this difference. Now this was not farming in the strict sense of the term. The payments to be made by the officers do not seem to have depended on any competition between various officers competing for the same charge. Yet as the jagirdar was also the administrative officer-in-charge of the area, he must have been left very much to his own devices for collecting the land revenue. He submitted an account to the central government. But this must have been a simple affair showing on the credit side the total revenue due as settled by the state and on the debit side the salaries due to the officer. It is not likely that the audit by the central government ordinarily went into such intricate questions of details as the actual revenue collected by the jagirdars. Of course, scandalous exactions ruining peasants and thus endangering the payments of the surplus due to the state would naturally attract the attention of the central government and so would any interference with the grants made to the servants and the soldiers of an administrator.

The actual collection, however, does not seem to have been made by the assignees even. They depended on 'Collectors' probably the forerunner of the village *numberdars*, who were allowed two *Jitaly* per *Tanka* of their collections.<sup>12</sup> Whether this was an additional cess as now, or was allowed out of the sums dues, as under Akbar, is uncertain.

Naturally then the problem changes its form. If the peasant paid the revenue to the assignee who was not ordinarily accountable for what he received to the state, the question of how the state assessed the land revenue becomes less important. That it retains some importance under Feroz Shah is due to the fact that under Ala-ud-Din, Ghias-ud-Din, and

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12. *Ibid*, 99.

Mohammad Tughlaq very bold experiments had been made for the purpose of impoverishing the cultivators. The principles underlying the assessment of the land revenue during these reigns were political rather than fiscal. Under Feroz Shah, fortunately, political considerations seem to have been thrown into the background and revenue was settled on fiscal considerations alone. The state seems to have assessed the entire countryside in a preliminary survey that is said to have taken six years. The revenue seems to have been assessed now in cash permanently probably either by a system of averages or by some rule of the thumb or by mutual understanding. As it was intended to use the new settlement for getting the countryside repopled, and as this seems to have been effected, it is reasonable to suppose that the assessment made by the state was observed by the assignees who were in many cases both the assignees of the revenue and the administrators of the areas. The entire territory was given to the assignees of various types. But an assignment did not always absolve the assignee from the payment of the surplus. The state thus paid for most of its establishment in this way sparing itself both the trouble of collecting the land revenue and of making arrangements for the payment of its servants. It, however, paid certain officers salaries in cash: witness the slaves some of whom were thus paid salaries ranging from 20 to 100 *Tankas*.<sup>13</sup> Several other officers also seem to have been paid cash salaries. Money for these payments, as well as for the personal expenses of the king, had to be forthcoming. This seems to have been provided for by the surplus of revenue over the salary assignments of the administrators in charge of *parganahs*, besides the *jazya*, the tributes to the king, import and export duties and octroi. The chronicles, do not seem to mention any crown lands. If the king kept any territory for himself, it must have been very inconsiderable in extent, mostly consisting of pleasure gardens, vegetable and fruit gardens.

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 270.

# THE EARLIEST PERSIAN ACCOUNT OF PANIPAT,

1761.

BY

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR, Kt., C.I.E., D.Litt.

## *Introduction*

Only eight months after the last battle of Panipat had been fought, Ali Muhammad Khan (original name Mirza Muhammad Hasan), the last Padishahi Diwan of Gujrat, completed his monumental history of that province entitled *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*. At the very end of this work he gives an account of Sadashiv Rao Bhau's Hindustan campaign, which was evidently based upon the reports brought to Gujrat by soldiers and officers of Damaji Rao Gaikwad's force who had survived that fatal field. Much of this account is inaccurate, its source being camp gossip and not official despatches or news-letters, but at the same time it contains some accurate details and deserves translation as the earliest written narrative of that historic battle. A comparison with Kashi Rao's Persian narrative (written in 1780), which I have already translated in the *Indian Historical Quarterly* (Calcutta), will enable the reader to correct Ali Muhammad's errors, particularly the decisive part falsely ascribed to Shuja-ud-daulah.

—Jadunath Sarkar.

## *Translation*

[ Vol. II, P. 590 ]

On the 10th October 1760, Sadashiv Bhau seated prince Jawan Bakht on the throne at Delhi as Heir (*wali-ahad*) on behalf of his father and struck coins in the name of Shah Alam II as Emperor. He, from the way, sent Malhar Holkar and Jankoji Sindhia ahead with a strong force as his advanced division, and himself followed them with the artillery and the camp bazar. Abdus Samad Khan (*faujdar* of Sarhind) on hearing of it, hastened towards Kunjpura,—which was a strong place belonging to Najib-ud-daulah,—where his brother Nejabat Khan was staying with his troops and artillery.

Malhar and Jankoji arrived by rapid marches. Nejabat came out of his fort and joined Abdus Samad and gave battle. Malhar reported this

to Sadashiv who then came up by forced marching. ( p. 591 ) Abdus Samad, finding himself heavily outnumbered by the Deccanis, decided to retreat, shut himself up in the fort of Kunjpura, and wait there for the arrival of the Shah's army. The Marathas, seeing their enemy shaken, fell on them at the gallop, and the Muslims had no time to shut the gates. After a struggle in which many were slain, Abdus Samad, Qutb Khan, Nejabat Khan with his sons and 17 of his officers, were captured alive. Nejabat Khan unable to bear the disgrace of captivity, killed himself. Abdus Samad and Qutb were slain by order of Sadashiv. All Kunjpura was looted; about 20 elephants and 3000 horses were taken [ by the Maratha government ] besides what the Deccani looters had carried off. It is rumoured that the Marathas seized here nearly one *krone* of Rupees worth of booty besides the artillery, munitions and fort materials.

On 24th October, the Shah and Najib-ud-daulah ( advancing from Patparganj, opposite Delhi ), forded the Jamuna river between Bagpat and Khekra [ which is seven miles south-east of the new town of Bagpat, the latter being one mile north of old Bagpat ], after overcoming many difficulties, in the courses of which large numbers were drowned, so that the corpses of nearly 150 men and many animals were washed ashore at the ferry of Rajghat in Delhi, and so also at other ferries. The Shah, after fording the Jamuna, left Sonapat at his back and encamped at Sambhalka, seven *kos* from the bank of the Jamuna, in readiness for fighting, and entrenched.

[ P. 592 ]

Sadashiv Bhau on hearing of the Shah's crossing, marched out of Kunjpura, left Panipat behind him and halted opposite the Shah, six or seven *kos* from him, digging trenches round his camp and chaining his artillery together. On 2nd November [ the first ] skirmish took place and some men were slain. Shuja-ud-daulah tried to arrange a peace as he feared the after-consequences of war; he made Malhar his intermediary, but Sadashiv in his arrogance refused to make terms, especially as his pride had increased inordinately after the capture of Kunjpura. He posted a force on the further side of Jamuna by closing the path of the coming of grain, fodder and powder and shot from Najib-ud-daulah's territory to the Shah's army, and another force [ on the western side of the Jamuna ] to close the road from Delhi. [ P. 593 ] After all his troops, artillery and camp had crossed over and joined him, the Shah marched from Sambhalka and encamped two *kos* from the bank of the Jamuna.

Great scarcity reigned in the Shah's camp,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  seers of flour selling for a rupee. Just then he heard that the *vanjaras* were bringing a large caravan of grain for the Maratha army from the Bahadurgarh side.

The Shah detached a force against them. This force fought and brought away nearly 20,000 oxen [laden with grain]. The son of Najib-ud-daulah with a strong escort convoyed from the Saharanpur *zila* much grain [to the Durrani camp], so that scarcity was turned into plenty there.

On 28th November a great battle was fought in which the Shah's troops were victorious. On 4th December the Deccanis came out in full force and the battle raged till one quarter of the night was over. In addition to the wounded, as many as 5374 corpses of Muslims and Kafirs were taken out of the battle-field. Not a tent remained in which lament for the dead or the groans of the wounded were not heard. For some days after this the Deccanis had no heart to come out and fight, but contented themselves with firing their numerous and heavy guns on the defensive.

Then the Shah learnt that at the Bhau's writing, Naro Shankar had sent from Delhi 2,000 newly enlisted horsemen with a Maratha force, under Chimnaji Pandit, to take control of the Doab and stop the coming of grain from that region, and that this body was stopping at Sarai Lal Khan, two *kos* from Ghazi-ud-din-nagar; and also that Govind Pandit [Kher] the *mokasadar* of Chakla Etawa and other mahals of that district, with 10,000 horsemen, old and newly recruited, had arrived near Mirat and wanted to close the path of provisions from the dominions of Najib-ud-daulah. [P. 594] Therefore, the Shah sent off Jahan Khan with 5,000 cavalry against him. He first fell on Chimnaji, who was in the way. Chimnaji fled back to Delhi with the greatest difficulty. Jahan Khan immediately afterwards attacked Govind, who had alighted a short distance off. Govind was slain with many of his men and his troops were plundered. Jahan Khan returned in safety with Govind's severed head, which Najib-ud-daulah sent to Malhar, in reprisal for the slaughter of his sardars at Kunjpura.

During this static condition between the two armies, the Shah appointed a force to close the road for the coming of supplies from Delhi to the Maratha camp. Immediately a severe famine broke out there. Heavy rain fell that winter; animals beyond count died through want of fodder and grain. A survivor of the battle has told me that nearly 60,000 horses besides other beasts, and men without number, perished. The Shah's detach-

*The Earliest Persian Account of Panipat, 1761*

ment arrived near Narela, 12 *kos* [north] from Delhi. Naro Shankar closed the gates of the capital and posted 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot to guard the trenches before the city walls.

[ P. 595 ]

In the night of 13th January 1761, the Maratha sardars who had reached the extreme point of famine, came to Sadashiv Bhau and reported that the condition of their horses and men was hopeless through starvation. He took counsel with them all night. They decided to march to Delhi with all their force, dragging what guns they could by means of the bullocks of the grocers and other shopkeepers, as the artillery oxen had perished. Next morning the Shah on seeing this, prepared for battle. The battle was bloody and fought at close quarters.....

[ P. 596 ]

A disastrous defeat was about to fall on the Shah's army when Shuja-ud-daulah in concert with Najib, charged the waist of the Deccan army and slew most of the sardars on that side. [*Utterly untrue statement. J. S.*] Viswas Rao, when seated on an elephant, was killed by a musket bullet. On hearing of it the Bhau got down from his own elephant, took a horse, and with Jankoji came to the battle-field in order to supervise the fight (*khavar-giri*). When the Maratha army saw this [i. e. the empty *hauda* of the Bhau], they at once broke up in confusion. The Muslims gave chase and mixed up pellmell with the fugitives.

[ P. 597 ]

There was a heavy slaughter. The Deccanis fled away in terror, throwing away their ornaments and clothing. Trustworthy people have told me that for 12 *kos* from the battle field the ground was covered with corpses. Immense booty [P. 598] was taken by the Muslim army. Nearly 700 elephants, 25,000 horses and a similar number of bullocks camels etc, laden with property – were seized by the Shah's Government, in addition to what Shuja and Najib took. About 20,000 persons were taken prisoners; with 12,000 women in good position among whom 700 travelled in *palkis*. The survival or death of Sadashiv Bhau and Jankoji Sindhia has not been ascertained up to now, when at the time of writing this narrative, eight months have elapsed since the battle. Three thousand fugitives reached Delhi the day after the battle. The ruffians of the city robbed them. Naro Shankar fled away to Agra.

# THE RĀṢṬRAPĀLA NĀṬAKA OF AŚVAGHOṢA

BY

DR. P. C. Bagchi, M. A., Dr-é's lettres (Paris)

The name of Aśvaghōṣa stands very high in the history of Sanskrit literature. Those who have read his *Buddhacharita* know that the language in which he writes is not what is generally called Buddhist Sanskrit, a language mixed up with dialectal forms but a purer form of language which is in no way different from classical Sanskrit. Besides he is endowed with a high order of poetical genius and as a poet and dramatist is in no way inferior to Kālidāsa.

The dramas of Aśvaghōṣa were long forgotten till at last fragments of one of his great works were discovered from Central Asia by the members of the German Archaeological Mission. These fragments were edited and published by Prof. Luders and the name of the drama was correctly restored as Śāriputra-prakarana. Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhattacharya in a recent article called — *A New Drama of Aśvaghōṣa* (*The Journal of the Greater India Society*, V, p. 51) has collected two references to a new drama of Aśvaghōṣa, the Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka. The first allusion to it is made in the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti which was composed in the 6th century A. D. It is asked there, "Who is Bhādanta Aśvaghōṣa?" The reply is, "He who wrote the Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭak". "What is that Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka?" Then follows a short information on the beginning of that drama. The Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka was evidently existing in the time of Dharmakīrti. The second reference is made in a treatise of logic composed after 900 A. D. It is the Nyāyamanjarī-granthibhanga in which the work is referred to as Rājyapāla-nāṭaka. As even the exact title of the work was not known to the author, the work seems to have been already lost.

Prof. Bhattacharya is naturally of opinion that the subject matter of the work was taken by Aśvaghōṣa from the Ratthapāla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. We have fortunately not only earlier references to the work in the Chinese Tripiṭak but also a detailed account of the plot of the work. These references were studied at length by the late Prof. Sylvain Lévi in his article—*Encore Aśvaghōṣa* (*Journal Asiatique*, 1928, p. 193). As the article is of a fundamental importance for the problems bearing on the history of Aśvaghōṣa it is surprising how it escaped the notice of



Prof. Bhattacharya. The detailed notice on the Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka is contained in the *Fu fa tsang yin yuan chuan* (Nanjio 1340, Bagchi, *Le canon Bouddhique en Chine* I, p. 245). The work was translated into Chinese from an Indian original by Ki-kia-ye (Kekaya ?), who was most probably a monk of Central Asia in 472 A. D. The Chinese title of the work may be translated as "A record on the nidāna or cause of transmitting the Dharmapitaka—a history of Indian patriarchs". The work might be of earlier origin. It contains the following account of Aśvaghoṣa and his Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka.

"In the city of Pāṭaliputra, Aśvaghoṣa had been going here and there to preach his religion and to convert others to it. Inspired by the desire to save the residents of that City he composed a beautiful piece of song called, *Lai ch'a ho lo* (Rāṣṭrapāla). Its tune was pure and elegant, and beauty and sadness were perfectly harmonised in it. It dealt with sorrow, vacuity, the essence of impersonality (*dukkha*, *śūnyatā*, *anātmā*) that is to say all that which constitute the illusory world. The three worlds or the dhātus are the prisons for imprisoning the people and it is impossible to be happy in any of these places. The position of a king is only apparently high. Although he is powerful and free to do whatever he likes, his position is after all impermanent. On the fateful occasion nothing can save it. It is like the cloud in the sky which disappears and is dissolved in an instant. The body is empty and vain like the plantain tree. It is the enemy, the thief and it is not possible to convert it into a friend. It is like the cage of venomous serpent. It is not possible either to love it or to get pleased with it. This is why the Buddhas always spoke ill of the body. It is thus that Aśvaghoṣa spoke at length of *dukkha*, *śūnyatā* and *anātmā*. He gave this piece of song to the artists who were to execute it but the artists were incapable of understanding its spirit. The airs of the songs, and the sounds of the instruments were all falsified and incorrectly executed. So Aśvaghoṣa put on the dress of a layman and got into the assembly of the artists. He himself played on the cymbals and the drum and took upon himself the lute and guitar. Then the sounds of the instruments became elegantly melancholic and the airs of the songs became perfect. The performance gave expression to *dukkha*, *śūnyatā*, *anātmā* and *dharma*. At that time there were five hundred Kṣatriya princes in the City who understood the spirit of the song. They at once imbibed an aversion to the five desires, gave up the world and took religion. But the king of Pāṭaliputra was afraid that his people on hearing this song would renounce the world, that his kingdom would be empty and the functions of the king would be ruined. He therefore at once circulated an order forbidding the

people to play the music. The Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka according to this account was a drama which delineated the history of Rāṣṭrapāla. Rāṣṭrapāla gets from his wayward parents the permission to enter the religion. He then comes back home with the hope of converting his relatives—his tragic meeting with his parents—his talk with the King of the country—his magnificent lesson on morals to the king etc., ”

The story therefore seems to have been the same as that of *Ratṭha-pāla-sutta*.

The same account appears in the Jaina canonical work called Piṇḍaniryukti in a altered form. The Piṇḍaniryukti attributed to Bhadrabāhu who according to tradition was contemporaneous with Candragupta Maurya. The Jaina tradition on chronology is however largely unreliable. We know for certain that the Jaina canon did not assume its final shape before the Council of Valabhi (5th century A. D.). Prof. Lēvi (*op. cit.*) has also given a detailed account of this version. In this account the scene is at first at Rājagṛha. Āsāḍhabhūti, a disciple of Dharmaruchi Sūri takes the place of Aśvaghōṣa. It is said that the young man Āsāḍhabhūti being tempted, marries the two daughters of a famous actor, Viśvakarman. Āsāḍhabhūti is soon disillusioned and abandons them after composing a new drama, the *Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka* which would give them the means of livelihood. Subsequently Viśvakarman went to play the drama at Pāṭaliputra where five hundred Ksatriya princes became so moved that they gave up the world. The people were furious at it and in order to avoid any such happening in future, burnt the manuscript of the drama. The plot of the drama consisted of the edifying adventures of Bharata the Cakravarti, the manifestation of the absolute to him and his renunciation of the world with five hundred princes.

Although the Jaina version is completely altered it is not difficult to discover in it an allusion to Aśvaghōṣa and his famous Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka. It is therefore certain that the Rāṣṭrapāla-nāṭaka of Aśvaghōṣa was known till the time of Dharmakīrti (6th century A. D.) and great success of the drama is borne out by all the sources of information.



# AN INSCRIPTION OF MUHAMMAD MA'SUM

BY

Prof. B. D. Verma, M. A., M. F., A. F.

The inscription was discovered by me at Maheshwar, which is some 20 miles from Indore and was once the capital of Mahārānī Ahalyā Bāi Holkar. It is kept in a mosque which is near the post office. I took its impression by the kind permission of the Mutawallī of that mosque. Maheshwar (22° 11' N. and 75° 36' E.) lies on the road which was used, in olden times, by the travellers while going from the north to the southern India. This inscription informs us that the Emperor Akbar also passed by Maheshwar when he went to his capital in the year 1009 A. H. (1600-1. A. D.) after conquering the fort of Asirgarh on 17 January 1601, which was a very strong fort in the Khāndesh.

This inscription was composed and written by Sayyid Nizām-u'd-Dīn

Life of Md. Mir Muhammad Ma'sūm of Bakkar (or Bhakkar,  
Ma'sum modern Sikkhar of Sind), who was the famous calligraphist of the court of Akbar. He was born<sup>1</sup> at

Bakkar on 7th Ramzān, 944 A. H. (7th Feb. 1538 A. D.). In his youth he went to the Gujarāt and stayed there for about 20 years. In 998 A. H. (1589-90 A. D.), he went to the Imperial camp at Lahore, with Khwājeh Nizām-u'd-Dīn Ahmad, compiler of the "*Tabaqāt-i-Akbarī*", who was the Bakhshī of Gujarāt in those days. Akbar was much impressed by the genius and the meritorious services of Muhammad Ma'sūm and gave him some villages as a *Jāgīr* and asked him to go to his native land to see his old mother. Muhammad Ma'sūm reached Bakkar on 14th Safar, 999 A. H. (2nd Dec., 1590 A. D.).

At Bakkar he helped Mīrzā Khān-i-Khānān ('Abdūr-Rahīm) in conquering the southern half of Sind. In 1003 A. H. (1594-95 A. D.)

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1. Dr. U. M. Dā'udpotā, M. A., Ph. D., has quoted two couplets from the 'Geneological tree of Muhammad Ma'sūm' in the introduction to the "*Tārīkh-i-Ma'sūmī*" which he has edited for the B. O. R. Institute, Poona. The couplets say that Muhammad Ma'sūm was born in the night of Monday, the 7th Ramazān. But according to the "*Indian Ephemeris*" the 7th Ramazān was Thursday and not Monday. The night which was ascribed to Monday according to the Muhammadan calendar—was the night of Tuesday according to the European practice.

## *An Inscription of Muhammad Masum*

he was raised to the *Mansab* of 250. For the next three years he was one of the high officials at Qandhār. In 1008 A. H. (1599-1600 A. D.) he accompanied Emperor Akbar when the latter started on a campaign to conquer the mighty fort of Asirgarh. In this journey Muhammad Ma'sūm wrote many epigraphs and got them inscribed in bold *Nasta'liq* on big stones at the places where the Emperor halted. Some of these inscriptions have been discovered and noticed in the *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*. Still many of them, I presume, are still lying in oblivion.

After the death of Akbar on 17th Oct. 1605 A. D., Jahāngīr appointed Muhammad Ma'sūm governor of Bakkar which was his native-land where he constructed many buildings in order to immortalize his name. He died<sup>2</sup> there on 6th Zu'l-Hijjat, 1019 A. H. (9th Feb. 1611).

He possessed a versatile genius: he was a poet, a historian, a physician, a calligraphist and a soldier.<sup>3</sup>

The inscription is fixed in a wall. The letters are inscribed in relief. The inscribed portion is 2 ft. 10 inches, x 12 inches. The style of writing is elegant *Nasta'liq* and the language is Persian.

### *Translation*

In the year 1008 A. H. (1599-1600 A. D.) the Emperor Akbar, refuge of the Caliphate, led a campaign to the Deccan and conquered the Deccan and the Dāndes.<sup>4</sup> In the year 1009 A. H. (1600-1. A. D.) he passed through this place and intended to go to the Hind (*i. e.* Hindustan). It was written by Muhammad Ma'sūm of Bakkar.

2. The author of the "*Ma'āthir-U'l-Umarā'*" writes that he died in 1015 A. H., but the inscription on the grave of Muhammad Ma'sūm at Bakkar falsifies this. I agree with Dr. U. M. Dā'udpotā and Prof. Muhammad Shafi that he died in 1019 A. H. In the inscription the date is given quite clearly and the doubt can be raised only about the chronogram in which the letter (*he*) is most probably broken. I base my conclusion on the strength of the calendar. 6th Zu'l-Hijjat of the year 1015 A. H. corresponds with 25th March 1607 and the day is Wednesday while the day given in the inscription is Friday. On the other hand, 6th Zu'l-Hijjat of the year 1019 A. H. falls on Saturday which corresponds with the Friday night of the Muhammadan reckoning.

3. For details, see Dr. Dā'udpotā, *Ta'rikh-i-Ma'sumi*, op. cit, 'Introduction', and V. A. Smith, *Akbar*, p. 245, n. 1.

4. In the inscription of Kaliadeh, near Ujjain (Gwalior State) which was also written by Muhammad Ma'sūm, this name is written (Khāndes). Prince Dāniyal was appointed the Viceroy of the Deccan by Akbar after the conquest of the Deccan, and in compliment to the Prince the name of Khāndesh was changed to Dāndesh. (V. A. Smith, *Akbar* p. 286). This inscription has not been noticed in the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, XVII, p. 10.

بتاخی مستله خلافتیله  
 اکبر بادشاه عمرت  
 و کن نمود فتح دکن  
 دانیدس کردید و  
 مسته ازینجا بومرود  
 منوچه بند شدند  
 حره محمد معصوم ایلر

Scale. 21.

An Inscription of Md. Ma'sūm, from Maheshwar.



# THE LAST DAYS OF VIJAYANAGAR

BY

Prof. K. A. NILAKANTA SASTRI

The reign of Venkatapati Deva Mahārāya (1586 to 1614 A. D.) marked the last flicker of the Vijayanagar Empire before it went out finally under his successors. He was not in the direct line of succession, but he was chosen deliberately 'by the unanimous vote of all the classes'—as a contemporary Jesuit letter puts it. There was need for a strong ruler, and even the nobles of the realm felt it. To curb the forces of disorder in the Empire and to combat the increasing insolence of the Muslim states of the Deccan, strong and vigorous leadership was required, and Venkaṭa furnished this for nearly three decades. He brought the rebellious poligars under control and waged successful war against the Muhammadans, from whom he took back much of the territory that had been lost under his predecessor. In civil administration he strove to sustain the failing strength of the village assemblies, and to administer impartial justice and promote economic welfare by resuscitating agriculture which had suffered much from the inroads of Muslim armies. After him, however, came the deluge.

Venkaṭa had many wives but no son. And his love for one of these ladies had led him to wink at a fraud she practised on him, borrowing a baby of one of her maids and calling him her own. Hoping to stop the mischief from going further, Venkaṭa nominated a nephew of his, Śrīranga, as his successor to the throne. But the presence of the putative son was a complication, and Śrīranga was no paragon of strength or wisdom. The nobles fell into two camps; the party of the 'son' was headed by his maternal uncle Jagga Rāya, who took Śrīranga by surprise and imprisoned him with his family. When Yācama Nāyaka, the leader of the other party, succeeded in removing prince Rāma, son of Śrīranga from the prison, and began further to exert himself for the release of Śrīranga, Jagga Rāya answered by putting to death Śrīranga together with the rest of his family still in prison.

But nothing daunted, Yācama proclaimed Rāmadeva Emperor, and shortly after Jagga Rāya met his fate in the battle of Toppūr, but the civil



### *The Last Days of Vijayanagar*

war continued to disturb the peace of the country for long. The Nāyaks of Madura and Gingee had taken sides against Yācama and Rāma, and Jagga Rāya's brother Etirāja and his other allies were still at large. The death of the pretender, the so-called son of Venkaṭa, led to a peace which was not to Yācama's liking. Rāma married the daughter of Etirāja who thereupon went over to his side. But Yācama felt that Etirāja had not been punished adequately and had an eye on Pulicat which belonged to Etirāja : and the Nāyaks of Madura and Gingee now became jealous of Etirāja's influence at the Court, and kept up their opposition. And the European powers established in the ports, particularly the Portuguese and the Dutch, occasionally joined in the fray; and thus there was much sporadic fighting in various parts of the country. The kingdom of Vijayanagar, or rather Karnāṭaka as it now comes to be called, was but the shadow of a great name.

After a decade and a half of much struggle, Rāma and his father-in-law Etirāja, succeeded by about 1629 in restoring the semblance of imperial authority once more over a considerable part of the Empire. But much had been lost in the interval, and Kurnūl had been conquered permanently by Bijāpūr in 1624 after two invasions and a tough fight. Rāma died in 1630 at the early age of twenty.

Another disputed succession and civil strife followed. Rāma had nominated a cousin of his, Peda Venkaṭa, to the succession ; but Rama's uncle Timma Rāja, disputed his right and confined him to his native place Ānegondi for a time. But the great Nāyaks of the South favoured Venkaṭa, who was also ably assisted by his nephew Śrīranga. Timma, however, ceased to be a source of trouble only with his death in 1635, after which date Venkaṭa, felt free to go and live in Vellore, the capital of the Empire at the time. But Venkaṭa had no peace. For reasons that are not clear to us, his nephew Śrīranga, once so loyal to him, now rebelled and actually engineered two invasions from Bijāpūr in 1638 and 1641; on the first occasion Venkaṭa bought off the enemy by surrendering large amounts of treasure, and the southern Nāyaks came to his aid in 1641. The Sultan of Golconda chose the occasion for laying hands on the coastal districts of the Telugu country. Venkaṭa died in the midst of defeat and disaster, a refugee in the forests of the Chittoor district, in October 1642.

Śrīranga, the rebel nephew of Venkaṭa, now became his successor. But as king he was not equal to undoing the mischief he had started as rebel. For a time jealousy among the Muslim states appeared to

provide Śrīranga a chance, and he repelled Golconda once in 1643-4 with the aid of Bijāpūr troops. But the turbulence of the Nāyaks, the persistence of Golkonda, and the formation of an alliance between Bijāpūr and Golkonda under the auspices of the Grand Mughal to partition the Karnāṭak Empire, led to the inevitable end. The armies of Bijāpūr and Golkonda swept everything before them, and by 1648-9 Śrīranga was reduced to a penniless refugee in the courts of his feudatories who were reduced to submission one after another by the Bijāpūr forces. He fled from Vellore to Gingee, and from Gingee to Tanjore, and finally repaired to Mysore, where he kept up his court with the aid of the Keladi chiefs till death came to him as a relief sometime about 1675.

But the fall of Karnāṭaka was not the fall of the Hindu cause. For even as Bijāpūr was ravaging Karnāṭaka and driving Śrīranga into exile, Śivāji commenced his eventful career, and Śrīranga did not come to his end before Śivāji had been crowned as Chhatrapati.

In the foregoing sketch of the last fifty years of Vijayanagar history I have followed, besides the well-known indigenous sources, some indications given by contemporary Dutch records; and in the rest of this paper I shall cite and comment on the various treaties concluded during the period between the Dutch East India Company and the court of Karnāṭaka. These treaties will be seen mostly to concern the affairs of the important Dutch factory at Pulicat. The texts of the treaties will be found in Heeres—*Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandico-Indicum* Vol. I (1596-1650) which forms Vol. 57 (1907) of *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-Landen Volkenkunde Van Nederlandsch-Indie*.

'The foundation of Pulicat', observes Moreland,<sup>1</sup> 'possesses peculiar interest for students of commercial history, because it was the first fort in India to be held by the merchants of a European Company, and it led directly to Armagon and to Madras.' The first charter relating to Pulicat was granted on the 24th April 1610 by Venkaṭapati Rāya to Captain Arent Maertszoen.<sup>2</sup> It permitted the Dutch to build a stone house on some land given to them in Pulicat where they could store all ammunitions of war, anchors, sails, merchandise, etc., and protect them from fire, robbers and other mishaps; and to pay 2% duty on all goods imported to and exported from Pulicat—a payment which was to be made only once on any set of goods and from which rice and other necessities for use in the 'house' were to be exempt. The king was to forbid

1. *From Akbar to Aurangzeb* pp. 228-9.

2. Heeres, xxxvii pp. 83-5.

the Portuguese to dwell or trade at Pulicat, and not to allow any European to trade without a permit from the Dutch. Neither side should raise any question or dispute on matters of religion. The king shall restore to the Dutch any man who having done wrong takes refuge with him or in his country. All the traders of the Dutch East India Company were to be free to trade without let or hindrance, and the Dutch Captain Resident in Pulicat for the time being was to have power to catch and to put in chains defaulting painters and weavers, and the king was to help them in this. The Dutch were to supply to the king at the earliest opportunity any European goods or war material he might want from Holland and at the prices prevailing for them in Holland. Trade was the primary object of the Dutch; but they meant to run no risks, and even under Venkaṭa II, a powerful monarch, they stipulated for freedom to organise their own defence and to be judges in their own cases against the industrial population of the country with whom they carried on business.

The express exclusion of the Portuguese from Pulicat only roused the hostility of this nation, long settled in St. Thomé, against the new Dutch settlement, and after some unsuccessful attacks upon it, the Portuguese finally destroyed it on the 9th June 1612. The next charter to the Dutch from Venkaṭa, dated 12th December 1612 and issued at Vellore was in fact rendered necessary by this mishap. It says in the preamble: 'As on the 9th June of this year, the Portuguese of St. Thomé razed to the ground the counting house at Pulicat, killed some people, and carried as prisoners to St. Thomé, the senior merchant Adolf Thomasson and others, it has been necessary to conclude the following contract with the above mentioned king.' This charter,<sup>3</sup> negotiated by Wemmer van Berché'm, Director of the Dutch possessions on the Coromandel coast, repeats all the terms of the old one, with one difference, viz., that the customs rate was to be  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for imports and 2 per cent. for exports as against the uniform 2 per cent. of the earlier charter. The effects of the recent hostilities with the Portuguese are reflected in the terms of the charter. A regular fort in Pulicat had become a necessity, and it was stipulated that the king was to allow his queen Bāyamma to complete at her cost the fort begun by her at Pulicat – afterwards the famous fort Geldria; the fort was to be under the protection of her people, but the Dutch were to have the use of one half of it, and the keys of the gates were to be handed over to them every evening, and the doors opened in the morning by two porters

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3. Heeres-xliii pp. 100–104. cf. Moreland *op. cit.* pp. 229–30.

together—one appointed by the Dutch and other by the queen. And the Dutch were to be free to pursue hostilities against the Portuguese in Pulicat, St. Thome and all the ports and places in the king's territory, without any obstruction from his officers. The last clause in this agreement is of particular interest to us. It runs: 'And because the abovementioned Pulicat lies far from the king, it is hereby agreed, that besides him, we shall stand under the protection of Jagarāja who will in all difficulties and accidents protect us against all ill-wishers and enemies that should cause us trouble by violence or otherwise,—for which the above mentioned Jagarāja shall grant us a *cowle* for our security and peace.' Jagga Rāya was the brother of Bāyamma, the queen of Pulicat, and was chief minister at this time, and Berchem thought it worth his while to go to Kolār and get Jaga Rāja's *cowle* before he returned to Pulicat.<sup>4</sup>

All the European Companies trading in India learnt soon enough that the grant of the *de jure* sovereign of the country was worth nothing without the good will of the minister or governor who was the real power in his territory.

The treaty of December 1612 was not observed. The fort Geldria was completed at the cost of the Dutch Company and garrisoned by them in 1613, and to secure even this was no easy task. Then came Venkaṭa's death and the war of succession, in which Jagga Rāya died (1616). The next document in our collection<sup>5</sup> is an agreement between the Etirāja, the brother of Jagga Rāya, and the Dutch governor of Pulicat, and is dated 28th August, 1620. In it Gobbūri Etirāja (Gouber Interagie or Jttiragie) calls himself governor over 40 Hindu miles of territory, and states that he was on a visit to Pulicat, when he gave this letter of authority (brief van credentie) to the Dutch captain. He appoints Pedarāja his visitor at Pulicat, and requires him to govern the city as in the time of Bāyamma (Obayama). The Dutch were to carry on as usual, and Etirāja promises to protect them with all his might against enemies. The term of the contract is said to be three years in the preamble. It falls in the period following the alliance between Rāma and Etirāja mentioned above.

Differences seem to have arisen between Pedarāja and the Dutch, and evidence that these were eventually composed in an amicable manner

4. McLeod: *De oost Indische Compagnie*, i pp. 127-8.

5. lxviii pp. 158-60. Some words in this record are difficult to understand though the general sense is clear.

## *The Last Days of Vijayanagar*

is furnished by a treaty of peace and perpetual alliance between Pedarāja and his friends on the one side and the Dutch governor of Coromandel on the other. The treaty is dated 19th August 1624.<sup>6</sup>

Rāmadeva, ably assisted by his father-in-law Etirāja, so far regained his control over his vassals and the kingdom by 1629, as to call to order the European Companies trading on the Coast. The Portuguese visited him first, as usual with complaints against the Dutch at Pulicat, and offered a considerable sum of money to induce the king to expel them. Ijsbrantsz, the Dutch governor of Pulicat at the time, sent Carel Reniers and Chinnana Chetti to meet the king at Tirutani where he lay encamped with a large army of 65,000 men. They met the king on the 26th October 1629, and among the presents offered were a young elephant, sandal, mirrors, white sugar, red lac, a Japanese box and so on. The king reported to them what the Portuguese of San Thomé, had told him and insisted on peace being observed in his territory and San Thomé being left alone by the Dutch. At the same time, the king revived the levy of duties at 1½ per cent. on imports and 2 per cent. on exports that Berchem had accepted in 1612, but had been allowed to fall into disuse in the confusion that followed when, Pulicat, in the strength of Fort Geldria, had been a law unto itself. Finally as a result of the Dutch Mission agreeing to give an undertaking to respect the king's peace, they were let off the tolls and were given a *cowle* excusing them from the payment of all customs duties on imports and exports at Pulicat.<sup>7</sup> The *cowle* is dated 14th November 1629.

As Rāmadeva died soon after, in May 1630, Ijsbrantsz sought and obtained confirmation of the privileges granted by him from his successor, and the brief charter is dated on the full moon day in October 1631.<sup>8</sup> The name of the king does not occur, but we may suppose it was Venkaṭa III, for we have another charter issued by him at the same time relating to the 'great *śungam* (groote sioncan van Pallescatta) of Pulicat.'<sup>9</sup> This *ola* is addressed to the Dutch governor and Malaya Chetti. It is short and mentions many facts otherwise unknown. It reads: "Before this Rāma Deva Rāya gave you the villages of Karuṅḷi (Carongoer) and Perambūr (Perombeur), and I gave you Arasūr (Aresour); in place of which three villages, I now give you the great great *śungam* (sionkan) of Pulicat,

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6. lxxx pp. 193-5.

7. xcii pp. 230-1. McLeod, i pp. 488-9.

8. cli. p. 250.

9. ciii. p. 251. Malaya Chetti was an *alias* of Chinnana Chetti.

būmi śunkam (bhomiḥ sionkan). What this brings in, you must share as you did before in regard to the villages."

We now have a long gap in the charters issued by the Vijayanagar rulers to the Dutch; but we may note in passing the existence of some charters issued by other rulers, feudatories in name, of the Vijayanagar kingdom, as these charters show the stages in the contraction of the area under the sway of the kings of Karnāṭaka. The English left Armagon for Madras in the beginning of 1640; and the Dutch received a *cowle* from Velugoṭi Venkaṭapati enabling them to go and trade at Armagon (Durgarāyapatnam) and other places in his territory. This chieftain had made himself master of the North-east part of the Vijayanagar kingdom during the time of Rāmadeva, offered a discreet submission, when in 1629 Rāma prepared to march against him with a large force,<sup>10</sup> and, doubtless, reasserted his independence at the earliest opportunity. He was an ally of Śrīranga who rebelled against Venkaṭa III and seized the government in 1642.<sup>11</sup> There are two charters and a letter from Tupāki Krishnapa Nayak to the Dutch governor of Coromandel, all dated in the year 1643. Tupaki Krishnapa was at this time the influential general and *de facto* ruler in the province of Gingee; the *cowle* of March 17, 1643<sup>12</sup> allows the Dutch freedom of trade in all the territory of Gingee and gives them besides a house at Tegenapatam, and a letter from Krishnapa to Arent Gardenijs written at the same time (Panguni 13, Chitrabhānu) conveys to him, in addition to a house and garden at Tegenapatam, the whole village of Tondamānattam.<sup>13</sup> Then two *cowles* dated 3rd November 1643 reiterated all the privileges mentioned in the first, and gave jurisdiction to the Dutch over the residents of Porto Novo, Pondicherry and Tegenapatam, and Krishnapa swears by his father Venkaṭapanaick's name that he will abide by the terms of the *cowles*.<sup>14</sup>

It is thus clear that the Vijayanagar kingdom whose rulers gloried at one time in the title of 'rulers of the three seas' had lost all control of the extensive sea board of Southern India.

All was not over yet. In Pulicat the writ of Vijayanagar ran for some time more. Śrī Ranga visited Pulicat on the 28th April 1643

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10. McLeod i. p. 487.

11. *ib.* ii. p. 395.

12. Heeres clii pp. 394-99.

13. *ib.* pp. 399-400.

14. Heeres, clix pp. 417-19. This Venkatapa is different from the Velugoti Venkatapa mentioned above.

and was received in Fort Geldria with honour, and in his turn he made a present to the Dutch company of one half of the tolls collected in Pulicat on all incoming and out-going goods.<sup>15</sup> This was in addition to the freedom from all tolls for the company's own trade. The *cowle* conveying the gift is dated April 29, 1643, (Subhānu, Viśākham, new moon). But the Dutch found that difficulties cropped up with the leaseholders who held the lease of the other half of the tolls of Pulicat, and there was also much trouble due to the invasion of the Golconda forces. In spite of a bilateral agreement with the lessees concluded in September 1644,<sup>16</sup> the Dutch seemed to have gained little out of this gift. Once more Śrī Ranga had to regulate the affairs of Pulicat in April-May 1646. The Dutch had stood by him in his war with Golconda, and the king gave evidence of his gratitude and of his good sense in the arrangements he made. He gave the Dutch the entire lease of Pulicat for an annual payment of 8000 pardaos, of which they were to keep 2000 as compensation for damages they had suffered in the past and remit the remaining 6000 to him. Besides, he gave them the usufruct of the income of seven villages round about Pulicat, a privilege which other lessees had enjoyed before, and only stipulated for an addition of two horses and some 'rarities' to the usual annual present of an elephant, a horse and so on.<sup>17</sup>

The last occasion on which Śrī Ranga dealt with the Dutch at Pulicat was in October 1646 when, for reasons not quite evident, he once more confirmed all the *cowles* and gifts granted before; but the days of his overlordship of Pulicat were numbered, and by the end of the year Pulicat definitely passed under Golconda, and the first *cowle* from Mir Jumla to Arnold Heussen, the then Dutch governor of Pulicat, is dated the last day of 1646 A. D.<sup>18</sup>

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15. Heeres cliii pp. 403-5. McLeod, ii p. 180.

16. clxiii pp. 426-9.

17. clxxvi. pp. 472-4. McLeod ii p. 402.

18. Heeres clxxx. p. 486.

# THE SIKHS AS A FACTOR IN THE 18TH CENTURY HISTORY OF INDIA

BY

PANDIT JAYCHANDRA VIDYALANKAR, Benares.

1 The independence movement started in Maharashtra by Shivaji and continued first by Rajaram and Tarabai and later by the Peshwas, had its repercussions in other provinces of India: in Bundelkhand, in Brajbhumi with its Jat population, amongst the Sikhs of the Punjab and perhaps also amongst the Gorkhas of Nepal. This aspect of Indian history has not so far received the attention it deserves. The tangled story of the Delhi Empire through this period has been unravelled and told by two great historians, Irvine and Sarkar, but they had to view the events through the focus of Delhi, while each of these centres of activity deserves a separate study. An attempt is made here to bring into relief certain aspects and problems connected with the history of one of these, the Sikhs.

2 Though the "transformation" of Sikhism into a political power might have been gradual, and may be traced to earlier events, there is no questioning the fact that the Sikhs first definitely launched upon their political career under the lead of Guru Govind Sinha C., 1695 A. C. The date is significant, for it denotes the exact period when the Maratha power once apparently crushed by Aurangzeb, reasserted and proved its continued vitality, and the Mughal Empire reeled under the staggering blows of Santaji Ghorpade. The period is marked by risings throughout India, all of which owed their inspiration to the happening in the South, as the Sikh rising in the Punjab unquestionably did. Guru Govind Sinha's plan of keeping his base of operations in the hills of the Eastern Punjab would further suggest an inspiration from Shivaji's model. But he had no hold on the hillmen of the Himalayan districts, his Sikhs all hailing from the plains of the Punjab. He failed in his attempt and had to seek refuge in the wastes of Bhatinda. He died in Maharashtra and before his death entrusted a devotee with the mission of continuing his work in the Punjab. The work of this man, Banda as he called himself, and more capable as a military leader than his *guru*, was in conception, but



## *The Sikhs as a Factor in Indian History*

a continuation of what Govind himself had started. The Empire under the weak successors of Aurangzeb was yet strong enough to put down this renewed revolt in the Punjab, and the Sikhs for a time were hunted down or driven again to the deserts of Bhatinda and Bikaner (1716).

3 The common histories do not mention any thing about the Sikhs during the quarter of a century following the martyrdom of Banda and his comrades, but G. C. Narang, relying upon Aliuddin's *Ibratnama* and Gyan Singh's *Panth Prakash* has given some details about their activity during the period.<sup>1</sup>

The Sikhs begin to make their appearance again in the plains of the Punjab from 1724 A. C. onward, i. e. during the Bajirao epoch, organise themselves into a *buddha dal* and a *tarun dal* in 1734, throw a fortress on the Ravi during the confusion of Nadirshah's invasion and become bold enough to plunder his rear in the course of his retreat.

4 During the next two epochs, 1740-1761 and 1761-1772, the Sikhs became a power to be reckoned with and established their independence. The confused history of this period has recently been clasified by that monumental work of Sir Jadunath Sarkar : *Fall of the Mughal Empire*. Some details about the Sikh history, however, still require elucidation. The chief features of the history of the period are the invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali. As the invader in every case either directed his force against the Punjab or had to hold it in his rear, the activity of the Sikhs during this period naturally assumes importance. In fact, the first three invasions of Abdali were against the Mughal Empire for taking possession of the Punjab and Sind, the next two to contest the supremacy of the Punjab and Delhi with the Marathas, and the last three (not counting the one in January 1765 when he hurriedly retreated) mainly against the Sikhs for contesting the possession of the Punjab.

5 Throughout these upheavals the Sikhs were playing their own game, plundering the retiring invader, erecting fortresses, defying the authority of the governor, whether he owed his suzerainty to Delhi or to Kabul, and possessing themselves of the country between Amritsar and the hills. There are however two alleged events in their struggle for freedom to which I would like to invite pointed attention.

Cunningham has started it on the authority, it would seem, of Browne's *India Tracts* and Malcolm's *Sketch* that in 1752, after Abdali's return, Muinul-Mulk or Mir Mannu required Adina Beg "to bring the Sikhs to

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1. *Transformation of Sikhism* (Lahore, 1912), pp. 124, 126, 133.

order, for they had virtually possessed themselves of the country lying between Amritsar and the hills. He fell suddenly upon them during a day of festival at Makhowal, and gave them a total defeat. But his object was still to be thought their friend, and he came to an understanding with them that their payment of their own rent should be nominal or limited, and their exactions from others moderate and systematic. He took also many of them into his pay." <sup>2</sup>

Now this event, if historically true, would mean the first recognition of the Sikh right of *Chauth*.

6 The second event is more important, and refers to the year 1758. After the fourth invasion of the Abdali, Prince Taimur was left in charge of the province with Jahan Khan, the ablest general of Abdali, as his lieutenant. According to the traditional account, the Sikhs rose in rebellion, and Taimur with Jahan Khan had to retire to the Chenab, leaving the capital to be occupied by the Sikhs, whose leader Jassa Kalāl now used the Lahore mint to strike his own rupee. This was only two months before the Maratha occupation of the Punjab. The Sikhs had seized Lahore though they could not oust the Afghans from Sarhind, Multan and Attok. This tradition has been followed by Cunningham, Latif (*History of the Punjab*, 1891) and Narang. The last-named writer even quotes the inscription on Jassa Kalāl's coin in original Persian, apparently from Aliuddin's *Ibratnama* written in 1854, which in turn is based, according to Narang, "upon Khairuddin's book written during Ranjit Singh's reign."

Now this tradition is absolutely neglected or tacitly rejected by Sir Jadunath Sarkar. His history of the Maratha occupation of Lahore is apparently based upon Tahmasp-Miskin's account, and the circumstantial details given by that eye-witness leave no room between the Afghan withdrawal from and the Maratha occupation of Lahore. But Miskin may not be as reliable a witness as he has been taken to be. We are asked, for example, to believe that the city of Lahore could not stand a siege as it was not well-provisioned! In this case at least, the eye-witness seems to be trying to conceal the Afghan defeat at the hands of the upstart Sikhs.

The traditional account of Jassa Kalāl's rupee receives further corroboration from a queer source. It has been described and its interesting legend<sup>3</sup> quoted in a Persian manuscript on Indian numismatics written

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2. *History of the Sikhs* (original edition London 1849, p. 103.)

3. *Sikkā Zad dar jahān bafazl-i-Akāl mulk-i-Ahmad girift Jassā Kalāl.*

## *The Sikhs as a Factor in Indian History*

in 1186 A. H. (1772 A. C.) for Nawab Asafuddaula of Oudh and now in possession of the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Benares.<sup>4</sup>

No specimen of the coin has so far been found, but it is to be noted that if Jassa Kalāl really struck it, it must have been in 1758, for the next Sikh occupation of Lahore in March 1764 was by Lahnāsingh, Gujjarsingh and Shobha Singh.

7 The Sikh activity during the Abdali invasion of 1759–1761 is noteworthy. The invader passed through the Punjab to Rohilkhand, and the Marathas recaptured Delhi in August and Kunjpura in October 1760. This emboldened the Sikhs and they attacked the Afghan garrisons of Sialkote and Lahore. Ala Singh of Patiala was in communication with Sadashivrao Bhau. Kincaid's statement (iii, 65) that "behind the Marathas was the Punjab held by Afghan governors in Ahmad Shah's interest" is only partially true.

According to the traditional accounts relied upon by Narang (pp. 151-152), the Sikhs met in their assembly at Amritsar on *Baisakh-Sankranti* (April 13, 1760) while the Abdali was in Rohilkhand, and, dispersing, not only attacked Lahore, but occupied a number of posts in the districts of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, Ferozpur and even Ambala. This, if true, would have meant the complete cutting off from his base of the Abdali, and the Maratha helplessness at Panipat, with the Sikhs in strength so near the battlefield, would be simply inexplicable. Narang did not see this implication of the story, and hence accepted it without scrutiny. We are now, fortunately, in possession of true facts, thanks to the work of Sir Jadunath Sarkar. The Sikh assembly which voted attack on Afghan positions met not on *Baisakhi* but on *Divali* day (Nov. 6, 1760), i. e. after the capture of Kunjapura by the Bhau. They did, of course, attack Lahore and Sialkote, but not all the districts mentioned in the traditional account, which has confused some later year's events with those of 1760.

Sir Jadunath has explained the Bhau's march to Kunjpura as a march towards the Sutlaj, and there is no doubt that the Sikhs were emboldened in their activity by this move of Sadashiv. But one wonders why he did not make this move in August, while the Jamna was still in floods. Had he reached the Sutlaj, the Sikhs would certainly have arisen throughout the Punjab.

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4. Cf. Proceedings of the Numismatic Society of India, 1934, p. 13.

8 Within three years and a quarter of the battle of Panipat, the Sikhs became masters of the Punjab, and another invasion by the great Abdali in 1767 could not oust them from power. The credit of the final overthrow of the Abdali power thus belongs to them. But the bold fight which the Marathas from beyond the Narmada had put up for the defence of their country against the invader, while the proud Rajputs and Jats lay trembling or sulking in their homes, must have inspired the Sikhs of the Madhavrao epoch as much as the careers of Shivaji, Rajaram and Tarabai had inspired Guru Govind Sinha.



# SLAVERY UNDER THE PESHWAS

BY

B. G. MURDESHWAR, B. A., LL.B.

1 The institution of slavery may be traced to the very dawn of human history. The primeval warrior seldom spared his vanquished foe, but if he did, he enslaved him. In tribal wars the victorious party carried away as slave the women folk of the other, and the defeated nation always yielded to the conqueror its quota of slaves. Slavery thrived, thus, with ascendant militarism and soon became an integral factor in the social organisation. In ancient Greece and Rome slavery was an established institution, and laws were formulated with minute care to define its character.

2 In India slavery of two kinds was known from the earliest times. The Aryan conquerors of the country did not assimilate in their social organisation the aborigine tribes. That organisation moreover, being theocratic in character, the aborigines and the persons that performed unclean functions laboured under a defective status in law. Considered beyond the pale of society, they were cut off from all social intercourse. Besides this the servitude of classes there was also the servitude imposed on individuals. Captives of war and persons convicted of certain crimes were enslaved: the indigent one who in times of scarcity surrendered himself to another in return for food and protection repaid the obligation by service: and the son of a slave also spent his life in slavery.<sup>1</sup>

3 Slavery in ancient India was not attended with hardship and cruelty to the extent that it involved in some other countries. Slaves were treated much like the domestic and other servants of modern times and in most cases could emancipate themselves. Manumission was at the discretion of the master only where the subjection had arisen out of birth or had been contracted voluntarily in consideration of price received from the master. The slave who saved his master's life moreover was entitled to his freedom and to a share in the master's property; and the slave girl who bore a child to her master, similarly could claim to be

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1 *Manu-smṛiti*, VIII, 415,

## *Slavery Under the Peshwas*

emancipated.<sup>2</sup> During the period of subjection, the master had no power of life and death over the slave as the Roman patriarch had. The master's authority to mete out even moderate chastisement was limited to the same extent as the father's authority over the son. And the law directed that a female slave devoted to the master should not be sold or otherwise transferred unless in the event of the master's extreme distress. The slave, lastly, could acquire property; the property did not pass to the master but enured to the benefit of the slave, and often helped him to purchase his freedom.

4 The general features of slavery under the Muslim rulers were similar. The power of unrestricted violence which the law vested in the master was seldom, if ever, called into play. On the other hand, if the slave was a Muslim he had certain definite rights in law; and to a convert to Islam from the lowest of Hindu castes the change was a definite gain. Slavery was no bar to a successful career and indeed many who began their life in slavery lived to occupy the front rank of the nobility and to lead large armies. Another interesting aspect of slavery in Muslim India is the enormous increase in the number of slaves. Ala-ud-din Khilji is reputed to have possessed 50,000 slaves and Mahamud Tughluq felt himself compelled to set apart a day in the week on which he devoted himself to the task of manumitting. Firoz Tughluq encouraged his nobles to send slaves to him, for which remissions were made in the annual tributes leviable from them; and in his reign the number of slaves had risen to the enormous figure of 200,000.<sup>3</sup> The Mughal emperors also possessed numerous slaves but on a perhaps less grandiose scale. And presumably the nobles prided themselves on the possession, similarly, of numerous slaves. A considerable number of slaves was imported from foreign countries principally from Africa and Western Asia.

5 Under the Marathas, slavery retained the character it had been given by Hindu legists but with certain modifications. The *Vyavahara Mayukha* of Nilakantha Bhatta, which was composed in the seventeenth century and was a recognised authority at the Maratha Court especially in Gujrat, bears testimony that the juristic theory of the time differed little from that of the preceding ages in so far as it related to the condition of slavery. But contemporaneous records, on the other hand, show that the usage differed considerably from the legist's theory and that long established custom met several contingencies not provided for by it.

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2 P. N. Sen: *General Principal of Hindu Jurisprudence*, 1918, pp. 296.

3 K. M. Ashraf - *Life and Conditions of the People of Hindustan*, (1220-1550) J. B. B. R. A. S. Vol. I, 15.

6 The commonest origin of the condition was sale. It does not appear that there were any fixed centres of slave trade. The trade appears to have been carried on mainly by Charans and Vanjaris. The former were wandering bards and minstrels, and their function principally was to gratify their patrons by composition and recitation of songs in honour of their patrons and their ancestors. They maintained moreover geneologies of their patrons' families and their aid was sought in settling intricate questions of kinship at the time either of marriage or of partition. They enjoyed certain privileges from the Hindu Kings in the country, who were among their patrons, and some of them slowly adopted the profession of trade in cattle and grain. These, it is suggested, came later to be known variously as Banjaras, Vanjaris and Lamans and to play an important part not only in the inland trade of the country but also in the commissariat arrangements of Indian armies.<sup>4</sup> The Maratha records are explicit that they dealt also in slaves and it would also appear that they were the principal slave traders in the Maratha country.<sup>5</sup>

7 The records are inadequate as to the source from which these traders themselves obtained their supply, but those sources are fairly obvious. In an age when the means of communication were undeveloped, failure of crops spelt starvation to the rich and poor alike and the hardship caused especially to the latter was extreme. In a serious famine, death by starvation was almost certain; and one of the means of deferring that eventuality was to sell their children when their belongings were exhausted. Methwold records that in some parts of Vijayanagar such was the extreme want "that parents have brought thousands of their young children to the sea-side selling there a child for five fanums (a small gold coin), transported from thence into other parts of India and sold again to good advantage."<sup>6</sup> Sale of children was indeed so common in Indian famines of the medieval times that the point hardly needs further elaboration: it has been noticed alike by foreign travellers and by Indian poets. The famines presumably afforded them a fertile source wherefrom the slave trade derived a fruitful supply.<sup>7</sup>

8 But it could not have been the only one. Apart from the areas stricken by the visitations of famine occasionally there were certain tracts

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4 Russell and Hiralal, — *Castes and Tribes of the Central Provinces*. Vol. II pp. 163, 251.

5 *Selections from Peshwas' Daftar* Vol. 42, p. 56.

6 Moreland, *Relations of Golconda* p. 3.

7 S. P. D.—Vol, 42, pp. 33-34; Steele - *Law & Custom of Hindu Castes* 197.



subjected to chronic scarcity and wherein the poorer classes always lived on the verge of starvation. These were apt to be combed in a search for recruits to servitude nor is it to be supposed that such a search was always peaceful. The classes of people engaged in slave trade were known to be given to violence and rapine on a suitable opportunity<sup>8</sup>, and a slave may as well have been purchased by them as kidnapped<sup>9</sup>.

9 War furnished yet another source of the supply of slaves. Prisoners of war were not numerous and they were not usually sold into slavery; but in the loot and rapine that usually followed a war, women and children were frequently seized and enslaved.<sup>10</sup> The part the Banjara slave dealers themselves played in this process of enslavement of defenceless civil population is not clear. Presumably they travelled with the armies in charge of the commissariat arrangements and joined in the loot along with the other camp followers. If they themselves captured a slave they could keep him themselves; and one captured by any of the soldiers they could purchase at small cost.

10 The other sources of the supply of slaves was inconsiderable. The old rule of law as to the enslavement of a man for the reason of his connection with a slave girl was a dead letter;<sup>11</sup> for such connections were all too common. Such too was the rule which decreed enslavement in release of heavy debts. Nevertheless on occasion when the load of debt was too heavy, one was apt to voluntarily embrace servitude<sup>12</sup> in return for the liquidation of that debt.<sup>13</sup> But in some cases a woman found in adultery was subjected to servitude though such enslavement was not decreed by the law-givers. This however was warily done. The usual punishment for such woman was the sacrifice of a limb or the imposition of a fine; but were she unable to pay the fine, belonged to one of the sudra castes, and her husband was a man of no consequence, the revenue farmer forcibly detained her and sold her into slavery, crediting the proceeds in satisfaction of the fine.<sup>14</sup> It appears however that this practice had the sanction of long-established usage.

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8 Russell & Hiralal-*op. cit.* pp. 163, 251.

9 Steele-*op. cit.* 197.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 197.

11 Narada quoted in *Vyavahara Mayukha*, X, 6.

12 *S. P. D.* Vol. 42, p. 33 ;

13 Chapekar-*Peshawaichya Savalit*, p. 185.

14 *S. P. D.* Vol.-42, p. 33. Steele-*op. cit.* 197.

11 The slaves for the most part were women, and male slaves were rare: this is partly the cause, as perhaps also the result, of the fact that slavery to a considerable extent was an extended form of concubinage. All castes and communities yielded a quota to slavery except the Brahmins; for the old law that a Brahmin may not be enslaved was still rigidly enforced.<sup>15</sup> There were Mohomedans among the slaves, Sidis of Africa,<sup>16</sup> women of the Sonar and Prabhu castes. And Govindpant Bundele is recorded to have sent ten slave girls, apparently obtained locally, from Bundelkhand.<sup>17</sup> Another limitations as to the castes from which slaves may be recruited follows from the social factor of untouchability. None belonging to any of the untouchable classes could be conveniently maintained for service in a Hindoo household; indeed such was the strength of the current prejudice that a man who harboured in his house a slave-girl belonging to one of the higher castes but who had had a connection with an untouchable, had to undergo elaborate penances.<sup>18</sup> The limitation, as is obvious, was qualified in observance by the fact that the slave-owners were not all Hindus governed by Brahminical notions: there were doubtless slave-owners of other persuasions.

12 The ownership of slaves was a common condition under the Peshwas. The state, perhaps, owned the largest number of slaves; and the payment made to the officers was sometimes in kind and included slave.<sup>19</sup> The great officers of the state, the Sardars and Inamdars and the merchant princes doubtless owned slaves in large numbers — though not to the extent to which the princes and nobles of Delhi sultanate owned. The subedar of Kalyan left at his death 29 slave-girls; and this should furnish basis for the estimate of number of the slaves owned by others. It is not surprising that lesser officers, captains of soldiery and affluent farmers should own slaves; but it does seem curious that Puraniks, Haridas, and Bhikshuks who lived mostly on voluntary charity, should afford a similar privilege,<sup>20</sup> though that they did so only testifies to the nature and volume of contemporaneous charity. *The Peshwas' Diaries* testify also to the fact that several Europeans owned slave-girls: the Anglo-Indian "nabob" with a seraglio populated by such slaves was not uncommon in the eighteenth century.

15 *Vyavahara Mayukha*, Selections, Vol-42, 32.

16 *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries*, -Madhaorao I, II 324.

17 *Ibid*—*Balaji Bajirao*, 190—1.

18 *Ibid*—*Balaji Bajirao*, 188.

19 Chapekar, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

20 *Ibid.*, 185,

## *Slavery Under The Peshwas*

13 On purchase, the slave became the property of her master much like chattel and was styled "*kunbin*" (female slave). A slave could be pledged or sold either for a cash price or in liquidation of debt.<sup>21</sup> She could be, and was often given away in gift to holy men. And on the master's death his slaves formed part of the assets divisible among his heirs; and if there was only one slave, a price was set on her, and the one among the heirs who took her was to reimburse to the others a corresponding share of such price.<sup>22</sup> The extent of the master's dominion does not appear to have been defined; perhaps cases of unrestrained violence did occur but were not noticed by the authorities either because they were not uncommon and therefore connived at or because none thought it worth the while to acquaint the authorities with such happenings.

14 Slaves were utilised for several kinds of service. A large majority were doubtless absorbed as domestic servants, and a fair number in agricultural labour. Often enough they were retained for company. These classes, moreover, were not mutually exclusive; a slave may be required to be a domestic and on occasion an agricultural labourer, while she was also her master's concubine. The prices the slaves fetched corresponded with the nature of functions they could perform. A good worker would fetch somewhere between Rs. 60 and Rs. 100.

15 The slave's life was no mere drudgery, though with a poor and harsh master it was apt to be such. They were clothed and fed, sometime much better than the free men of their standing, and were allowed to possess property. Every auspicious occasion in the family, and the major festivities of the calendar brought them presents from the master. A considerate master would reward extra hard work by cash payment. The Sidi woman slaves employed in the manufacture of armaments in Konkan were paid, under the orders of Sar Subah, Re. 1 each for the hard work they did for Government. A slave could put by the gifts she received from time to time and accumulate enough wealth wherewith to purchase other slaves or her own freedom.

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21 *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries, Madhaorao I, Vol-11, 324.*

Chapekar- *op. cit.* 155.

22 *Ibid* - 185.

16 The state levied a tax on the sale of slaves and in return afforded to the master a protection of the rights acquired under the sale, limiting its interference with those rights to only such rare cases where servitude has proved to have been imposed by flagrant injustice, fraud or violence.<sup>24</sup> The protection it afforded more over was active; it seized absconding slaves and returned them to the owner, the latter paying the expenses of the slaves, conveyance and maintenance during the period during which she was in government's charge. It appears that government officers were very vigilant in this respect and were able to trace a fugitive slave with remarkable promptitude. A manumitted slave had therefore to fortify herself by a formal deed or release lest she should suffer from their attentions.<sup>25</sup> Occasionally the officers located a fugitive without being able to discover the master and in such cases the slave vested in the state to be dealt with at the discretion of government.

17 A person once sold into slavery was not irrevocably lost in that condition. If she had friends who could afford it or belonged to a caste which had both the will and the means necessary, her emancipation would be promptly purchased. The slave herself could procure her own emancipation either by paying to the master a price for her release or by giving him another acceptable slave. The master himself often released the slave from bondage on the latter attaining old age.

18 The condition of servitude was not essentially inconsistent with the slave's opportunity to lead a life of her own. Sometimes, she was married off to some one in her own station in life. The question as to what status was assigned to the children born of slave whether within or without wedlock cannot be answered catagorically. A slave-girl's child born in lawful wedlock was not slave by birth; its father was its natural guardian. But a child born illegitimately was as much the property of the master as its mother herself. Conversely the son of a slave by a free woman was a slave at birth; his mother as natural guardian, had dominion over him during non-age.<sup>26</sup> Should the son be born after the slave's marriage to his mother, he became the property of father's amster. Female children of slaves were given away in marriage, the expenses being borne by the master; and childless Sudra and Muslims sometimes

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24 S. P. D. Vol. 42, 37.

25 *Satara Raja & Peshwas' Diaries-Balaji Bajirao*, Vol, II, 191.

26 S. P. D, Vol. 42, p. 39.

adopted or acknowledged their illegitimate offspring, whereupon the latter was vested with the property rights which he would have obtained if he were a legitimate son. The slave lost caste upon enslavement, but his progeny in a stated generation — the number of generations these provided varying with circumstances — was entitled to be readmitted to the caste. The slaves and their progeny were not always content with this promise of reinstatement in the far future and sought to establish connection, by marriage, with some uncontaminated family belonging to the caste. If the facts went undetected their admission to the caste was easy; if they were found out, and if the caste did not profess a high place in the hierarchy of castes, there was doubtless some trouble at the time, but perhaps the matter was subsequently allowed to be forgotten.

# GOVIND SAKHARAM SARDESAI

BY

SIR JADUNATH SARKAR

## *Family and birth*

His family belongs to the Karhada section of the Brahmans, and therefore it must have originally migrated from Karhad in the Satara district to the Konkan, where it settled and acquired villages near Mavlanga, some distance north of Devrukh in the Ratnagiri district. The temple of Narasimha, the tutelary deity of the entire Sardesai sept, stands on a hill that overlooks the creek of Makhazan. The historian's great grand-father Janardan and some other ancestors served the Chhatrapatis and their ministers, the Peshwa, the Pratinidhi of Vishalgad, and the Pant Amatya of Gagan(gad)-Bavada, ministers of the Kolhapur branch of Shivāji's house, and distinguished themselves by their ability and loyalty. One of them was surnamed *Satya-vādi* or Truth-teller. His father, Sakharam Mahadev, fell on evil days. He took to agriculture; but Nature in Maharashtra is often an unkind mother who grudgingly gives her bliss at labour's earnest call. His crops repeatedly failed, his house caught fire and he fell into debt; but the sturdy yeoman continued to wrestle with a reluctant soil to the end of his days. This tenacity of character, this spirit of independence and honest simplicity of life, were his richest legacy to his sons. One anecdote will illustrate his inflexible honesty and sense of justice. His unprofitable farm loaded him with debt; the other creditors let him compound with them by a partial remission, but one man would not agree to any concession nor give him time; he used to dun the poor debtor frequently, abusing and threatening him in public. But through a strange oversight this debt became barred by lapse of time before the angry creditor could file a suit for recovery. Years later, Sakharam's sons, now doing well in their professions, sent him a sum for his farming needs, strictly warning him that no part of it must be paid to that Shylock who had exasperated them all. Sakharam's reply was, "I have received your remittance and used it to discharge my dues to that man in full. You can do whatever you like with your father." Happily he lived to see his sons well educated and well started in life, and died in 1907 at the ripe age of 73.

As the great western road from Kolhapur to Ratnagiri enters the Konkan after crossing that triumph of British engineering, the Amba Ghat pass, it reaches the village of Sakharpe at the 12th mile beyond this pass. Here one diversion turns to the right for Devrukh and further north, while a humbler cart track branches off to the left and leads to the village of Govil at the end of ten miles by a rough stony route. In this latter village stands the home built by Sakharam, and here his five sons,—Govind, Narayan, Ganesh, Dinkar, Bhaskar and two daughters were born.

Govind Sakharam Sardesai was born on 17th May 1865<sup>1953</sup>, not in Govil itself, but in the neighbouring village of Hasol, just across a tiny rock-cut brook which parts the two places. Owing to some religious observance his expectant mother was removed to a relation's house at Hasol and brought back to Govil when the baby was twelve days old. Even in boyhood Govind Rao gave evidence of his burning hatred of injustice and passion for punishing wrong-doers. A neighbour persistently played the wicked trick of leading his cattle in the depth of night to trespass into Sakharam's fields and eat up the green crops. Young Govind silently bided his time, and one dark cloudy night, accompanied by a single herdsman of his own age, took his father's cattle across that dry stony rivulet into the field of this bad neighbour and let them browse on his ripening corn to the full, while he waited for the time to lead them back. Meanwhile, it had rained among the upper hills and a flood came down filling the riverbed and turning it into a deep raging torrent. For hours together the boy sat down in the darkness and drizzle, tremblingly waiting for the morning which would bring down upon him a merciless thrashing and the impounding of his cattle. But evidently Clio (the Muse of History) took pity on her future votary and entreated Jupiter Pluvius; the rain ceased, the river level went down just sufficiently to enable the two and their cattle to wade across in safety to their home, before the first streak of dawn could betray them to the enemy.

### *Education*

After receiving elementary teaching in the neighbouring large village of Shiposhi, young Govind was sent for his English education to the High School at Ratnagiri, as nearest to his home, though 30 miles off. At the beginning of every term the little boy would leave his home, his books, pair of dhoties and pillow rolled up into a bundle with a small mattress which formed his only bedding being carried by a farm hand to Devle. Here he waited till the caravan of bullock carts carrying grain to Ratnagiri approached and he joined their escort, dismissing his servant. At his

entreaty some kindly carter would allow him to deposit his tiny bundle in his wagon or offer him a ride on payment. Then the small boy would trudge on foot at the tail of the line of carts all the night, amidst the gloom of that almost primitive forest and a silence that was broken only by the monotonous creaking of the wagon-wheels or the far off cry of some wild animal, the hunter or the hunted.

In this way he reached Ratnagiri, where a life of more than Spartan rigour awaited him which would have made a modern student of, say the Fergusson College, spending fifty rupees a month, shudder. The poorer scholars were allowed to sleep on the floor of their class rooms at night. But as soon as day broke they had to roll up their mattress beds and stack these little cylinders in a line along the furthest wall, and study in the open. A hotel in the town gave them two bare meals of rice or millet bread and dal a day for a monthly charge of a rupee and a half. On this they lived and worked.

The Ratnagiri Government School had once been famous for its excellent teaching. But towards the end of Govind Rao's life there, it fell into slackness and decline. The masters had no efficiency or energy; discipline and examination results grew deplorably worse. The boys used to do as they liked. One day a teacher rebuked a big burly pupil for neglecting his lessons; the latter faced round in a defiant attitude, as if going to clench his fists, and all the class looked expectantly on for a few rounds. But this master at least was a man of the true old type; crying out, "*You dare me ! You dare me !*" he laid his stick (*not cane*) on the lad's back as mercilessly as only the Indian carter can thrash his dumb driven bullock. At last the sleep of the gods in the Secretariat Olympus was broken. A reform of the school was ordered by Government, and Rao Bahadur Ganesh Vyankatesh Joshi and Moreshwar Waman Kirtane were sent to effect it. This efficient and strict head-master Joshi in a short time pulled the institution together, restored discipline, and improved the teaching by sending away the worthless members of the staff and importing able young masters in their places. The effect was immediate, though Mr. Kirtane stayed there for a year only. His admirable judgment of character was proved by his choice of his assistants.

And also by Kirtane's choice of a son-in-law. While teaching the class, Kirtane instinctively perceived the brilliant promise which Govind Rao's solid parts, under an unassuming exterior, held out for him. So Mr. Kirtane arranged for his marriage with his eldest daughter, Ganga Bai, whose name was in consequence changed into Lakshmi Bai, because the holy Ganges who dances among the matted locks of Shiva cannot



## *Govind Sakharam Sardesai*

become Govinda's consort without committing bigamy ! They were married on 29th February 1884 and have enjoyed a happy matrimonial life now for 54 years.

After matriculating from the Ratnagiri High School in 1884 young Sardesai joined first the Fergusson college at Poona and later the Elphinstone College in Bombay.

Here, owing to some family differences, he did not get any help from the quarter expected and had to work, like many another brilliant poor scholar of our country, as a private coach in order to pay for his education. In this way he graduated from the Elphinstone College in 1888.

### *Service in the Baroda State*

Soon afterwards he entered the service of the Baroda State, in the Palace department.

He soon came to be employed in teaching the Maharajah's sons and young relatives and the children of some nobles in the Princes' High School, rising at last to be its Head-Master. He counted among his pupils besides all the sons of the Maharajah, the present Dowager Maharani of Cooch Behar ( Indira Rani ), the present Rani of Dewas Junior, and the mother of the ruling Chief of Sandur ( Bellary district ).

Finally after 25 years service as tutor Govind Rao was taken on Maharajah Gaekwad's personal staff, as keeper of his household accounts, his pay at the time of retirement being Rs. 485/-.

In the train of Sir Sayaji Rao Gaekwad he paid five visits to Europe between 1892 and 1911.

Here he displayed the same methodical habits, minute accuracy and steady industry which have marked all his work. After the day's business or sightseeing in some European city, when the Maharajah's party returned to their hotel in the evening and the other members of the staff went out to take the air or seek amusement, Sardesai would first sit down and write up the accounts of that day's transactions, while every detail was fresh in his memory, and only then think of his personal needs. During the voyage back he would complete a regular statement of the moneys received and spent during the entire tour (with vouchers) and submit it to the Accountant General of the State immediately upon his return. Men marvelled at it, because his less punctual predecessors in office used to take months before they could complete their accounts and at the end of the time often failed to account for certain sums through lapse of memory.

Sardesai was perhaps the only member of the Maharajah's large staff in his numerous European tours, who returned home without contracting a penny's debt.

At last in 1925 Govind Rao claimed retirement on account of age. The Maharajah Gaekwad wanting to exact life-long service from such a devoted officer visited his displeasure on him by graciously granting him a pittance as pension in return for 37 years of continuous service. The Fundamental Rules which assure the status rights and wages of public servants in British India do not fetter the ruler's will in these Native States.

### *Desolated Home*

A free man at last, Govind Rao could now look at himself, and found that Fate had struck at him unsparingly and left him utterly desolate,—save for one life-long partner in weal and woe and a pair of devoted brothers. Nature had blessed him with two offsprings, both very bright handsome boys. The younger, Srivatsa-lanchhan (born in 1903) showed precocious intelligence and used to take big books — on poetry fiction or biography — out of his father's library and read them in secret for hours together. At the age of ten he was attacked by an obstinate low fever which no doctor could cure and which passed into a waste, ending his young life within two years. (1915)

Every care had been taken by the father for the children's healthy growth ; they were brought up in the open air as much as possible, lodged in the rural suburbs in preference to the overcrowded city, trained in physical exercise and swimming, and in one case sent to Northern India. But all human endeavour proved of no avail.

The eldest boy Shyamkant (born in 1898) was gifted with unsurpassed brilliancy. He was admitted as a boarder in Rabindranath Tagore's School at Shanti-Niketan and there passed the Matriculation Examination of the Calcutta University (1916). His powers can be judged from the fact that he learnt Bengali within one year so well as to stand first in that alien language beating all the other boys of this school whose mother-tongue was Bengali. Returning home, Shyamkant graduated from Fergusson College, Poona, standing first class in the entire Bombay University in B.A. and next year in B.Sc. Next, he went to Europe, learnt German, took a Doctorate in Chemistry at Berlin in 1924, and made advanced studies with a view to qualifying himself for the expert guidance of industry on return to India. But alas, he was not destined to see his native land and his parents again ! This clean-living youth, the picture of manly health and beauty, developed consumption and was

removed to Switzerland; but all the treatment in that famous sanatorium failed. He lingered on for months in unspeakable agony, which he bore with stoic fortitude — his one anxiety being that his parents should find some consolation. As he wrote in a most touching letter, his last appeal to them—

‘ Father and Mother, mourn not for me in case death overtakes me. Think of those parents who are in similar circumstances or of those who are more unfortunate than you. I cannot bear the idea of your grief.

Remember, “ उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ” ’

Thus he breathed his last, on 28th November 1925 at the age of 28, in that foreign soil, his last days being brightened, if any thing could brighten them, by the loving care of his uncle Ganesh S. Sardesai who had gone from Bombay to attend him. The brilliant promise of Shyamkant's youth, if time had been given to fulfil it, and his loving devotion to his parents would have consoled them amidst all the ills of life, ‘ the slings and darts of outrageous Fortune ’, the caprice of the autocrat, the poison-tooth of envious rivals, the infirmities of age. But, the wise of ancient days have truly said, “ Those whom the gods love die young.” The one redeeming feature of this usual tragedy of Hindu homes was that Shyamkant had not been married, and the tears of a young widow did not mingle with those two stricken down old people.

#### Historical Research

From the unspeakable loneliness and utter vacuity of a forlorn old man's life, Govind Rao was saved by a force stronger even than Death, — his passion for advancing the study of Maratha history on a scientific basis. He had begun his literary career in Baroda by making Marathi translations of Machiavelli's *Prince* and Seely's *Expansion of England*, which were published in the Baroda Series in 1895. He then planned and composed his famous *Riyasat* works in Marathi about this time, with the object of diffusing higher knowledge in a popular form through the vernacular. Here his devotion to national History found an adequate expression in the form of a complete conspectus of the course of Maratha rise and fall, from the beginnings under Chhatrapati Shivaji to the dismal day when from the balcony of the Parvati temple the last Peshwa Baji Rao II looked helplessly on the ruin of his dynasty and the extinction of the independence of his people. This grand plan was carried to completion under the title of *Marathi Riyasat* in nine volumes in the

course of 30 years, the first volume having been published in 1901 and the last in 1932. Several of the volumes have gone into a second edition, and a third or completely rewritten version has now become necessary.

*A Hermit of History*

Some months after retiring from Baroda service, Govindrao settled at Kamshet, a small village on the Poona-Bombay Railway, 29 miles from Poona. Here his brother Dr. Dinkar Rao had built a bungalow on the bank of the brook Indrayani as a weekend country retreat, and one or two other detached villas also had sprung up. The rural peace and seclusion of the place, its setting amidst the hills of the Ghat range and the rivulet that fringes it, and its bracing temperate climate justify him in calling it his hermitage (*āshram*). Here he has removed his library and devoted himself entirely to historical research with the tireless industry and singleness of aim of a monastic recluse. His books, notes and papers have been so carefully arranged that he can in a minute lay his hand on anything that he requires.

*His Method of Work and Mental Outlook*

The same regularity and methodical habit characterise his studies. As he reads any book, he writes down marginal comments and cross references and marks corrections of names, dates, etc. in it. Then he adds his own index or expands the author's where it is too scanty. Letters, criticisms and press cuttings are filed carefully. All these form a priceless repertory of corrections and references in relation to the original materials of Maratha history. His accumulated corrections (up to 1930) in the voluminous series of Marathi historical letters published by Rajwade, Sane and Parasnis have been printed as a booklet by the enlightened Rajah of Aundh and made available to students all over India, who have been thus spared an immense amount of labour and distraction.

But of even higher influence on his work than such excellent habits has been his mental outlook. He has, all his life, been passionately fond of the open air,—in the metaphorical sense as much as in the literal. He has developed a pan-Indian view-point in discussing all questions of the past and present; he has travelled in many other provinces of India besides visiting all historical sites in his own Presidency; he is as familiar with the trend of thought in North India as in his native Maharashtra.

*His Historical Work and Influence*

He has been always eager to know every source that can throw any light on the subject of his research; he has been ruthless in scrapping up

the obsolete and the erroneous in what he had once written and the first to welcome new truth from whatever corner it might come. Eternal vigilance in self-criticism has been the saving salt of his writings. Tireless striving after accuracy, passion for going down to the root of things, cool balance of judgment and unfailing commonsense in interpretation-have marked his historical works and marked him off from the common herd of popular rhetoricians and platform orators with their sole stock in trade of effervescent verbiage and cheap claptrap.

In God's universe no really good work can be ever lost, no true worker can be permanently kept down by the howls of envy and ignorance. Historical workers throughout India very quickly learnt to appeal to Sardesai for help in their studies in Deccan history, and he has ungrudgingly assisted them with bibliographies, notes, lengthy discussions and correction of their drafts and even boarded them at his *āshram* as the Rishis of old did their *antevāsis*. A still wider circle of research scholars has been signally benefited by the new and correct editions that he has brought out of the Maratha historical documents originally published by Sane and Parasnis, after correcting their dates and readings, rearranging the material in the strict chronological order and adding new letters, notes and indexes of his own.

It has been his dream to create a school of Maratha history around the nucleus of his library, - which contains everything in the Marathi and many in the English languages on the subject with his price-less corrections and notes. But this noble ambition is still a dream.

### *The Peshwas' Daftar : its History*

His life's opportunity came in 1929 when he was entrusted by the Bombay Government with the work of exploring the uncharted sea of "The Peshwas' Daftar" - about 27,000 bundles of Marathi manuscripts, - and editing the cream selected from them. But this great enterprise has involved many years of spade-work before, which will be appreciated only when the full history of it comes to be written.

The official records of the Peshwas, namely, letters received, drafts of replies and orders, account books and diplomatic notes, were carefully preserved in Poona and passed into British possession when their rule was ended in 1818 and Maharashtra was incorporated in the Bombay Presidency. To these were added in the first half of the 19th century vast numbers of bundles of manuscripts letters, village reports, accounts, legal judgments, etc., seized by the Inām Commission wherever they could lay their hands and also the papers collected by the early British Agents and Com-

missioners in the Deccan districts and the records of the confiscated Satara Raja. All these are now lodged in the Alienation Office building in Poona.

Three attempts to explore these records had been previously ordered by the Bombay Government under Messrs Logan and Jackson of the Civil Service and Rao Bahadur D. B. Parasnis. But every time it had been abandoned after a little scratching of the surface, as the workers were appalled by the immensity of the mass of papers to be handled and the expenditure of time and money, (30 years and 8 lakhs of Rupees, according to one estimate) which the completion of the task was believed to involve.

Meantime public impatience had been steadily growing at this very spring-head of Maratha history being kept under seal, with no prospect of that seal being ever removed. D. B. Parasnis and G. S. Sardesai both pressed for their exploration before the Indian Historical Records Commission which had been created by the Government of India in 1919 for giving expert advice on the records in the possession of the central and provincial Governments. Sardesai kept hammering at it and interviewed high officials. At last in 1929 it was decided to have these Marathi manuscript records examined and such of their contents as had any historical importance printed by the Bombay Government. The task was entrusted to Govindrao Sardesai with a staff of ten assistants (actually six) to be trained and directed by him. The provincial Government granted about Rs. 10,000 annually for three years. But in the budget of the fourth year, when completion was within sight, extreme financial stringency compelled Government to stop the grant altogether. On the eve of Christmas 1931 I was informed officially that the task would be abandoned and the staff given notice of dismissal on the 29th February next unless public subscriptions were collected before that date for meeting the entire expenditure of this final year.

Taking Sardesai with me, I visited many places in the South and made urgent appeals for funds; thanks to the enlightened liberality of the Maratha public the necessary sum of Rs. 12,000 was subscribed and the great work was at last actually completed in 45 printed volumes of Marathi records with a handbook compiled by Sardesai. The unprinted material of minor historical importance has also been carefully sorted and rearranged for the convenience of future workers. It is an achievement that recalls to our memory the huge *corpus* of documents on Roman history published under the guidance of Mommsen, and it stands as an

enduring monument to the devoted labour and wide accurate learning of this son of Maharashtra.

*Sardesai's Patience and Successful Achievements*

When a reader is apt to grumble at any short coming in the editing of these 45 volumes, he should remember that Sardesai's work was done at Poona,

*Amidst the din of all things fell and vile,  
Envy's hiss and Folly's bray.*

The editor closed his ears as he patiently toiled on for four years. And time has proved as true a judge as it is a Healer. As volume succeeded volume recognition of Sardesai's achievement came in unstinted measure from those best entitled to criticise, the wide world of scholarship: and the series closed in a blaze of unclouded appreciation. He was created a Rao Bahadur as "historian."

In November 1934 the public of Satara presented to Sardesai, by the hands of the great Shivaji's present-day successor, the historic robe of honor of 3½ pieces and a silver plate the inscription on which, taken from Matthew Arnold, very happily describes Sardesai's method of work and quality as a scholar.

*"One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee,  
One lesson which in every wind is blown,  
One lesson of two duties kept at one,  
Though the loud world proclaim their enmity—  
Of toil unsever'd from tranquillity;  
Of labour, that in lasting fruit outgrows  
Far noisier schemes, accomplish'd in repose,  
Too great for haste, too high for rivalry".*

It was a great work accomplished in silence but not in repose so far as the labourer was concerned.

*Incredible Hindrances to his Editing of the Peshwas' Records*

I have compared the *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar* series to Momsen's colossal corpus of Latin historical inscriptions. But no one who knows the circumstances under which Sardesai had to do his editing can in fairness expect the perfection of the great German historian's work in his. Apart from the constant obstruction which called away the editor from his proper work, in order to see and placate this man and that, or to supply

facts for contradicting the untruths of irresponsible M. L. C.s. The rules laid down by authority for his access to these records were such as would not be credited in respect of an official archivist in any civilised country. The editor had to work in the Alienation Office which does not possess a single work of reference nor has any lending library of the necessary historical works within reach. He had to compare the press copy with the original in that office building and was for the first two years not allowed to take away even the press copy to his own library for annotation until it had been censored by an executive officer.

Again, he was for nearly a year ordered to inspect only the Peshwas' Diaries and not to touch any other section of the records, such as the diplomatic correspondence (*Chitnisi Rumals*) which were sure to yield the richest harvest of historical papers. The cause of this strange decision was that in moving the Budget grant for this exploration work the Minister had spoken of the Diaries only, and this supposed pledge to the Legislature was respected with more than Prussian literalness, though the so-called Diaries are not Diaries at all, but merely daily records of income and expenditure. Thus many precious months were lost at the beginning, while public expectation was boiling up in impatience. The public forced the hands of the Government and the editor; it was imperative to publish the first volume or two without waiting for the completion of a topic or the perfecting of the editorial notes. In the case of historical records in Europe, such as the correspondence of George III, edited in six volumes by Fortescue, the editor freely went through the whole mass arranged them according to topics and years, dated and annotated them in a large library and only then published his first volume. In the case of the Peshwas' records the procedure forced on Sardesai was the reverse of this: as soon as he had picked out despatches on a particular subject (such as the Udgir campaign or the Maratha activities in North India) in sufficient number to form a small volume, he had to print it without waiting to complete the search and include all the extant papers relating to that particular subject. This naturally resulted in some errors in his dating of the letters (for most of them are undated) and in explaining obscure references in them, errors which it is now very easy to correct with the complete series of 45 printed and indexed volumes before us.

*Call for an Improved Edition of Selections from Peshwas' Daftar*

A second inconvenience resulted from this hurry. As the exploration proceeded, supplementary volumes had to be issued which overlapped the earlier volumes on the same subject and the chronological sequence of



the despatches was broken. The student has to hop from one volume to a second or a third and then back again to the first or second to get all the documents on a single battle or conference, and he finds some of the editorial notes in the earliest volumes unsatisfactory in the light of the knowledge now gained from the later volumes. Despatches found and printed in a mutilated form in the earlier volumes have to be completed by their subsequently discovered missing portions which are printed in the later volumes. I have pieced together one complete letter from three volumes ! Hence, as soon as the present edition of the *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar* is sold out, the series should be entirely reconstructed and re-edited; all the letters on a particular subject should be brought together, arranged in strict chronological sequence, and printed in one large volume. The notes also should be revised where necessary.

With the advantage of the whole series of 45 volumes in print (a very different thing from a mass of undated, loose manuscript sheets) and the minute chronology of Indian History 1730-1800 construed by me, it would be the easiest thing in the world to correct and particularize the tentative dates given in many places in these *Selections*. Indeed, such corrections have been made by Sardesai himself as the series advanced and he has added them to the index sheets of the first 25 volumes which were printed when the series was half way to completion.

### *The Recovery of Mahadji Sindhia's Records*

But this was not the end of Sardesai's exertions in the cause of the original sources of Maratha history. The Peshwa's state archives suddenly dry up about the year 1776, for during the long predominance of Nana Fadnis (*circa* 1778-1798) the official papers that reached the Government in Poona were delivered to him and subsequently passed from his city-residence to his village home at Menavali. D. B. Parasnis got hold of them at the beginning of the present century and published a portion in his monthly magazine *Itihās Samgraha*. He also took Rs. 63,150 from the late Maharajah Madhav Rao Sindhia by a written undertaking to print privately for this State fifteen volumes of historical letters and biographies relating to the early rulers of the dynasty; but he lived to print and deliver only four volumes of Marathi letters (numbered II-V) and no biography at all. The original manuscripts of these four volumes and the still greater portion that he left untouched have not been secured either by the Bombay Government to whom Parasnis's heirs sold his library, nor by the Gwalior Durbar whose *pre-paid* contract remains more than two-thirds unfulfilled. The search after the missing first volume of these

privately printed "Mahadji Letters" and the manuscript material for the unprinted volumes is a romantic tale which the reader will find unfolded in my foreword to the Gwalior Durbar's cheap reprint of these five volumes of Mahadji Letters, now rearranged correctly dated and annotated by the same indefatigable G. S. Sardesai (1937). The quest is not yet at an end. Sardesai's perseverance and patience are still as conspicuous and tireless as at the inception of his work upon the Peshwas' Daftar. I have marvelled at it, as I had been again and again tempted to throw the search up in sheer despair.

*Now Editing the English Records on Maratha History*

The completion of the series of Marathi records in 1934 meant for Sardesai not repose but the shouldering of a new task, the editing, jointly with me, of the English records of the old Poona Residency. "The official records of the Maratha Central Government (Peshwas' Daftar) practically come to an abrupt end about the year 1781 with the conclusion of the first war with the English. Just at the point where the Peshwas' Daftar fails us, the English records come to our rescue. In 1782 began the long line of British agents at Sindhia's Court. On the 30th March 1786 a British Resident was established at Poona and later (1788) two others at Nagpur and Hyderabad. The Poona Residency records in the English language contain a rich and varied mass of historical and economic information".

The Bombay Government having undertaken to publish these English records of Poona as a necessary supplement to the Marathi series (completed in 45 volumes) and in many respects complementary to the English records preserved in the Bombay Secretariat (partly printed by Forrest), the work was entrusted to Sardesai and myself as joint general editors on a purely honorary basis. I have taken in hand the papers relating to Sindhia and Northern India generally, while Sardesai is editing the despatches of the Poona Residents and in addition minutely revising the volumes given to our assistants so far as they relate to the Deccan Powers, the final editing and passing for the press being left to me. He has already issued a large volume on Malet's long embassy, and his second volume, on the Residency of Palmer (the immediate successor of Malet) is about to come out of the press. This, with my volume on Daulat Rao Sindhia (now in preparation), will bring us down to the eventful year 1800.

*His Life's Achievements*

The revolution that has taken place in the writing of Maratha history since the beginning of the twentieth century through the discovery and publication of Modi manuscript records and the use of contemporary French Persian and Portuguese sources, will stand as the abiding monument to Sardesai and his collaborators, long after the dust of vulgar controversy has been laid, for they alone have made it possible by their life-long labours at their own expense.

Govind Sakharam Sardesai's life has been lengthened beyond the span assigned to the progeny of Adam by the Psalmist of Israel. Wealth, happiness or even fame has not been his lot. Work for the cause he has at heart alone has kept him up, — a work inspired by the stern call of duty to those who will come hereafter. If human life is truly measured, not by number of years spent on earth, not by the amount of riches piled up and pleasure enjoyed, nor by the din of popular applause that acclaims a man, but by enduring achievements, — then the life of Govind Sakharam Sardesai has not been lived in vain.

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